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THE PONTIFICAL INSTITUTE OF MEDIAEVAL STUDIES
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Between Reason and Faith: Siger of Brabant and Pomponazzi on the Magic Arts*

ARMAND MAURER C.S.B.

HENRI BUSSON'S inquiry into the sources of rationalism in the French literature of the Renaissance led him to conclude that modern rationalism stems principally from Italy and, in particular, from the University of Padua. He concluded further that the rationalism of this school was in continuity with the Averroism of the Middle Ages, having received from the Averroists of the thirteenth century the fundamental principle of rationalism: the opposition of faith and reason.[1] Indeed, he asserted that the rebirth of rationalism in the sixteenth century was above all the rebirth of Averroism. For it was this movement, as transformed at Padua, which determined the precise point of attack of free-thought. From this point of view, European rationalism can be said to date from the thirteenth century.[2] In coming to this conclusion, Busson was essentially in agreement with J. Charbonnel who had pointed out, in his study of Italian free-thought in the sixteenth century, the impact of heterodox Averroist ideas on the European mind through Italian writers of the Renaissance.[3]

Busson singled out Pietro Pomponazzi as the central figure in the rationalist circle of Padua in the sixteenth century. He did not claim him to be the father of Paduan rationalism, but the man who took up its ideas, developed and systematized them, and through his writings and immediate disciples left an indelible stamp upon both Italian and French libertinism.[4] In particular, he made a study of Pomponazzi's treatise on the magic arts, the *De Incantationibus*, and showed the influence of its naturalist approach to problems of the marvellous and miraculous upon such men as Cardan, Campanella, Cesalpini, Vanini, Wier and Montaigne.[5]

The main source of information for mediaeval and renaissance Averroism used by J. Charbonnel and H. Busson was Ernest Renan's *Averroès et l'Averroïsme*, the first edition of which appeared at Paris in 1852. Subsequent historians of mediaeval philosophy have found much to modify and correct in this work, but they have confirmed its main thesis of the existence of a mediaeval Aristotelianism influenced by Averroes and lasting into the Renaissance. We now know much more of the origins of this movement in the thirteenth century, of Siger of Brabant who was its leader at that period, and of the school which formed around him at the University of Paris.[6] So too, precious light has been thrown on the influence of Siger in succeeding centuries and on his connection with the Renaissance.[7]

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* This article represents a section of work done as a Fellow of the John Simon Guggenheim Foundation.

[1] La source principale du rationalisme moderne, c'est l'Italie, et dans l'Italie, l'école de Padoue. Elle avait reçu, en effet, des averroïstes du xiiiᵉ siècle le principe fondamental du rationalisme: l'opposition de la foi et de la raison; elle l'applique comme Averroès aux dogmes de la Création, de la Providence, de l'Immortalité. H. Busson, *Les Sources et le développement du rationalisme dans la littérature française de la Renaissance (1533-1601)* (Paris, 1922), pp. xii-xiii. On Paduan Averroism, cf. E. Troilo, *Averroismo e aristotelismo padovano* (Padua, 1939); same author, *Per l'averroismo padovano o veneto* (Venice, 1940). For the introduction of Averroism into Italy, cf. P. Renucci, *L'Aventure de l'humanisme européen au moyen-âge* (Paris, 1953), pp. 151-158. Anneliese Maier offers evidence that Bologna, not Padua, was the cradle of Italian Averroism. Cf. her articles: "Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des italienischen Averroismus", *Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken*, XXXIII (1944), 136-157; "Die Bologneser Philosophen des 14. Jahrhunderts", *Studi e Memorie per la storia dell' Università di Bologna*, Nuova serie I (1955), 297-310.

[2] On pourrait dire que la renaissance du rationalisme au xviᵉ siècle fut surtout la renaissance de l'averroïsme. C'est lui qui, transformé par le centre d'études de Padoue, fixa les points d'attaque précis de la libre-pensée. En tant que le rationalisme européen en est issu, il date du xiiiᵉ siècle. H. Busson, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

[3] J. R. Charbonnel, *La Pensée italienne au xviᵉ siècle et le courant libertin* (Paris, 1919), pp. 713-714.

[4] Cf. H. Busson, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

[5] Cf. the introduction to his French translation of this work under the title *Les Causes des merveilles de la nature ou les enchantements* (Paris, 1930); same author, "L'Influence du De Incantationibus de P. Pomponazzi sur la pensée française 1560-1650", *Revue de littérature comparée*, IX (1929), 305-347; *La Pensée française de Charron à Pascal* (Paris, 1933), pp. 316-378.

The pages which follow aim at making a small contribution to the latter aspect of Siger's thought. In his commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* he expresses his views on the origin of the marvels attributed to the magic arts, and his handling of the problem reveals striking similarities to that of Pomponazzi in his *De Incantationibus*. There is a similar opposition of the religious and rational approaches to the marvellous and occult, and a similar effort to find a naturalistic explanation of them. They also share a similar philosophical view of the universe and of the causal relationship between the spiritual and material worlds, largely inspired by Aristotle and his commentator Averroes. No evidence is available that Pomponazzi read Siger's *Metaphysics* or that Siger exercised a direct influence upon him. Some of Siger's writings, it is true, were read in Pomponazzi's circle, and a direct influence is not impossible.[8] More likely, however, the similarities in their thought are due to the use of common sources and to the persistence in the sixteenth century of the Averroist tradition which Siger did so much to establish in the thirteenth.

SIGER OF BRABANT

Siger of Brabant takes up the problem of the origin of magical phenomena quite incidentally in his lectures on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. While treating of the notion of power in Book V, he abruptly raises the question of the power responsible for the wonders accomplished through the magic arts.[9] This offers him an opportunity to give his opinion on a subject much debated among the philosophers and theologians of his day, and also to voice his disapproval of St. Thomas Aquinas' treatment of the magic arts in the latter's Disputed Questions *De Potentia Dei*.[10] As we shall see, he was conversant with St. Thomas' views on the subject, and he took exception to them not only on the grounds of their being philosophically dubious, but also because he considered them an infelicitous mingling of rational and religious notions, which he himself always strove to keep separate.

Like all men of his century, Siger of Brabant was convinced that the magic arts could bring about wonderful effects, such as the foretelling of future events, the manifestation of secrets, and the finding of treasures and thefts. The question remains as to the power lying behind these marvels. Siger observes that we judge of any power by its operation, and marvellous operations, such as those of the magic arts, reveal a superior and marvellous power. As to the identity of this power, he thinks two opinions worthy of consideration: the effects of the magic arts are brought about either by separated (i.e. immaterial) Intelligences or by the heavenly bodies.[11]

---

[6] Cf. F. Van Steenberghen, *Siger de Brabant d'après ses oeuvres inédites* II (*Les Philosophes Belges* XIII, Louvain, 1942); *Aristotle in the West* (Louvain, 1955), pp. 198-229; "Siger of Brabant", *The Modern Schoolman*, XXIX (1951), 11-27; "Nouvelles recherches sur Siger de Brabant et son école", *Revue philosophique de Louvain*, LIV (1956), 130-147. (F. Van Steenberghen dates the beginning of Latin Averroism from the fourteenth century). E. Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York, 1954), pp. 387-402. A. Maurer, "The State of Historical Research in Siger of Brabant", *Speculum*, XXXI (1956), 49-56.

[7] Cf. B. Nardi, *Sigieri di Brabante nel pensiero del rinascimento italiano* (Rome, 1945).

[8] Cf. B. Nardi, *op. cit.*

[9] Siger's Question on the magic arts is contained in a very brief redaction in the Paris manuscript of the *Metaphysics*, edited by C. Graiff, *Siger de Brabant, Questions sur la métaphysique* (Louvain, 1948), p. 362, l. (51) — p. 363, l. (93). It is contained in a more ample form in the Cambridge manuscript (Peterhouse 152). J. Duin in part edited the Question in the Cambridge manuscript in *La Doctrine de la providence dans les écrits de Siger de Brabant* (Louvain, 1954), pp. 87-93. For a description of this manuscript, cf. A. Maurer, "Siger of Brabant and an Averroistic Commentary on the *Metaphysics* in Cambridge, Peterhouse *Ms* 152," *Mediaeval Studies*, XII (1950), 233-235; J. Duin, *op. cit.*, pp. 137-139. All references are to the Cambridge manuscript unless otherwise noted. J. Duin has commented on Siger's doctrine on magic, *op. cit.*, pp. 426-428. In several places I have read the manuscript differently from him.

[10] Cf. St. Thomas, *Quaestiones disputatae De Potentia Dei* VI, 10 (Rome, 1942).

In support of the former view Siger cites Hermes Trismegistus (whom he calls an expert in magic),[12] and also the Arabian philosopher Avicenna. Avicenna, he says, considered bodies subject to the separated substances and no less obedient to them than to corporeal agents. These substances can directly cause rainfall and similar natural phenomena. In proof of this, Avicenna pointed out that the human soul can bring about changes in its own body simply through its ideas. For example, a terrified man grows cold and a passionate man hot. From this he argued that a soul liberated for the most part from emotions can bring under subjection not only its own body, but other bodies as well. It can cure others by its will alone, or give them the evil eye even at a distance. And if our soul can do these things, much more so can higher powers produce marvellous and superior effects in matter.[13]

Siger is here referring to a passage in Avicenna's *De Anima* in which the Arabian philosopher describes the power of the human soul over matter. In accord with his Platonic conception of the soul, he does not think that it is immersed in the body, but is rather its guardian. Matter is accordingly under its sway, and through its intellectual power it can produce miraculous effects in the inanimate as well as the animate world.[14] The conclusion that the separated substances in general have this power is not found in the passage Siger refers to, but he probably felt justified in drawing it in view of Avicenna's conception of the relationship between the spiritual and material worlds. As he points out later when criticizing Avicenna, the Arabian philosopher thought that all material forms were produced by the separated substances. The role of efficient causes in this world is simply to dispose matter to receive these forms. The separated substances are in effect creators or "givers of forms". In this view, the material world is directly under the control not only of human souls, but especially of the celestial Intelligences, who can directly bring about effects in it.[15]

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[11] Consequenter, quia virtus attenditur ex operatione, et operationes mirabiles representant virtutem excellentem et mirabilem, cum appareant quaedam operationes factae secundum artes magicas, ut enuntiationes futurorum et manifestationes occultorum, ut inventio thesauri vel furti vel ceterae hujusmodi operationes mirabiles, quaeritur utrum istae operationes sunt a virtute corporum <caelestium> vel a substantia aliqua intellectuali separata, secundum quod quidam crediderunt. Siger of Brabant, *Metaph.* V, 41; Cambridge, Peterhouse *Ms* 152, fol. 86^{v}; ed. J. Duin, *op. cit.*, p. 87, ll. 65-73.

[12] On Hermes and magic, cf. A. Festugière, *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste* I (Paris, 1944), pp. 283-308.

[13] Item, ad idem videtur opinio Avicennae. Vult enim quod materia corporalis obedit conceptioni substantiae separatae non minus quam corporeis agentibus. Unde et dixit a substantia <in>corporali separata immediate casum quandoque pluviae fieri et alia hujusmodi. Probat autem hoc per signum, quia corpus nostrum manifeste transmutatur ad solam conceptionem animae nostrae, ut apparet in timentibus et frigefactis et in concupiscentibus calefactis. Et ex hoc progreditur, dicens quod cujus anima liberata est multum a passionibus sensibilibus, tali animae habet obedire non tantum corpus proprium sed etiam alienum. Et ideo ponit ex sola voluntate earumdem corpora aliorum sanata esse; ex hoc etiam ponunt fascinationis causam. Cum enim anima talis vehementer esset effecta in malevolentiam alicujus, et maxime pueri, eo quod tenerae complexionis, contingit ipsum ex hoc transmutari, etsi distans sit. Quod si intellectus noster talia potest quanto, tanto magis virtutes superiores a materia penitus liberatae (*ms*: libertate) possunt materiam ad effectus mirabiles et excellentiores transmutare. Fols. 86^{vb}-87^{ra}.

[14] Multotiens autem anima operatur in corpore alieno sicut in proprio, quemadmodum est opus oculi fascinantis et aestimationis operantis. Immo, cum anima fuerit constans nobilis similis principiis, obediet ei materia quae est in mundo, et patitur ex ea, et invenitur in materia quicquid formabitur in illa. Quod fit propter hoc quod anima humana, sicut postea ostendemus, non est impressa in materia sua, sed est providens ei. . . . Tunc non est mirum si anima nobilis et fortissima transcendat operationem suam in corpore proprio, ut cum non fuerit demersa in affectum illius corporis vehementer, et praeter hoc fuerit naturae praevalentis constantis in habitu suo, sanet infirmos et debilitet pravos, et contingat privari naturas et permutari sibi elementa, ita ut quod non est ignis fiat ei ignis, et quod non est terra fiat ei terra, et pro voluntate ejus contingant pluviae et fertilitas, sicut contingit absorbitio a terra et mortalitas. Et hoc totum proveniat secundum virtutem intelligibilem. . . . Materia etenim omnino est obediens animae, et multo plus obedit animae quam contrariis agentibus in se. Avicenna, *De Anima* IV, 4, (Venice, 1508), fol. 20D.

The second theory mentioned by Siger differs from Avicenna's in that it ascribes the extraordinary effects of the magic arts not to special immaterial causes, but to the movement of the heavenly bodies: the general material causes which, according to Aristotle, produce all events in this world. Siger attributes this view to the Arabian philosopher Alkindi who, in his *Theory of the Magic Art,* explained the works of magic by the harmony of the celestial spheres.[16] Aristotle, says Siger, is in agreement with this, at least in his intention or philosophical outlook.[17]

To these two opinions Siger adds another which, like the first, ascribes magical phenomena to immaterial Intelligences, but it describes these Intelligences as evil beings or demons, because it looks upon most magic as evil and as having an evil purpose.[18] Three indications are given as proof that the results of magic are due to intelligent beings and not to the heavenly bodies. Magicians use definite prayers to produce definite effects. These words do not have their efficacy from the speaker, but from the intellectual substances to which they are addressed. Hence some superior intelligence is the cause of the wonders produced by magic. The same conclusion follows from the fact that magicians employ sensible figures and symbols, which have no active power to dispose matter to receive impressions from the heavenly bodies. Finally, magicians use sacrifices and offerings which appear to have as their purpose homage to intelligent beings. All these are signs that the magic arts accomplish their wonders not through the heavenly bodies, but through intelligent beings called demons.[19]

Siger does not identify the upholders of this opinion, but it is not difficult to recognize them as Christian theologians such as St. Augustine and, in particular, St. Thomas Aquinas. In his *De Civitate Dei* St. Augustine has much to say about the role of demons in human affairs and magic. He pictures theurgists and sorcerers as entangled in the deceitful rites of demons who masquerade under the name of angels.[20] The origin and success of magic are attributed to demons, who, he claims, are enticed by men to work marvels by the use of symbols, such as stones, plants, animals, incantations and ceremonies.[21]

St. Thomas takes up these notions in his *De Potentia Dei* when treating of miracles and the magic arts. He describes the two rival opinions of the philosophers regarding miracles—the Avicennian and Aristotelian—in much the same terms as Siger, which suggests the possibility that Siger used St. Thomas' treatise in preparing his own.[22] To these opinions of the philosophers St. Thomas opposes the teaching of the Faith: *sententia fidei.* The Faith agrees with Avicenna that spiritual creatures can move bodies in place, but not that they can control matter at will. As Augustine says, matter is not subservient to the bidding of the wicked angels, but rather to the will of God, who alone grants this power. Consequently, Aquinas rejects the Avicennian notion that spiritual creatures can directly impress forms on matter. This, he asserts, is a prerogative of God, who alone has unlimited power over matter.[23]

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[15] Cf. fol. 88^{ra}; J. Duin, *op. cit.*, p. 92, ll. 33-39.

[16] In oppositum est Alkindus (*ms* Alguidus or Algindus) in tractatu suo *De Theoria rationis magicae.* Vult enim expresse quod harmonia caelestis causa est operum factorum per artes illas. Fol. 87^{ra}. For Alkindi's ideas on magic, cf. L. Thorndyke, *A History of Magic and Experimental Science* I (New York, 1929), pp. 643-647, especially p. 644.

[17] Item, hujus opinionis videtur esse Aristoteles, ut apparet intentione ejus 12 hujus et 8 Phys. Ex quibus autem dictis ejus hoc apparet, videbitur in dissolutione quaestionis. Fol. 87^{ra}. Cf. *Metaph.* XII, 8, 1073a13ff; *Phys.* VIII, 8, 9.

[18] Quidam enim volunt quod opera ista causata sunt a virtute substantiae intellectualis separatae et substantiae malae quam daemonem appellant, quia plura operum talium mala sunt et fiunt ad finem malum. *Ibid.;* J. Duin, *op. cit.*, p. 88, ll. 85-88.

[19] Fol. 87^{rab}; J. Duin, *ibid.*, ll. 88-98.

[20] Cf. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* X. 9: CSEL 40, p. 460. For Augustine's teaching on demons, with its Platonic and Scriptural background, cf. R. H. Barrow, *Introduction to St. Augustine, The City of God* (London, 1950), pp. 208-218.

[21] Cf. St. Augustine, *op. cit.*, XXI, 6; CSEL 40. p. 525.

[22] Cf. St. Thomas, *De Potentia Dei* VI, 3.

As for the Aristotelian view, St. Thomas says that the Faith agrees that the separated substances cause the local movement of the heavenly bodies, but it maintains, contrary to Aristotelianism, that these creatures can, with the divine permission, move other bodies as well.[24]

Neither Avicenna nor the Aristotelians, then, can furnish St. Thomas the theologian with an adequate answer to the question of the origin of the miraculous or marvellous. When he turns to discuss the magic arts, he is willing to concede to the Aristotelians that some magical phenomena, for example certain transmutations in matter, can be explained by the heavenly bodies working through powers and energies in our world. But by and large this explanation is inadequate, for there are certain results of magic that are altogether beyond the scope of material forces. For instance, through the magic arts spoken answers are caused to be heard; and it is plain that speech can come only from an intelligence. Hence these words must come from an intelligence, especially since the answers sometimes convey information about hidden matters beyond the reach of man's reason. Nor can it be said that this is done simply by tricking the imagination. In that case these voices would not be heard by all the bystanders. It follows that these answers proceed from an intelligence, and one beyond that of the magician himself. They must come from either good or bad spirits. Not from good spirits, because they would not associate with evil men, as most magicians are; nor would they cooperate in the evil-doing characterizing most magic. The only solution left is that the replies elicited by magicians come from evil spirits or demons. It is in order to carry out more easily their evil designs that demons allow themselves to be enticed by the magicians' art with its ritual of observing the stars, using material signs, and offering sacrifices, prayers and prostrations.[25]

In his *De Operationibus occultis naturae* St. Thomas makes the same point, using another of the proofs for the existence of demons cited above by Siger. Magicians, he says, use figures and images to produce their prodigies. But since these consist simply in artificial configurations and dispositions of matter, they have no active power to cause them, unless they serve as instruments for the demons.[26]

These, in brief, were the opinions on the magic arts current in the thirteenth century when Siger of Brabant took up the subject in his lectures in philosophy at the University of Paris. The Avicennian position held that spiritual substances, like the human soul and celestial intelligences, directly cause magical phenomena. The Aristotelian position maintained that they were due to the forces of nature working through the power of the heavenly bodies. Finally, the Augustinian position, inspired both by Scripture and Platonism, held that demons were at work in the magic arts.

Faced with these conflicting opinions, Siger confesses his lack of competence to settle the matter once and for all. It is difficult, he avows, to determine the power causing magical phenomena unless you are very skilled in the arts of magic. As a good Aristotelian, he knows that it belongs to those with experience to judge principles in the natural order. As for himself, he modestly disclaims any skill in these matters; but he will set out to resolve the problem as best he can by means of reason.[27]

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[23] Cf. St. Thomas, *ibid.; Summa Theol.* I, 110, 2. Cf. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* III, 8; PL 42, 875: Non est putandum istis transgressoribus angelis ad nutum servire hanc visibilium rerum materiam, sed soli Deo. In his *Quaestiones Disputatae De Malo* XVI, 9, St. Thomas denies that demons or other spiritual substances can, by their own power, formally change bodies in the inferior world, except by using material forces proportionate to the effects.

[24] Cf. St. Thomas, *De Potentia Dei* VI, 3.

[25] Cf. St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, VI, 10.

[26] Cf. St. Thomas, *De Operationibus occultis naturae*, 3, 10, 11; *Opuscula Omnia* I (Paris, 1949), pp. 204, 209-210.

Siger begins in his usual manner by distinguishing between what he knows and what he believes. "I know one thing", he says, "but I believe another": *unum scio, aliud autem credo.*[28] We can recognize in this terse formula his customary method of separating his rational, scientific knowledge from his religious beliefs.[29]

As far as Siger's scientific knowledge of the matter is concerned, he draws it as usual from Aristotle. I know, he continues, that it is Aristotle's intention that the works of the magicians are not accomplished by a separated intellectual nature whom we call a demon, but by the power of the heavenly bodies.[30] As Aristotle shows, the metaphysician is not ignorant of the existence of separated substances. He has some knowledge of their nature, for he can prove that they are immaterial, immobile, eternal, actually understanding, and the like. As for their number, he reckons it according to the number of the movements of the heavenly bodies, which he proceeds to establish. He also shows that these celestial Intelligences can bring about new effects in the sublunary world only insofar as they are the final and efficient causes of the movement of the heavenly bodies.[31]

If we consider the direction of Aristotle's thought, then, two conclusions are evident. First, there are no separated substances of the sort we call demons, for they are not included among the efficient and final causes of the celestial movements. Secondly, separated intellectual substances have no direct influence upon the sublunary world, but only through the intermediary of the heavenly bodies.[32]

In proof of this, Siger points to the eighth book of Aristotle's *Physics,* in which it is shown that any new event, whether proceeding from a voluntary or non-voluntary agent, can be attributed to an eternal, immobile cause only through the mediation of the heavenly bodies.[33] This was a point Siger had already dealt with in commenting on the *Metaphysics.* In the third book he showed that if a new effect is produced, something new must have occurred in its cause. For every diversity in an effect happens because of a diversity in its cause: *Omnis diversitas in effectu contingit ex diversitate in causa.* Now, when something comes to be which before was not, a diversity is present, and so there must be some diversity in its cause. But absolutely no diversity is possible in the First Principle and the other eternal, immobile substances. Therefore they can bring no new effect into existence except by means of a cause which is subject to change.[34] Now, the works accomplished through the magic arts are new, since they did not exist before. Hence, according to Aristotle, they cannot immediately proceed from the power of a separated intellectual substance.[35]

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[27] Qui non multum expertus est in talibus operationibus artium magicarum, difficile est eum diiudicare quae est virtus quae est principium talium operationum. Sensibilia enim principia sunt expertorum. Ideo ego, non expertus in talibus, secundum quod ratione ad hoc duci possum, a qua virtute procedant talia opera, intendo ostendere. Fol. 87ra; J. Duin, *op. cit.*, p. 88, ll. 79-84.

[28] *Ibid.*, l. 99.

[29] On Siger's attitude towards faith and reason, cf. E. Gilson, "La doctrine de la double verité," *Etudes de philosophie médiévale* (Strasbourg, 1921), 51-69; same author, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York, 1954), pp. 398-399; F. Van Steenberghen, *Le Mouvement doctrinal du XI^e au XIV^e siècle* (*Histoire de l'église* 13, Paris, 1951), pp. 275-277.

[30] Scio enim quod de intentione Aristotelis est quod opera facta per magos non sunt facta a natura intellectuali separata quam daemonem dicimus, sed a virtute corporum caelestium. Fol. 87^{rb}; *ibid.*, ll. 99-2.

[31] *Ibid.*, l. 2-p. 89, l. 10. Siger here refers to *Metaphysics* XII, 6, 1071b3-1076a40.

[32] Ex quo apparet de intentione Aristotelis esse duo, scilicet quod non sunt tales substantiae separatae quas daemones dicimus, cum non ponantur causae effectivae et finales motuum superiorum; quod etiam ab aliqua substantia intellectuali separata non possunt aliqui effectus novi in his inferioribus immediate causari, sed tantum mediantibus corporibus supracaelestibus. *Ibid.*, p. 89, ll. 10-16.

[33] *Ibid.*, ll. 17-20. Cf. *Physics* VIII, 7, 261a6-7.

[34] Siger of Brabant, *Metaph.* III, 16; ed. J. Duin, *op. cit.*, p. 79, ll. 70-76. Cf. *Metaph.* III, 16; ed. C. Graiff (Louvain, 1948), p. 143, ll. 51-54.

This is the conclusion at which human reason arrives when following the principles of Aristotle. Is it, however, a necessary conclusion of reason? Siger does not think so. The proposition that any new effect must proceed immediately from a cause in which something new occurs (hence not from an eternally unchangeable cause), depends upon the prior proposition that if a cause possesses everything whereby it is the cause of a given effect, the effect necessarily exists. If this latter proposition is true, an eternal, unchangeable cause could produce directly only an eternal and necessary effect, for it eternally and unchangeably is disposed to be its cause. So it could not immediately produce an effect which began in time. But Siger is convinced that the proposition in question is not necessary, but only probable. For it is a universal proposition drawn from individual cases of causality in the world about us, and it is then extended to all instances of causality. Such an inductive law, according to Siger, has only probable value:

> Quando enim accipitur ex istis singularibus aliqua propositio universalis, et ex hoc quod ita est in multis, creditur esse ita in omnibus, accipitur propositio probabilis tantum.[36]

We know nothing of the way the First Cause acts except from our knowledge of causes in this world. We are certain, however, that its action is proportionate to its being, and that the being of the First Agent, as well as its mode of activity, far exceeds that of agents in our world. No wonder, then, that we cannot completely grasp the First Cause's mode of acting, and that we can fall into error in ascribing to it conditions applying to causes in the world about us.[37]

We can prove even by reason that a cause can be possessed of everything whereby it is the cause of a given effect, without that effect existing. For an effect is more dependent on a cause than vice versa. Now, effects remain in existence without their causes, as in the case of projectiles which continue to move even when their original movers are no longer in contact with them but only the adjacent parts of air or water. *A fortiori,* then, a cause can exist, in possession of everything whereby it is a cause, without its effect existing. This would indeed be astonishing, but not impossible. So even though it would be surprising if the First Agent existed eternally, while its effect did not, this would not be impossible.[38]

Siger in this way leaves open the possibility of accepting on faith God's creation of the world in time and the direct intervention in the material world of spiritual beings like demons. It is not absurd to believe this, even though human reason leads us to the opposite conclusion. Indeed, he remarks, there are some tenets of faith whose opposite seems to be more firmly supported by reason than the opposite of this one.[39]

Siger insists, however, that it does not come within the province of rational, scientific knowledge to assert the existence of demons. On that level he follows the direction of Aristotle's philosophy in denying their existence and in explaining the extraordinary effects ascribed to them by the action of the heavenly bodies. Strictly speaking, that is what he *knows*: *unum scio*. Yet his faith leads him to believe something quite different: *aliud autem credo*. He writes that he does not intend to deny the existence of intellectual substances called demons, nor that some new effect can be directly produced by a separated intellectual substance. He believes, however, that many works of the magic arts are not brought about directly by the power of such an intelligence, but by the power of the heavenly bodies.[40]

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[35] Patet igitur de intentione Aristotelis esse quod talia opera facta per magicas artes, cum nova sint, non possunt immediate procedere a virtute alicuius substantiae intellectualis separatae. Fol. 87va; J. Duin, *op. cit.*, p. 89, ll. 29-32.

[36] *Metaph.* III, 16; ed. J. Duin, *op. cit.*, p. 80, ll. 15-18.

[37] *Ibid.*, ll. 18-27. Cf. *Metaph.* III, 19; ed. C. Graiff, *op. cit.*, p. 155, ll. 23-38.

[38] *Op. cit.*, III, 16; ed. J. Duin, p. 80, l. 28-p. 81, l. 45.

[39] *Ibid.*, ll. 46-49.

In explanation of this position, he points out that it is the very nature of science to be concerned with what happens always or in the majority of cases. The incidental does not fall within its compass. Now no universal truths can be laid down as to what prayers, sacrifices or signs are to be used so that a demon will produce a given effect at a given time. This depends on the demon himself, who can act only with God's permission. It follows that the works of demons do not fall within the scope of science.[41]

On the other hand, magic is both an art and a science, and as such it yields scientific knowledge. For instance, it tells us what forces produce magical effects, as well as the time when these effects should be produced. Since it does involve knowledge of this sort, the prodigies it accomplishes are not from the power of a demon or a separated intellectual substance. Rather, they come from the power of the heavenly bodies. A man who knows the positions of the stars, the powers of herbs, times and places, and other factors which dispose matter to receive many effects from the heavenly bodies, can by his art produce many excellent and marvellous works. As a result people marvel, and it is noised abroad that these works were produced by invoking the demons or by the power of some very exalted beings.[42]

The objection might be raised that in bringing about their prodigies magicians actually use prayers, sacrifices, and images, the purpose of which does not seem to be disposing matter but doing homage to intellectual beings. Siger replies that if magicians use prayers, sacrifices and rites, it is because they enjoy being admired by the people. They employ these signs as if they helped to produce magical effects, making it appear that they can call to their aid demons and the power of superior beings. It may even be that some magicians are deceived in thinking that demonology is an art and science and consequently employ these prayers and images. But when they do so, they are not acting according to the art of magic.[43]

It might also be objected that many of the prodigies of the magic arts could not come about through the influence of the spheres or the heavenly bodies; for instance the moving of statues from place to place, their speaking by themselves and giving replies about the future; also the revelation of hidden things, like thefts, treasures and the like. In reply to this, Siger insists that even on the supposition that these things occur through the power of demons and not through the heavenly bodies, they cannot be the work of the art or science of magic, for, as he has shown, there is no universal truth concerning such matters. Nor does it prove anything to say that it is the common opinion that these things occur by the power of demons. With the savant's typical distain for the opinion of the crowd, he says that many falsehoods are current among the people. In matters where the truth is extremely hidden, the common people are not to be believed:

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[40] Aliud autem credo. Non enim intendo negare tales substantias intellectuales, quas daemones dicimus, nec quod a substantia aliqua intellectuali separata possit procedere immediate aliquid novum. Credo tamen quod opera multa facta per artes magicas non sunt facta immediate a virtute talis substantiae intellectualis, sed a virtute corporum caelestium. Fol. 87^{va}; *op. cit.*, p. 89, ll. 33-38.

Consequently, Siger's refusal to deny the existence of demons or the creation of the world in time is owing to his belief. He has made it clear that it is not owing to scientific knowledge.

[41] *Ibid.*, p. 89, l. 39-p. 90, l. 75.

[42] Item. Si per artes magicas aliqui effectus mirabiles producantur, non fiunt a virtute talis substantiae intellectualis quam daemonem dicimus. Sed si per artem magicam aliqua talia fiant ita ut eorum possit haberi ars et scientia quando et ex quibus contingit ea produci, de necessitate fiunt a virtute corporum caelestium. Qui enim sciret determinatos situs stellarum et virtutes herbarum et loca et tempora et alia quibus contingeret disponi materiam ad inductionem multorum effectuum a corporibus caelestibus, artificiose posset multos effectus nobiles et mirabiles producere. Et si qui tales effectus sic producantur, admiratio eorum est in causa eius quod vulgatum est talia opera fieri per invocationes daemonum vel in virtute aliquarum substantiarum valde nobilium. Fol. 87^{vb}; *op. cit.*, p. 91, ll. 86-98.

[43] Ad illa quae arguuntur in oppositum ex signis, dicendum quod si magici utantur talibus orationibus, figuris et sacrificiis, non tamen utuntur eis ad operandum artificiose. Et dico 'ad operandum', quia si talibus utantur, huius causa est quia artifices gaudent cum reputantur mirabiles. Ut igitur tales videantur quod daemones possent invocare et in virtute causarum valde nobilium tales effectus producere, utuntur talibus quandoque conferant ad effectus producendos. Dico autem 'artificiose', quia bene potest esse quod aliqui decepti, credentes quod talium factorum a daemonibus contingat esse artem et scientiam, utuntur talibus in operando, sed isti artificiose non operantur. *Ibid.*, ll. 99-9.

> In his in quibus veritas valde occulta est, non est vulgo credendum . . . Et si dicas quod vulgatum est, hoc non probat. Multa enim falsa vulgata sunt.[44]

After replying in this fashion to the arguments in favour of the thesis that demons account for at least some magical phenomena (the first two of which we recognize as St. Thomas'), Siger turns to the Avicennian explanation of magic. We have already seen that, according to the Arabian philosopher, matter in the sublunary world is subject to the influence of the ideas of separated Intelligences even more than to causes acting from within that world. A separated Intelligence by its will alone can cure the sick, cause rain to fall, and bring about other wonderful effects. Indeed, Avicenna thought that all material forms are placed in matter by the separated Intelligences; agents in the lower world simply dispose matter to receive them.[45]

No doubt Siger was acquainted with Avicenna's teaching on this point from his own works. He also knew Averroes' account of it in his commentary on the *Metaphysics*, and he wholeheartedly agreed with the Averroistic criticism. If Avicenna were correct, forms would be created in matter by the separated Intelligences. Now this is contrary to Aristotle—so runs the criticism of Averroes —for the Stagirite teaches that a form is not *per se* in potency to exist or to be generated, but rather the composite of form and matter. Forms are generated from matter, being drawn from the potentiality of matter by a body which moves it by its active qualities. Hence there is no creator of forms as Avicenna thought; corporeal agents move matter and bring into act forms potentially present in it. As Siger puts it, summing up the doctrine of Averroes: there cannot be another type of agent giving a form and changing matter: *non potest esse aliud agens dans formam et transmutans materiam.*[46]

Consonant with his criticism of Avicenna's notion of causality, Siger rejects the Arabian philosopher's explanation of *fascinatio*, or casting of spells. According to Avicenna, a soul, once it is freed from passion, can directly affect the body of another person even at a distance. Not so for Siger, who seeks an explanation of this phenomenon in harmony with the views of Aristotle and Averroes. Aristotle knew that the conceptions of our soul give rise to movements of the sense appetite, like fear and desire. From them, in turn, there follows a definite change in the body, and this bodily alteration affects other bodies. In this way the soul can cause changes in the body of another person, but it cannot do it directly. It can affect another body only through the intermediary of its own body. Thus an old woman of very hard complexion can be violently aroused to work evil on a child, and through the movement of her heart her body will be violently changed. This bodily change, radiating outward, can affect the medium and finally the child. In confirmation of this, Siger refers to the phenomenon, recounted by Aristotle, of a woman during her menstrual period altering the appearance of a mirror simply by looking at it.[47]

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[44] *Ibid.*, p. 92, ll. 14-15, ll. 27-28.

[45] Ad illud Avicennae dicendum est quod ipse opinatus est quod materia hic inferior obedit conceptioni substantiae separatae magis quam agentibus contrariis, ita ut sola voluntate talis substantiae contingat quandoque infirmos sanari et casum pluviae fieri et alia huiusmodi opera mirabilia. Immo plus dixit quod omnis forma materialis inducitur a substantiis separatis, agentia autem hic solum sunt disponentia materiam, ut recitat Commentator super 7^m huius. Fol. 88^{ra}; *op. cit.*, p. 92, ll. 33-40. Cf. *supra*, note 13; Averroes, *In VII Metaph.*, t. c. 31 (Venice, 1574), 180-181.

[46] Aristoteles et etiam Commentator istud improbant 7° huius. Probat enim quod solum compositum est quod per se generatur. Si enim forma per se generaretur, ipsa per se esset in potentia ad esse. Ipsa enim generaretur ex aliquo quod est pars sui in fine generationis. Quod si haec sunt impossibilia, cum hoc quod materia est ingenita, relinquitur solum compositum esse quod generans per se generat. Ex quo sequitur quod non potest esse aliud agens dans formam et transmutans materiam. *Ibid.*, p. 92, ll. 40-47. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaph.* VII, 9, 1034b8-19; Averroes, *ibid.* and *In XII Metaph.*, t. c. 18, 303-305.

With this, Siger closes his account of the cause of magic. The most striking feature in it is the separation, and even opposition, of his belief and his knowledge. He does not doubt the teaching of his Christian Faith regarding the existence of evil spirits or demons who can interfere in the affairs of our world. Neither does he doubt that God can directly produce effects in matter. But his reason tells him the opposite. As is usually the case for Siger, the voice of reason is Aristotle as interpreted by Averroes. And it tells him that no spiritual, incorruptible being can bring about an effect in the world of corruptible matter except through the movement of the spheres and heavenly bodies. On the level of rational, scientific knowledge, then, we are led to conclude that all events in our world, both ordinary and extraordinary, are caused by the heavenly bodies. If there are exceptions to this law, they are extra-scientific and fall within the domain of faith. Reason by itself would lead us to deny such exceptions; but reason is fallible, especially when confronted with God and the spiritual world. What is more, our knowledge of the way spiritual beings operate is only probable, since it is based on our experience of causality in the sensible world and extended to the immaterial. So we should not be surprised that reason leads us into error in this matter. This is just another instance of a general rule in which Siger summarizes his experience in matters touching upon faith and reason: human reason leads to conclusions which, in the light of faith, must be denied: *Ratio humana ducit in hoc quod debet negari.*[48]

Can we say, then, that Siger adopted a personal position on the subject of magic and demons contrary to Aristotle?[49] Yes, if by this we mean that, as a believing Christian, he held as true, doctrines contrary to those of the Stagirite. But this is only half the story, and not the most significant part from the point of view of the history of ideas. We must add that he did not oppose Aristotle's heterodox teachings as a philosopher and on the level of rational thought. True, he is insistent on pointing out the limitations under which the philosopher works, and he even gives a reason in favour of the doctrine of faith as opposed to Aristotle; but the main direction of reason, in his view, is that taken by Aristotle and his commentator Averroes. The result is an opposition between Christian belief and rational knowledge in sharp contrast to the intimate reconciliation between them in the mind of a Christian theologian like St. Thomas Aquinas.

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[47] Quod autem Avicenna probat per signum, dicendum quod impossibile quantumcumque anima alicuius hominis liberata sit a passionibus, transmutet corpus alienum. Nec per illam viam fit fascinatio, sed per aliam. Sicut enim vult Aristoteles libro *De Causa motus animalium* (8, 701b21-23), ad animae nostrae conceptionem insurgunt appetitus sensitivi, ut timor, concupiscentia, et huiusmodi. Ex quibus sequitur alteratio corporis determinata secundum causam vel factum. Et sic anima potest esse causa alterationis corporis alieni. Sed hoc non est ex anima immediate, sed ex motu cordis tali vel tali. Cum enim contingit aliquam vetulam multum durae complexionis vehementer affici in malitiam alicuius pueri, contingit mediante motu cordis corpus eius vehementer alterari. Et alteratione redeunte ad exteriora, contingit infici medium, et ex hoc ulterius contingit infici puerum. Unde secundum eundem modum oculus menstruatae inficit speculum, ut docet Aristoteles in *De Somno et vigilia* (*De Somniis*, 11, 459b29-32). *Ibid.*, p. 93, ll. 48-63. St. Thomas criticizes Avicenna's doctrine of *fascinatio* in the same way in his *De Malo* XVI, 9, ad 13m.

[48] Siger of Brabant, *Metaph.* III, 19; ed. C. Graiff, p. 155, l. 22.

[49] J. Duin stresses Siger's disavowal of Aristotle, *op. cit.*, pp. 428-429. But if it is true that Siger as a Christian makes a personal choice against the heterodox doctrines of Aristotle, it is equally true that as a philosopher he is on the whole committed to him.

From the point of view of reason Siger considers magic an art and a science. As such, its aim is to bring about dispositions in matter so that extraordinary effects will appear through the power of the heavenly bodies, which govern all growth and decline in our world. A magician accomplishes this through a universal, scientific knowledge, and not through prayers and sacrifices to demons. In all this we see Siger intent on finding a naturalistic explanation of magical phenomena: one separate from, and even contradictory to religious and popular notions, and in harmony with the laws governing all nature.

These are themes we shall meet again, although more boldly and sharply delineated, if we turn the pages of history to the sixteenth century and read Pomponazzi's *De Incantationibus*.

PIETRO POMPONAZZI

Pomponazzi dedicated his *De Naturalium effectuum admirandorum causis, sive De incantationibus* to a doctor of his native city of Mantua, who had written to him requesting his views on the causes of certain seemingly preternatural events.[1] Among other marvels the doctor, probably Ludovico Panizza, told of several boys under his care who were cured by a man using only words and songs. The doctor begged Pomponazzi to give his opinion about the wonderful results of the magic arts and, in particular, to explain how the Aristotelians give a probable account of them.

The doctor further inquired if Pomponazzi agreed with the three religions—Christian, Jewish, and Mohammedan—which explain preternatural events by demons. Still another solution known to the doctor is that of Avicenna, who claimed that an intellect well disposed and elevated above matter has all material things under its control. For example, the human soul can cause rainfall, hail, and the like. Both these solutions, the doctor went on to point out, are clearly contrary to Aristotle. He did not admit the existence of demons, the solution advanced by religion, nor did he think that any agent can act without contact with its effect, which seems to follow from Avicenna's position.

The doctor had once heard Pietro Trapolino, who had been his teacher at Padua as well as Pomponazzi's, give another answer to the problem. He had maintained that the words and signs used in magic are the instruments of the heavenly bodies. It is not impossible, then, that they can produce extraordinary effects through the power of those bodies. The doctor himself was not satisfied with his former teacher's solution, and in his perplexity he wrote to Pomponazzi for his views on the matter, and especially for an account of Aristotle's teaching.

All this Pomponazzi recounts in his dedicatory letter to the doctor of Mantua which serves as a preface to the *De Incantationibus*.[2] The letter sets the problem of the treatise and in the same terms as Siger raised it in the thirteenth century. The same possible explanations of magical phenomena are suggested: the invocation of demons, the human soul or intelligence, the power of the heavenly bodies. The same text of Avicenna's *De Anima* is cited in favour of the second hypothesis. It is recognized that neither the first nor second explanation is in accord with Aristotle's philosophy. The fundamental issue of causality is also raised, and the basic difference between the Avicennian and Aristotelian notions of a cause is brought to the fore. The *status quaestionis* is thus the same for

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[1] The work was written in 1520 and published posthumously at Bâle in 1556. Citations are to the Bâle edition of 1567. For its doctrine, cf. F. Fiorentino, *Pietro Pomponazzi* (Florence, 1868); A. Douglas, *The Philosophy and Psychology of Pietro Pomponazzi* (Cambridge, 1910), pp. 270-303; H. Busson, *Pietro Pomponazzi, Les causes des merveilles de la nature ou les enchantements*, French trans., introduction and notes (Paris, 1930); E. Cassirer, *Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance* (Leipzig, 1927), pp. 108-115; L. Thorndike, *A History of Magic and Experimental Science* V (New York, 1941), pp. 94-110.

[2] Pomponazzi, *De Incantationibus*, pp. 1-5.

Siger and the Italian philosopher, and, as we shall see, their resolution of it is also basically the same.

Like Siger of Brabant, Pomponazzi begins his treatise by proclaiming his Christian Faith. He assures the doctor that he believes whatever the Church teaches about the marvellous events observed in the world and recorded in history. All the three religions—Christian, Jewish, and Mohammedan—agree that there are such beings as demons, and that they can produce preternatural effects in this world. This, Pomponazzi asserts, is the safer answer to the doctor's difficulty, especially that given by the Christian religion. Indeed, he adds, we must maintain the existence of demons not only because the Church says so, but also to explain many experiences.[3]

At the very outset, then, Pomponazzi is careful to state his belief in the Church's teaching regarding the existence of angels and demons who can intervene in extraordinary ways in mundane affairs. Not only does he begin his treatise on this note, but he concludes it in the same way. In the final chapter, which serves as a retraction of the ideas set forth in the main portion of the treatise, he assures the doctor that Christ is the pure truth, and that He does not permit His holy Church to err in essential matters: *Christus, qui est pura veritas . . . et non permittat ecclesiam sanctam errare in essentialibus.* The Aristotelian explanation of the miraculous and marvellous is said to be false: *dogma Aristotelis est falsum, Christi doctrina verissima est.*[4] Nor should we be surprised that Aristotle failed to understand the cause of the marvellous events under discussion, for human reason is in error in the majority of cases. After all, we know that Aristotle and Plato were mortal men and ignorant sinners. Would it not be foolish to put faith in them, especially when they are opposed to the Catholic religion? We may not be able to reply perfectly to their arguments against religion. But one reply suffices: they are in contradiction to the Faith; therefore they are in error.[5]

So much for Pomponazzi the believer. There remains to be considered Pomponazzi the philosopher and Aristotelian. For, if he is careful to state that he is a Christian and that truth is on the side of faith, he also shows a great love for philosophy and especially for Aristotle, even when he contradicts the truth. The philosophers alone, he says, are the gods of this earth: *soli sunt dii terrestres.*[6] Indeed, anyone who does not have a share in philosophy is a beast: *qui de philosophia non participat, bestia est.*[7] As for Aristotle, Pomponazzi avows that he has loved him from his youth.[8] So he will undertake to defend him, while, at the same time, dissociating himself at least verbally from his ideas.

It is puzzling to many, Pomponazzi remarks, that Aristotle denied the existence of demons, although Plato and Socrates admitted their reality. It would seem that he was quite inexcusable for falling into this error. Pomponazzi assures us, however, that Aristotle's attitude towards demons was strictly in accord with his method. He based his philosophy upon the sensible world, as the only starting point from which to rise to the world beyond our senses. Now spiritual beings like demons cannot be proved to exist from sensible data. In fact, they are clearly in contradiction to natural principles. No wonder, then, that Aristotle boldly denied their existence.[9]

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[3] *Op. cit.*, 1, p. 6.

[4] *Op. cit.*, 13, p. 316.

[5] Aristotelem autem et Platonem scimus fuisse homines mortales, ignorantes, et peccatores, veluti ipsi de seipsis dicunt. Quare, fatuum est in omnibus fidem eis adhibere, et praecipue in his in quibus Christianae religioni adversantur. Et quamvis eorum rationes adversus religionem videantur nobis apparentes, et fortassis nescimus perfectam earum solutionem, unica solutio est, quoniam fidei adversatur, ergo quod dicitur ab eis falsum est. *Op. cit.*, 13, pp. 320-321.

[6] *Op. cit.*, 4, p. 53.

[7] *Op. cit.*, 12, p. 251.

[8] *Op. cit.*, 10, p. 110.

[9] . . . cum Aristoteles ex sensibilibus in insensibilia processerit, viderit que ex sensibilibus haec insensata probari non posse, et haec principiis naturalibus aperte adversari, ideo audacter hos daemones negavit. *Ibid.*, p. 111.

At first sight it might seem that Aristotle needed demons to explain the movement of the heavenly bodies. But the celestial Intelligences suffice for that. Natural reason cannot prove that God is assisted by an innumerable host of spiritual beings. They are said to exist in order to explain numerous effects observed in this world, such as oracles, divinations, omens, auguries, and the like. But this explanation is unreasonable, worthless and entirely unnecessary. Those who proffer it speak of the spiritual substances they call demons or angels as though they can hear our prayers, see our actions, and rejoice and sorrow with us. In short, they speak as though they were human like ourselves: an anthropomorphism foreign to philosophy.[10]

How, then, do the Aristotelians explain the extraordinary phenomena usually attributed to angels and demons? Many deny the phenomena outright and say that they are stories like Aesop's Fables, told to instruct the people, or snares laid by the priests to obtain money or honour. Pomponazzi himself does not entirely agree with this explanation, which he brands as both unsafe and shameless. After all, we have the testimony of many eminent men to the fact that such phenomena occur. He does assert, however, that according to Aristotle many of these extraordinary phenomena are deceptions of men and priests, as Albert the Great himself often warns us. Pomponazzi adds that this is known to be true in some cases in his own day.[11]

Pomponazzi admits, however, that there are undoubted marvellous events attested by trustworthy witnesses. But these, he says, the Aristotelians explain by natural causes without any recourse to demons.[12] Nature is replete with hidden powers capable of extraordinary effects. Herbs, stones, minerals, and animal extracts change bodies not only through evident properties, but also through vapours and invisible qualities. Daily experience teaches us of the invisible power of the magnet to attract iron, of rhubarb to purge cholera, and the like.[13] Man too possesses hidden and extraordinary powers, situated as he is between the eternal and changeable worlds and sharing in both.[14]

[10] Ponuntur (*scil.* daemones) autem propter quosdam effectus quos vident in isto mundo inferiori qui numerati sunt, utpote pro oraculis, divinationibus, ominibus, auguriis, et denique pro caeteris hujusmodi generis, veluti et ponentes confitentur. Verum hic modus sive necessitas ponendi videtur esse satis irrationabilis, vana, et nullius prorsus momenti; quoniam ita loquuntur de istis substantiis et immaterialibus, ac si essent homines: quod remotissimum est a philosophia, ut manifestum est. Nam homines sunt mortales, mente et corpore mutabiles, existentes quasi secundum utramque partem in continua transmutatione: quorum nullum de substantiis immaterialibus dicere possumus, veluti ex VIII *Physicorum* et II *De Caelo* demonstratum est. Quomodo enim immaterialia et aeterna de novo possunt intelligere et desiderare? Quomodo a rebus moveri possunt? Quomodo gaudere et tristari? Et sic de reliquis, quae omnia passionem et corruptibilitatem argumentantur. Quomodo etiam possunt nos alloqui, nostras audire voces, nostra videre opera, et reliqua huiusmodi, quae deliramenta esse videntur. *Ibid.*, pp. 111-113.

[11] Mihi autem non videtur tutum neque sine verecundia dictum, quod a plerisque dici solet haec experimenta negantibus, haec scilicet esse ab hominibus conficta, velut Aesopi apologi, ad plebis instructionem, vel quod sunt sacerdotum aucupia ad subripiendas pecunias, et ut in honorem habeantur. . . . Ego inquam hanc sententiam non approbo, quandoquidem viri gravissimi, doctrina eminentissimi, et novi et veteres, tam Graeci quam Latini, ac Barbari moribus, haec verissima esse affirmant. *Ibid.*, pp. 113-114. Quantum vero ad illud, quod statuae sudaverint, lacrimas emiserint, guttas sanguinis emanaverint, versae fuerint secundum situm, et sic de reliquis: secundum ipsos satis patet quid dicendum sit. Facta enim haec omnia sunt procuratione spirituum. Verum secundum Aristotelem puto sic esse dicendum, quamquam haec multotiens sint hominum et sacerdotum deceptiones, veluti Albertus in secundo suorum *Mineralium* saepe commemorat et admonet, et nos vere scimus temporibus nostris haec aliquando contigisse, fidem tamen praestantes gravissimis auctoribus, dicimus iuxta responsiones priores, haec fieri ab ipsis intelligentiis mediantibus corporibus coelestibus. *Ibid.*, p. 146. St. Albert refers to some wonderworkers lying and deceiving, without specifying who they are. Cf. *Liber Mineralium* II, 1, 3; *Opera Omnia* V (Paris, 1890), pp. 27b, 31a.

[12] . . . per causas naturales nos possumus hujusmodi experimenta salvare, neque est aliqua ratio cogens haec per daemones operari. Ergo in vanum daemones ponuntur. Ridiculum enim et omnino fatuum est relinquere manifesta et quae naturali ratione probari possunt, et quaerere immanifesta quae nulla verisimilitudine persuaderi possunt. *Op. cit.*, 1, pp. 19-20.

[13] *Op. cit.*, 3, pp. 21-22.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 25.

Cures worked through relics of the saints can be explained by these hidden powers in nature, and also by the faith and imagination of the one healed. Pomponazzi sees no necessity to maintain that these cures are caused by spiritual beings acting as God's ministers. On this point he is critical of St. Thomas' *De Operationibus occultis naturae*. The Angelic Doctor teaches in this work that the invisible, superior powers of natural things follow upon their specific forms; for instance the power of the magnet to attract iron. Hence they belong to all the members of a species, although they can be weaker or stronger in different individuals owing to the disposition of matter and the position of the heavenly bodies.[15] If an individual in a species causes a superior effect of which the other members are not capable, this is a sign that the effect comes not from an inherent power in the individual, but from the action of some higher agent. Thus tides result from the action of the moon and not from any permanent power in water, since water does not ordinarily behave in this way. So, too, the relics of a saint can effect a cure only through the power of God and not through any power of their own, since not all bones heal the sick.[16]

With all due respect for St. Thomas, Pomponazzi says, this position carries no weight. For it is well known from physicians and philosophers that occult properties follow upon matter and not upon form, and hence they do not belong to a whole species. Applying this principle to relics, Pomponazzi sees no reason why the cures they effect cannot be exlained by inherent natural powers. All relics need not cure equally. Furthermore, he suggests that such cures can be the result of faith and imagination, for it is well known how efficacious these are in causing health and sickness. Lastly, Aquinas' account of tides he finds completely unintelligible. It assumes the action of the moon upon the water, even though there are no apparent intermediaries by which it could contact it. So amazed is Pomponazzi at this thesis that he doubts (probably with his tongue in his cheek) if St. Thomas really wrote the work.[17]

Pomponazzi holds that man's ideas have an influence not only upon his own body and feelings, but also, by their means, upon exterior things.[18] On this point his position is much like Siger's; in support of it he even quotes the same passage from Aristotle's *De Motibus animalium*. Through the power of his imagination and desire, he says, a man can bring about changes in his blood and spirits, and through these he can affect external objects. This is how old women bewitch children, whose bodies resist their influence less than those of older people. If a man's imagination and cogitative powers are strongly fixed on something, he can bring into reality what he imagines. The soul has thus wonderful control over its own body and exterior things.[19] Like Siger of Brabant, however, Pomponazzi does not think Avicenna correct in supposing that the soul can produce these effects simply by its knowledge and command, without using sensible means. He agrees that the soul can do these things only by changing exterior matter and by transmitting vapours affected by the soul's power and malice.[20]

These hidden powers of nature alone, however, would not explain the extraordinary effects they produce. Above them the Aristotelians place the heavenly Intelligences and bodies, which by their circular movements cause all events in the sublunary world.[21] As for God's role in the production of these effects, Pomponazzi says that according to Aristotle He causes all things, both material and immaterial, as their final, efficient and exemplar cause, the latter generally being reduced to a formal cause. He refuses here to discuss the question, widely debated in his day, whether Aristotle thought God to be the true efficient cause of the universe or only is conserving cause, although elsewhere he seems to adopt the former view.[22] All that he wishes to make clear for the moment is that the Stagirite did not think that God produces sublunary effects immediately, but rather through the instrumentality of the heavenly bodies and their Intelligences.

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[15] Cf. St. Thomas, *De Operationibus occultis naturae*, 10, p. 209.

[16] Cf. *op. cit.*, 3, 4, p. 205.

[17] Pomponazzi, *op. cit.*, 12, pp. 231-234. Pomponazzi also criticizes St. Thomas' doctrine of the magic arts, contained in *De Potentia* VI, 10, in his *De Immortalitate animae*, 14 (Bologna, 1954), p. 216.

[18] Pomponazzi, *De Incant.*, 3, pp. 28-36.

[19] *Op. cit.*, 4, pp. 48-51.

[20] Ut enim Avicennae ascribitur, anima sola cognitione et imperio tales producit effectus non sensibiliter neque insensibiliter alterando, sed solum ex obedientia materialium quae sunt nata parere nutui eius animae. Secundum vero nos, anima talia non operatur nisi alterando, et per vapores transmissos ab ea qui sunt affecti tali virtute vel malitia. *Op. cit.*, 4, p. 52.

While rejecting Avicenna's position, Pomponazzi is not certain that it is contrary to the opinion of Aristotle. Cf. *op. cit.*, 2, pp. 20, 21.

The reason for this is easy to see. If God were the immediate cause of a new event, something new would happen to Him. For in order to produce anything new, a new change must take place in its cause. Now God is unchangeable. It follows that He cannot be the immediate cause of any new happening in this world; He is only the general cause of all that happens here below. The fact that a particular event occurs is owing to the determinate position of the heavenly bodies and the particular time in which it happens. All events in this world are thus the direct effects of the heavenly bodies.[23]

As for angels and demons, there is no need, according to Aristotle, to maintain their existence as the causes of the marvels observed in nature and recounted in history. The common people see these wonders and, being ignorant of their true cause which is invisible, believe they are done by God, or angels, or demons, and that the men who work them are familiar with these spirits.[24] But such explanations are not only superfluous; they are contrary to the principles of philosophy. Why then did some philosophers, like Plato, teach the existence of angels and demons? Pomponazzi replies that they did this not because they believed such things really exist, but for pedagogical reasons.[25] Demons and angels are poetic fictions useful for leading the uneducated crowd to do good and avoid evil, as children are stimulated and restrained by hope of reward and fear of punishment. They really have no place in philosophy, although they are suitable for the teaching of religion, which, as Averroes says in his commentary on Aristotle's *Poetics*, is similar to poetry.[26] Aristotle himself, Pomponazzi observes, condemned the use of metaphors and myths in philosophy, unlike Plato who made constant use of them. This is probably the reason why Aristotle was never popular, and why the common people and priests rejected him and praised Plato.[27]

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[21] *Op. cit.*, 10, pp. 120, 122, 123.

[22] Primo itaque supponamus Deum esse causam universalem omnium materialium et immaterialium, et sic vim gerere causarum finalis, efficientis, et exemplaris, quae ad causam formalem reduci solet. . . . Numquid autem, cum secundum Aristotelem mundus sit aeternus, veram habeat causam efficientem, an potius conservantem, alienum est huic nostro proposito. *Op. cit.*, 10, pp. 115-116. In his commentary on Averroes' *De Substantia orbis*, Pomponazzi holds that, according to Aristotle, the world and the Intelligences depend on God as on an efficient cause. Efficient causality in this sense is to be understood as a "simple emanation", not as a transmutation of matter. Cf. *Ms* Bibl. Vat. *Reg. lat.* 1279, fols. 29^v-30^v. This also seems to be Siger's position. Cf. *Metaph.* II, 8; ed. C. Graiff, pp. 46-51; *Physics* II, 20; ed. A. Zimmermann, *Die Quaestionen des Siger von Brabant zur Physik des Aristoteles* (Cologne, 1956), pp. 68-70. The distinction between these two kinds of efficient cause: one which changes matter, the other which gives being simply, is from Avicenna, *Metaph.* VI, 1, fol. 91A. For Avicenna's doctrine and Averroes' criticism of it, cf. E. Gilson, *History of Christian Phil. in the Middle Ages*, pp. 210-211; 643, note 20. For the debate on this point in Pomponazzi's day, cf. A. Maurer, "John of Jandun and the Divine Causality", *Mediaeval Studies*, XVII (1955), 195-197.

Siger and Pomponazzi thus appear to adopt Avicenna's cosmogony, with its eternal production of the Intelligences and matter, while rejecting with Averroes his doctrine of a creation of new forms in matter by the Intelligence or *Dator Formarum*.

[23] Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 133-134; 12, pp. 221-223, 243-244.

[24] Supponitur tertio quod aliquando aliqui habentes cognitionem istorum sic operantium secundum tertium modum (i.e. by means of occult and invisible changes), inducunt aliquos effectus, quos vulgares videntes et nescientes reducere in causam, (quoniam insensibiliter operetur huiusmodi causa) credunt talia fieri aut a Deo, aut ab angelis, aut a daemonibus, et existimant homines ipsos talia operantes habere familiaritatem cum angelis vel cum daemonibus. *De Incant.*, 3, p. 23. Cf. 4, p. 43.

[25] Quare a me alienum non est, nec a veritate remotum, Platonem revera angelos et daemones introduxisse, non quia hoc esse crediderit, sed quoniam suum fuerit propositum homines rudes instruere. *Op. cit.*, 10, p. 202.

[26] Sermo enim legum, ut inquit Averrois in sua poesi, est similis sermoni poetarum.

Since the Faith and Aristotle are incompatible with each other, it is inevitable that conflicts like the present one should arise between the devotees of religion and the philosophers. Indeed, men of religion have always held philosophers in suspicion and have hated and derided them.[28] What is to be done in order to avoid such conflicts? Pomponazzi's advice is reminiscent of Averroes' to the philosophers of Islam: philosophy should be kept from the common people. It should not be taught to them for they are incapable of learning it. Believing only what they see, they are unable to appreciate the hidden powers of nature and they ascribe their marvellous effects to supernatural beings. Pomponazzi also warns philosophers to beware of talking with inexperienced priests, who often wield power in the republic. As Plato says, nothing makes philosophy so ridiculous as to try to persuade rustic and common folk of its divine teachings. They are either unaccustomed to hear them, or else they are too weak of mind to grasp them. The result is that they transfer their own fault to philosophers and to philosophy itself. What is worse, they exile philosophers from their cities, kill them, and utterly exterminate them.[29]

Although Pomponazzi protests that truth is on the side of faith and not of philosophy, these remarks would seem to indicate clearly enough where his heart really lies. Like the Latin Averroists of the Middle Ages, he always verbally aligns himself with the Christian Faith and professes that it alone teaches the truth when contradicted by philosophy. But there is evidence that in fact he espoused the Averroist supremacy of reason over faith and the relegation of religion to the uneducated crowd.[30] Indeed, he explains religion

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Nam quamquam poetae fingunt fabulas quae, ut verba sonant, non sunt possibiles, intus tamen veritatem continent, ut multotiens Plato et Aristoteles referunt. Nam illa fingunt, ut in veritatem veniamus, et rude vulgus instruamus, quod inducere oportet ad bonum, et a malo retrahere, ut pueri inducuntur et retrahuntur, scilicet spe praemii et timore poenae. *Ibid.*, p. 201. On the pedogogical value of myth in Plato, cf. *Republic* II, 17, 376e-378; in Aristotle, cf. *Metaph.* XII, 8, 1074b2-8.

Pomponazzi seems to have this passage of Averroes in mind: Primum (*scil.* peccatum) est quod imitetur (*scil.* poema) id quod est impossibile, quoniam imitatio debet esse de re quae est, vel existimatur esse, ut confingere malos per daemones, vel per id quod est possibile ut in pluribus, vel in paucioribus, vel ad utrumlibet indifferenter. Hoc enim genus rerum magis congruit rhetoricae quam poeticae facultati. Averroes, *Paraphrasis in librum Poeticae Aristotelis* VII (Venice, 1574), 228D.

[27] Ex quibus patere potest causa cur Aristoteles aperte locutus non fuerit. Genus namque philosophandi per aenigmata, metaphoras et fictiones maxime a Platone usitatum damnavit Aristoteles et ex toto a se reiecit. Quare nil mirum si Plato a vulgaribus et sacerdotibus fuerit exaltatus, Aristoteles autem repulsus et depressus. *Ibid.*, p. 205. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaph.* III, 4, 1000a18.

[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 203-204.

[29] Verum haec non sunt communicanda vulgaribus, quoniam horum arcanorum non sunt capaces, et non credunt nisi quod vident, vel quae sunt videre assueti. Cavendum est etiam cum imperitis sacerdotibus de his habere sermonem. Causa autem patens est, quia multotiens philosophi fuerunt ex urbibus expulsi, aut incarcerati, aut lapidibus et ultimo supplicio affecti. *Op. cit.*, 12, p. 243.

Immo, teste Platone Epistola per nos citata ad Dionysium, nihil est quod magis philosophiam ridiculam faciat quam tam divina agrestibus et prophanis viris velle persuadere; neque hoc irrationabiliter contingit. Cum enim tum ex disuetudine audiendi, tum ob ingenii hebetudinem haec minime capere possint, in philosophos et in philosophiam culpam transferunt. Quo fit, ut convitiis et irrisionibus eos prosequantur; immo quod deterius est, ex urbibus expellant, trucident, et prorsus exterminent. *Ibid.*, pp. 219-220. Cf. Plato, *Epistle II*, 314A. For the relation between faith and reason in Averroes, cf. L. Gauthier, *La Théorie d'Ibn Rochd (Averroès) sur les rapports de la religion et de la philosophie* (Paris, 1909).

[30] Cf. W. Betzendörfer, *Die Lehre von der zweifachen Wahrheit bei Petrus Pomponatius* (Tübingen, 1919). M. de Andrea maintains that Pomponazzi, while separating faith and philosophy, always subordinated the latter to the former. Cf. M. de Andrea, "Fede et ragione nel pensiero del Pomponazzi", *Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica*, 38 (1946), 278-297. This is indeed what is to be gathered from his formal statements on the subject; but it does not take into account certain disquieting texts which incline one to think Pomponazzi was in fact a rationalist.

itself by the same natural forces controlling all events in the world. Like every happening in the sublunary world, religions, according to the philosophers, arise and decay under the influence of the heavenly bodies. Their rise and fall may not be perceptible, but that is owing to their long duration, which gives them an appearance of eternity.[31] In fact, the present religions all existed an infinite number of times in the past, and they will reappear an infinity of times in the future.[32] Pomponazzi explicitly applies this to Christianity, whose decline he thinks he can detect in his own day: "In our faith", he writes, "everything is growing cold, miracles are ceasing, except fictitious ones; for the end seems to be near: *propinquus videtur esse finis.*"[33]

When Pomponazzi writes in this manner he reveals a spirit foreign to Siger of Brabant. We find nothing in the latter's works comparable to the Italian Averroist's anti-clerical and anti-religious sentiments. Like him, Siger teaches the eternity of the world and the cyclical return of all events, including opinions and religions, adding, like Pomponazzi, that these cycles escape human memory because of their antiquity.[34] But Siger professes this solely as the opinion of Aristotle and not as the truth, and he gives no hint that he is insincere in this statement. Pomponazzi is writing in a different century than Siger; one in which the rift between reason and faith has widened, and minds inclined to rationalism express themselves more freely and boldly. He is also writing in a different milieu: that of Padua and Bologna, where the declining years of the Middle Ages saw the growth of a lay and anti-clerical spirit.[35] It was there in the fourteenth century that Marsilius of Padua drew up the program of the lay state to which the Church was subordinate,[36] and John of Jandun philosophized as the self-styled "ape" of Averroes with an independent and apparently mocking attitude towards the faith.[37] Pomponazzi simply carries on and intensifies the rationalist movement of these naturalists.

But however different their personal attitude towards religion may be, Siger of Brabant and Pomponazzi reveal many similarities in their philosophical conception of the universe, owing to their common allegiance to Aristotle and frequent borrowings from Averroes.[38]

As Aristotelians, both realize that demons have no place in their philosophical view of the universe. They observe, as does St. Thomas,[39] that Aristotle makes no mention of demons, and this for a good reason, since his philosophy rests upon sensible data and it admits no spiritual substances except those necessary to account for observable movements in the heavens. St. Thomas sums up well

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[31] *Op. cit.*, 12, p. 285.

[32] Unde ritus qui nunc sunt, infinities fuerunt secundum speciem, et infinities erunt, nihilque est quod simile non fuerit, et consimile non erit, nihil erit quod non fuit, nihil fuit quod non erit. *Ibid.*, p. 290.

[33] Quare et nunc in fide nostra omnia frigescunt, miracula desinunt, nisi conficta et simulata, nam propinquus videtur esse finis. *Ibid.*, p. 286.

[34] Ex hoc autem quod semper est movens et sic agens, sequitur quod nulla species entis ad actum procedit, quin prius processerit, ita quod eadem specie quae fuerunt circulariter redeunt, et opiniones, et leges, et religiones et alia ut circulent inferiora ex superiorum circulatione, quamvis circulationis quorumdam propter antiquitatem non maneat memoria. Haec autem dicimus secundum opinionem Philosophi, non ea asserendo tamquam vera. *L'Opuscule de Siger de Brabant "De aeternitate mundi"*, ed. W. J. Dwyer (Louvain, 1937), p. 42. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaph.* XII, 6, 1071b3-1072a18, 1074b12.

[35] Cf. G. de Lagarde, *La Naissance de l'esprit laïque au déclin du moyen âge* II (Paris, 1934), pp. 95-104.

[36] Cf. A. Gewirth, *Marsilius of Padua, The Defender of Peace* I: *Marsilius of Padua and Medieval Political Philosophy* (New York, 1951).

[37] Cf. E. Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York, 1954), pp. 522-524.

[38] On the subject of the intellectual soul Pomponazzi was a critic of Averroes. Cf. his *De Immortalitate animae*, 4 (Bologna, 1954), pp. 48-69.

[39] Aristoteles non posuit aliquas animas medias inter coelorum animas et animas hominum, sicut posuit Plato; unde de daemonibus nullam invenitur nec ipse nec ejus sequaces fecisse mentionem. St. Thomas, *De Substantiis separatis*, 3, 18; *Opuscula Omnia* I (Paris, 1949), pp. 135-136. In fact, there are a few incidental references to demons in the Aristotelian treatises. Cf. H. Bonitz, *Index Aristotelicus* (Graz, 1955), p. 164.

Aristotle's empiricism apropos of this question: *non multum recedit ab his quae sunt manifesta secundum sensum.*[40] Aristotle needs the separated substances to explain the movement of the heavenly bodies, but he sees no necessity for another grade of spirits between them and the inferior world.

Siger and Pomponazzi also realize that the Aristotelian notion of causality precludes the role of demons in human affairs. According to that notion, the introduction of any new determination or form into matter requires a change on the part of the cause, and Aristotle considers the separated substances eternal and unchangeable. So the production of new effects can be due only to causes which are themselves subject to change, that is, to material things. Ultimately, all events—even the extraordinary ones resulting from magic—must be traced back to the movements of the heavenly bodies.

Under these circumstances it is understandable that our two philosophers should reject the Avicennian conception of a "giver of forms": a spiritual being who can directly introduce new forms into matter. Averroes is bound to appear to them as the authentic interpreter of Aristotle when he maintains, against Avicenna, that new determinations can arise in matter only through the agency of material forces. The spiritual world cannot have a direct efficacy on events in the universe; it can at best exercise a remote and mediate influence upon them.

It is hardly surprising to find both Siger and Pomponazzi also critical of St. Thomas' treatment of the marvellous and miraculous. His very manner of approaching the subject is different from theirs and little congenial to them. His method is that of the theologian who seeks to understand better what he believes. He is assured by faith of the existence of spiritual beings like angels and demons, and of their ability, with the divine permission, of acting upon our world. He is also convinced by faith of the immediate influence of God upon every event in the universe. As for the Aristotelian philosophy, he is well aware of its deficiencies, especially on these points. On the subject of demons, for instance, he shows an independent and critical attitude towards Aristotle and prefers the position of Plato which, he says, is the more adequate one.[41] St. Thomas never considers the philosophy of Aristotle the voice of reason itself, nor does he adopt it as his guide in his work as a theologian. While remaining deeply indebted to Aristotle, as well as to other philosophers, the philosophical speculation he brings to bear upon his faith is fundamentally original.[42]

In contrast to St. Thomas, Siger and Pomponazzi are not theologians, but philosophers attempting to resolve the problem before them within the limits of nature (*infra limites naturales*),[43] with Aristotle as their guide. They both accept—at least verbally—the truth of the Christian Faith, but faith is kept entirely within its own sphere, which is separated from that of reason. Without vital contact with each other, reason and faith thus go their own way and generally in opposite directions. This divorce between faith and reason, destructive of the theology so dear to the Middle Ages, was the legacy of Averroes to his mediaeval followers and their most significant contribution to the Renaissance.

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[40] St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, 2, 11, p. 130.

[41] Haec autem Aristotelis positio certior quidem videtur esse eo quod non multum recedit ab his quae sunt manifesta secundum sensum; tamen minus sufficiens videtur quam Platonis positio. St. Thomas, *ibid.*

[42] Cf. E. Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, pp. 361-383; *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas* (New York, 1956).

[43] Cf. Pomponazzi, *De Immortalitate animae*, 14; p. 212.

Epistola solitarii ad reges: Alphonse of Pecha as Organizer of Birgittine and Urbanist Propaganda

ERIC COLLEDGE

IN a recent article,[1] G. Mollat has reviewed some fresh judgments upon the character and conduct of Peter Roger de Beaufort, and he begins, very justly, by using as a touchstone the views of present-day historians upon Sts. Catherine of Siena and Bridget of Sweden, and upon the share which they may have had in inducing the pope to return from Avignon to Rome. Mollat examines the opinions of E. Dupré-Theseider[2] and of B. Guillemain,[3] and he finds them both wrong. Dupré-Theseider was willing to concede that Gregory XI had been influenced by St. Catherine in making his decision to leave France, but he went on to suggest that Gregory's susceptibility to such influence was attributable to "congenital weakness of character."[4] Guillemain, on the other hand, denies that St. Catherine played any part in this matter. Very cursorily he includes St. Bridget in this judgment, and his real thesis seems to be that we may safely neglect hagiography and stick to the hard facts of political science in interpreting the events of 1376.

But if Guillemain had known the case of St. Bridget of Sweden, he would hardly have written in this vein. He shows that Gregory had decided to leave Avignon at the beginning of his pontificate, but we have first-hand evidence to show that St. Bridget had urged his predecessors, Clement VI and Urban V, to return to Rome, and that Cardinal Beaufort, as he then was, participated in her last interview with Urban at Montefiascone in 1370. Guillemain contends that St. Catherine did not come to Avignon until June, 1376, where she seems only to have been received once, when, according later to Dominici, it was Gregory who informed her that he had decided to leave, and Guillemain shows that two months before her arrival the pope had told the Venetians that he would require sea-transport from France not later than the first day of September. Yet we know that St. Bridget's most trusted messenger, Alphonse of Pecha, had been in Avignon in the summer of 1373, renewing Bridget's pleas for the restoration of the Holy See to Rome. St. Catherine's letters of January, 1376, Guillemain maintains, were almost certainly never seen by the pope, but we know that he did see some of St. Bridget's "revelations", for in 1370 Alphonse saw her put them into his hand for him to convey to Urban V, and he says that when Cardinal Beaufort had read them he did not dare to show them to the pope. St. Catherine's real mission, Guillemain claims, was to make peace between Gregory and Florence, and to urge a crusade to set free the Holy Places, but we, without assenting to this imputation to St. Catherine of narrow and merely local interests, may observe that St. Bridget strove for peace throughout Christendom, and that she warned Gregory that God would not bless a crusade.[5]

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[1] "Grégoire XI et sa légende", *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique,* XLIX (1954), 873-7.

[2] *I Papi di Avignone* (Florence, 1939).

[3] "Punti di vista sul papato Avignonese", *Archivio storico italiano,* CXI (1953), 151-206.

[4] The rest of Mollat's article is concerned to show by a detailed examination of Gregory's conduct of his war against the Viscontis that this imputation of "congenital weakness" is not likely to be justified.

[5] St. Bridget's opposition to a crusade has been overlooked by the pro-Greek historians of such events (see *infra,* note 65), nor have they paused to consider the fact that when she visited Cyprus, it was not only the Greeks whom she reprehended for their misdeeds, but also the Lusignans and the Catholics generally.

There is no reason for the general neglect of St. Bridget by modern scholars. Manuscripts of her *Revelations* exist in plenty among the great libraries of Europe, as do the two printed texts, the one published at Lübeck in 1492, the other edited by Gonzales Durante, bishop of Montefeltro.[6] We now also have the sumptuous edition of the documents in the process of St. Bridget's canonization which was published by Isak Collijn.[7] If we read these essential texts, if we observe the complex train of events which led to the succession of declarations of her sanctity, and, above all, if we study the activities of Alphonse of Pecha, who in her lifetime was her spiritual director and ambassador, who was named by her when she was dying as her literary executor, and who until his own death laboured to produce an authorized text of her *Revelations*, to secure her canonization and to promote, as she had done, the interests of Rome as the supreme pontiff's only see, we shall find that Bridget had been recognized together with Catherine by the men of their own age as a factor far from negligible in the affairs of Christendom. Only a sentimentalist would today depict these holy women as gaining unaided a purely miraculous victory over the powers of darkness: Catherine and Bridget were both acquainted, from long and bitter experience, with the realities of politics, and they both knew the harm done to God's cause when evil men, to serve their ends, seemed to fight for it. None the less, it is completely contrary to the facts to suggest that Bridget was only believed in by a handful of superstitious weaklings. The evidence shows that she was widely held in great reverence as a true prophetess of God, and, more important, that those who opposed her teaching did so not with any show of scepticism or cynical indifference to such prophetic gifts, but because they believed, or claimed to believe, that she was possessed of the devil. Of all the documents in her case, few are more significant, as a corrective of the erroneous views which Mollat deplores, than the *Epistola solitarii ad reges*, the tract in which Alphonse of Pecha sets out to prove that his dead mistress was truly inspired by the Holy Spirit. This present article seeks to show Alphonse in the inseparable roles which were ordained for him by his devotion to Bridget, as editor of her writings, as propagator of her cause, and as agent, after the outbreak of the Schism, of the Roman Pope.[8]

When Bridget died in Rome on July 23, 1373,[9] it was evident that her disciples would almost at once take steps to promote the cause of her canonization. *Hostiensis*, Henry of Segusio (ob. 1271), the chapter in whose *Summa*, "*De Reliquiis et veneratione sanctorum*," was still a century later one of the prime authorities on procedure, had laid down that in the cause of a confessor of the faith, it must at the outset of the enquiry be established that in life the candidate had been distinguished by many labours undertaken in the name of Christ, by charity, by saintly repute, by simplicity and humility, by patience under afflictions and that, before and since the candidate's death, there had been miracles which can be shown to be neither fraudulent nor mere operations of natural laws, which manifest the candidate's peculiar merits, and which have worked for the strengthening of the faith.[10] Those who had been about her in her lifetime believed that they could prove that in Bridget's case all these conditions were fulfilled to an overwhelming degree. But there were further considerations; probably no other cause in the long history of the processes of canonization passed through and occasioned so many troubles, until it comes to be quoted, with something like awe, by Lambertini as a classic instance of one misadventure succeeding another.[11]

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[6] The present writer has used the second edition of Durante's text, published at Antwerp in 1611.

[7] *Acta et processus canonizacionis beate Birgitte* (Samlingar utgivna av Svenska Fornskriftsällskapet, II^1, Uppsala, 1924-31).

[8] A short but well-informed study of Alphonse is by Michael Seidlmayer: "Ein Gehilfe der hl. Birgitta von Schweden: Alfons von Jaen", *Historisches Jahrbuch*, L (1930); this, however, takes no account of the importance of the *Epistola solitarii*. Alphonse is also constantly mentioned in Seidlmayer's later work, *Die Anfänge des grossen abendländischen Schismas* (Spanische Forschungen der Görresgesellschaft II 5, Münster, 1940), and also in Walter Ullman, *The Origins of the Great Schism* (London, 1948). In the valuable article, "Brigitte de Suède", by F. Vernet in the *Dictionnaire de spiritualité*, much bibliographical information is found, and a just and precise account of the work of scholars who have studied the circumstances of the composition of the *Revelations*. The pioneer works of K. B. Westman and A. S. Kraft, cited below, are still indispensable. The present article attempts to assess also the importance, for such studies, of Alphonse's tracts, including *Ad pontifices* and the *Viridarium beate Birgitte*, and of Adam Easton's *Defensorium*. The fullest and best-documented account of the controversies concerning St. Bridget's canonization is still T. Höjer's *Studier i Vadstena Klosters och Birgittinordens Historia* (Uppsala, 1905), and especially chapters iv and vi. The present writer has been greatly helped by the advice of Fr. Paul Grosjean, S.J., and his fellow Bollandists, of Sister M. Dominic, O.SS.S., who kindly allowed him to consult an unpublished life of St. Bridget by the late Margaret Howitt, and of Mr. F. R. Johnston.

[9] *Acta et processus*, p. 21.

Henry of Langenstein had been one of the first to sound a note of warning: in his "Proposals for Peace," which he wrote in 1381, he asked: *Si conveniat Urbanum V, Brigidam de Suecia, Ducem Britanniae Carolum, non obstante nimia sanctorum multitudine, canonizari?*[12] Although many other orthodox Christians were complaining that the calendar was overcrowded, Langenstein had a special reason for objecting in these three cases, and by those familiar with them his complaint must have been recognized as a particularly telling gibe at the Roman Pope.

Bridget had done everything in her power to force Urban V and then Gregory XI to take up residence again in Rome. One of her chief claims to sanctity was the vast body of "Revelations" of which many were concerned with this prerequisite for the reformation of Christendom, and in which she claimed divine authority for her command that the popes should not live in Avignon. Thus it followed that those who supported her claims to sanctity also supported Urban VI after his rival had been elected as Clement VII at Fondi in the autumn of 1378 and had withdrawn to France, and when in 1391 she was canonized for the first time by Urban's successor, Boniface IX, it was not only the Clementine faction who regarded this as a precipitate act, the times being so troubled and she so controversial a figure.[13]

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[10] *Summa aurea D. Henrici Cardinalis Hostiensis* (Lyons, 1547), fol. 188^{v}.

[11] *De Servorum Dei beatificatione et beatorum canonizatione* I (Bologna, 1734), p. 74.

[12] *Consilium pacis de unione ecclesiae*, ed. von der Hardt, *Magnum Oecumenicum Constantiense Concilium* II (Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1697-1700), p. 56. Höjer, p. 115, implies that he would emend the Latin to make it refer to an already accomplished canonization of Bridget and Charles of Britanny by Urban VI, but such an emendation is neither necessary nor warrantable. It is true that recently there has been a suggestion made that Charles was canonized in 1376 (see *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique*, XLVI [1951], 182-6, and XLVII, 192-4), but the evidence in support of this theory, it must be said, is hardly convincing. Höjer was well aware that Bridget's canonization had not been achieved in 1381, but he does not seem to have appreciated the allusion by Langenstein to the by then flourishing cult of Urban V. Urban died on December 30, 1370 (Eubel, *Hierarchia catholica medii aevi* I [2nd edition, Münster, 1913], p. 20). In the *Secunda vita* devoted to him, the author of which was Werner, canon of Bonn and secretary at Avignon during his pontificate (G. Mollat: *Etude critique sur les "Vitae Paparum Avenionensium"* [Paris 1917], pp. 48-58), we are told that between the pope's death and his translation to the tomb at Marseilles which he had during his lifetime prepared, on May 31, 1371, at his grave in Avignon "Deus multa miracula operatur pro illis qui ipsum devote invocant" *(Vitae Paparum Avenionensium* I, ed. G. Mollat, [Paris 1914], p. 393). In the *Sexta Vita* by Aimeric of Peyrac, who wrote in 1399 (Mollat, *Etude critique*, pp. 110-1), it is stated that after Urban's reburial miracles continued to be worked "per universum orbem" *(Vitae Pap. Aven.* I, p. 406), For further details and the subsequent history of Urban's cult, see J. H. Albanes: *Actes et documents concernant le B. Urbain V* (Paris, 1897).

[13] The cause of Charles of Blois is the perfect antithesis to that of Bridget. He had been the adversary and for many years the prisoner of Edward III, and he was succeeded as duke by John IV, Edward's candidate and the enemy of the French. John saw in popular Breton devotions to Charles and in the initiation of the process for his canonization threats to his regime. But the French king was one of those who sent petitions to accompany the transcript of the evidence taken in Britanny in 1371, asking that Charles be declared a saint (F. Plaine, *Histoire du B. Charles de Blois*, in *Manuscrits du procès*

Bridget's cause might in the end have enjoyed a smoother passage through the courts if it had then been postponed. But it was politically advantageous to the Urbanists that it should be hastened, and, furthermore, her merits were being urged by a small band of enthusiasts who, because of their residence in Rome and their prominent services to Urban, were well placed to attain their end. Of this company three members are outstanding: Bridget's own daughter, Katherine, herself to be canonized in the next century, the English cardinal Adam Easton, and the Spaniard Alphonse of Pecha, former bishop of Jaen. The case of St. Katherine of Sweden is already well documented,[14] and we can shortly expect a study of Adam Easton,[15] so that they will only incidentally be mentioned here.

To understand the part which Alphonse played in St. Bridget's spiritual family, in her lifetime and after her death, we must briefly recall what is known of her literary and political activities. She was the daughter and wife of great landowners in Sweden, and she appears to have been given the education which a girl born into a wealthy and pious family of the late Middle Ages might expect. That education, naturally, did not include Latin instruction, but early in her spiritual life she found it necessary to record the visions which she claimed to have received, and to have them translated into Latin for those who knew no Swedish. The first of these occasions was in 1347 or 1348, when, apparently with the approbation of the Swedish king and hierarchy, she sent Bishop Hemming of Åbo and Peter, prior of the Cistercian house of Alvastra, as her messengers to Avignon, to make known to Clement VI revelations which she had received concerning him. The tenor of these is sufficiently indicated by this one quotation: *Sed tu qui deberes soluere animas et ad me praesentare, tu vere es animarum interfector. Ego enim institui Petrum pastorem et seruatorem ouium mearum. Tu autem es disperor et lacerator earum. Tu autem peior es Lucifero . . .*[16] Most probably the Latin here is the work of Master Matthias, a doctor of divinity and canon of Linköping, one of the most eminent Swedish theologians of the Middle Ages, the author of a commentary upon the entire Bible, as well as one upon the Apocalypse from which St. Bernardino of Siena was largely to draw.[17] Matthias was Bridget's confessor at this time, and he is the author of the prologue, beginning *Stupor et mirabilia audita sunt in terra nostra . . .*, which, as the *Revelations* finally were edited by Alphonse and Prior Peter, appears as a general prologue, but which is in fact the letter of credence which Peter and Bishop Hemming took with them to Avignon.

What answer they brought back to Sweden with them we do not know, except that they failed to gain approbation for Bridget's projected *Rule*, but it is clear that the documents were preserved. In 1349 Bridget set out for Rome, to be

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de canonization du B. Charles de Blois (Saint-Brieuc, 1921). When in 1376 Gregory XI at last left Avignon, no action had yet been taken and in the events of the following year a complete impasse was reached. Clement may well have wished to canonize Charles, but the documents seem to have accompanied the curia to Rome, and the state of renewed warfare between England and France would make it impossible for Clement's emissaries to go to Britanny and repeat the original process. Urban, on the other hand, would hardly have canonized Charles, even if he had wished to, for fear of antagonizing one of his chief adherents, the English king. But although the processes of law then failed, the devotion of the Breton people remained steadfast and in 1904 Charles was at last beatified.

[14] Notably in the edition by Isak Collijn of the documents of the process of her canonization: *Processus seu negocium canonizacionis beate Katerine de Vadstenis* (Samlingar utgivna av Svenska Fornskriftsällskapet, II 3, Uppsala, 1942-6).

[15] L. Macfarlane has already published some of his material concerning Easton. See *infra*, note 100.

[16] *Revelationes* I, 41.

[17] The most recent study of Matthias is by Bengt Strömberg, *Magister Mathias och Fransk Mendikantprediken* (Samlingar och Studier till Svenska Kyrkans Historia, IX, Stockholm, 1944), in chapter v of which he uses the discoveries, by Collijn and others, of portions of a dismembered manuscript which they consider to have been the until then lost commentary *super totam Bibliam.* See also Toni Schmid, *Birgitta och hennes Uppenbarelser* (Lund, 1940), pp. 225-6.

present at the next year's jubilee. She was accompanied by Master Peter Olafsson, then a secular priest and warden of the Hospital of the Holy Ghost at Skeninge, and followed shortly by the other Peter. She was never to return to Sweden, and they were to remain with her for the rest of her life, serving as her confessors and amanuenses. It is probable that one of them brought to Rome such revelations as had already been recorded. Books I and II of the final form of the *Revelations* concern visions received before this time, in Sweden, as also Book V, the "Book of Questions", which is entirely occupied with an account of one single vision which she received about the year 1347, whilst she was riding from Alvastra to Vadstena. There are single revelations scattered through the other books which are also of this early period.

The volume of material increased after the family took up residence in Rome and, although Bridget continued to write her visions down in Swedish as they were received, and to hand them over to the two Peters for translation into Latin, there is evidence to show that she was not entirely satisfied with the results. She began to learn Latin herself, if indeed she had not already started in Sweden.[18] After Alphonse joined her family, he seems to have been given as one of his tasks the supervision of the translating, after drafts had been made by the two Swedish priests.

The *Revelations* contain several references to Bridget's Latin studies. In one the Virgin appears to ask her why she weeps and, when she says that it is because she is obliged to remain at home with her grammar-books, instead of visiting the station churches, she tells Bridget that her studies are as acceptable as her devotions would be;[19] and Revelation IV, 74 begins: *Filius Dei loquebatur sponsae* (that is, to Bridget) *dicens: Tu composuisti hodie, quod melius esset praevenire quam praeveniri* . . . This revelation is repeated as VIII, 34, and it there reads: *Tu in grammatica tua composuisti hodie* . . . Evidently she had at this time reached the stage of simple exercises in the active and passive voices.

But we cannot even be sure how proficient she finally became in Latin, because here also the evidence of different witnesses heard during the process does not agree. One of the preliminary documents which was submitted to the commissioners was the *Vita* by her Swedish confessors, in which they stated: *Tantum autem profecit dicta domina in brevi in sciencia grammaticali, quod sciuit pro*

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[18] Here, as so often in the documents concerning St. Bridget's case, apparently reliable and first-hand witnesses contradict each other. No. 38 of the articles produced by the procurator of the cause on July 11, 1379, and used as a basis for the interrogation of witnesses, states *inter alia* that until her fortieth year or thereabouts she was unskilled in Latin (*Acta et processus*, p. 24). As she was born in 1303 or 1304, this would put the beginnings of her Latin studies *ca.* 1344, some five years before she left Sweden for Rome. This is confirmed by one of her Swedish companions, who says that she was altogether without knowledge of Latin until the age of forty, and that he can testify to the good progress which she later made (*ibid.*, p. 276). So far, this would seem not to contradict what is written in the supplication addressed by the bishop and chapter of Linköping on March 16, 1414, for the canonization of the bishop's predecessor, Nicholas Hermann (see *Bibliotheca Hagiographica Latina* I, [Brussels 1898-9] no. 4275), where Nicholas, who had as a young priest been a member of Bridget's household in Sweden, is described as . . . *beate Byrgitte predicte in grammatica instructorem* . . . (Jarl Gallén: "Les Causes de Sainte Ingrid et des saints suédois", *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum*, VII [1937], 28). The source of this statement seems to be Nicholas' *Vita* (*Bib. Hag. Latina* II, 1900-1, no. 6101), where we read: Cum autem pedagogus beate Birgitte factus esset, eandemque in grammaticalibus, vt ipsemet in quadam notula fatetur, instrueret . . . (*Ms* British Museum, *Harley* 612, fol. 294ʳ). But a later witness in St. Bridget's process, the Italian Lorenzo Angeleri, prior of St. John Lateran, testified that in the jubilee year and later she could speak only Swedish, and that she at first used to speak with him through an interpreter, whereas later she was able to converse with him and others in Latin (*Acta et processus*, p. 420). One of her Swedish confessors stated that she was first divinely commanded to discontinue her lengthy readings of prayers in Swedish, and that once she had done this she was helped by the prayers of St. Agnes and the teaching of his fellow-confessor to learn Latin (*ibid.*, p. 545). All in all, it would seem that if she did begin to study Latin in Sweden under Nicholas Hermann, her first attempts did not prosper, and that it was not until she entered the cosmopolitan and Latin-speaking society of Rome that she made real progress.

[19] *Revelationes* VI, 105.

parte legere, intelligere et proferre sermonem latinum.[20] It is not inapposite to observe here the variant, reported by Collijn, in *Ms* British Museum, *Harley* 612:[21] *quod sciuit experte intelligere et proferre . . .* It is difficult here to say whether one should prefer *pro parte* to *experte*, for one of the authors of this *Vita*, Prior Peter, at the end of the evidence which he gives under article 38, is reported as saying: *Tantum autem profecit in breui tempore . . . quod sciuit competenter intelligere et proferre sermonem in lingua litterali.*"[22] This suggests that it is the reading of the other manuscripts, *pro parte legere, intelligere . . .* which is corrupt, and that here in *Ms Harley* 612 we have what the two Peters originally wrote. Other witnesses speak as approvingly as they of Bridget's Latin, the Swedish bishop-elect of Västerås and the Italian Cardinal Elziarius de Sabrano among them,[23] and Alphonse of Pecha testifies that when she spoke with him, her confessors and many others, it was *litteraliter satis competenter.*"[24] Yet the evidence of one further witness, the Italian Nicholas Orsini, count of Nola, is difficult to reconcile with this. Testifying under article 29, concerning Bridget's prophetic gifts, he says that it was he who introduced her into the presence of Urban V at Montefiascone, and that he served *quasi interpres* during their conversation, which he reports fully, *quia nesciebat bene grammaticam nec intellexit bene linguam dicti domini pape.*[25] The implications of Orsini's evidence seem to be unambiguous; but when he comes to testify to article 38 itself, *dixit se super hoc nescire deponere veritatem, sed quando ipsa domina Brigida loquebatur cum isto teste, semper loquebatur litteraliter, tamen aut congrue aut non nescit, ex eo quia ipse non est perfectus grammaticus.*[26] We must furthermore take account of Orsini's earlier evidence concerning the submission at Montefiascone of Bridget's *Regula S. Salvatoris* for papal approval. Speaking of himself, he says: . . . *qui dictas constituciones vidit et cum pluribus aliis personis bonis et religiosis viris super illis contulit, et quia plurimum discrepabant a stilo moderno curie Romane, non mutando effectualia predictarum constitucionum ipsas per alium stilum composuit ipse testis . . .*[27] Without enquiring too closely how a man who admits that he is not *perfectus grammaticus* is capable of revising a Latin document (perhaps we should in his last-quoted statement understand Orsini merely to be suggesting that he caused such a revision to be made, although that is not what he says), we can observe a measure of agreement between the witnesses on this question of Bridget's Latinity: those who had most to do with her writings state that she could speak *litteraliter*, which seems to mean no more than "with an adequate Latin vocabulary." Orsini says of her, *nesciebat bene grammaticam*, which here clearly refers to her knowledge of formal grammar, but by his own showing he is not a good witness to this point. It would seem that the more important reason for his being needed as an interpreter was her difficulty in following Urban V's Latin. This narrative, together with Orsini's further statement about the differences beween the Latin of the first draft of her *Rule* (originally, it will be recalled, composed in Sweden to be submitted to Clement VI in Avignon) and "the modern style of the Roman curia," suggest that Bridget had learned to speak a Latin which was strongly coloured by local usage, first Swedish, then Italian, which was inadequate for literary purposes, and which differed very markedly from the spoken Latin of the court at Avignon.

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[20] *Acta et processus*, p. 95.

[21] Described by Collijn in *Acta et processus*, pp. xvii-xxi, and by K. B. Westman, *Birgitta-Studier* I (Uppsala Universitets Årsskrift, I, 1911), pp. 269-70, although neither description is so full as one might wish. *Ms Harley* 612 is a vast tome made for the English Birgittine house. The initial letter of *Stupor* in Master Matthias' prologue, on fol. 2^r, is a monogram of the name "Syon".

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 546.

[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 300, 254.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 393. We know from Alphonse's evidence on the legality of Urban VI's election (see *infra*, note 100) that he habitually used "satis" in its Italian sense of "very much": a man is "satis notus pontifici", very well known to the pope; "et hoc fecerunt satis laeto animo", they enthroned the pope very joyfully; "cives Romani satis tristes", the Roman citizens were very sad at the results of the election.

[25] *Acta et processus*, p. 232.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 236.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 231.

Yet Orsini's statement that he was the only person present at the first interview with Urban at Montefiascone shows that at least she could dispense with anyone to translate to her from Latin into Swedish. We know this also from the events of her second audience. Again, she and the pope spoke with the aid of an interpreter, who this time was not Orsini but her spiritual director, Alphonse. His account of this audience to the canonization commissioners is very brief,[28] but in the evidence which he had given six months earlier, as to the legality of the election of Urban VI, he had described it in some detail. From his story of this interview, and from all the other evidence which we have concerning the relations between him and St. Bridget, we can see that in her life and in her household he played the most important part.

Many of the facts concerning Alphonse's life are recorded and most of the records were used by Seidlmayer, but even so, one does not always obtain a clear picture of him. He was young enough to be Bridget's son;[29] it is conjectured that he was born about 1330. His parents were Ferdinand Rodriguez Pecha, chamberlain to Alphonse XI of Castile, and Elvira Martinez, grand mistress of the queen's household. She was a native of Segovia, and it is stated that Alphonse was born in that city, where, after her husband's death in 1345, she endowed several religious houses.[30] They had three children whose names are known: Peter Ferdinand, regarded as the founder of the Spanish Hermits of St. Jerome,[31] one of the several congregations of hermits who followed the rule of St. Augustine; a daughter, Major, who in her widowhood entered religion, and Alphonse.

The question of the Italian origins of the Pecha family is still obscure. None of the older authorities who allege this to be a fact state their evidence. The first to do so are L. Fumi and A. Lisini,[32] who relate Alphonse to the influential Siennese house of Pecchi, and aver that his grandfather, Peter, had left Siena to accompany the Infante Henry of Castile to Spain, where he had settled and received marked royal favours. Unfortunately, the only evidence which Fumi and Lisini give for this statement clearly was cited by them in error. Their "Siennese document of the year 1333"[33] is in fact a contract, dated November 30, 1333, containing no such information as this, and having as one of its witnesses a Peter Poccie.[34] It would seem that some other source for their information exists, but so far it has not been identified, in archives in Siena or elsewhere.

Alphonse became a secular priest, and received early promotion, first as archdeacon of Saldaña.[35] Innocent VI, in a provision dated October 23, 1359, named him as bishop of Jaen in Andalusia,[36] but the Jaen chapter profited by the civil tumult prevailing in Castile to assert their right to election, naming a certain Andrew as bishop. Only after Andrew's death in December, 1367, does Alphonse seem to have entered into possession of the see,[37] and on July 19, 1368, he surrendered it in person to Urban V at Montefiascone, *ex certis causis rationalibus.*[38]

Exactly what happened next we do not know. Seidlmayer says that it was at

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[28] *Ibid.*, p. 372.

[29] *Revelationes* VII, 16, "Additio".

[30] Ximena, *Catalogo de los Obispos de las Iglesias Catedrales de la Diocesis de Jaen* (Madrid, 1654), p. 340; Colmenares, *Historia de la insigne Cuidad de Segovia* (Segovia, 1637), pp. 287-8.

[31] M. Heimbucher, *Die Orden u. Kongregationen der katholischen Kirche* II (2nd edition, Paderborn, 1907-8) p. 235.

[32] *Genealogia dei Conti Pecci, Signori di Argiano* (Pisa, 1880), pp. 42, 44, 48.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 42.

[34] No. 2026 of the Archivio di San Domenico. Its contents were kindly verified by the Director of the Siennese State Archives.

[35] Ximena, p. 340.

[36] *Ein Gehilfe*, pp. 4-5 and note 9, quoting Reg. Av. 140. fol. 133^{v}.

[37] *Ein Gehilfe*, p. 4.

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 5, note 9, following Ximena, who had seen the Jaen archives. The originals in the Avignon registers are missing, according to Seidlmayer.

Montefiascone that Alphonse first heard of Bridget,[39] but the source which he gives for this statement, Alphonse's evidence under article 3 in the canonization process, does not support it. All that Alphonse says there is that he was told of Bridget and her daughter, and of their way of life in Rome *a quodam deuoto et laudabili heremita fratre Laurencio de Yspania.* And although Collijn, when he edited the *Acta et processus*, could not identify this Lawrence, later he was able to show that he was one of a group of Spanish hermits living at Montefalco near Assisi.[40] Yet probably Seidlmayer is not very far out in his further conjecture that it was in 1368 that Alphonse took up residence in Rome. The next event in his life which we can date with certainty is the second interview, already mentioned, between Bridget and Urban V at Montefiascone, when Alphonse interpreted, which interview, we know, took place in the summer of 1370.[41] One may suppose that two years was in itself not too long a time to be occupied by Alphonse in learning to know Bridget and her way of life, and in gaining her confidence.

Yet it is stated that in these two years Alphonse also undertook some form of religious profession. In the *Summarium* of the process of canonization, under the heading *Testes debent esse fide digni,* he is described as *dominus Alfonsus . . . qui maximum patrimonium et fratres et sorores et matrem et consanguinitates et amenum et delictabilem episcopatum in iuuentute dimisit ex toto amore Christi, et in vita spirituali et humili perseuerauit hucusque, et perseuerare non cessat.*[42] Elsewhere he is constantly referred to as "hermit." Thus the text of one of St. Bridget's revelations reads: *Nunc ergo . . . trade omnes libros revelationum . . . episcopo meo heremite, qui conscribat eos . . .*[43] All the authorities, with one exception, agree that Alphonse joined his brother Peter Ferdinand's Hieronymite congregation, and it is frequently stated that at his death he was living in one of their houses, S. Girolamo di Quarto, outside Genoa. Both these statements, however, require qualification.

Sbaralea claims, without stating his evidence, that on coming to Italy Alphonse first joined the Third Order of St. Francis.[44] This can be reconciled with the seemingly contrary assertions that he became a Hieronymite hermit, if we recall the account of how Peter Ferdinand Pecha's congregation began when he joined a number of Spanish hermits who were already living according to the precepts of Thomas of Siena,[45] otherwise Thomas Unzio or Blessed Tommasuccio of Foligno, who was himself a Franciscan tertiary. According to Heimbucher, it was not until 1374 that Peter Ferdinand obtained at Avignon from Gregory XI confirmation of his new congregation, when it was stipulated that instead of the rule of the Third Order they should follow the Augustinian Rule. Sbaralea's statement may simply mean that before 1374 Alphonse was already attached to his brother's congregation.

Yet we have no direct evidence that he ever became a professed member of it, nor is it even true to say that the house in which he died then belonged to it. In his evidence on the legality of Urban VI's election he stated that a copy of St. Bridget's *Revelations* had been sent to the convent of S. Maria de Agnago in the diocese of Palencia, a Hieronymite house.[46] Alphonse calls the house *fratris et domini mei fratris Petri de ordine S. Hieronymi,* indicating that Peter

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[39] *Ibid.*, p. 5, note 11.

[40] *Acta et processus*, p. 364: Isak Collijn, *Birgittinske Gestalter* (Stockholm, 1929), pp. 107-18.

[41] Werner in his *Secunda Vita* (see *supra*, note 12) states that Urban withdrew from Rome on April 17, arrived at Montefiascone on April 26, and set out from there for Avignon on August 26 (*Vitae Pap. Aven.* I, 392). He says that Bridget was received by the pope and given approbation for her Rule *de mense julii eodem anno* (*ibid.*).

[42] *Acta et processus*, p. 601. Collijn thinks that Alphonse himself may have been the author of the *Summarium; ibid.*, p. xliii.

[43] *Extravagantes*, 49.

[44] *Supplementum . . . ad scriptores trium ordinum S. Francisci a Waddingo* (Rome, 1908), p. 30.

[45] Heimbucher, II, 235-6.

[46] Raynaldus, *Annales Ecclesiastici* XVII, p. 49, no. 8.

Ferdinand was his superior and brother in religion, as well as his brother by blood. But we learn from a bull of Urban VI, dated August 7, 1383, that Sanchio, former prior of the house, and others of the brethren had fled from Castile on account of King John, because they did not wish to acknowledge Clement as pope. They had come to Genoa, and Urban granted them permission to build there a house of their order, dedicated to St. Jerome.[47] After the death of the first prior, it seemed that the house might fail for want of novices, so that Alphonse and the community arranged for it to be taken over by the Olivetans, which was achieved shortly before Alphonse died.[48] He was buried in the church, where this inscription was placed on his tomb:

> Hic iacet Reverendus Pater Dominus Alphonsus de Vadaterra, Natione Hispanus, qui disperso Patrimonio proprio propter Deum, relictoque Episcopatu Geennense, vt pauper Christum pauperem sequeretur Eremiticam vitam duxit. Tandem Ianuam veniens Eleemosynis fidelium sub vocabulo Beati Hieronymi hanc fundauit Ecclesiam, quam regi obtinuit per Venerabiles Monachos Ordinis Montis Olivueti. Demumque migrauit ad Dominum Anno MCCCLXXXVIII, die 19 Augusti.[49]

Seidlmayer, who used Lancellotto, Ughelli and Torelli, was able to point out that in *Ms* Vatican, *lat.* 3826, a copy of the *Revelations* which came from Quarto, there are annotations, fols. 118, 142 and 210, stating that this copy was written and corrected from Alphonse's *originales* in 1399, and that it was he who gave the site for the monastery and who obtained the transfer to the Olivetans.[50] But it will be observed that none of the evidence either states or implies that Alphonse was ever professed, either as a Hieronymite or as an Olivetan, and, although it would doubtless be unjust to suggest that his style of "poor hermit" was a mere legal fiction, it is plain that his renunciation of his episcopal see was not purely voluntary. It will be shown that thereafter he led a life not outstanding for its solitude, and not apparently straitened by any lack of funds.

The form of living which he adopted was dictated, in St. Bridget's lifetime, by his almost constant attendance upon her. In the summer of 1370, as we have seen, he was with her in Montefiascone. For at least a short time after this, it would seem, he was living either in solitude or in a house of hermits (perhaps in the Spanish community at Montefalco), because St. Katherine, in her evidence in the canonization process, stated that on one occasion Alphonse *venit de*

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[47] Lancellotto, *Historiae Olivetanae* II, 15, "De Monasterio Quartano," (Venice, 1623), p. 171.

[48] *Ibid.*, p. 172. Lancellotto tells us nothing of Alphonse's previous dealings with Sanchio and his brethren. Ughelli, in *Italia Sacra* (Venice, 1719), seems largely to follow Lancellotto, but he adds the details that there were three Spanish hermits, that Alphonse came to Genoa while their house was being built and found them destitute, and that he supported them with alms from himself and others (cols. 892-3). Ughelli adds that Alphonse also had fled from Spain because of the Schism, which we know to be untrue. Torelli, in *Secoli Agostiniani* VI (Bologna, 1680), adds nothing to Lancellotto's account of the foundation and does not mention Alphonse by name, but he states that although the house still has the title of "Monte Oliveto", it is in fact occupied by Observant Carmelites (pp. 212-3).

[49] Lancellotto, p. 172: but he has in his transcription omitted the last "I" from the year of Alphonse's death. The original slab of the tomb, with many barbarous spellings, and a later, improved copy, which Lancellotto followed, have both survived, and are now let into the south wall of the church. Photographs very kindly taken and sent to the present writer by Signor Giuseppe Camagna show beyond question that both give the year as 1389. Subsequent writers have copied Lancellotto's mistake, but Adam Easton's letter of February 9, 1390, in which he assumes Alphone still to be alive (see *infra*, note 119), makes it improbable that his death had taken place so long as eighteen months previously.

[50] *Ein Gehilfe*, p. 18, note 58. Seidlmayer seems however to be wrong in referring to the Olivetans as "eine Abzweigung" of the Benedictines. The account of the Olivetans which Heimbucher gives (I, pp. 281-3) suggests precisely the opposite: that they originated as a separate community, that later the Benedictine Rule was enjoined by the bishop whom they asked for approbation, and that only later still did relations develop between them and the Benedictines. If Heimbucher's account is to be relied on, the Olivetans would seem to be an accretion rather than a ramification of the Benedictines.

heremo ad Romam to bring her mother requests from Gregory XI for her prayers and counsels concerning *aliqua secreta dubia eiusdem pape.*[51] This can only have been between December 30, 1370, the day of Gregory's election,[52] and the following November. In May, 1371, St. Bridget was commanded in a vision to leave Rome and go on pilgrimage to Jerusalem, and she set out in November, accompanied by Katherine and her son Charles, the two Peters and Alphonse. They were delayed in Naples, where in February or March, 1372, Charles died. In April they landed at Famagusta, and on May 12 arrived in Jerusalem. In October they revisited Cyprus on their return journey, and at the end of the year were again in Naples. In February, 1373, Alphonse was sent by Bridget from Naples to Avignon to convey further revelations to Gregory, urging him to come to Rome. The rest of the party returned there in March, but when in September Alphonse rejoined them, Bridget had already been dead a month and more.

There is abundant evidence to show the exact nature of Alphonse's responsibilities as a member of her household and we can see that they were determined partly by the linguistic considerations which we have already examined. He was Bridget's spiritual director, but not at first her confessor, an office which the two Peters held and, although Bridget learned to speak Latin, we can be fairly sure that Alphonse never learned Swedish. In his evidence in the cause of her canonization he affirmed: *Visiones eciam divinas quas habebat in oracionibus suis divinitus statim predictis suis spiritualibus patribus duobus detegebat et dicebat, timens illudi ab angelo sathane sub specie angeli lucis, et omnes illas subiciebat eorum judicio et discrecioni.*[53] Magnus Petri in his evidence, it is true, says of the vision received in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre: *quam dicta domina Brigida statim narrauit confessoribus suis et suprascripto domino Alfonso*, but against this we must set Prior Peter's assertion that Alphonse was put in charge of the work of translating which he and Master Peter had hitherto undertaken.[54] Katherine in her evidence concerning her mother's revelations in Naples suggests that the normal procedure was that Bridget would write them down in Swedish and that then the two Peters and Alphonse would all have a share in the Latin translation.[55]

On some occasions, however, Alphonse and Bridget did dispense with the Swedish confessors as intermediaries. He states that whilst she was at Montefiascone, for some three months, he acted as her confessor, because her two chaplains had remained in Rome, ill, and that even after they had recovered she continued from time to time to confess to him.[56] He also suggests that the revelation granted to her in her prayers, warning Urban V that he should not return to Avignon, came to her at Montefiascone[57] and, in his evidence on Urban VI's election, he adds that the text of this revelation, which she gave to the pope, had been written out (he does not need to specify that this was in Latin) by him.[58] During these months, it would seem, he and Bridget came to understand one another's Latin better.

So far we have only seen Alphonse acting as *interpres*. Even in this capacity he must have been of great value to Bridget, for she, who had been mistress of the household to a Swedish queen,[59] would appreciate an interlocutor whose parents had been courtiers and who would know, at Montefiascone, Naples and Cyprus, the forms and styles to be used to princes, even in upbraiding them. But soon we see him advanced, and entrusted with the scrutiny and revision not only of the language of her *Revelations*, but also of their content. The first indication which we have of this promotion is in the revelation preserved as *Extravagantes* 49, granted to Bridget, we are informed in its rubric, in Famagusta on the way to Jerusalem, in which she is instructed: *Nunc ergo . . . trade omnes libros revelationum . . . episcopo meo heremite, qui conscribat et elucidet et catholicum sensum Spiritus mei teneat.*[60] In other words, Alphonse was to be given the as yet uncoordinated material which, presumably, the two Peters had charge of, from which he was to prepare a definitive text, free from all ambiguities and any suspicion of heresy.

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[51] *Acta et processus*, p. 327.

[52] Eubel, I, p. 21.

[53] *Acta et processus*, p. 370.

[54] *Ibid.*, pp. 270, 489.

[55] *Ibid.*, p. 325.

[56] *Ibid.*, p. 364.

[57] *Ibid.*, p. 364.

[58] Raynaldus, XVII, p. 49.

[59] *Acta et processus*, p. 528.

Although we have no evidence that relations between Alphonse and the two Peters were not harmonious, or that they failed loyally to accept his promotion to the position of editor-in-chief, when he returned to Rome in September, 1373, he found that on her death-bed Bridget had repeated her instructions that Prior Peter was to hand over the whole body of the *Revelations* to him, whom the Holy Spirit would guide in his disposal of them.[61]

The allusion to the care which Alphonse was to have for the orthodoxy of the *Revelations* plainly reflects some of Bridget's experiences as a prophet of divine wrath. These may be illustrated by one incident of which Alphonse was witness and narrator. Article 36 states that the presence of blasphemers or sinners caused her to be miraculously overwhelmed by a nauseous stench, and that a notable instance was in 1372 at Famagusta, and was occasioned by one Simon, a Dominican, confessor to the uncle of the king of Cyprus.[62] Alphonse in his evidence gives a fuller account of this incident, at which he says that he was present. Certain revelations had been granted to Bridget concerning the future of the kingdom of Cyprus. These were derided by some of the religious of the island and Simon, *magnus theologus et astronomus, cognoscens planetas et sydera sed non seipsum,*[63] came to her lodging, she being sick, and under a hypocritical show of friendship interrogated her closely concerning the visions and revelations which she had received. She answered him humbly and simply, but when he had gone she complained to Alphonse and Prior Peter of the smell of sulphur which she had endured.[64] Charles Malocello, a noble of Genoa who was in Cyprus at the time, confirms this account, and adds that Simon averred that she was possessed (*Ista est una mente capta*). He also adds the significant detail that Bridget sent Alphonse to carry her prophecies to a kinsman of the witness, one Peter Malocello, and to the queen of Cyprus and her barons.[65] Later, when he came to write the *Epistola solitarii*, Alphonse made good use of the fact that even in her lifetime Bridget had been assailed as a heretic and worse.

If we turn now to the evidence concerning Alphonse's activities as editor of the Birgittine canon after her death, we must first examine the present state of the *Revelations*. For his edition Durante consulted numerous manuscripts and was in places concerned to give variant readings from them, but none the less his edition very properly was based on what still must be regarded as the definitive text, that of the first printed edition, published at Lübeck in 1492 under the commission of Vadstena, the mother-house of the Birgittine Order.[66] We learn from the prologue to this first edition that it had been prepared for printing by the Vadstena fathers *prematuro studio et exquisita diligentia*, and we are also told that Alphonse arranged the revelations into books, and that then Prior Peter, who had been the first *conscriptor* (until, that is, he was superseded in this office by Alphonse), *aliquas alias revelationes extra libros originales pretermissas redegit seorsum in cedulas et sexternos*. This material he made over to the brethren of Vadstena in the presence of Bishop Nicholas of Linköping and others, affirming the authenticity of it and of numerous other revelations which he had deposited in his own house of Alvastra. Many of these, it is said, agree in subject-matter with parts of the original eight books, or with the *declarationes* (or rubrics preceding chapters, most of which are the work of Prior Peter), and *additiones* (or notes subjoined to chapters, which are by Alphonse). Those additional revelations which did not appear anywhere else were at that time inscribed in a separate volume at Vadstena, and now, in 1492, are for the first time added, the so-called *Revelationes extravagantes*.[67] But in fact the *Extravagantes* do appear in many fifteenth-century manuscripts: in one of them, Stockholm, Royal Library A. 22, written at Vadstena before 1450, in the prologue to the *Extravagantes* we have a slightly more detailed account. Prior Peter was the *conscriptor*, Alphonse arranged the revelations into books and chapters, and *certis capitulis discreuit*, and it was he who added the rubrics.[68]

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[60] Seidlmayer points out the importance of this passage: *Ein Gehilfe*, pp. 12-3 and note 38.

[61] In the *Vita*, the two Peters record this, but they there state that it was first revealed to Bridget at Montefiascone that Alphonse was to undertake this work; *Acta et processus*, p. 98.

[62] *Ibid.*, p. 24.

[63] Collijn gives no other details, and it has not been possible to identify this Simon. Raymond Creytens O.P., in his article, "Hugues de Castello, astronome Dominicain du XIVe siècle," *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum*, XI (1941), 95-108, discusses the pursuit of astronomy and astrology in the Order in the fourteenth century, but Simon's name is not recorded as an author of such treatises by Creytens, or by Quétif-Echard.

[64] *Acta et processus*, p. 390.

[65] *Ibid.*, pp. 430-1. See also pp. 266, 325 for other statements that Alphonse acted as interpreter at such interviews in Jerusalem, Cyprus and Naples. The most recent account of Bridget's activities, while she was in Cyprus, written exclusively from the Greek standpoint, is in George Hill, *A History of Cyprus* III (Cambridge, 1950), p. 1083 and note 2. This account is essentially derived from Leontios Machaeras, *Recital concerning the sweet land of Cyprus, entitled Kronaka* II, edited and translated R. M. Dawkins (Oxford, 1932), pp. 176-7. Johann Paul Reinhard (*Vollständige Geschichte des Königreichs Cypern* [Erlangen and Leipzig, 1766-8], I, p. 265 ff.; II, Beylage 60, p. 92) derives his account of Bridget purely from Estienne de Lusignan, *Description de toute l'isle de Cypre* . . . (Paris, 1580), fols. 231b-4b, and Lusignan merely quotes a French version of the *Revelations* concerned. Bridget's own writings seem also to be the only source for the vituperations of Dositheos which Dawkins, and, following him, Hill quote with such relish. They do not mention Simon, because they have not consulted the *Acta et processus*.

In December, 1373, Bridget's son and daughter, Birger and Katherine, had set out for Sweden, to accompany their mother's bones to their resting-place in her house of Vadstena, where on Lady Day, 1375, Katherine was professed, shortly before she returned to Rome with documents, chiefly describing miracles, required for the process. It was Alphonse, who plainly was an excellent canonist, even though he said of himself that he had abandoned his episcopal see *volens sine scriptura iurium iustius vivere*,[69] who perceived that the evidence which Katherine had brought was inadmissible, being inadequately authenticated.[70] Katherine's chaplain was therefore sent back to Sweden for the information which was lacking.[71] In November, 1375, Gregory XI at Avignon commissioned the Swedish hierarchy to conduct the necessary formal enquiry at Vadstena;[72] meanwhile Katherine and Alphonse were busy collecting Italian evidence, in Rome and Naples principally.[73] Soon after Gregory entered Rome on January 16, 1377, he received Katherine, who petitioned him for the ratification of the *Rule* and for her mother's canonization,[74] and on May 29 at a public consistory at S. Maria Maggiore evidence of miracles which she and Alphonse had collected was presented to the pope.[75] Gregory's death in the following year and the ensuing troubles delayed matters, but at last, on March 3, 1379,[76] the proceedings opened.

It seems from the evidence then offered by Alphonse and Prior Peter, who had remained in Rome after Bridget's death,[77] and who must have been fully occupied, that they had already completed their work as editors of the *Revelations*, to which both of them refer by book and chapter.[78] There are similar textual references in Alphonse's evidence on Urban VI's election,[79] and there, in addition to his statement, already noticed, concerning the copy of the *Revelations* sent to S. Maria de Agnago, he testifies that *dominus meus archiepiscopus Hispaliensis* has a copy.[80] He and Prior Peter, in their evidence in the canonization process, also speak of Alphonse's other editorial activities. Alphonse himself says:

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[66] The present writer has used the superb copy in the Bodleian Library, one of the limited issue printed on vellum.

[67] Fol. Aj.

[68] Westman, pp. 303-4, and see also A. S. Kraft, *Textstudier till Birgittas Revelationer* (Kyrkohistorisk Årsskritt, XXIX, 1929), *passim*.

[69] Raynaldus, XVII, p. 53 (erroneously printed as "35").

[70] *Acta et processus*, p. 393.

[71] Höjer, pp. 104-5.

[72] *Ibid.*, p. 103.

[73] *Acta et processus*, pp. 342, 395-410.

[74] Höjer, p. 107.

[75] *Ibid.*, pp. 107-8.

[76] *Acta et processus*, p. 3.

[77] Alphonse in his evidence on Urban VI's election says of Peter *qui nunc est hic*, (that is, in Rome) . . . *xxx annis;* Raynaldus,

> Sed quia multi non immerito dubitabant, quomodo et qualiter predicta domina Brigida poterat habere et habebat frequentissime in oracionibus suis tantam habundanciam reuelacionum et diuinarum visionum, que continentur in libris suis, ideo ipse testis dixit ad certificandum seipsum et alios animales homines et carnales, qui spiritualia sublimia non sapiunt nec percipiunt, factus et compositus fuit prologus hoc plene declarans per diuinam scripturam super primo libro celesti et clarius super viij° eidem domine Brigide diuinitus reuelato, qui intitulatur liber celestis imperatoris ad reges, et ibi plene declaratur de hac materia, ut testis loquens asseruit, et de modo discernendi illusiones diabolicas sub specie angeli lucis a visionibus diuinis ministratis a spiritu sancto.[81]

This work of assembling and selecting from the whole body of the revelations must in itself have been a careful and arduous one, for we may suspect that in places the editors made fundamental alterations to their material. Perhaps the clearest example which can be cited is in the edited text of *Revelationes* IV, 104-5, beginning: *Mater loquitur ad filium, dicens: Benedictus sis tu, fili mi.* In IV, 104, our Lady reminds her Son that He commanded that a sinner should be forgiven though he offend seventy times seven times, and she implores Him to have pity on the unhappy realm of France, uniting herself in this petition *cum Dionysio et aliis sanctis tuis quorum corpora in hac terra istius regni Franciae sunt, animae vero in caelo.* She then describes the political state of France in a long similitude of the two ferocious beasts seeking to destroy one another, who are the kings of France and England. In IV, 105, Christ speaks. If the warring kings wished for peace, He who is true peace would give it to them perpetually, and it is His will that the one king should make peace *per matrimonium,* so that his kingdom may have a legitimate heir. Both kings should do all in their power to promote the Christian faith, they should cease from their intolerable exactions, and should seek the salvation of their subjects' souls. But since *ille rex qui nunc tenet regnum* will not wish to submit to such counsels, his life shall end in misery, his kingdom be given over to tribulations, and his line be held in such detestation that all shall be amazed. If the other king, who has justice on his side, be willing to submit to Him, Christ shall aid him and fight for him; but if he be disobedient, he shall not attain to his desire, but shall lose all that he has so far won. When the men of France acquire true humility, their kingdom shall have a lawful heir and a good peace.

We need not wonder that St. Bridget became so popular in England in the decades after her death, and that devotion to her did not flourish in France.

XVII, p. 49.

[78] E.g. *Acta et processus*, pp. 369, 373, 375 (Alphonse), 485, 489 (Peter).

[79] E.g. Raynaldus, XVII, p. 49.

[80] *Ibid.* Writing in the previous year to Archbishop Birger of Uppsala, a letter dated January 15, 1378, now in the Stockholm Royal Library, Alphonse had said that the *Revelations* were already known in Spain, and were being constantly copied in Italy and Sicily; Westman, p. 21, note 5. In the next century, Torquemada, writing from Rome, stated that the records of the canonization process showed that whilst it was going on, the bishop of Worms took a copy of the *Revelations* to the Emperor, the Infante Friar Peter of Aragon took one to France, and others were obtained by the ambassadors to the Holy See of Castile, Cyprus and Naples, and by many universities, cities and religious orders; Durante's text of the *Epistola Domini Johannis* (see *infra*, note 164).

[81] *Acta et processus*, p. 375.

These two chapters of the *Revelations* gained an independent fame. Hoccleve, in *De Regimine principum,* which he is thought to have composed in 1411 or 1412, gives a very accurate verse paraphrase in English of IV, 105.[82] In 1435, when Henry VI's emissaries to the Congress of Arras were instructed that the peace which they were to negotiate was to be ensured by a marriage between Henry and a French princess of his choosing, the English claimed the authority of the *Revelations* for such procedure, their written proposals, *Ad Laudem,* opening with a quotation from IV, 105: *Volo quod fiat per matrimonium.*[83] In the further conference of 1439 they again alleged the *Revelations*, and dismissed the conflicting prophecies with which the French countered by arguing that the prophet in question 'was unknown, and not greatly approved by the Church."[84]

But we have cause to doubt whether Bridget's original revelation made any mention of matrimony as a way of pacification. We have already seen that in 1347 or 1348 Prior Peter had been sent with Bishop Hemming to Avignon to convey her admonitions to the pope, and Prior Peter's evidence in the cause of her canonization, and the *Vita* of which he was joint author, state that at the same time they were instructed to bear messages to the kings of England and France and letters to their queens.[85] Counsels of peace at this time could hardly have recommended that the English king strengthen his title to the French throne by marriage, because Edward III had been married since 1328, whereas after the death of his son, Edward the Black Prince, in July, 1376, the marriage of the new heir, the infant prince Richard, was constantly discussed. He succeeded his grandfather in June, 1377, and in January, 1379, Clement's envoys to England were instructed that they were to press for a peace between England and France, proposing a marriage between Richard and a daughter of Charles V. Similar instructions had been given in the previous month to Clement's nuncio to Charles. The Clementine mission to England was rejected, but in May, 1380, at the Anglo-French conference at Leulinghen, the same offer was made by Charles himself.[86] It is fairly clear that the text which we have of *Revelationes* IV, 104-5, is a revision in the light of events after the death of the Black Prince, who outlived St. Bridget by three years. But the original revelation seems to have survived: *Ms* Cambridge, Corpus Christi College 404 is a book of prophecies of the popular type, the fourteenth-century portions of which were written after 1378, as can be seen from a reference to "Urbanus vi^{us}."[87] Beginning on fol. 102^{v} we have the text of "a vision of a certain matron of the land of Sweden concerning the right of the king of England to the kingdom of France", which, it is stated, was sent by the king of Sweden to Edward III in October, 1348. The letter is in fact addressed by Magnus both to Edward and to Philip VI, and it names the bearers as Bishop Hemming and Prior Peter. The only speaker in the revelation proper, which begins *Domina celi regina angelorum, sola manens in domo cum audiuit verbum angeli . . . ,* is the Virgin: she declares that the king of England is nearer to the French throne than the king of France, but that Philip was elected to it, some giving their votes out of fear of England, others in ignorance of the rights of the case, others knowing the just claims of England but seeking favour from Philip. Because he did not come to the throne by violence, he should be allowed to enjoy it for his lifetime, but he should take Edward to be as it were his elder son, and acknowledge him as successor. This reflects much better the state of affairs in France in 1348, and it might be thought that this writing is entirely independent of the official text already quoted, were it not for one significant phrase, where the Virgin pleads her cause *propter mortem filii mei et preces eorum quorum corpora quiescunt in francia, anime autem sunt in celo.* It is impossible that the authors of the revised text did not know this original version, and it would seem that it was suppressed as being out of date. One may justifiably ask in how many other early revelations this was done.

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[82] Ed. T. Wright (Roxburghe Club, 1860), p. 193.

[83] Jocelyne Gledhill Dickinson, *The Congress of Arras, 1435* (Oxford, 1955), p. 218 and note 7.

[84] *Ibid.*, p. 218 note 8.

[85] *Acta et processus*, pp. 512, 620, 622.

[86] *Calendar of Papal Letters* IV, ed. W. H. Bliss and J. A. Twemlow (London, 1902), p. 228; N. Valois, *La France et le grand schisme* I (Paris, 1902), pp. 128-9; *Thomae Walsingham Historia Anglicana* I, ed. H. T. Riley (London, 1863), pp. 380-1; E. Lavisse, *Histoire de France* IV (Paris, 1902), p. 264.

[87] M. R. James, *A Descriptive Catalogue of the MSS of Corpus Christi College, Cambride* II (Cambridge, 1912), pp. 269-77.

The editorial work undertaken by Alphonse and his collaborators in the five years between St. Bridget's death and the opening of her cause was not solely confined to the preparation of a definitive text of the *Revelations* and the composition of prologues to certain of its books. Prior Peter, in his evidence concerning the incredulity of many to whom individual revelations were addressed, deposed:

> Multe (revelaciones) continentur in libro celesti et multe in libro celesti imperatoris ad reges et multe in tractatu de summis pontificibus, quas ipse testis loquens scripsit ab ore ipsius domine Brigide et ex eius precepto. Et aliquas translatauit de scriptis que ipsa domina Brigida scripserat manu sua . . . Et dixit iste testis quod dominus Alfonsus heremita predictus fuit eciam scriptor multarum dictarum reuelacionum ex ore et ex precepto domine Brigide.[88]

Some modern scholars, notably Westman, have been led astray in considering this "treatise of the supreme pontiffs" by the rubric which follows Book IV of the *Revelations* in Durante's edition: *Et hic est finis Quarti Libri secundum Alphonsum.* Then comes IV, 131, and IV, 132-44 are given the title *Revelationes ad Sacerdotes et ad Summos Pontifices.* Westman observed this and compared the Durante edition with the text found in *Ms Harley* 612, where Books I-VIII are followed by two additional Books, the first, IX, which occupies fols. 125-33, described as *liber nonus celestium imperatorum, qui intitulatur ad pontifices, et continet multas alias reuelaciones que non agunt de pontificibus, ut patebit.* On the basis of this he suggested that the treatise to which Prior Peter alluded consisted merely of the thirteen chapters so designated by Durante,[89] but Westman here has missed the point.

Book IX, *Ad Pontifices,* as it appears in *Ms Harley* 612, consists of fifty-seven chapters. A comparison of their contents with the eight books of the *Revelations* and with the *Revelationes extravagantes*[90] shows that Alphonse in compiling *Ad Pontifices* used, from the material already published by him and Prior Peter, IV, 49, 131-44, VI, 63, 102, 110, 113-22 and VII, 111-2, thirty-one chapters in all, including the *Additio* and the *Declaratio.* For the remaining chapters he drew on what are now known as the *Extravagantes.* But we have seen that the *Extravagantes* were not published as such, and were not available to readers, in Alphonse's lifetime. *Ad Pontifices,* it is evident, was designed as a short text for the information of those who would probably not consult the major edition of the *Revelationes.* In *Ms Harley* 612 it is followed by another such compilation, fols. 133^r-60^v, there called *liber decimus, qui dicitur celeste viridarium beate Birgitte, contextum de quibusdam reuelacionibus celestibus per venerabilem*

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[88] *Acta et processus,* p. 524.

[89] *Birgitta-Studier* I, p. 26 and note 3.

[90] *Ad Pontifices* 1 (*Revelationes* VI, 63), 2 (IV, 136), 3 (IV, 49), 4-11 (IV, 137-44), 12 (*Extravagantes* 83), 13 (*Ex.* 50), 14 (*Ex.* 84), 15 (*Ex.* 51), 16-9 (IV, 132-5), 20 (*Ex.* 82), 21 (*Ex.* 85), 22 (*Ex.* 52), 23-4 (*Ex.* 86-7), 25 (*Ex.* 73), 26 (*Ex.* 88), 27 (*Ex.* 54), 28-35 (VI, 115-22), 36 (*Ex.* 47), 37 (*Ex.* 76), 38 (*Ex.* 74), 39 (IV, 139, *Additio*), 40 (VI, 114), 41 (VI, 113), 42 (VI, 102, *Declaratio*), 43 (VI, 110), 44 (*Ex.* 75), 45 (*Ex.* 89), 46 (*Ex.* 79), 47 (*Ex.* 91), 48 (*Ex.* 63), 49 (a single sentence, apparently from one of the Jerusalem revelations when Bridget was thought to be dying, which has not been identified), 50 (*Ex.* 61), 51 (*Ex.* 53), 52 (*Ex.* 65), 53 (*Ex.* 56), 54 (IV, 131), 55-6 (VII, 111-2), 57 (*Ex.* 80).

patrem Alfonsum quondam Giennensem episcopum. It begins with a prologue, which is Alphonse's dedicatory letter to the nuns of Vadstena. Out of *caritas* he has put together this small book from the various places in the *Revelations* which deal with the coming into the world of Mary and of Christ, and with their earthly lives until they ascended to their heavenly kingdom. These matters have been newly revealed to the world to increase and strengthen Christian faith. Alphonse has arranged the material according to subject matter, and he has put it all into dialogue form.

Although the *Viridarium*, unlike *Ad Pontifices*, does not make any use of material until then unpublished, it may be that it was not the only other supplementary document which Alphonse had in view, for we now know that Prior Peter was not in possession of all the documents which he and Alphonse had excluded from the *Revelations*. We have already observed the reference in *Ms* Vatican *lat.* 3826 which suggests that Alphonse retained and took with him to Genoa the original manuscripts or the first copy made from them, and one or two unpublished revelations, and various formularies praying that the Church be delivered from the evils of simony, were discovered in *Ms* Uppsala C 86 and published by Westman. The rubric to the anti-simoniacal "office" reads: *Item notandum quod tam istud officium quam eciam subsequenda ac eciam plures alie revelaciones facte s. Birgitte reperte sunt in quaternis dicti dni. Alfonsi episcopi . . . post mortem eius.*[91]

So much for Alphonse as editor-in-chief of the *Revelations*, an office which he found it possible to combine with much travelling and negotiating. We know that he served not only in carrying messages from Bridget to the popes, but also in acting as papal emissary to her.[92] We learn that at least on one occasion he took similar messages to St. Catherine of Siena, who in March, 1374, wrote to two of her Dominican disciples, Bartholomew Dominici and Thomas Caffarini, saying that she had received from the pope requests for her prayers for his intentions, and that his messenger had been Alphonse: *e ciò fue el padre spirituale di quella contessa che morì a Roma, ed è colui che renuntiò el vescovado per l'amore della virtù.*[93] We also know that in or shortly before 1378, the year in which Blessed Clara Gambacorti embraced religion, Alphonse was in her native city, Pisa, where her father asked him to attempt to dissuade her from trying her vocation. So far from succeeding, Alphonse strengthened her in her determination, and he seems also to have inspired her with a devotion to Bridget which she never lost. Before he left Pisa he gave Clara *vitae ejus* (sc. *Birgittae*) *descriptam historiam.*[94]

It is unnecessary to repeat in full here the story of Alphonse's activities, as confidant and confessor of Cardinal Peter de Luna, on behalf of Bartholomew Prignano during the preliminaries to the conclave which in April, 1378, elected him as Urban VI.[95] After the outbreak of the Schism Alphonse's efforts seem to have multiplied, for now there was the cause not only of Bridget to be urged, but also of the Roman Pope who would have had her voice, had she lived, and who had the support of all her family. In December, 1380, for example, Rodriguez Bernardi, the ambassador to the Holy See of the king of Castile, writes to his master that he and his companion, Ferdinand de Illescas, the king's Franciscan confessor, are to have all their travelling necessities lavishly supplied by "brother Alphonse, the former bishop of Jaen, who has been diligent in everything which could help us, out of his honour and zeal for Your Royal Majesty."[96] This is courtier's language: Alphonse was diligent in the service of anyone who might advance the two causes which he had so much at heart. The anonymous *Responsiva unitatis fidelium ad processum regis Franciae* recalls how, when Charles V of France sent his son's tutor, Philip de Mézières, to John Visconti in an attempt to win him over to the Clementine side, Visconti summoned Alphonse, and how Philip was forced to retire, *confutatus, inanis et vacuus*, after Alphonse had proved Urban's election to have a three-fold validity, *per viam electionis, per viam juris et per viam spiritus.* These matters, it is stated, are all set down in the *libellus* which Alphonse at the time wrote, and which should be available at the French court.[97] This same "*libellus*" is mentioned again by one of the witnesses in the process of canonization of St. Katherine of Sweden: Matthias, a professed Birgittine and chaplain to King Karl Knutson of Sweden, giving evidence on September 1, 1475, and questioned as to his knowledge of the divine origin of Katherine's revelations, said that he had seen a letter which Alphonse wrote to the *consiliarius* of John Visconti, setting out the various grounds for regarding Urban VI's election as lawful, and naming among them that it was so revealed to Katherine.[98] It is noteworthy that another witness, Clement Petri, confessor-general of Vadstena, who claimed wide knowledge of the documents in Katherine's case, *in pluribus antiquis libris vulgaribus et latinis*, and who quotes the *Epistola solitarii*, is however ignorant of any revelations granted to her,[99] which indicates that the Visconti letter which Matthias had seen was not in the Vadstena archives. The probability is that it had been sent to the Swedish as well as to the French court, and that it was Matthias' position as court chaplain which had gained him access to it.

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[91] Westman, p. 295.

[92] See *supra*, note 51.

[93] E. Dupré-Theseider, *Epistolario di Santa Caterina da Siena* (Rome, 1940), p. 85. Seidlmayer's deduction from this letter, that Alphonse tried to attach himself to St. Catherine after St. Bridget's death: " . . . denn er muss ein Mann gewesen sein, der nur als Diener an einem fremden Lebenswerke seine Ruhe finden konnte" (*Ein Gehilfe*, p. 16), seems hardly to be justified by the evidence.

[94] *Acta SS*, April II, p. 506, the contemporary "Life" which seems to be the source of all the other accounts of the relations between Alphonse and Blessed Clara, but for criticisms of the statement made in it that he had known her father in Jerusalem, see J. B. Sajanello, *Historica Monumenta Ordinis S. Hieronymi Congregationis B. Petri de Pisis* (1st edition, Venice, 1728), p. 12, (2nd edition, Venice, 1758), pp. 17-8, where it is shown that the Gambacorti family returned from their exile in the Holy Land two years before St. Bridget and Alphonse made their pilgrimage.

[95] Full descriptions will be found in *Die Anfänge des grossen abendländischen Schismas* and in *The Origins of the Great Schism.* See *supra*, note 8.

From the foregoing it would seem that Alphonse or others had circulated copies of his views on Urban's election to various European courts, and there can be little doubt that the *libellus* was essentially identical with the memorandum which he presented to Matthew Clementi, who had been sent by the king of Aragon, at Clementi's own suggestion, to collect evidence concerning the elections of Urban and Clement VII, who had ignored the king's subsequent letter of recall, and who, under Alphonse's tutelage, sat in Rome in March, 1379, to hear witnesses on behalf of Urban.[100] Thus it came about that there were meeting at the same time in Rome two interrogating bodies, the other the commissioners appointed to take testimony in the matter of St. Bridget's canonization. It is highly significant that among the first witnesses to be heard by Clementi were Alphonse himself (March 3), Easton (March 9) and Katherine (March 10), she, furthermore, being the only woman summoned.

In their evidence before these two commissions, Bridget's family had two strings to their bow. Every effort was made to keep the proceedings in the matter of her canonization free of politics and personalities, and the same principle, so far as it affected living persons, seems to have governed the editing of the official text of the *Revelations*. One example will suffice to demonstrate this. Alphonse, in his evidence in Bridget's cause, gives a detailed description of how he had assisted as interpreter in Cyprus when she had prophesied that the sins of the Lusignans would be visited upon the kingdom unless they repented.[101] In the year which followed their visit her prophecies had been fulfilled in most spectacular fashion. But then the tone of Alphonse's evidence changes, and it goes on:

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[96] *Die Anfänge*, pp. 39, 233.

[97] *Ms* Bodleian, *Digby* 188, fol. 8^r, quoted in *La France et le grand schisme* IV, p. 512.

[98] *Processus seu negocium*, p. 35.

[99] *Ibid.*, pp. 50-1.

[100] *Die Anfänge*, p. 75. The evidence of Alphonse and the others is preserved in Vat. Arch. arm. 54, 17, for a very full description of which see Seidlmayer, *Die spanische 'Libri de Schismate' des Vatikanischen Archivs* (Spanische Forschungen der Görresgesellschaft, I, 1940). Alphonse's evidence is printed in Raynaldus, XVII, pp. 49-53. For Adam Easton's evidence, and for valuable information concerning the two commissions which took such depositions, see L. Macfarlane, *An English Account of the Election of Urban VI, 1378* (Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, XXVI, 1953, pp. 74-85).

> Item dixit eciam iste testis loquens, quod similiter fecit coram domina regina Neapolitana prefata domina Brigida, quoniam ipsa eidem domine regine dedit in secreto quandam reuelacionem diuinam sibi a Christo factam magne comminacionis, terroris et ire Dei, que quidem, vt dixit ipse testis, nimis secreta sunt.[102]

What were these so secret revelations of God's anger against Queen Johanna, not to be published, unlike those to the royal house of Cyprus? We have perhaps a hint as to their nature in the reiterated accounts of Bridget's amazing fortitude and resignation when her son Charles died in Naples on the way to Jerusalem: Alphonse, who says that he was at Charles' death-bed, is one of the deponents as to this.[103] These accounts must have had a much greater significance at the time, if the story is true which we first read in the *Chronicon de genere et nepotibus sancte Birgitte*, written by Margaret Clausdotter, who was professed as a Birgittine at Vadstena in 1440, became abbess there, and died in 1486.[104] This chronicle, which is the source of the celebrated anecdote of how Bridget presented to the pope her sons, Charles clad in the inappropriate splendour of *en hærmelins kiortil*,[105] also gives us a most circumstantial account of how Charles' death alone frustrated or ended (the abbess with nun-like discretion does not say which) his adulterous intrigue with Queen Johanna.[106] If this story were well-founded, there was good reason why in 1379 it should not be mentioned. Johanna, notorious profligate though she was reputed to be, had been deeply awed and moved by Bridget's spiritual gifts during her sojourns in Naples and, even though the Fondi conclave which elected Clement had met under the queen's protection, Urban was still not without hope of winning her over to his side. We know from Blessed Raymond of Capua's life of St. Catherine of Siena that after she came to Rome a close friendship grew up between her and Katherine, Bridget's daughter, and that the pope proposed that the two women should go to Naples as his advocates, a project which was abandoned because of Katherine of Sweden's unwillingness and on Raymond's advice, much to Catherine of Siena's indignation.[107] In the event, Johanna was not persuaded to abandon Clement, and her defection led to some of the greatest scandals of Urban's disastrous pontificate. He excommunicated her, allowed a crusade to be preached against her, crowned Charles of Durazzo as king of Naples in June, 1381, in return for promises which were never kept, and in the ensuing conflict with Charles was so disgraced and humiliated that a number of his cardinals took legal counsel on whether he might lawfully be placed under restraint. Six cardinals were arrested when Urban discovered this; of them, Adam Easton was the only one to escape death, upheld through his barbarous imprisonment and torturings, he was later to maintain, by the intercessions in Heaven of St. Bridget.

It is ironic that he should have followed Alphonse in 1379 as second witness on behalf of Urban. The atmosphere in which Clementi heard their evidence was very different from that of the canonization commission; there was no need for tenderness for the reputations of prelates and princes, and Alphonse's evidence is savage in its indignation at the pusillanimity and worse of successive popes. Bridget had commanded Clement VI to return to Rome; she had warned Urban V of what would befall him if he went back to Avignon. All had come about as she had foretold: he had died there miserably, in his last agony vowing to go to Rome if he were spared, and lamenting that he had not followed her counsels.[108] When he was dead, Cardinal Beaufort was elected as Gregory XI. Of all men alive, he should have known that he must accept Bridget's advice, for it was he who had received her and Alphonse when she came to Montefiascone to seek to deter Urban in his flight, and Alphonse was present when she had put into Beaufort's hands a written account of a revelation so terrible that the cardinal dared not show it to Urban as she bade him. After preliminary messages had been exchanged with this new pope, the *homo carnalis et animalis* of St. Paul's words, luxuriating among the fleshpots of a second Egypt, living in wickedness in Avignon *cum suis parentibus et carnalibus cardinalibus*, Alphonse was sent to France to warn him of the consequences to him if he did not come to Rome. The journey was undertaken in secret, as the pope's family and the French cardinals would probably have had Alphonse assassinated if they had known the nature of his mission. After he had been received by the pope a second time, Gregory, instead of coming to Rome himself, sent a murderous expedition there to quell opposition to him by violence, a massacre carried out at the pope's orders by the very man who now rules as "antipope" in Avignon. These are matters in which Alphonse has been a witness.[109]

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[101] *Acta et processus*, pp. 372-3.

[102] *Ibid.*, p. 373.

[103] *Ibid.*, pp. 370-1.

[104] *Scriptores Rerum Suecicarum* III, ed. Annerstedt., II (Uppsala, 1871-6), p. 207, note a.

[105] *Ibid.*, II, p. 211.

[106] *Ibid.*, II, pp. 211-2.

[107] *Legenda Major* III, 1, no. 335 (*Acta SS*, April III, p. 946).

This account of Bridget's negotiations with successive popes can be very well illustrated from the *Revelations*, even though Peter and Alphonse departed largely from strict chronological order in their arrangement of the text. We have already observed the tenor, in I, 41, of the revelation conveyed to Clement VI. In III, 27, we have the first of several laments over Rome uttered by Christ. This would seem to have been written by Bridget soon after her arrival there, and, significantly, it seems to reflect rather her horror at the state of the city than her grief at the Pope's continued absence. But in IV, 5, we have an account of how St. Peter appeared to her, and said that in her lifetime she should hear the Romans cry *Vivat Vicarius Petri*! . . . , and should see the Pope with her own eyes. IV, 10, is another lament of Christ over the pagan life lived in Rome. IV, 33, is in the form of a letter, apparently addressed to a secular lord, and it seems to be a recapitulation of admonitions on the ruined state of the Church and of Rome, and on the absence of the Pope. In IV, 39, Christ warns Bridget that the Pope must return. In IV, 136, He tells her that Innocent VI (who had succeeded Clement VI in 1352) is made of better metal than his predecessor, but should listen to her words. In the next revelation, IV, 137, Urban V (who succeeded Innocent in 1362) is to be told that his time is short: for the good of his soul he should confirm the Birgittine Rule and grant the indulgences for her house of Vadstena for which Bridget was petitioning him. In the next, IV, 138, Our Lady tells Bridget that by her intercessions Urban has been moved to come to Rome, to the end only that he shall perform works of mercy and justice and strengthen the Catholic faith. Now he vacillates, drawn by the advice of his carnal friends, and threatens to bring great woe upon himself. In the next, IV, 139, we have, according to the rubric, which is probably Alphonse's, the revelation conveyed to Gregory XI by Orsini: the pope is to be told that if he will return to Rome and have pity on the Church, he shall find mercy himself. In the next, IV, 140, we undoubtedly have the text to which Alphonse referred at the only point in his evidence before the canonization commissioners where he broke silence on the subject of Bridget's political activities, to describe how, after other emissaries had been sent to Avignon, he himself had conveyed to Gregory *quandam aliam terribilissimam reuelacionem*, foretelling what would be the consequences to him personally if within a stated time he did not return to Rome *cum humilitate et pastorali caritate.*[110] The revelation is indeed "most terrible": Bridget has seen how the Virgin and the devil are contending for Gregory's soul, to whom already great mercy has been shown. He is to be in Rome by next April at the latest. There will never be peace in France until the French make their peace with God, with whom their projected crusade to the Holy Sepulchre finds no favour. Alphonse is to make this revelation known to Orsini and to the nuncio before it is communicated to the pope. In IV, 142, we have a further communication for Alphonse to deliver, but with no such instructions: Christ asks why Gregory hates Him, and allows his worldly curia to despoil the courts of Heaven? In the curia is to be found insatiable cupidity, execrable lustfulness, revolting simony.

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[108] The chronicles of the times abound with such stories. The *moderni* could quote Cardinal Hugh of Britanny's deposition concerning Gregory XI's dying lamentations that he had brought his cardinals to Rome and endangered the Church (Mollat, *Vitae Pap. Aven.* II, p. 742). Gerson has another version: in *De Examinatione doctrinarum* he tells how the expiring Gregory: protestatus est . . . ut caverent ab hominibus, sive viris sive mulieribus, sub specie religionis loquentibus visiones capitis sui: quia per tales ipse seductus, dimisso suorum rationabili consilio, se traxerat et ecclesiam ad discrimen schismatis imminentis, nisi misericors provideret sponsus Iesus (*Omnia Opera* I, ed. Dupin [Antwerp, 1706], p. 16). Dupin in his annotations points out that this refers to Catherine of Siena, but he has overlooked Bridget. See Vernet's article, *Dictionnaire de spiritualité* (*supra*, note 8).

[109] Raynaldus, XVII, pp. 48-55.

It will be recalled that in his *Informationes* Alphonse said that he had sought a second interview at Avignon with Gregory. In IV, 143, we have the reason for this: the text of a revelation which Bridget received in Naples after Alphonse had left, and which has been recorded and sent after him. It is in the form of a letter to Alphonse, beginning: "Our Lord Jesus Christ said to me, my lord bishop, that I should write these words written below to you, which you must show to the Supreme Pontiff." If the pope, seeking to be assured that her visions are of divine inspiration, asks for signs, he already has his answer in Christ's words to the Pharisees. If he will do Christ's bidding, he shall have a sign, the grace of God; if he is disobedient, his sign shall be every manner of tribulation.

This revelation is of great value, as it is one of the few which throw light on the attitude towards Bridget of the recipients of her admonitions. We may compare it with that other in which she records that sometimes in Rome she feared for the safety of her family, when she was reviled as a sorceress (*pythonissa*),[111] and it should be read in conjunction with a preceding one, IV, 141, a revelation concerning Gregory, also received in Naples, but not, according to Alphonse's rubric, revealed to him because this was not divinely commanded. As she was praying for the pope, Christ appeared to her and said that Gregory was like a paralytic, unable to move hand or foot. She replied excusing his conduct, and telling of the obstacles to his return from Avignon: "and I have heard that many oppose him, saying that they have the Spirit of God, and that they have received divine revelations and visions; and that they use these as a pretext to dissuade him from coming." What evidently was in Bridget's mind, when she sent the message about Gregory seeking signs and wonders, was that if he was being presented with conflicting revelations and prophecies he might well imitate Pharoah and ask for proofs of the seers' supernatural gifts, and there is the further implication in her message to Alphonse that if he is questioned on this matter, he is to decline to claim such proofs in her case.

In those calamitous times many 'revelations' of the future were being published: satirists and would-be reformers found this a convenient method of diffusing ideas without being held responsible for them. In Bridget's allusions to prophecies designed to deter a return to Rome, we perhaps have a reference to the famous prognostications of Telesphorus, which are now thought to have been first composed between 1356 and 1365, although the extant manuscripts present a version revised ca. 1386.[112] Especially in the later version, these were a powerful anti-Roman document, foretelling how the Roman Pope will be slain in 1393 in Perugia, how the Church will be reformed and returned to apostolic poverty with the dissolution of its religious orders, and how a new order will arise which shall give the Church a *Pastor Angelicus*, who in turn shall bestow the Imperial crown upon the French King. Henry of Langenstein wrote a *Liber adversus Thelesphori vaticinia*, in which he says:

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[110] *Acta et processus*, p. 372.

[111] *Extravagantes*, 8. The form printed by Durante is "*phitonissa*", which is also recorded in Migne's edition (Paris, 1890) of Maigne d'Arnis's *Lexicon manuale*.

> Inceperunt iam et alii sub hoc schismate loqui quasi prophetae vel vates: sed verius divinatores, quia ex fictis suspicionum regulis, ac ex astris, et aliis huiusmodi horum vocibus, multorum aures, vanitatum cupidae, inclinatae sunt: horum vaticiniis, verius vaniloquiis, omnes aures dederunt: libellos eorum falsitatis plenos, sumptuose et decore transcribi fecerunt (*many of the surviving Telesphorus manuscripts are elaborately written and illuminated*) quasi a Spiritu Sancto editos, stulte putantes, aliquid de futuris magni in eis latitare.[113]

And John of Jenzenstein, archbishop of Prague, similarly deplores the modern multiplicity of prophets in his *Liber de consideratione*, addressed to Urban VI. This however did not prevent him on another occasion from sending to Urban, at the pope's request, it is true, a long account of a dream which he had had, and which evidently had gained some celebrity, which the archbishop interpreted as prefiguring a happy outcome, by which he meant a triumph for Urban, to the Schism.[114] Urban seems to have been anxious to gather such material, whether for the strengthening of his case or for his own comfort, and the other side did the same. The *Libri de schismate*, a great collection of documents relating to the Schism made by Cardinal Martin de Salva of Pamplona and then acquired by Alphonse's former patron, Benedict XIII, contains not only pro-Clementine propaganda but also numerous works concerning the visions of the Infante Friar Peter of Aragon, including "certain revelations which Friar Peter wrote for Bartholomew" (that is, for Urban VI).[115]

Bridget in her lifetime was accustomed to having criticisms similar to those of Langenstein against Telephorus levelled at her, and she had always known what her duty was on such occasions. As early as 1347-8, Master Matthias in *Stupor et mirabilia* briefly indicates the possibility that her visions may by her detractors be condemned as of diabolical origin, and we have seen how Simon the Dominican denounced her as possessed in Famagusta in 1372. A few weeks later, in Naples, the queen sent the archbishop and a deputation of theologians to her sickbed to enquire what the future held for Naples, and also to question her as to the manner of her revelations. We are told that she answered them with great humility, and yet with a wisdom and subtlety which greatly impressed her hearers.[116]

On such occasions as these Bridget was being subjected to *probatio*, to tests designed to show whether she was divinely inspired or seduced by the devil, tests corresponding to doctrines and techniques about which a considerable literature, based upon quotations from the fathers, had grown. It was a commonplace, to use the Scriptural allusion which hardly any mediaeval writer on the subject can resist, that the devil knows well how to disguise himself as an angel of light. Any visionary was expected to acknowledge the possibility that his visions might indeed be such diabolical frauds imposed upon him, and to submit with good grace to *probatio*, to refuse which, indeed, would in itself be sufficient sign that he was no servant of God but an instrument of the Evil One. In *Rev.* IV, 38, Bridget claims that she had been warned by Christ against a too easy trust in dreams; the devil, He reminded her, is the father of lies.

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[112] Emil Donckel, "Studien über die Prophezeiung des Fr. Telesforus von Cosenza, O.F.M.", *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*, XXVI (1933), 282-314.

[113] Pez, *Thesaurus anecdotorum novissimus* I, ii (Augsburg, 1721), 513.

[114] The letter, "de quodam somnio consolatorio", is printed by Loserth, *Der Codex Epistolaris des Erzbischofs von Prag Johann von Jenzenstein* (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Husitischen Bewegung, I, Vienna, 1877), pp. 87-95.

[115] Seidlmayer, *Die spanischen 'Libri de Schismate'*; see *supra*, note 100.

[116] *Acta et processus*, p. 562.

We shall see that after her death, when the standard text of her *Revelations* began to circulate, and when their importance as testimony in favour of Urban began to be urged in the courts of Europe, there would be many who would seek to discredit her by saying that the *Revelations* had come from the devil. It is to counter such criticisms that the *Epistola solitarii ad reges* was written by Alphonse.

It was composed as a prologue to Book VIII, and just as *Ad Pontifices* was compiled by Alphonse with the double end of serving as a "Mirror to Pontiffs" and also of giving, from unedited material left over from Books I–VII, a conspectus of the whole body of the *Revelations*, so Book VIII is in part a "Mirror for Kings", in part a general Birgittine anthology. Some of the revelations date from Bridget's early days at the Swedish court: VIII, 2, beginning "I am the true king, and no one but I is worthy to be called king", contains counsels to the Swedish king: he should dismiss his evil counsellors, and replace them with those who will not sell justice, who love God and have pity on the miseries of their neighbours.[116a] VIII, 22 and 23, (which Prior Peter had already used as VII, 18 and 19) contain the admonitions to the king of Cyprus, foretelling the doom which would come upon his kingdom. VIII, 27 and 28, (already used as IV, 104 and 105) are those directed at the hostile kings of England and France. VIII, 10, is evidently written for Queen Johanna of Naples. Others, however, are of more general application: VIII, 1, for instance, the allegory of the palace which is the kingdom of God.

We know that this Book VIII had been edited and the *Epistola solitarii* had been composed before September, 1379, because in the evidence which Alphonse gave in the canonization process on September 16, already quoted, he said that he had written the prologue, resolving the doubts of those who questioned the manner and the abundance of Bridget's revelations, to the eighth book, . . . *qui intitulatur liber celestis imperatoris ad reges* . . .[117]

Chapter I of the *Epistola solitarii*[118] is addressed to the kings of Christendom: would that they were true kings in Christ! The book of the *Revelations* which follows was made by Bridget for them, for their instruction and correction: they are not to be Pharaohs, incredulous and obdurate, but rather they shall receive these as true visions, with the help of this epistle, teaching them to discern true from false. To be able to do this, one must know the Scriptures and the fathers, and must also be practised and experienced in the conduct of spiritual life. Today there are few competent so to judge: many willing to be led into rash and immature condemnation of such visionaries as Bridget. They cite instances of those who in former times were led astray by Satan, forgetting the many whose visions were true. They are apt to condemn simple men, and even more women, as incapable of visions and unworthy, forgetting how often God in the Old Law and the New chose such simple ones to manifest His power and confound the wise of this world. He called a shepherd-boy to be His prophet, and His apostles were not doctors but simple fishermen. Both Testaments abound with instances of women endowed with the Holy Ghost. It is dangerous either to approve or condemn such visions without careful examination: the same fate which overtook Pharaoh and his people because of his incredulity has in our own days come upon the kingdom of Cyprus, whose king would not give credence to Bridget.

[116a] Relations between Bridget and King Magnus had become very strained because of her outspokenness, before she left Sweden for Italy, and it was perhaps a fortunate circumstance that in 1376, when Swedish requests for her canonization were sent to Rome, the reigning monarch was no longer Magnus, who had been supplanted by his nephew, Albert of Mecklenburg, who made the necessary petition, presumably with good will. On their side, Bridget's family tactfully refrained from pointing out during the process that Magnus was yet another in whose case Bridget's prognostications had been fulfilled.

[117] *Ibid.*, p. 375.

[118] The text used is that of the Durante 1611 edition.

This opening chapter is aimed not so much at kings as at their counsellors, learned men, doctors in both laws, no doubt, of the type that will dismiss the *Revelations* as the vapourings of a mere woman, a type which is the very antithesis of Alphonse, who draws for us here an excellent miniature portrait of himself, a man learned in scriptural and patristic lore rather than in worldly science (his disparaging remarks on canon law will be recalled), and a practised spiritual counsellor, above all to holy women (as what we have seen of his relations with St. Bridget, St. Catherine of Siena, St. Katherine of Sweden and Blessed Clara Gambacorti shows him to have been). The chapter in one place alludes to Bridget's own remonstrances to those who would condemn her as an ignorant simpleton: she had reminded her detractors, in IV, 113, that she was in good company with David. The violent overthrow by the Genoese of the Lusignan dynasty in Cyprus in 1376 was so recent that Alphonse's allusion to it here is a most telling point.

Chapter II is an analysis of the classical literature, scriptural and patristic, on the subject of *discretio*, as it concerns both visionaries and their visions. The visionaries themselves are to be examined under various heads. Are they spiritually-minded or of the world? Do they live under expert spiritual guidance, or according to their own will and judgment? Do they submit their temptations and their visions to their directors' judgment, fearing to be deceived, or do they take pride in them? Do their lives bear fruits of obedience, humility, charity, prayer, or are they marked by pride, vanity, ambition? Are they firm in the faith and obedient to their superiors, or is their faith and obedience suspect? Have they continued for long in spiritual life and in visions, or are they only beginners? Are they of sound intelligence and judgment, or are they giddy, easily moved, fantastic? Have they been examined by learned men about the matter and manner of their visions?

As to the visions themselves, what is their nature: were they received in waking, in sleeping or in dreaming? Are they corporeal, imaginary and spiritual, intellectual and supernatural? Were they received in ecstasy? Have mysteries and doctrines of the faith been revealed in them? Has divine truth been illuminated or illustrated? Do the visions accord with Scripture? Do they promote virtue and the health of souls, or do they lead to error, teaching that which is monstrous and irrational? Are they always true, or do they sometimes deceive? Do they foretell worldly honours and riches, or humility? Do they encourage pride or meekness, disobedience or obedience?

Chapter III continues this. After describing how by the commandment of Christ she chose to write down her visions "in her own Gothic tongue" and how these were translated for her by Prior Peter, and how Master Peter taught her and Katherine Latin and liturgical chant, it goes on to demonstrate how Bridget in her life and works conformed to all the conditions set out before.

Chapter IV is an account of her manner of receiving her visions, for which, Alphonse says, many have asked him. He refers them to the *Revelations*, and particularly to IV, 77. He himself has often seen her in ecstasy, absorbed in prayer, blind and deaf to everything about her. On recovering, she would relate her visions to him and to her two confessors. Often she would recount to them the physical sensations which she had experienced, "fearing to be deluded by the devil".

Chapter V gives a detailed account of the principal authorities on *discretio*: St. Augustine in Book XII of *De Genesi ad litteram*; St. Jerome's Prologue to the Apocalypse (and especially his distinction between corporeal, spiritual and intellectual visions); St. Gregory in Book IV of the *Dialogues*; St. Thomas Aquinas, writing on prophecy in the *Secunda secundae*; St. Gregory in Book XVIII of the *Moralia*, and Nicholas of Lyra's Prologue to the Psalter. It demonstrates how the *Revelations* conform to their definitions.

Chapter VI rehearses how the *Revelations* show that Bridget was instructed in the manner of distinguishing divine visions from diabolical frauds, and how she was closely interrogated on these matters by theologians in Sweden and in Naples. Alphonse now indicates the principal distinguishing tokens, with his authorities. The visions should bear fruit of humility and obedience, as John Cassian shows in the *Collationes*. They should be accompanied by the sensations appropriate to rapture, as described by Hugh of St. Victor in *De Arra animae*, St. Anthony in *Vitae patrum* and St. Gregory in Book XXVIII of the *Moralia*. The visionary should experience an influx of supernatural intellectual light, as is defined by St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XII, and by St. Thomas. What is revealed must be according to faith and morals, and should promote the instruction of others. The visionary should die a holy and edifying death, and be distinguished by miracles after death.

The *Epistola* concludes with Chapter VII, a very brief recapitulation.

We have seen that the *Epistola* had been composed before September, 1379. It is improbable that at that early date, only a year after the Fondi conclave and the election of Clement VII, Langenstein's "Proposals for Peace", the earliest anti-Birgittine document known to the present writer, could be in Alphonse's hands, even if it was already written. (The date generally assigned to it is 1381). It would seem that in writing the *Epistola* Alphonse was drawing upon his experiences as Bridget's aide during her many vicissitudes, and upon his knowledge of the temper of her adversaries and Urban's, to meet what he foretold would be the tenor of opposition to her *Revelations*, rather than that he was already answering written objections to them. But such pamphlets were not long in appearing.

The first major attack of which we learn is a *libellus* composed in Perugia which came to the knowledge of Adam Easton, and to which he supplies answers in a letter which he sends from Rome to the abbess and convent at Vadstena, telling them that a copy had been sent to Alphonse at Genoa. The letter, which is given the title of *Defensorium*, is dated February 9, 1390,[119] that is, it must have been composed very soon after Easton's release from imprisonment, as a consequence of the death of Urban VI on October 15, 1389, and too soon for him to have learned that Alphonse had died in Genoa on August 19, 1389. The Perugian tract has not as yet been identified, but its contents are precisely indicated by Easton's detailed replies. This attack which he is answering is directed not so much at the *Revelations* as at the rule for the Order of St. Saviour to be followed at Vadstena, and at the *Sermo angelicus*, a long eulogy of the Virgin which, divided into twenty-one portions, forms three long lessons for each day's Matins in the Order. The *Rule*, it was claimed, had been dictated to Bridget by Christ, and the *Sermo angelicus* by an angel, both in her mother tongue. The *Rule* had been authorised by Urban VI in 1378, *sed in tertia persona*,[120] evidently to avoid giving scandal to those unwilling to believe that it was a verbatim record, albeit translated into Latin, of Christ's own words. The *libellus* seems to have begun with linguistic criticisms, and to have asserted that the *Rule* is composed in so crude and barbarous a style and is so full of grammatical errors that it was impossible for the Holy See to approve it until it was corrected, an assertion confirmed, as we have seen, by the evidence in the canonization process of Nicholas Orsini. To this criticism Easton merely replies: *Moniales seu mulieres sunt inbecilles intellectu et rudes ad capiendum subtilia legis Dei: ergo regula vivendi talibus debet sub stilo grosso, facili atque rudi tradi, secundum capacitatem congruam earumdem.*[121]

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[119] So the copy in *Ms* Uppsala C 518; Höjer, p. 114 and note 1. *Ms. Harley* 612's copy (fols. 169^{v}-179^{r}) has the same day and month, but lacks a year. That in *Ms* Bodleian *Hamilton* 7 (*A Summary Catalogue of Western MSS in the Bodleian Library* V, no. 24437), fols. ccxxix - cclviii, a fifteenth-century German copy, lacks a date. Other texts, not seen by the present writer, are in *Mss* Lincoln Chapter Library 114 and Brussels, Bib. Roy. 9523. The order and numbering of the articles in the *Defensorium* agree in the Harley and Hamilton copies so far as article 31. Then in the Harley manuscript, fols. 178^{v}-9^{r}, there follows an "article 32" not found in Hamilton, which begins: Item in leccione quarte ferie dicitur quod bonum esset, conueniens et dignum, quod dies illa ab omnibus in magna reuerencia haberetur qua materia illa in anne utero concepta et collecta fuit ex qua benedictum corpus matris dei formari debebat . . . Then, in the Harley manuscript, fol. 179, apart from the first twelve lines of col. 1, and the whole of fols. 180-1 are left blank. The same scribe resumes on fol. 182, with "article 48", which corresponds with Hamilton's article 32. In Harley, articles 49-54 correspond with Hamilton, articles 33-38, after which the article corresponding with no. 39 in Hamilton is wrongly numbered 54 in Harley, and so to the last article, no. 41 in Hamilton, no. 56 in Harley. The three blank folios in *Harley* 612 are in no way blemished, and each page has the scribe's usual running title to this "Book XII" of the *Revelations*, "Adam Cardinalis". The Hamilton copy offers no hint as to the nature of the missing seventeen articles for which the space was left in *Harley* 612.

The next point made by the *libellus* is that it is stated in the Prologue to the *Rule* that Christ with His own lips dictated it to Bridget in Swedish. This statement the writer has denounced as improbable. This is of interest, as it indicates the entirely irrational but very widely held belief of the times that God and His angels and saints would not make use of any vernacular tongues, a belief which is reflected in the questions which the inquisitors put to St. Joan of Arc about whether St. Catherine and St. Margaret spoke to her in French.[122]

Some of the other points made in the *libellus* are also not without interest, although they need not be examined in detail. It is alleged that Bridget taught heresy about the Incarnation, the Creation, the Virgin, and divine prescience; it is asked why, if when Christ was on earth He showed the most perfect way of life, He should have come again to Bridget to show another, and also if the Holy Scriptures are not in themselves a sufficient record of Christ's words?

Although more of such objections is heard in the next decades at the councils, the *libellus* does not at this time seem to have represented any great body of opinion among those who adhered to Urban VI. After the reports of the first commission appointed to hear the canonization cause, and of a second commission appointed to consider, among other matters, the text of the *Revelations*, had been studied, the pope had promised Katherine that her mother's canonization should take place, but then it was decided to postpone this event because of the troubles of the times.[123] Katherine had thereupon return to Sweden, and died at Vadstena, as a professed nun, in 1381.[124] In 1389 Urban had announced that the canonization would take place during the celebrations of the jubilee which he proclaimed for the coming year,[125] but he had died before the year began, and been succeeded by Boniface IX. One of the purposes of Easton's letter to Vadstena was to urge them to send a fresh petition for canonization to Rome. Boniface was favourably disposed, but appointed a third commission to re-examine the evidence.[126] One of the three cardinals serving on the commission was the now rehabilitated Easton. It would seem that only two objectors appeared before them,[127] and after they had put in their report, St. Bridget was solemnly canonized on October 7, 1391,[128] an event which gave the greatest offence in the Clementine camp, and which laid up many troubles for the Birgittine Order in the next century.

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[120] Höjer, pp. 66-7.

[121] *Ms Hamilton* 7, fol. ccxxxi.

[122] P. Champion, *Procès de condamnation de Jeanne d'Arc* I (Paris, 1920), pp. 64, 276.

[123] Höjer, pp. 110-1.

[124] *Acta SS*, March III, p. 515.

[125] Höjer, p. 113 and note 1.

[126] *Ibid.*, pp. 114-5.

[127] *Ibid.*, p. 116 and note 2.

It would be tedious to follow these troubles through all their complexities, but it must be observed that one of their prime causes lay in the grants which had been made of special indulgences to those who should on certain feasts visit and offer alms at the monastic churches of the Order. St. Bridget had claimed divine authority for asking for such grants.[129] On February 1, 1378, Vadstena was granted the same indulgence as that allowed to the church of San Pietro ad Vincula on its patronal feast, August 1,[130] then on December 3, 1397, Vadstena, and later the other houses of the order, which by then included Lübeck in Germany and Syon in England, were further granted the indulgence allowed to the Portiuncula Church in Assisi,[131] to be gained on Mid-Lent Sunday and hence known as the "Laetare" or "Portiuncula" indulgence. At the Council of Constance, where the French "nation" showed themselves very hostile to the Order, its foundress and its privileges, motions were put under way to abolish all plenary indulgences granted from Rome and Avignon since the time of Gregory XI.[132] Although this precisely was not achieved, Martin V after his election took cognizance of the sentiments of the majority of the Council, and made separate concordats on the matter of indulgences with each "nation", that is, with each voting bloc, at the Council.[133] Syon was not affected, since the English concordat left such affairs to the decisions of individual ordinaries.[134] The bishop of London recommended the retention of the "Syon Pardon", and in 1419 Henry V obtained a special ratification of all the house's privileges.[135] But the Scandinavian kingdoms were part of the German "nation," whose concordat was determined by the views of the Germans themselves, the greatest sufferers under the abuses during the Schism in this matter, and Vadstena and Lübeck found their privileges abolished.[136] In Lübeck the monks defied their bishop, and continued to proclaim the "Pardon."[137]

When the Council of Constance was in progress, the Swedish envoys had asked that St. Bridget's canonization of 1391 be confirmed.[138] The last pontifical act of John XXIII, on February 1, 1415, was to do this,[139] but the envoys had further asked that three new Scandinavian candidates for canonization should be enrolled among the saints.[140] André Combes has recently made out an excellent case for his contention that Gerson produced his famous attack upon St. Bridget's authority, *De probatione spirituum*, as a protest against these further requests, which were referred not to the pope but to the Council, and by the Council to a commission of which Gerson was a member. Combes assigns to Gerson's tract the date August 3, 1415, by which time her canonization had been solemnly proclaimed again.[141]

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[128] Boniface IX's bull of canonization, *Ab Origine mundi*, is printed in Durante, pp. 18-23 of the unnumbered prefatory pages.

[129] *Revelationes* IV, 137.

[130] Höjer, p. 99 and note 3. A text of the bull granting the indulgence is in Magnus Celsius, *Apparatus ad historiam sveo-gothicam* (1728), p. 137, no. 29.

[131] Höjer, p. 146 and note 1.

[132] Hefele, *Conciliengeschichte* VII (1874), p. 335 and note 1.

[133] *Ibid.*, p. 335, 340-1.

[134] Rymer, *Foedera* IX, p. 731.

[135] *Ms* British Museum *Harl.* 2321, fols. 17^{v}-62^{r}, written in a fifteenth-century hand, contains what is evidently a "stock" sermon to be preached at Syon on the pardon days, explaining the Church's doctrine of *a pena et a culpa*, commenting upon the notices concerning indulgences exhibited in the church, recounting Syon's privileges and directing the faithful as to the necessary dispositions for gaining the indulgences. On fol. 23^{v} it is stated that Pope Martin has confirmed the grant of the Vincula indulgence to Syon, but not as yet to any other house of the order, and the sermon goes on to relate how the Portiuncula indulgence was first granted to Vadstena, and then to all the other Birgittine houses, 'and in special to þis monasteri of Syon, as our billes schewe". See Mary Bateson, *Catalogue of the Library of Syon Monastery* (Cambridge, 1898), pp. 49, note 3, and 56, note 1, for further information on such sermons.

[136] Höjer, pp. 175-6.

[137] *Ibid.*, p. 176 and note 2.

[138] Von der Hardt, *Magnum Oecumenicum Constantiense Concilium* IV, pp. 39-40.

[139] *Ibid.*, IV 40.

[140] See the article by Gallén referred to, *supra*, note 18.

There can be little doubt that *De probatione spirituum*[142] is in part based upon the *Epistola solitarii*, and is a re-arrangement of Alphonse's material, skilfully designed to throw the onus of proof back on to the supporters of St. Bridget. It is well known from the writings of the apostles and the fathers that spirits may be good or evil, of God or of the devil (*Consideratio* I). It is not given to all to prove the origin of spirits, but only to some by the gift of the Holy Ghost (*Consideratio* II). There are different methods of proof: one method is by learning in the Scriptures, another is *per inspirationem intimam, seu internum saporem, sive per experimentalem dulcedinem quamdam; sive per illustrationem a montibus aeternis effugantem tenebras omnis dubietatis*. The authorities for this are St. Gregory in the *Dialogues*, St. Augustine in the *Confessions*, and *Hugo de Ar(r)a animae*.[143]

Without the gift of the Holy Ghost, it is impossible for men to apply general rules derived from abstract study to particular cases; with the gift, men may judge in their own cases but still be ignorant where others are concerned. Hence there is a third method of proof, the *modus officialis* with which prelates are entrusted by their office (*Consideratio* IV). The first method, which is the method the Council will need to employ, will be useless unless men of good life are consulted: evil livers can only give misleading judgments. Proof of this is in the multitude of conflicting testimonies now in the hands of the Council, and especially in the case of Bridget, who claimed to have received constantly the visits in visions not only of angels but also of Christ, His Mother, St. Agnes and other saints, who all spoke familiarly with her. It is dangerous in this case either to condemn or to approve: nothing could be less worthy and fitting in this Council than to approve false, illusory or frivolous visions as if true, and to condemn what has received the approval of various countries would cause scandal in Christendom and lessen popular zeal (*Consideratio* V).

It will be seen that what Gerson is really asking for in this last article is that the Swedes and others be left to continue to honour St. Bridget, but that the French be not asked to set the seal of their approval on her *Revelations*, by which, they may have feared, French policy and dealings in the last century would stand condemned.

Consideratio VI continues: The first method, of learning, is also useless unless it is applied by men themselves expert in spiritual warfare (that is, against the devil). There is the same difference between a theologian and a contemplative as there is between an apprentice in medicine and his master. The judges whose opinions are to be sought must be sound theologians and advanced contemplatives (and here Gerson alludes to what he has already said in attacking Ruysbroeck's doctrine as defined in *The Spiritual Espousals*). We cannot see nor scrutinize the hearts of others, but we can know them by their fruits, and we must enquire into all the circumstances of their visions.

Are visionaries by nature of good and sound judgment? (He lists various types of frenetic, hysteric, morbid mentality which are to be discounted). Are they mere novices and beginners? By whom are they frequented? If by the rich, we may suspect spiritual pride or a concealed pleasure in their gifts; if by the poor, we may suspect them of fraud. Do they prefer their own judgment to that of others? As to their visions, are they according to St. James iii, 17: pure, peaceable, modest, tractable, producing good works, impartial? Are they such as might be achieved by common knowledge and intelligence? If so, they are no visions. God reserves visions to reveal the new, not the old and received. The people should be brought to an understanding of the faith through the preaching of the Scriptures, not through visions, pleasing though their novelty be (*Considerationes* VII-VIII).

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[141] *Essai sur la critique de Ruysbroeck par Gerson* I, "Introduction critique et dossier documentaire" (Paris, 1945), pp. 297-329.

[142] *Opera omnia* I, ed. Dupin, pp. 37-42.

[143] Alphonse in his Chapter VI has the same discussion of "sweetness" as a mark of divine inspiration, and he cites the same authority: "*Probatur etiam hoc pulchre per Hugonem de St. Victore in soliloquio* De Arra animae, *in fine totius tractatus, ubi anima loquitur ei dicens . . . . 'Qu(i)d est illud dulce . . . .'* (Durante, p. 586).

Here again, the relations of this to Chapter II of the *Epistola solitarii* are plain, and the application to St. Bridget of the additional points which Gerson introduces is equally so. We can see a clear allusion to her frequenting the palaces of kings (Gerson probably knew that she had in her day been grand mistress of the household to a Swedish queen, although he may not have been aware that Alphonse's mother had held the same office to a queen of Castile), to her desire for Franciscan poverty, and to the claims which many of her devotees, including the Lübeck monks, were making for her *Revelations*, that they were to be regarded as of equal authority with the Scriptures.[144]

Gerson continues: those who receive visions must comport themselves with prudence, and a heavy responsibility rests upon their spiritual advisers that they are not encouraged in pride. Their reasons for revealing their visions must be scrutinized: when this has been done for seemingly excellent reasons, it has led to great scandal and disunity, as in these days in the cases of John of Varennes, Hus and others. So too should their conversation: do they speak in secret or in public, are they actives or contemplatives, is their life marked by great penitence or conviviality; and, especially if they be women, how do they converse with their confessors and directors? Are they everlastingly talking, now confessing their sins, now relating their visions, now holding pious discourses? The fathers, and especially St. Augustine and St. Bonaventure, tell us that there is no more killing or incurable malady than this. He quotes Virgil on Dido:

haerent infixi pectore voltus
Verbaque nec placidam membris dat cura quietem.[145]

God is to be found in peace and stillness; such women do not find Him (*Considerationes* IX-XI).

We can observe here the subtlety of Gerson's approach: he will not directly impute heresy to a canonized saint, but he may remind his readers of the many heretical visionaries there have been. And in his references to the heavy responsibilities borne by the directors of visionaries, it is plain that we have an allusion to Alphonse and the active encouragement which he gave to St. Bridget, who, Gerson reminds us, was not a religious, lived in a constant blaze of publicity, and was much given to the public utterance of her views. Without saying it in so many words, *De probatione spirituum* makes clear beyond all doubt that Gerson did not believe that her inspiration came from God.

This was not, however, the end of the great Birgittine debate. Because it was thought that the approbation given to her by the Council of Constance was halfhearted, as indeed we have the evidence of *De probatione spirituum* to show that it was, Martin V re-affirmed her canonization a second time at Florence, on July 1, 1419.[146] Meanwhile, as has been shown, trouble had broken out because of the Lübeck monks' refusal to submit to their loss of the Vincula and Laetare indulgences. When the Council of Basle was convoked, this was one of the matters which required urgent regulation: the Vadstena diary records that on August 13, 1433, the monastery received a writ, summoning the confessor-general and abbess to appear before the council *cum documentis super revelacionibus beate Birgitte et super indulgenciis festi Sancti Petri ad vincula.*[147] One can imagine the horror of the abbess at being required to emerge from her Order's very strict *clausura.* In fact the confessor-general and brother Ako, later bishop of Västerås, set off on September 27;[148] they went first to Rome, where they consulted the Spanish Dominican John Torquemada, then Master of the Sacred Palace and since the time of the first canonization well known as a devotee of St. Bridget. When they arrived in Basle they found that the representative of the University of Paris, Nicholas Amici, had brought a process against the Lübeck monks in the matter of the indulgences, to which the monks had replied by citing the unassailability of the *Revelations.*[149] A commission, appointed to consider this, had published a report condemning one hundred and twenty-three doctrinal errors which, it alleged, had been discovered in the *Revelations.*[150] In May, 1434, at which time Cardinal John Cervantes was still the Council's judge in matters of faith,[151] a second commission was appointed to confer with him and to examine articles taken from the books *assertarum revelacionum S. Brigite,*[152] and on this commission the lead in attacking the Birgittine writings was taken by a German Franciscan, Matthias Döring, an extreme *modernus.*[153] Döring was already the author of an anti-Birgittine tract, *Probate spiritus,*[154] but he can hardly have been active in the deliberations of the first commission, as Höjer claims, because we know that although he was nominated to represent his province at the Council, as late as September 2, 1434, he wrote from Breslau to Cardinal Cesarini, explaining his absence as caused by a provincial visitation which he was undertaking, and that in October, 1434, he was in Rostock.[155] Except that a fresh member was appointed to the second commission on August 14, 1434,[156] there appears to be no record of its activities until March 26, 1435, when the Council was obliged to take account of the letter from the king of Denmark and from twelve bishops, supporting the *Revelations* and pointing out the disorder which would ensue in Denmark if they were condemned as superstitious.[157] As a result, an auxiliary commission was in this year appointed, which was presided over by Torquemada, who had by now emerged as the leader of the *antiqui,* and it published a vindication of the hundred and twenty-three supposed errors. This vindication appears in Mansi as Torquemada's *Defensiones,*[158] a most detailed study of the question which takes each point raised by the opposing faction in turn and answers it, arguing in every case for the text of the *Revelations* and proving with a wealth of citations that what Bridget taught has the authority of the Scriptures and of some of the greatest of the Church's doctors, including St. Bernard and the Victorines. The *Defensiones*

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[144] It must be said that Alphonse himself did not, in the preface to the *Viridarium*, discourage such claims, and we may see how far some of St. Bridget's devotees were prepared to go in an annotation by John of Kalmar, a Vadstena monk (ca. 1362-1446; Westman, p. 267, note 1) to his copy of the *Revelations*, now *Ms* Lund University Library 21. He quotes the opinion *virorum virtutum et magne literature* that in the *Revelations* is to be found *consummacio tocius theologie*, and then goes on to cite their belief (which must at least have been his own) *quod si tota sacra scriptura fuisset combusta, doctrina illa que in libris reuelacionum continetur sufficeret ad reformacionem catholice fidei omniumque bonorum statum tocius mundi* (*ibid.*, p. 287, note 1).

[145] *Aeneid* IV, 4.

[146] Höjer, p. 180 and note 1. A text of the

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confirmatory bull is in Durante, pp. 24-5 of the prefatory, unnumbered pages.

[147] *Scriptores Rerum Suecicarum Medii Aevi* I, ed. Fant (Uppsala, 1818), p. 151.

[148] *Ibid.*, p. 151.

[149] Höjer, p. 206.

[150] *Ibid.*, p. 207 and note 2.

[151] He retained the office until July of that year, when he was sent on a mission to Italy, and was succeeded by Cardinal Louis Aleman; Westman, p. 279 and note 3; G. Pérouse, *Le cardinal Louis Aleman et la fin du grand schisme* (Paris, 1904), pp. 184-5; see also O. Richter, *Die Organisation und Geschäftsordnung des Basler Konzils* (Leipzig, 1877).

[152] Haller, *Concilium Basiliense* III (Basle, 1896-1904), p. 95.

[153] See P. Albert. "Die 'Confutatio Primatus Papae': ihre Quelle und ihre Verfasser", *Historisches Jahrbuch,* XI (1890), 439-90, and the same author's work, *Matthias Döring: ein deutscher Minorit des 15. Jahrhunderts* (2nd edition, Stuttgart, 1892).

[154] Westman, pp. 282, 283 and notes 1 and 2. The tract is partially reported in *Ms* Uppsala University Library C 31, fols. 92-5, and *Ms* C 518: Höjer, p. 208.

[155] Höjer, p. 206; Albert, *Matthias Döring,* pp. 45-7.

[156] Haller, III, p. 175.

[157] *Ibid.*, V, p. 123.

[158] *Sacrorum Conciliorum Collectio* XXX (Venice, 1792), pp. 699-814.

were however set aside by the conciliar commission on matters of faith, now presided over by Cardinal Aleman, who, after receiving an *advisamentum* from the commission originally appointed to consider the *Revelations*, ruled (1) that the Order was in no way to continue to publish the Vincula or Laetare indulgences, (2) that the conduct of the Lübeck brethren was condemned, (3) that neither the title, *Libri divinarum seu coelestium revelationum*, nor many of the doctrines of the *Revelations* should be approved, (4) that much in them needed skilled theological interpretation, and that in their present form they were not to be published, (5) that in future manuscripts this *advisamentum* was to be added as a commentary, and (6) that the teaching of some of the Order that the *Revelations* should be given the same credence as the Gospels was rash, untrue and inadmissible. None of this, however, impugned St. Bridget's sanctity, canonization, cult or *Rule*.[159]

This adverse verdict was confirmed by a bull of December 1, 1436.[160] But the Order must soon have received advice that the question might be again opened, because on September 5, 1444, two of the Vadstena brothers, the diary states, set off for Rome *pro tribus negociis expediendis, videlicet pro approbacione revelacionum, et confirmacione regule Sancti Saluatoris, et pro proprie manus subscripcione doctorum declarancium articulos de revelacionibus per emulos extractos*.[161] The articles referred to are the one hundred and twenty-three condemned at Basle, and this renewed application to Rome reflected the situation which had terminated the council after trouble had developed between it and the pope, who this time was joined by all the cardinals except Aleman, who persisted in Basle, and Cervantes, who withdrew to neutral territory.[162] The approbatory declarations which were to be authenticated in Rome were those of Torquemada, by now a cardinal,[163] and his supporters. Their original findings at Basle in favour of the *Revelations* are printed by Durante,[164] as are also their authentications, dated March 29, 1446, at Rome.[165] The two brothers originally sent from Vadstena had been robbed on their journey and forced to return. On August 2, 1445, the confessor-general and a companion had set off and they returned on October 22, 1446, having obtained the necessary declarations, with seals and signatures, but with the questions of the approbation of the *Revelations* and the confirmation of the *Rule* still in suspense, *quia unio non erat facta*.[166] Durante printed Torquemada's findings as a prologue to the *Revelations* themselves. Chapter I contains the information, already mentioned, about the many copies of the *Revelations* taken during the original process of canonization. Chapter II describes the salutary effects of her revelations in St. Bridget's own life. Chapter III asserts the unquestionable truth of that which was revealed, Chapter IV its conformity to Scripture and to the dotcrine of other saints. In Chapter V there is a reminder of her canonization and of its confirmations.

It is a tribute to the power of St. Bridget's advocacy of the cause of Rome that fifty years and more after her death her writings were still capable of dividing the *antiqui* from the *moderni*. It is a tribute to the competence and prescience of the *Epistola solitarii* that Torquemada was happy to produce a defence of the *Revelations* which does not seek to disguise its derivation in large part from Alphonse's work.

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[159] Höjer, p. 211. A letter from the Lübeck monks to Vadstena in 1473 stated that the revocation of the Vincula indulgence was made on March 1, 1436; *ibid.*, p. 211 note 2. But the Vadstena diary records that the confessor-general returned there from Basle on 27 January, 1436, "inexpeditis negociis ordinis nostri"; *Scriptores Rerum Suecicarum* I, p 153.

[160] Höjer, p. 211, note 3.

[161] *Scriptores Rerum Suecicarum* I, p. 161.

[162] Pérouse, p. 248.

[163] Eubel, II, pp. 7-8. The date of his promotion was December 18, 1439.

[164] This is the *Epistola Domini Johannis*, in the unnumbered prefatory pages, the text proper of which begins: Dixerunt Judith Ozias et presbyteri, Omnia quae locuta es vera sunt. . . .

[165] Entitled *Littera testimonialis* in the unnumbered, prefatory pages in Durante.

[166] *Scriptores Rerum Suecicarum* I, pp. 161. 162, 164.

The final acts of rehabilitation were delayed until the pontificate of Sixtus IV, who, having already annulled the decrees of the Council of Constance in 1478,[167] on July 1, 1484, restored to Vadstena the Vincula indulgence and its other lost privileges,[168] when the Basle decrees were annulled. The Order must then have triumphed greatly, but one may wonder if any of its members understood that although they had won their cases in the courts, the true cause of their foundress still had to prevail. She had written:

> Vidi in Roma a palatio papae prope sanctum Petrum usque ad castrum sancti Angeli et a castro usque ad domum sancti Spiritus et usque ad ecclesiam sancti Petri quasi quod esset una planities, et ipsam planitiem circuibat firmidissimus murus, diuersaque habitacula erant circa ipsum murum. Tunc audiui uocem dicentem: 'Papa ille qui sponsam suam ea dilectione diligit qua ego et amici mei dileximus eam possidebit hunc locum cum assessoribus suis, ut liberius et quietius aduocare possit consiliarios suos.'[169]

It would seem that here St. Bridget is not speaking allegorically, but that she intends us to take these words as meaning exactly what they say, but before there was to be a pope who would reduce his earthly lordship to the limits which she drew, Vadstena and Lübeck and Syon and half Christendom were to be laid in ruins.

The age of political and spiritual chaos in which St. Bridget lived was in many ways very like our own days. Sometimes we are forcibly struck by this, as when we read how while she was living in Rome the demagogue of the day was assassinated in the city and his corpse strung up for vilification and mutilation by the frenzied mob who not long ago had given their adoration to him. And then, as now and always in such times, a multitude of false prophets had arisen to bewilder and cajole men. The *Epistola solitarii* is no mere academic exercise in theology. It is written with Alphonse's two constant aims clearly in view: Urban must triumph and reunite Christendom, and the *Revelations* are his letters of credence to Christendom; and the *Revelations* are true because Bridget was a saint of God, as must appear by her canonization. She is no Abbot Joachim, no Telesphorus, and it is implicit in all that was written about *probatio* that its object is by no means to demolish and dismiss all prophecy and revelation as illusory and superstitious, but to distinguish between the false and the true. The very passion with which such writers as Henry of Langenstein and John Gerson inveigh against those whom they suspect of fraud is a measure of the credence which they, in common with all medieval men, were bound to give to seers and visionaries who could pass the tests. Today it is easy for us to dismiss such figures as St. Bridget and St. Catherine from the scene, and to discover as the prime causes of the political events of their age economic factors which the Christian faith and its leaders neither controlled nor affected. But in doing so we forget that the politicians of the Middle Ages, avaricious, greedy for power, venal and corrupt, still believed in the Four Last Things. In all the documents in the case of St. Bridget we have the clearest proof that popes and kings could not always deny audience to those who came to speak to them of death and judgment, hell and heaven, that "even as constrained to hear they heard them."

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[167] Raynaldus, XIX, no. 46, p. 279.

[168] Höjer, p. 223 and note 3.

[169] *Revelationes* VI, 74.

An Introduction to the Study of Saxon Settlement in Transylvania During the Middle Ages

EUGEN WEBER

THIS brief study is an attempt to leave the main current of the medieval *Drang Nach Osten,* and to investigate the fortunes of a relatively small number of German colonists. It concerns those men who, attracted by offers of royal privilege and land, settled in Transylvania between the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries. Cut off in a sense by the aftermath of the Mongol invasion of 1240, in another by the change of mood and motives which the next two centuries saw in Central European politics, their communities kept until their recent destruction certain characteristics which the original founders had brought into the land. They retained until 1944 and 1945 forms and customs more faithful to their origins than any we know in the West, and which are therefore of considerable importance to the historian of the Middle Ages in Europe.

The documents mentioned below, and others relating to the period, are fortunately available in the great collections, mainly German, which the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have left us. The collections of Endlicher, Fejer, Schwandtner, Theiner, are all rich in relevant material. For the ecclesiastical history of the period, the volumes of A. Potthast's *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*—1304 (Berlin, 1875), are a mine of information. P. Jaffe's work, which ends in 1198, covers rather too early a period, especially for sees like that of Milcov, which plays an important part in our story. Best of all collections, and dealing directly with our subject is the *Urkundenbuch zur Geschichte der Deutschen in Siebenbürgen* (Hermannstadt, 1892), of F. Zimmerman and C. Werner. This, and the first volumes of E. Hurmuzachi's *Documente Privitoare la Istoria Românilor,* give a succession of relevant documents, apparently well-edited, and reliable.

As it will appear below, information on early immigration is scanty. Sources concerning similar activities in other lands can help to throw some light on what happened, or what we may surmise happened, in Transylvania. Most helpful from this point of view can be the *Chronica Slavorum sev Annales Helmoldi,* and also Otto von Heinemann's compilation of the *Codex Diplomaticus Anhaltinus.* The scholarly essay of E. O. Schulze, *Die Kolonisierung und Germanisierung der Gebiete zwischen Saale und Elbe* (Leipzig, 1896), and F. Curschmann's suggestive work on famine as a basic motive during the middle ages—*Hungersnöte im Mittelalter* (Leipzig, 1900)—both prize essays at a time when the standard of prize essays was high, help us to visualize the times, and some of their problems. When seeking help from such quarters, however, one must be careful to remember differences in local conditions. There is, for instance, a temptation to look, say, to work like that of E. Lavisse, *La Marche de Brandebourg sous la Dynastie Ascanienne* (Paris, 1875), for information on the problems and the forms of contemporary settlements. Yet, it is clear that, while the background and the motives of both groups of settlers are much the same, the student can get into trouble if he tries to use information concerning Brandenburg to clarify conditions in the rich uplands of Transylvania.

Concerned more directly with the subject, one might begin with F. Teutsch's great book, *Geschichte der Siebenbürger Sachsen* (Sibiu, 1925), and A. Scheiner, *Die Herkunftsfrage der Siebenbürger Sachsen* (Ostland, 1931). Even an incomplete bibliography, such as this, should mention Ioan Ferent, *Cumanii Si Episcopia Lor* (Blaj, 1931), Schünemann's article in the *Siebenbürger Vierteljahrschrift* of 1934, "Die Stellung des Sudestens in der Geschichte der mittelalterlichen deutsche Kolonisation", and another excellent essay by F. Maksai, "Die Ansiedlung der Sachsen," which appeared in *Siebenbürgen und seiner Völker* (Budapest, 1944). About the knightly orders, M. Perlbach's article on the German Orders in Siebenbürgen may be found in the *Mitteilungen des Instituts für Oesterreichische Geschichtsforschung,* XXIV (1905). W. Bergmann's slender volume, *Reste deutscher Ordensburgen in Siebenbürgen* (Freudenthal, 1909), is mainly useful in providing a compact series of charter-references concerning the stay of the Teutonic Knights in *Terra Borzā*. G. E. Mueller should be read for a sense of the lively polemics of local historical societies.[1] The books of N. Iorga, though concerned with the Roumanian side of the question, can be recommended for soundness and style, free of the ponderousness which too often encumbers the work of German historians.[2]

When all is said and done, however, it is well to bear in mind when considering the origins of the Saxon settlements the warning of a Saxon scholar, Mr. R. David, writing in number 184 of the *Kronstadter Zeitung* (Brasov, 1936). Mr. David points out that a chancellery was only set up at the court of Hungary during the second half of the twelfth century. Thus, it is only from then on that written documents appear in any number. Obviously, this does not mean that nothing had been done until that time, but simply that it had been done on verbal orders; and this may explain the lack of documentary evidence concerning the first Saxon colonists, of whom we know practically nothing.

Nothing, in fact, is more uncertain than the history of Transylvania after the Roman evacuation of 275; but this is what seems to have happened: such Daco-Romans as had elected to stay behind after 275 continued their life, adapting themselves to the new conditions and the new surroundings—new, that is, from a political, military, and soon economic, point of view. Hoards of Roman and Byzantine coins, found in the various parts of Transylvania, seem to indicate the existence of commercial relations with the Empire up to the sixth century, when the Slavs became masters of the country. The two peoples intermarried, and Slav words, like Slav names, are present to this day in the speech of the native population. By the time the Hungarians arrived in the land, the Dacian Slavs seem to have become assimilated. The Hungarians certainly do not appear to have found any purely Slav groups. They found small principalities, the result of the mixture between Slavs and the Romanized native Geto-Thracian population. "Daco-Romans transformed by Slavs", as Seton-Watson quotes Xenopol's phrase.

Towards the end of the eleventh century, the king of Hungary, interested mainly in the salt and gold mines of Transylvania, built the fortress of Turda, in the West, on the Black Cris. A series of other fortresses followed—at Dej, Bistrita, and in a number of other points. The king of Hungary was an Apostolic king: his duty, especially in the newly-conquered lands, was the propagation of the Catholic faith. The most effective means of doing this was generally force. To protect himself from Byzantine influence—and also from German suzerainty—he cultivated Rome. About this time we find a bishop sent direct from Rome established at Belgrad (Alba Iulia, the Roman's Apulum), on the River Mures.

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[1] G. E. Mueller, *Für wen ist das Andreanum im Jahre 1224 ausgestellt worden?* (Hermannstadt, 1930); *Das Deutschtum u. die secundaren Siedlungen in Siebenbürgen* (Hermannstadt, 1929); *Die Grafen des Siebenburger Sachsenlandes* (Hermannstadt, 1931). See also, by the writers quoted above: S. F. Endlicher, *Rerum Hungaricarum monumenta Arpadiana* (Sangalli, 1849); G. Fejer, *Codex Diplomaticus Hungariae ecclesiasticus ac civilis* (Budae, 1829-44); J. Schwandtner, *Scriptores Rerum Hungaricarum* (Vienna, 1746-48); A. Theiner, *Vetera Monumenta Historica Hungariam sacram* (Rome, 1859).

[2] *Histoire des Roumains de la Dacie Trajane* (Paris, 1896); *Scrisori si Inscriptii Ardelene* (Bucarest, 1906); *Histoire des Roumains de Transylvanie et de Hongrie* (Bucarest, 1916); *Histoire des Roumains et de leur Civilization* (Paris, 1920); *Histoire des Roumains et de la Romanité Orientale* (Bucarest, 1937-40).

A little later, a Cistercian monastery is founded at Cârta, in the valley of the river Olt.

This was the era of colonization, and the Hungarians were isolated in a strange, rich, and savage land. Beyond their castles, beyond the villages where native Vlach serfs lived and worked, beyond the settlements of their own, Hungarian, colonists, whose dues went to the baron or the abbot, there was the *Terra Blachorum,* the country of the Vlachs, with its forest and clearings, deep valleys for pasture, and the high hidden uplands, where agriculture had been practised—albeit in rudimentary fashion—for centuries. Here, the Petchenegs were masters, and later the Cumans.

About the year 1100, there appears to be in the land a rural society lacking any common political institutions, but possessed of similar laws and customs, and whose vestiges of Roman culture are apparent in the carry-over of Roman terms and a Roman tradition.[3] This collection of tribes without much cohesion in a land potentially rich, was the object of the new Hungarian campaign in which German settlers and German monks were cast to play an important part. Sword, plough, and cross were to work together, and indeed the missionaries did much effective work among the Cumans. Thus the *Magnum Chronicon Belgicum* repeats the characteristically exaggerated account of an Archbishop Robert of Strigonium, who crossed the great forest to baptize a prince of the Cumans and fifteen thousand of his men.[4]

But baptized or not, the natives were not trusted by the successors of Arpad. The Hungarian court saw that its rule could not maintain itself, let alone be extended, unless military measures were taken to consolidate it, and settlers recruited from reliable stock were brought into the country. Magyar colonists (Szekelys or Siculi) appeared at the beginning of the twelfth century, but most were fully employed in their own plains. So, because the king feared the Byzantine menace more than German pressure, he turned toward the latter. He called for colonists, and his call may have been similar to that which went out of Saxony in 1108, and which is worth quoting, because it expresses so well the motives of the time (yet not restricted only to that time):

> They . . . are an abominable people, but their land is very rich in flesh, honey, grain, birds, and abounding in all the products of fertility of the earth when cultivated, so that none can be compared to it. So say they who know. Wherefore, O Saxons, Franks, Lotharingians, Men of Flanders most famous—here you can both save your souls and, if it please you, acquire the best of land to live in.

The document from which this quotation is taken refers to Slavs, and is signed by Saxon bishops and barons, but its motives and the sentiments to which it appeals are general.[5]

A later historian, A. Hauck, has expressed some doubts, not concerning the authenticity, but concerning the assumed date of this document which Heinemann and others date in 1107-8. He suggests that this letter was only produced after the Wendish rising against the Germans, as a piece of propaganda for the Wendish crusade of 1147. Hauck is not necessarily right, and Kotzschke, who published his *Quellen zur Geschichte der Ostdeutschen Kolonisation* (Leipzig, 1912), nine years after the publication of Hauck's work, still dates the letter as of 1107. Whatever its exact date, however, the document seems relevant to our particular subject.

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[3] Endlicher, *op. cit.*, p. 249; also Schwandtner, *op. cit.*, III, p. 549: Haec regio dicitur antiquitus fuisse pascua Romanorum. I do not mean to become involved in the long debate between Rumanian and Hungarian historians, especially since ignorance of the Hungarian language has prevented my using works in that tongue (Galdi, Homan, Makkai among the moderns). But cf. H. Seton Watson, *History of the Roumanians* (Cambridge 1934), Chapter I.

[4] J. Pistorius, *Rerum Germanicarum Scriptores* III, cur. B. G. Struvio (Ratisbon, 1726), p. 242.

[5] *Codex Diplomaticus Anhaltinus* I, ed. Heinemann (Dessau, 1867), p. 137; cf. Hauck, *Kirchengeschichte Deutschlands* IV (Leipzig, 1903), p. 599, note 4.

How well it reflects the contemporary climate of opinion one can see by comparing it with a similar message sent out when the land of Holstein was thrown open to colonization, after the reduction of the native Abodrites in 1143. Helmoldus, compiler of the *Chronica Slavorum,* writes:

> Because the land was without people, Adolph sent messengers into all regions round about, even into Flanders and Holland, the bishopric of Utrecht, into Westphalia and Frisia, to proclaim that all who were in want of land might come with their families and receive the best soil, a spacious country, rich in crops, abounding in fish and flesh and exceeding good pasturage.[6]

As in Northern and North-Eastern Germany, the promoters of the Transylvanian settlements wanted to advance the rule of the Catholic Church towards the East,[7] and to secure the Carpathian mountain passes against the incursion of barbarians beyond. This done, they could settle down to squeeze some revenue out of their new territories.

It was the time when the great eastward movement of the German peoples had recovered from the check of the second Wendish rising, and was again in full swing. King Geysa of Hungary only had to canalize a part of this great tide towards the Transylvanian march which had so far defied all his efforts. The colonists would be *hospites*—guests of the king. And Stephen, first christian king of Hungary, who had married a daughter of Duke Henry of Bavaria, promoted the settlement of German colonists in Hungary proper as well as in Transylvania, not only on crown lands, but also on the lands of nobles and clergy. Gisela, his wife, looked to her father's lands for men, and settled a number of Bavarian families in "her" town of Satu-Mare (Szathmar, Sathmare).[8]

Thus there probably were skilled German workers, and isolated traders and settlers in Transylvania even before 1100. But the majority of Saxon settlements were made during the twelfth century, by small groups of *hospites*, a fraction of the century's *Drang Nach Osten* whose beginnings, as Iorga has pointed out, are parallel to and not unconnected with the first crusade.

The origins of these colonists, whom the earliest documents call men of Flanders (*Flandrenses*), or simply Germans (*Theotonici*), are doubtful and have been much disputed. The likeliest theory is that which, based on linguistic similarities, traces these settlers back to Luxemburg and the valley of the Moselle.[9] On the other hand, we know that the skilled German workers brought over to exploit the Bosnian mines during the eleventh century came from Saxony.[10] And it appears that, before the groups of immigrant peasants who followed their Count and their promoter, a small number of skilled German workers were imported to the mining districts.

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[6] *Chronica Slavorum* I, 58 (Frankfort, 1581), p. 47. The passage continues: Dixit: Holzatis et Sturmariis: Nonne vos terram Slavorum subegistis, et mercati eam estis in mortibus fratrum et parentum vestrorum? Cur ergo novissimi venitis ad possidendum eam? Estote primi, et transmigrate in terram desiderabilem, et incolite eam, et participamini deliciis eius, eo quod vobis debeantur optima eius, qui tulistis eam de manu inimicorum. Ad hanc vocem surrexit innumera multitudo de variis nationibus . . . ceperunt ergo inhabitari deserta Wagirensis provincia et multiplicabatur numerus accolarum eius.

[7] Iorga, *Histoire des Roumains et de la Romanité Orientale* III, p. 123, emphasizes the crusading character of the Hungarian kings: les rois de Hongrie, délégués permanents de croisade. . . . They frequently bore crusading names: King Emeric was Almericus — Amaury.

[8] A. D. Xenopol, *Istoria Românilor din Dacia Traiana* II (Second Edition, Bucarest, 1914), p. 176, note 5; Fejer, *op. cit.*, III, 2, p. 24.

[9] G. Kisch, *Siebenbürgen im Lichte der Sprache* (Leipzig, 1929). See also his *Vergleichendes Wörterbuch der Nosner u. Moselfrankisch-luxemburgischen Mundart* (Hermannstadt, 1905). As early as 1769, a western traveller recognizes the connection: De Feller, *Itinéraire* I, p. 277: Les Saxons à Bistritz et aux environs en Transylvanie parlent allemand, mais leur langage propre est l'allemand du Luxembourg.

[10] V. Jiecek, *Die Bergwerke Bosniens*, N.D.

There are others, too. There is talk of *Flandrenses* who, in 1052 forced by famine, settled in the neighbourhood of Erlau.[11] This is typical of increasing economic pressure and craving for soil in the older parts of Germany, which persuaded the hardier, the braver, or simply the more desperate spirits to brave the dangers and the promises of the New East.[12] Saxons, we find through a document of the fourteenth century, settled alongside Hungarians in the future country of Maramures,[13] and Flemings probably appeared in the course of that same twelfth century. The different groups came at different times, moved often in ignorance of each other, settled here and there, moving the homesteads at times, and at times even returning Westwards.[14]

One of the first of these groups settled in three villages near Belgrad on the Mures, under the protection of the Bishop, who sponsored and encouraged them. Other groups of settlers established themselves later on the Târnava, in central Transylvania; then in the South East at Hermannstadt (Sibiu), and in the North-Eastern mining areas of Rodna and Baia, on the far side of the mountains. But, whether from Flanders or from Luxemburg, from the valleys of the Rhine or the Moselle, from Bavaria, or from Saxony itself, after 1206 all settlers tended to be lumped together under the name of Saxons.

The miners apart, these groups of settlers had a purely rural character. They were peasants with no political ideas. All they had come for was a measure of freedom, and land of their own. The king himself had no idea of imposing any settled rule on them as long as he received his dues. The "royal guests" had to adapt themselves to local conditions and local ways. Like the trappers and traders of the American frontier five hundred years later, their relations with the native population of Vlachs and Szekels were not unfriendly. It is doubtful, in fact, whether, had they not known of their existence, the Germans would have braved the mystery of a territory of which the king spoke of as a desert. This was after the manner of the time, and simply meant that none of the inhabitants had received any grants or confirmation of rights from him, and that therefore neither they nor their holdings counted.[15]

The settlers adopted the native costume, or parts of it. They introduced western methods of cultivation. In this, they were eventually imitated by the natives, whom they had found in the habit of using the trunk of a tree as a plough, with all the branches lopped off, save for a bit of the stoutest which served for a share. They built their farmhouses after the fashion of those which they had known in the Rhineland and in Westphalia; but their villages here were different in appearance from the older, manorial, type of village.

The settlements formed a long street, with dwellings on either side, each set in the midst of a separate, rectangular, subdivision, with the kitchen-garden or orchard around the house, near the road, then the farm acres, then the pasture, and then the wood lot. The order would, of course, be subject to natural features, but this is the way they seem to have liked best, and this is the kind of village lay-out that still remains to be seen in the Saxon communities of Transylvania today.

The national communities lived side by side, not without friction. Encouraged, both by royal policy and by security needs to live in towns, the Germans who were the most advanced of the national groups in Transylvania began to produce a town-dwelling class of traders and artisans whose interests, like those of their farming friends, clashed with those of the native population in petty issues of rights of way, of pasture, and of ownership of land.[16] In all such clashes, the king's guests could count on the king's favour, and on the support of his officials. But, even in such a favourable position, their isolation and small numbers were a constant danger to their continued national existence.

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[11] Manner, *Die Besitzergreifung Siebenbürgens*, p. 38; F. Teutsch, *Geschichte der Evangelischen Kirche in Siebenbürgen* I (Hermannstadt, 1921), p. 7, note 2, etc.

[12] Cf. Curschmann, *op. cit.;* Schulze, *op. cit.*, p. 125, note 4.

[13] The authenticity of this document is doubtful. Iorga, *op. cit.*, III, p. 97, note 3, makes reservations.

[14] Teutsch, *op. cit.*, I, p. 3.

[15] Tatsche, *Sächsische Geschichtschreibung*, Ch. 11; also in *Archiv für Siebenbürgische Landeskunde*, (Neue Folge, II), 318.

Again and again, owing to the wide dispersal of their settlements, we find the Saxons losing their separate identity. In Cluj, Dej, Turda, Saxon townsmen were magyarized from the thirteenth century onwards. Round the towns of Sibiu and Orastie, whole communities merging with the Vlach peasantry lost their national characteristics. Only the charter which king Andrew II granted them in 1224 permitted the remainder to retain their identity to this day.[17]

After 1224, the Saxons, united under the protection of their privileges, considered themselves free on lands belonging exclusively to the king (*Fundus Regius*). Exempt from all feudal duties, they were merely under the obligation of paying a small sum once a year. This enviable position was confirmed in a series of charters in which the Saxon settlers were recognized as "one people", having "one judge", and holding everything directly from the Crown.

They were a hard-working, close-knit community; and the favour of the Crown depended on the high income which it derived from their labours, if only indirectly. But they were craftsmen, or peasants, or burghers, not fighting men (except in so far as all men were fighting men in those days), and in no position to guard the frontiers of the new provinces.[18]

Other men were needed to guard the mountain passes, and Andrew II, who had crusaded without signal success in the Holy Land, knew that there were knights to be found there, only too eager to leave a land where conditions were steadily deteriorating. His decision to bring the Teutonic Knights into his dominions, and the new privileges which aimed at making the Transylvanian Saxons one people (*Unus Populus*), may be taken together as indicative of a plan for a crusade in his own Eastern marches.[19]

Thus in the second decade of the thirteenth century, we find the Teutonic Knights leaving Syria for the Carpathians. They appear in charters of privilege as early as 1211 and 1212 and, by 1218, we find the Bishop of the land, who was also a German, William, styled *Transsylvanus Episcopus*, we find William protesting at the fall in his revenues as his peasants flock under the more efficient protection of the crusading knights.[20]

The king himself showed himself to be chiefly interested in the gold and silver for which he had commanded them to search. In 1222 they were granted the right to ship the salt mined in their concession at Ocna, down the rivers of Mures and Olt. Giving them the right to half the output of their mines, the king decided that on the far side of the mountains they must build only wooden towns, or markets. These must have been similar to that Kreuzburg which received a royal charter as early as 1212.[21]

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[16] Cf. *infra*, note 37.

[17] Hurmuzachi, *op. cit.*, I, p. 83, etc.

[18] The "honoured guests" were not, in fact, settled on the borders. Iorga, *op. cit.*, III, p. 100, writes: La ceinture de défense des frontières était confiée aux Szeckler, aux Roumains, et aux Petchénegues. The King's formula *Ad retinendam coronam*, used to define the newcomers' mission, points also to the fact that they were expected to assure support and a certain security for their royal patron, who had to deal with constant competition and opposition. That they took part in the struggles for the crown, we see also in Ch. Diehl, *L'Europe Orientale de 1081 à 1453* (Paris 1945), p. 62, where the Saxons of Transylvania are mentioned as fighting for Geyza II in 1155. For their role in such struggles, see also A. L. Schlözer, *Kritische Sammlungen zur Geschichte der Deutschen in Siebenbürgen* (Göttingen, 1795).

[19] For this scheme, cf. F. Zimmerman and C. Werner, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-20 and p. 31.

[20] Hurmuzachi, *op. cit.* I, p. 56. Andrew II grants them *terram Borza nomine, ultra silvas versus cumanos* (1211); of the documents of 1212 and 1218, the best edition is to be found in Zimmerman & Werner, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-12, no. 19, and p. 16, no. 27. For further privileges cf. *ibid.*, under year 1222.

[21] *Ibid.*, I, 14.

On the site of the Vlachish village of Brasov, they built Kronstadt—the city of the crown. Crossing the mountains into the great plain of Câmpulung, they built another burgh, Langenau, where a Saxon count, *Comes Laurencius de Longo Campo* is found buried. They forced the Cumans into Church, subjecting them to the authority of a bishop, for whom a new town was built at Milcov, on the river of the same name, not far from the Kronstadt where it would later be transferred.[22]

During its short history, before its destruction by the Mongol horde in 1241, Milcov was the centre of great missionary activity. J. Benko, in his interesting, though not always credible, work on the subject, would have us believe in the existence of a See there as early as the fifth century. Available evidence, however, begins to appear at a much later date, most of it in papal correspondence.

Pope Gregory IX started his pontificate in 1227, with a burst of activity much of which was directed towards the missionary field. In 1227, Theodore, Archbishop of Esztorgom, is instructed to proceed with the conversion of the Cumans. In 1228, the Friars Preachers, and Bela, the young king of Hungary, are exhorted to give him all support in their power. The bishopric itself is set up, and a bull of 1229 makes it directly answerable to the Holy See. A bull of 1234 confirms the position of the Bishop and his authority, whilst another of the same year reproves Saxons and Hungarians dwelling among the Vlachs for going over to their creed, and receiving the Sacraments from false bishops of the Greek rite.[23]

But while the bishopric is not mentioned by name until 1228, a *Capitulum Cumanum,* with no mention of Milcov, appears as early as 1218; whilst in 1217 we find Pope Honorius III authorizing the bishop to buy back certain rights which had apparently been handed over to laymen.[24]

A charming document of 1228 shows us the bishop Theodoric blaming the Szecklers, who had protested against the change in the name of the bishopric from that of Milcov to that of the Cumans. "Why does the change of name irk you," he asks. "Provided the bishop remains on the same good terms with you and full of understanding as before, are not the sheep and the wolf met in the Church of Christ? Why should not the Szeckler live peacefully alongside Vlach and Cuman?"[25]

Long before this, however, the relations between the Teutonic Knights and their royal patron had degenerated into open warfare, and led to the expulsion of the Order from their fief of *Terra Borzae* (Burzenland, Tara Barsii). The king, backed by his secular bishops, was jealous of the increasing power of the Order—and this especially as the Knights encroached on territory to which they had no rights. The king also seems to have regretted that, since the coming of the Order into his land, he was no longer the direct instrument of the Crusading movement in the Far East of Europe. He wanted to be once more an Apostolic and Crusading king in his own land.

After some fighting between the Teutonic Knights and the Royal levies, the latter occupied the territory newly taken by the Order from the Cumans. As a result of this, and of those intrigues and dissensions within the Order with which we become more familiar during its later history, the year 1226 finds them moving Northwards, where a Polish prince, Conrad of Mazovia, had offered them new attractions in Prussia. And so they pass out of our picture, though the reverberations of their grievance do not.

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[22] Iorga, *Inscriptii* I, p. 273, no. 1; Theiner, *op. cit.*, II, p. 267; J. Benko, *Milkovia sive antiqui episcopatus Milkoviensis per terram Transsylvanicam* (Vienna, 1781). Hardly authoritative, but full of information which deserves sifting, and interesting as the earliest work on the subject.

[23] Theiner, *op. cit.*, I, p. 86 (1227); I, p. 87 (1228); I, p. 90 (1229); I, p. 128 (1234); I, p. 131 (1234).

[24] Hurmuzachi, *op. cit.*, I, p. 65, gives the bull of 1218; see also *ibid.*, p. 60.

[25] G. D. Teutsch and F. Firnhaber, *Urkundenbuch zur Geschichte Siebenbürgens* (Vienna, 1849), p. 45.

As late as 1234, Gregory IX was still busy on their behalf, requesting the Patriarch of Aquileia and the Archbishop of Esztergom to make certain that King Andrew II and his son Bela, who had ejected the Order from the land of Borza, should be constantly reminded that the land should be returned, and damages paid for the Order's losses. The Order's own memory was a long one and when, one hundred and seventy years after the altercation, the Hungarian king Sigismund tried to induce them to return after the disaster of Nicopolis, his suggestions met with a very cold reception.[26]

The Teutonic Knights expelled, the Hungarian crown had to take other measures for the safety of its borders. In 1233, while the correspondence between the Holy See and the Court of Hungary stretched out, a Saxon Count, Corlard, was granted large fiefs in the area of Oituz and Gymes, on condition that he undertook the defence of the defile of the upper Olt, and the upkeep and garrisoning of the new castle at Turnu-Rosu which guarded one of the passes.[27] He brought into the area German settlers whose duty, with their Vlach serfs, was to secure this part of the country from barbarian incursions. Franciscan friars were installed on the northern banks of the Danube, south of the Carpathians, in the territory later to be called Walachia. Severin was built, only a small burgh then, not the castle built later by the Hospitallers, after the Mongol invasions, well in sight of the ruins of Trajan's bridge across the Danube and of the Roman Camp sited to guard it. A royal dignitary was established there, with the Avar title of Ban, to guard the Catholic conquest. The first coins minted for Vlachs on their own soil were minted by this dignitary. *Ban* was the name given to the coins, and has since come to be applied to all coins and to money in general in the Roumanian language.

Points of strategic and economic interest within reasonable distance of the Carpathian passes were now being occupied and exploited. The Valachian salt mines of Oltenia (Ocnele Mari) and Prahova (Slânic); the Moldavian salt mines at Ocna, the Transylvanian gold and silver mines at Bistrita and Sachsisch Regen, were apanages of the Hungarian Crown. It is safe to assume that many of the miners were imported from the West, in much the same way as the United States began the exploitation of their mineral resources in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by importing skilled labour from England.

Hungarian expansion and German colonization were halted, however, when in 1241 the Mongol hordes crossed the Carpathian Mountains from Galicia into Transylvania. At this moment, we find Vlachs, Hungarians, and Saxons fighting side by side to defend the mountain passes, and fighting a losing battle. A Persian chronicle of the Mongolian conquest speaks of three Saxon armies being defeated—probably feudal levies.[28] The Saxons, no doubt, wanted peace, not the sword.

The Mongols tried to set up a form of government in the wake of their victorious advance. To this the Saxons seem to have been among the first to submit, usually after a decent, but hardly excessive, show of resistance. Thus we are told that Rodna, the silver-mining town, *inter magnos montes positam Theutonicorum villam,* was full of Saxons armed to the teeth. Spoiling for a fight, they issued forth to meet the Mongol enemy who feigned retreat. The Saxons, after a short pursuit, returned to Rodna well pleased with their performance, got thoroughly drunk to celebrate their victory, and woke up to find the Mongols in the town. At that, the Saxons submitted without a fight, and henceforth their count, Ariscaldus, followed in the Mongol general's train with six hundred picked men-at-arms.[29]

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[26] Hurmuzachi, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 89-94 and 95-99; Iorga, *op. cit.*, III, p. 367; Fejer, *op. cit.*, III, 2, p. 394. Altogether, Fejer's monumental work of forty-four volumes and a large index offers the best-documented presentation of the period. Tome III, vols. 1 and 2, cover the centuries which are our main concern. It is well, however, to cross-check, as the editor was not always discriminating.

[27] Hurmuzachi, *op. cit.*, I, p. 127.

[28] R. Grousset, *L'Empire Mongol* (Paris, 1941), p. XI, speaks of these chronicles and their evidence as of first-rate importance.

The Mongols generally dealt thus with those who submitted at once to their authority. Further south, another column advancing along the river Siret, *ad terram episcopi Cumanorum,* met local opposition which it defeated. Milcov, the seat of the bishop, was destroyed.

The Roumanian historian Xenopol gives the text of a curious document, alleged to have been issued in 1242 by the same Kadar or Cadan who also took Rodna. This edict, dated "in the second year of our reign", instructs Szecklers and Vlachs to follow the Saxon example in accepting the conqueror's coin in payment for goods, in the same way as they accept the coins of Byzantium. Whether authentic or not, Xenopol's version, which comes from the notoriously untrustworthy collection of Count Joseph Kemeny, is worth giving as an oddity:

> Nos Cattan ex stirpe Iedzan in regno Hungariae (sic) Kaymacam solis et terrae maximo Khano Syngu Babilonici . . . hortamur . . . et committimus vobis Pengas, Bylany, Korni. Kastellani in castris Clusu, Dees, Busdach, quod cum a nobis data potestate ordinare debeatis ut quem admodum Flandry in initio regni nostri acceptabant nummos nostros vulgo Kesser Chunnich Tatar Pensa, et dicti Zycly et Blachy per omnia necessaria, quae ad nostram utilitatem pertinent, acceptarent, tanquam nummos byzantinos. Datum in Zuyo anno regni nostri II.[30]

Cattan was a real person, but it may be doubted whether he ever put his sign to such a paper. One may question the date or the authenticity of the document, if only because in the winter of 1241-42, on news of the death of the Great Khan, Ogodai, Batu's horde evacuated Transylvania. There is no doubt however that the Mongols had set up military governments, as attested both by Professor Iorga, and by M. Rene Grousset's authoritative account of their campaigning habits.[31]

The Mongol tide receded as swiftly as it had risen. The king returned from his flight, which had taken him to the shores of the Adriatic. Resolved to secure his frontiers once again, Bela IV may well have wished the Teutonic Knights back in his borderlands. Instead, he secured the services of a section of the Knights of St. John Hospitaller, whom he settled in the strategic pass of Severin. In their charter of 1247, "the rights of peasants of all estates and origins, also of Saxons and Germans," are safeguarded, and the knights are forbidden to molest them, or to take their holdings on the southern slopes of the Carpathians.[32]

But the Knights Hospitallers were not a great success. They did not stay for long; nor did they make for themselves a place in the popular mind, as the Teutons of the big red crosses had done. Naturally enough, the defence of the mountain passes continued to preoccupy Hungarian kings. In particular, the valley of the Olt was fortified and re-fortified, again and again, the Saxons playing their part in its defence, along with other nations. In the fourteenth century we actually find English archers in the royal fortress of Bran, near Hermannstadt (Sibiu).[33] But they were mercenaries—garrison troops which could be shifted *pour parer au plus pressé*. The *Drang Nach Osten* had run down, and colonization with it.

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[29] Endlicher, *op. cit.;* Rogerius, *Miserabile Carmen,* Ch. XX; Archidiaconus Thomas, *Historia Salonitarum Pontificum Atque Spalatensium,* Chs. 37-39, in Schwandtner, *op. cit.,* III; Xenopol, *op. cit.,* II, p. 257 ff.

[30] *Transilvania,* IV (1871), 55; Xenopol, *op. cit.,* II, p. 263.

[31] Grousset, *op. cit.,* p. 300; for details see Rogerius, *op. cit.,* Ch. XXXV, p. 287.

[32] Hurmuzachi, *op. cit.,* I, p. 249.

[33] Iorga, *Istoria comertului romanesc* I (1st edition), p. 55.

In fact, with the ebb of the Mongol tide, Western immigration into Transylvania also seems to stop. Crusading enthusiasm was dying out in Europe. In 1248 Louis IX of France led his ill-fated crusade to Egypt. About this same time, the great surge of German peoples halted on all fronts to take stock, and to consolidate its gains. When the movement started again, the direction for a long time would not be towards Hungary. Nor, for their part, did Hungarian kings, too concerned with internal quarrels and foreign ambitions, make much of an effort to attract further settlers in any numbers.

Those Germans already in place, continued to play their part, an important part, in the affairs of the land. I have not followed them beyond the early fifteenth century, but it is easy to mark their presence.

Thus, in 1395, the Transylvanian contingents to the ill-fated army which Sigismund was to lead to disaster at Nicopolis the following year, were led by a Voevode Frank, probably a German.[34] Saxon representatives appeared in Royal Congregations in 1291, 1317, and 1357.[35] In 1464, we find the Saxons of the town helping to elect a judge in Orâstie.[36] Saxons appear as parties in law cases and judicial documents dated 1383, 1385, 1413, and 1419. In almost every case, the local inhabitants who had lost pasture or other rights for the benefit of Saxon burghers or farmers tried to get their own back by raiding and spoiling the German lands. In almost every case the authorities are on the side of the Saxon settlers.[37]

In 1413 we find the "judges" of Fagaras—with a jury made up of Saxons and Vlachs—meeting to judge between the inhabitants of Saxon Marienthal, and those of other villages with German names—Stanendorf, Oelendorf, Gassendorf —but apparently Vlach population, for their inhabitants answer to Roumanian names like Bratul, Vlad, Bucur, Dobre, etc. Six Roumanian women had been killed, and the final document, bearing the seal of the Saxons, and that of the county of Fagaras, indicates the sum which the Roumanian plaintiffs accepted in settlement of their claims.[38]

Besides such sordid but inevitable contributions to the pattern of everyday affairs, the Germans appear also in another role. Traders and city-dwellers, they furnished much of the artistic work, and of the inspiration, not only for the churches of their own regions, but also for those of the neighbouring, Roumanian, principalities. It was at Sibiu that the Vallachian prince Mircea ordered from Master Hans the bell of his monastic foundation at Cozia, and it was probably from the same quarter that were bought altar pieces and censer of a gothic design unusual so far East. In fact, although much of the Roumanian art of this period owes its treatment to Italian or Italian-schooled artists, from the Saxon workshops of Siebenbürgen, of the seven German burghs, there stemmed a whole artistic school of German inspiration.

But German influence in the Churches was not only artistic: it was Roman and Catholic, as against the Greek persuasion of the Vlachs, on both sides of the Carpathians. Thus, the Council of Constance (1414-18) receives no delegate from Valachia, and only one from Moldavia. But, significantly enough, the solitary Moldavian delegate hailed from the solitary catholic town of Baia, early centre of German settlement and mining operations, which retained for a long time a Catholic German community, strong in its adherence to old ways and to the old religion.

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[34] Iorga, *Histoire des Roumains et de la Romanité Orientale* III, p. 360.

[35] Xenopol, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 230-31; Teutsch & Firnhaber, *op. cit.*, p. 167; Fejer, *op. cit.*, VIII, 2 p. 98; Hurmuzache, *op. cit.*, I, 2, p. 45.

[36] Hurmuzache, *op. cit.*, XV, p. 6; Xenopol, *op. cit.*, II, p. 235.

[37] Xenopol, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 205-6, but his references must be treated carefully: thus, in note 11, p. 205, the date 1403 should be 1413.

[38] Iorga, *op. cit.*, III, p. 407: Zimmerman & Werner, *op. cit.*, III, pp. 577-78.

Professor Iorga comments thus on the man whom contemporary documents name Kyrila:

> mais qui doit appartenir à ces familles saxonnes qu'on y trouve gouvernées par les leurs et ecrivant des lettres en allemand, à cette époque et plus tard aussi, pour aller ensuite reposer sous les pierres tombales, orneés du portrait de St. François et d'inscriptions, dans leur langue et en latin, dans l'eglise élevée par le prince Aléxandre pour faire plaisir à sa premiere femme catholique supposée.[39]

But these remarks have already taken me far beyond the scope of this article.

It is enough to say that the Saxon colonists, settled in solid groups based on ever-renewed royal charters of privilege, retained their identity through successive occupations, and under a succession of masters.[40] Frozen, as it were, in their foreign surroundings, they not only maintained but they emphasized wherever they could, the original social and material characteristics which they had brought with them out of the medieval West. Forms of village organization, land tenure, architecture, changed slowly—or not at all—and then almost always after a German model.

Of their special privileges we were frequently reminded until 1945. In their communities, and in the characteristics which they have preserved, we may find an opportunity of studying details and aspects of an older, indeed in many cases a medieval, custom and life, such as has long disappeared elsewhere in Europe.

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[39] *Op. cit.*, III, p. 400.

[40] The *Andreanum* of 1224 was periodically confirmed. In fact, the oldest copy in existence (the original has been lost) is a confirmation by King Charles Robert of Anjou, dated 1317, which can be found in Fejer, *op. cit.*, III; 1, p. 441, and in Schlozer, *op. cit.*, p. 535.

Giles of Rome and the Subject of Theology

PETER W. NASH S.J.

IN the last quarter of the thirteenth century the precise nature of the subject of theology was often discussed. Despite fairly uniform practice, there was a wide divergence of opinions on the theory. This is well illustrated by the controversy on the subject of theology carried on by Giles of Rome on the one hand, and Godfrey of Fontaines and Henry of Ghent on the other.[1] The dispute changed almost nothing, so that after twenty-five years we find Giles still asserting, with only minor reservations, that the subject of theology is God under the special aspect of glorifier. What Giles means by this position and his reasons for it will come to light in the course of unfolding the arguments pro and con in chronological sequence. This procedure entails some repetition and overlapping, but it has the advantage of presenting an exemplar of theological discussion among men who took each other's work seriously.

The works in which this controversy may be followed are: Giles of Rome, *Commentaries on the First and Second Books of the Sentences, Quodlibets* and a solitary *Quaestio de subjecto theologiae*; Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodlibets*; Henry of Ghent, *Summae quaestionum ordinariarum,* and *Quodlibets*. The chronological order of the questions is not always easy to determine, so that the order in which I shall treat them is tentative.[2]

I. GILES, *COMMENTARY ON THE FIRST BOOK OF THE SENTENCES* (1275-1278)[1]

A. *Prologue.*

St. Thomas' prologue to his commentary on the first book of the *Sentences* gives a division of the subject-matter of all four books of the *Sentences*. Using a text of *Ecclesiasticus*,[2] it also shows how the whole work has unity, for uncreated Wisdom, the divine Word, is the source whence all things hidden are revealed (Book I) and produced (Book II), the source of man's restoration (Book III) and his conservation in his end (Book IV). Giles imitates his quondam master by choosing a text on uncreated Wisdom, namely *Wisdom* vii, 26-27, which reads: "(I) For she is the brightness of eternal light and the unspotted mirror of God's majesty, and the image of His goodness, (II) and being but one she can do all things, (III) and remaining herself the same, she reneweth all things, (IV) and through nations conveyeth herself into holy souls. She maketh the friends of God and prophets." The four parts of the text summarize the subject-matter of the *Sentences*.[3] They also indicate something St. Thomas was not concerned about in his preamble, namely the efficient, formal and final causes of theology.[4]

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[1] Henry of Ghent died in 1293; Godfrey of Fontaines in 1303; Giles of Rome in 1316. The controversy lies between 1275 and 1301. It incidentally serves to underline Giles' formal independence of St. Thomas Aquinas under whom he had studied while preparing for the licentiate in theology, ca. 1269-1272; cf. P. W. Nash, "Giles of Rome: Auditor and Critic of St. Thomas", *Modern Schoolman*, XXVIII (1950), 1-20.

[2] Giles' *Commentary on the Second Book of the Sentences* was written during the years 1288-1309, and Henry's *Summae quaestionum ordinariarum* between 1272-1293; the various parts seem to have made their public appearance as soon as they were written. Giles' *Quaestio de subjecto theologiae* has no date assigned to it. The dates of the various *Quodlibets* are as given by P. Glorieux, *La Littérature quodlibétique de 1260 à 1320* (Kain, 1925), with some of the modifications suggested by Gregorio Suárez, "El pensiamento de Egidio Romano en torno a la distincion de essencia y existencia", *La Ciencia Tomista*, LXXV (1948), 80-81. Father Suárez is of great assistance in determining chronological landmarks in Giles' *Commentary on the Second Book of the Sentences*. Gerardo Bruni's tables in his edition of the now admittedly spurious *Quaestio de natura universalis* (Naples, 1935), are useful, though in need of correction by Father Suárez' work.

[1] *Commentarius in primum sententiarum* (Venice, 1521).

[2] *Eccli.* xxiv, 40.

[3] Giles, *In I Sent.*, Prolog.; fol. 1^{ra}.

[4] *Ibid.; fol.* 1^{vb}.

In his development of the prologue Giles will treat theology according to the four causes, thereby rearranging the apparently haphazard order of St. Thomas' treatment.[5]

Three points are of interest in Giles' preamble: (1) his apparent agreement with St. Thomas in making the subject of theology God and its ultimate end the vision of God; (2) his familiarity with and reliance on St. Augustine; (3) his explicit unification of theology through Christ.

With regard to the first point Giles says that the chief aim of Sacred Scripture, and hence of theology, is the knowledge of God, that it treats only of divine Being, either essentially or by participation, and that our end is to see God face to face.[6] Only twice is there a hint of a disagreement with St. Thomas. The first is in his summary of the fourth book of the *Sentences:* it concerns our sanctification, our vision of God after the resurrection "or the enjoyment which comes from charity".[7] This mention of fruition through charity in last place prepares the reader for the constant assertion later that theology is primarily affective, and that the beatific vision is less perfectly beatitude than the love which unites us with God. The second hint is in the prayer of St. Augustine with which he closes the preamble. In it occurs this line, which could be the motto of Giles on the subject of theology: *Meminerim te, intelligam te, diligam te.* He will insist that love is the true aim of theology, hence only that understanding of God is needed which suffices for love. This calls for a knowledge of God not as God, not as infinite, but only as beatifier, for even in the beatific vision there is no knowledge of God as infinite, yet there is the beatifying love of the infinite God. We have but a hint of this here.

With regard to the second point we may note his frequent appeal to St. Augustine's *De Trinitate.* He draws on it, first, to show that the right order of learning is a general knowledge followed by a progressively more specific knowledge.[8] Then he draws on it for his interpretation of the key-text from *Wisdom.* Thus to show that the first phrase, "For she is the brightness of eternal light, etc." sums up Book I (unity of divine Persons, their eternity, the distinction of persons, their equality in majesty), he goes to *De Trinitate IV*[9]: the Son emanates as brightness from light; the brightness is coeternal; emanation entails distinction, since nothing bears itself in order to be; the emanating light if less than the source would be darkness, not brightness. So for the second phrase, "because she is one, she can do all things", it is *De Trinitate* VI which shows the Word as creative likeness of the Father in whom are all the eternal reasons of all things in the mode of unity.[10]

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[5] St. Thomas' order of treatment in his *In I Sent.* is as follows: the need for theology, its unity, its speculative nature as a science and as a wisdom, its subject, and, finally, its mode of exposition. The order in the *Summa theologiae* Ia, q.1, is different: the necessity of theology, its scientific nature, unity, speculative nature, the way it differs from other sciences, its being a wisdom, its subject and mode of exposition. Giles systematically treats theology according to the four causes. Under the head of material cause he treats theology's subject, first in itself, and then in its consequences. Under the first he considers (a) the question of theology being a common or special science, (b) the way subject and matter differ, and (c) the subject in itself. Under the second division of material cause comes the consideration of the subalternation, the dignity, unity and distinction and necessity of theology. Under the formal cause he treats theology as wisdom and science, also its certitude. Under agent cause he asks if God alone teaches theology. And under final cause he decides the question of the practical or speculative nature of theology. The division is impressive with the impressiveness of a clever student putting his master's work into neat, logical order. The editor of the 1521 edition notes that on the points of unity, necessity, and final cause Giles opposes St. Thomas.

[6] Giles, *In I Sent.*, prolog.; fol. 1^{ra}: Deus, cujus cognitio principaliter in sacra scriptura intenditur . . . 1^{vb}: nam sic ordinatur iste liber quod primo determinatur de ente permanente cui non accidit innovatio; ut de ente divino per essentiam, et postea de ente cui accidit innovatio, ut de ente divino per participationem. . . . Finalis causa habetur . . . nam finis noster est ut sanctificemur et sanctificati amici Dei simus, et amici ejus existentes ipsum facie faciem videamus.

[7] *Ibid.;* fol. 1^{va-b}: . . . in quarto libro de sanctificatione nostra quae est per sacramenta et de visione divina quae erit post resurrectionem, sive de fruitione quae est per charitatem determinatur. St. Thomas in his prologue to the *In I Sent.* speaks of the sacraments as preparation for our induction into glory, the fruition, however, which it brings, consisting in the vision of God.

[8] *Ibid.;* fol. 1^{ra}: Secundum quod dicit beatus Augustinus X *de Trinitate*, cap. 1 [PL 42, 971]: nisi impressam cujuslibet haberemus doctrinae in animo notionem nullo ad eam discendam studio flagraremus. Taking this to mean the need of some foreknowledge for any learning, Giles sees it to be in agreement with Aristotle, *Post. Anal.* I. 1; 71al, with this difference that for Aristotle sense-perception needs no prior knowledge. Since learning is not a Platonic remembering, what comes first is a general, confused knowledge, and later a more distinct knowledge.

Finally, Giles sees the unity of the *Sentences* in a knowledge of God through the Son of God. The *Sentences* agree with St. Paul, St. Augustine, and Hugh of St. Victor, who respectively see God as known through "a mirror and a confused reflection *(aenigma)*", through "Scripture and creatures", through "the world and Christ".[11] These reduce to two ways of knowing God: through Christ and creatures, the theological or perfect way, the philosophical or imperfect way. The philosophers willed to know God through creatures alone. That was why, as Hugh points out, they could not in their worldly knowledge keep free from error that truth which divine theology alone knows how to preach with simple and unaffected assertion.[12]

Giles' commentary on the prologue then follows. We will not be concerned with all that he has to say on the four causes of theology, but will concentrate on the material cause, the subject of theology, though, as will appear later, the final cause greatly conditions his delimitation of the subject.

B. *The Prologue to the First Sentences.*

1. *Only the principal, formal object specifies a science.*

Giles posits that the subject properly speaking of a science is whatever is considered *per se*, primarily, principally, and in every mode in which the things under consideration may be found.[13] Thus in metaphysics only being is considered in these four ways, for it is the primary and principal aspect under which all the problems are resolved. Substance cannot be the subject *tout court* of metaphysics, for, though it is dealt with *per se*, primarily and more principally than anything else, still substance cannot be predicated of everything: it is not found in every manner of being. Yet substance may, after a fashion, be called the subject of metaphysics, as containing the character of being (*ratio entis*) more than accident does. Accident, though treated *per se*, is not considered primarily;

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[9] *Ibid.;* 1^{rb}: Unde Augustinus IV *de Trinitate*, cap. 20 [PL 42, 906] istam auctoritatem pertractans ait ibi: Quod emanat et de quo emanat unius ejusdemque substantiae est, neque enim sicut aqua de foramine terrae aut lapidis emanata, sed sicut lux de luce.

[10] *Ibid.;* 1^{va}: Unde dicitur VI *de Trinitate*, cap. 10 [PL 42, 931] de isto verbo quod est 'verbum perfectum cui non deest aliquid et ars quaedam omnipotentis atque sapientis dei, plena omnium rationum viventium incommutabilium, et omnes unum in eo, sicut unum ipse de uno.' Quare igitur unum est verbum divinum causa et omnium quae fiunt. Est enim operativa potentia omnium creaturaram.

[11] *Ibid.;* 1^{ra}.

[12] *Ibid.;* fol. 1^{rb}: Et ideo cognitio quam nunc de Deo habemus superat philosophorum cognitionem qui solum per creaturam Deum cognoscere voluerunt. In his *Errores philosophorum*, ed. J. Koch (Milwaukee, 1944), Giles did not explicitly mention as a necessary source of error in Aristotle, Averroes, Avicenna, Algazel, Al-kindi, and Maimonides the self-imposed restriction of knowing God through creatures only. This seems to be a new consideration in the spirit of St. Bonaventure's *Collationes in Hexaemeron* (especially VII, nn. 10-12). Giles will repeat this idea often and make it the justification for the *pis aller* of beginning theology with a consideration of creatures, or of using sensible examples: novices in theology may have been infected by the errors and methods of the philosophers; cf. *infra*, section VIII.

[13] *In I Sent.*, prolog., pars la, principium lm, quaestio la, solutio: fol. 2^{rb}: Nam illud quod per se et primo et principaliter et per omnem modum consideratur in ea (metaphysica) est ens, et ideo quicquid determinat determinat sub ratione entis. Verum quia ratio entis magis reservatur in substantia quam reservatur in accidente, quia accidentia non sunt entia quia sunt entis, ut scribitur VII *Metaph.* [Aristotle, *Metaph.* VII, 1: 1028a10-30], quantum ad istum modum, etsi non per omnem modum, tamen principalius considerat de substantia quam de aliis entibus. Et ideo dicit ipse in XII *Metaph.* [XII, 1; 1069a18] consideratio quaedam est de substantia principaliter.

so accident is only part of the subject. Illustrative examples, not being brought in *per se,* are not even part of the subject of metaphysics. Giles' point is that not everything considered in a science specifies it, but only the principal and formal object. Thus God can be considered by the metaphysician, but God is not the subject of metaphysics, for, though He contains the character of being *(ratio entitatis)* more than all other beings, He is not the aspect under which metaphysics treats all beings.

2. *No science is more special than theology.*

Having given the criterion for locating the subject of a science, Giles now asks if theology is a special or common science.[14] The answer will further determine the subject-matter in a rather general way. The subsequent question will pin it down precisely.

Here he notes that a science gets its specific community and abstractness from its subject, though these two characteristics are not necessarily on a par. From Aristotle's triple abstraction from matter result three specifically distinct philosophies: natural, mathematical and metaphysical. A greater abstraction can be found with a lesser community, e.g. mathematics in comparison to natural philosophy if only material beings existed. Moreover the subject of a common science is common as such, but not necessarily abstract.

With these distinctions in mind Giles sees theology differing from other sciences in four ways. (1) It alone comes by divine inspiration.[15] It is true that any science can be revealed, but sacred doctrine has to be revealed, because reason cannot attain it directly. This gives it a special character. (2) Theology does not directly nor principally treat of sensible things, nor does it begin with sensible things as humanly discovered sciences are forced to do. Theology follows the pattern of divine wisdom, which has itself as principal object and all other things as secondary object, known only in the understanding of itself. What is primarily looked to in theology is a knowledge of God Himself.[16] Hence, not having the sensible world as part of its subject, it lacks community. (3) Theology's subject, God, is not universal in itself, nor particular. Other sciences, even with regard to sensible things, find a universal object. Not so theology. (4) Yet theology outdoes all the other sciences in the universality of what it knows, for no other can know so many individual things with a scientific knowledge *(in propria forma)*.[17] We can conclude then that no science is as special as theology, for it concerns one thing only, which is really and not merely considered to be one. Yet none is more common, seeing all the things to which it reaches out. *Per se,* however, none is more special: *simpliciter est specialis.*

3. *The special aspect of theology's subject.*

Having thus limited theology to a special object, Giles now limits the aspect under which this object, God, is known.[18] Here at last we find the subject of theology as opposed to what might be called its matter. The subject is the principal object of a science; the matter, the secondary object. This Giles proves by a Procrustean handling of a parallel between subject and matter in the constitution of things, and subject and matter in sciences.[19] The working out of this analogy is not to our present purpose. We are concerned with what Giles considers the principal consideration of theology.

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[14] *Ibid.*, q. 2.

[15] Cf. St. Thomas, *In I Sent.*, prolog., q.1, a.4: Haec enim scientia in hoc ab omnibus aliis differt, quia per inspirationem fidei procedit. . . . Si autem volumus invenire subjectum quod haec omnia comprehendat, possumus dicere quod ens divinum cognoscibile per inspirationem est subjectum hujus scientiae.

[16] *Ibid.*, ad 1m: Deus non est subjectum, nisi sicut principaliter intentum, et sub ratione cujus omnia quae sunt in scientia, considerantur. Cf. *Sum. th.* I, q.1., a.7.

[17] St. Augustine is the source of this doctrine of knowledge *in propria forma* (cf. *De Diversis quaest.*, 83, q.46; PL 40, 29-31). Giles uses the fact of proper or special *rationes* in God to prove that, since we shall know God as He knows us, we too must know Him according to a special *ratio* (cf. *infra*, Section IX, 3).

[18] Giles, *In I Sent.*, prolog., pars 1, prin. 1, q.3.

Unlike metaphysics which, if and when it treats of God, does so *sub modo communi,* i.e. inasmuch as He is being and the cause of all things, theology considers God *sub speciali modo;* otherwise it would not differ from metaphysics. God, therefore, under a special aspect is what theology principally considers and is its subject. This special aspect is God as author of our restoration and finisher of our glory. And it is this aspect according to which theology treats everything that swims into its ken.[20]

Giles ends this question with a rejection of positions which (a) assigning too wide a subject really assign no formal object, and (b) assign a wrong formal object. Among the first group is the position of those who assign *res et signa* as theology's subject.[21] This would be to include everything and make the subject something universal. Nor is *ens divinum* the subject, since everything is contained under the divine being when understood in the wide sense, as some do, not only essentially and by participation, but also as extending to anything either united to it or signifying it. Nor again will the *scibile per inspirationem* do for a subject, because everything can be known this way.[22] These are not false positions, but only loose ways of speaking. When they say "subject", they really mean "matter". Their fault is in assigning no special aspect.

Among wrong formal objects assigned is *bonum salutare,* which is really not a special aspect but a common good.[23] Another mistaken formal object is Cassiodorus' "whole Christ"; this is not distinct enough as a subject.[24] Hugh of St. Victor's "works of restoration" will not do, since "restoration" is only an added condition, not the subject.[25] Finally, and this is certainly intended as a correction of St. Thomas' position, to make God the subject of theology is to come close, but not close enough, because it fails to assign a special aspect.[26] Without such assignation, there is only confusion among the sciences. So, although God is the chief concern of theology, and other things are treated under the aspect of God, there is still no subject for theology without the addition of a special aspect, such as "source of our restoration and fulfilment of our glory".

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[19] Schematically the parallel may be summarized thus:

I. The *differences* between 'matter' and 'subject'.
   A. *Matter*: pure potency for substantial form; in potency in every way; includes the potency of subject.
   B. *Subject*: a potency for accidental form, but not a pure potency, not a potency in every way; included in the potency of matter.
II. Application to knowledge.
   A. *Principal* object: is not in pure potency, since it gives actuality and species to a science; yet it is in some potency, because it needs the light of intellect and gets some actuality from it. So, being in act and not simply in potency, and having less potency than a secondary object, yet possessing the actuality essential to a science, it is rightly called SUBJECT.
   B. *Secondary object:* is not in act *de se*, since it gives no actuality to a science, being introduced only under the rubric of the principal object. It is in a twofold potency: (1) to the actuality from principal object; (2) to the actuality from light of the intellect. So, being simply in potency, having also the potency of being subsumed into a science not for its own sake, and lacking the actuality essential to a science, it is rightly called MATTER.

[20] *Ibid.;* fol. 3^{v}: Cum igitur metaphysica sit scientia communis determinabit de Deo sub modo communi, inquantum, scilicet, est ens, et causa universalis entium. Theologia autem cum sit scientia specialis de his de quibus determinat determinabit sub speciali modo. Et ideo sicut subjectum in scientia communi est commune in eo quod commune, ita subjectum in scientia speciali debet esse speciale in eo quod speciale. Et ideo Deus de quo principaliter intendit ista scientia sub aliqua speciali ratione debet esse subjectum in ea. Ista autem specialis ratio potest esse inquantum est principium nostrae restaurationis et consummatio nostrae glorificationis.

[21] Petrus Lombardus, *Sent.* I, dist. 1, cap. 1. Cf. St. Augustine, *De Doctr. christ.* I, 2; PL 34,19.

[22] The *ens divinum* and *scibile per inspirationem* sound like partial positions from St. Thomas, *In I Sent.*, prolog., p.l, a.4. There St. Thomas has the two together: Si autem volumus invenire subjectum quod haec omnia comprehendat, possumus dicere quod ens divinum cognoscibile per inspirationem est subjectum hujus scientiae.

[23] Is Giles thinking of St. Thomas here: *In I Sent.*, prolog., q.l, a.3: theologia est scientia de rebus quae ad salutem hominis pertinent?

[24] St. Thomas leaves the author of this opinion unnamed. The critical apparatus of the Ottawa edition of the *Summa theol.*, ad I, q.l, a.7, cites as upholders of this opinion Robert of Melun, Robert Grosseteste, Robert Kilwardy, Odo Rigaldi, but not Cassiodorus.

[25] Hugh of St. Victor, *De Sacram.*, Prol., 2; PL 176, 183.

[26] Giles, *In I Sent.*, prol., pars 1, prin. 1; q.3:

4. *Unity of theology a consequence of unity of object.*

Going on to treat of the consequences of theology having God under a special aspect as subject, Giles claims that only his position gives theology a true unity. He attempts to establish this claim by showing the shortcomings of St. Thomas' view that the unity of theology follows the uniqueness of divine light, which is the source of the formal aspect of theology, namely its divine revealability. Giles admits this to be a subtle position, but one in need of further refining.[27]

A science has a double actuality, one from the light, the other from the principal object. Light gives a general actuation, e.g. the light of the human intellect actuates all human sciences. So too divine light actuates theology in general. But, being so excellent, it could produce several distinct theologies. What is needed over and above the light is a special unity deriving from unity of principal object.[28] In confirmation of this Giles says that those upholding unity from light were forced to radicate the unity in a unity of aspect or formal object.[29] This, he says, begs the question. For to suppose a unity of aspect is to suppose a unity of the science, and this in turn is proved by unity of aspect (*ratio*). This does not solve the problem of achieving a unity of aspect so great in a science that any other science in the same genus would be superfluous.

Giles' own view is that unity of object is both necessary and sufficient for the unity of a science. In theology God is the principal object, and its mode is that of divine wisdom. Through it we can consider anything in its own proper *ratio*. So, in the genus of sciences resting on a divine light, there is but one species, thanks to the unity of object.[30] The implication is that St. Thomas did not go deep enough: he should not have been content with making the subject of theology be the divinely revealable or even God.

5. *Theology is affective.*

After the discussion on the material cause of theology, it would seem unnecessary to look at Giles' treatment of theology under any of the other causes in order to get more light on what he means by the subject. But what Giles says about the final cause, at least, is most important for explaining why he chose God as beatifier as the specifying aspect of theology. It will not come out fully at this stage, but here in germ is Giles' Augustinian approach to beatitude which governs his evaluation of theology.

Giles asks if theology is speculative or practical.[31] He answers that it is neither,

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fol. 3^{va}: Quarta positio est quod Deus est subjectum in theologia. Ista autem magis accedit ad propriam rationem subjecti, non tamen sufficienter assignat subjectum, quia ut patuit numquam assignatur aliquid subjectum in scientia nisi sub aliqua ratione.

[27] *Ibid.*, pars 1, prin. 2, q.3; fol. 5^{vb}: . . . est alius modus dicendi quod unitas theologiae est unitas luminis, nam ex unitate luminis divini scientia ista unitatem trahit. Nam ut habitum est theologia est scientia inspirata et per revelationem habita, quia unum lumen est a qua originaliter fit omnis talis revelatio, theologia scientia una dicitur. Iste autem modus licet videatur primo subtilior non est bonus tamen.

[28] The text continues: Nam nos videmus in scientia duplicem actualitatem, unam ex lumine, aliam ex principali objecto sicut apparet in scientiis humanis, nam lumen intellectus agentis praebet quamdam actualitatem singulis scibilibus, et per consequens singulis scientiis. Aliam actualitatem recipit scientia ex objecto principali.

[29] Cf. St. Thomas, *Sum. th.* I, q.1, a.3 (as noted by Giles' editor): Quia igitur Sacra Scriptura considerat aliqua secundum quod sunt divinitus revelata . . . omnia quaecumque sunt divinitus revelabilia, communicant in una ratione formali objecti hujus scientiae.

[30] Giles, *In I Sent.*, pars 1, prin. 2, q.3; fol. 6^{ra}: Quia ut habitum est per theologiam quae sequitur modum divinae sapientiae habens pro objecto principali Deum possumus de singulis rebus considerare sub propria ratione. Et ideo in genere scientiarum innitentium lumini divino non debet esse nisi una scientia, quia aliae superfluerent.

[31] *In I Sent.*, prol., pars 4, q.1; fol. 7^{vb}: Et quia dilectio et charitas in tota sacra pagina

for, if you consider the order among the various ends of theology, good works, speculation and love, you will see that only the last is the end simply. Now, as charity is in the power of affection, and questions of the speculative and the practical concern the intellect, theology is affective.[32] Even the term "wisdom" *(sapientia* from *sapor)* connotes this. If you must ask whether theology is more speculative than practical, it is the former, because the vision of God, to which all our knowledge, especially theology, is ordered, looks to beatitude far more than good works do.

Giles answers an objection drawn from St. Augustine to the effect that our reward is in vision.[33] Our reward is not vision simply, but vision as leading to love. This raises the problem of how Giles understands the relation of intellect and will to union with one's last end, a problem which is handled more explicitly in the *Quodlibets*.

A further difficulty (clearly from St. Thomas) is that sciences about the most speculable objects are the most speculative, which is the case with theology since it is about God.[34] Giles answers that these objects are also the most lovable.[35] That still leaves theology as primarily affective. Furthermore in this life theology achieves love rather than knowledge. This is not St. Thomas, who insists that theology is primarily speculative, since the ultimate end of man is contemplation of the truth.[36]

So far, then, we have discovered that for Giles the ultimate end of man is love, and in that is beatitude. This does not make it quite clear why the special aspect under which God is the subject of theology is God as Beatifier. It does, however, suggest that if theology's whole aim is affective, then it is specified by this end, by the union in love with God. He will further clarify this himself in his attempt to answer both Henry's and Godfrey's criticisms.

II. HENRY OF GHENT, *SUMMAE QUAESTIONUM ORDINARIARUM*, a. 8, q. 3 (ca. 1278-1280).[1]

Henry asks the same question: "Is theology practical or speculative?"[2] His solution is that there is only one end to theology, the speculative. St. Augustine can call it practical, because it considers temporal things and actions. But, absolutely speaking, it is speculative, because it concerns the eternal by whose rules temporal things are directed.

In answer to the third objection in the question, he recalls that St. Augustine had said that the end of the Scriptures is love. This does not make theology a practical science.[3] Using the same etymological derivation of *sapientia* from *sapor*, Henry admits that theology not only illumines the mind for knowledge of the

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intenditur, quia in ea pendet lex et prophetae, principalis enim finis in sacra pagina intentus est inducere homines ad Dei et proximi dilectionem.

[32] *Ibid.;* fol. 8^{ra}: Et quia charitas est in affectu, non in intellectu, intellectus autem dividitur secundum speculativum et practicum, theologia nec speculativa nec practica proprie dici debet, sed affectiva, quia ad affectionem principaliter inducit.

[33] *Ibid.*, In Contrar, 2m; fol. 7^{vb}: scribitur primo *de Trinitate*, c. 16 [I, 9: PL 42, 833] quod in visione merces tota promittitur. Sed visio pertinet ad speculativam.

[34] *Ibid.*, In Contr., lm; fol. 7^{vb}.

[35] *Ibid.*, ad lm in Contrar.; fol. 8^{ra}: scientia ista dicitur speculativa per comparationem ad praxim, magis tamen affectiva ut dictum est. Et quod dicitur quod est de maxime speculabilibus ita est de maxime amabilibus. Immo secundum quod ad praesentem vitam pertinet cui statui concessa est ista scientia magis attingit ad amorem quam ad cognitionem. . . .

[36] Cf. St. Thomas, *In I Sent.*, prol., q.1, a.3, quaestiuncula 1, sol.: . . . finis autem ultimus istius doctrinae est contemplatio primae veritatis in patria, ideo principaliter speculativa est.

[1] *Summae quaestionum ordinariarum theologi recepto praeconio solennis Henrici a Gandavo in aedibus Jodoci Badii Ascensii* (Parisiis, 1520). These were written between 1272 and 1293.

[2] *Sumae QQ.*, a. 8, q.3; fol. LXV. This particular question I take to have been written after that section of Giles' *Commentary on the First Book of the Sentences* which deals with the same question, and, therefore, after 1275-1278, but before Giles' *Quodlibet* I of 1285.

[3] *Ibid.*, ad 3m; fol. LXV^{v}: Ad tertium quod finis hujus scientiae est dilectio dei et fruitio dei, dicendum quod verum est non tamen ex hoc debet ista scientia dici practica.

truth, but also inflames the affections; this latter it accomplishes for the enjoyment of the good by union with it, not for doing some further good. This, however, Henry will not admit makes theology affective.

Henry recalls Giles' position that theology is affective, since its speculation is perfected in love and enjoyment.[4] This is wrong, because a science is denominated by its intrinsic finality, which is wholly within knowledge. Affection follows speculation, but is outside the science. The intrinsic end of a science as science is speculation, a knowledge of the intellect. So, absolutely speaking, it is truer to say that theology is speculative rather than practical or affective.

He will have more to say after he has had a chance to read Giles' *Quodlibet* III, 2, which, in turn, is governed by an anxiety to answer Godfrey's *Quodlibet* I, 5. This last is directed against the implicit doctrine of Giles' *Quodlibet* I, 21, to which we now turn.

III. GILES OF ROME, *QUODLIBET* I, 21 (Easter, 1285)[1]

In this *Quodlibet* Giles asks if those who possess the vision of God see everything that is in God. On the testimony of Gregory it would seem so, for what is not seen there when He is seen who sees all?[2] Giles does not agree to this. He admits that in the divinity there shines forth an infinity of Reasons *(rationes)* of things already made, to be made and merely possible.[3] But a finite intellect simply cannot see this infinity even if it sees the divine essence. He proves this by several analogies already suggested by Denis the Pseudo-Areopagite.[4]

Things exist in God as numbers in unity, lines in a point, particular agents in the sun, powers in the soul, and (here Giles adds a parallel given by St. Thomas but not by Denis)[5] as conclusions in their premises. Now one can know all of these: unity, point, sun, soul, premises, without thereby having to know all the numbers, lines, particular agents with their effects, and the conclusions derivable from them. Hence knowing God does not entail seeing all that is in Him or all the effects that can proceed from Him. This is the reason, Giles believes, why it is commonly said that knowing God whole *(totum)* is not the same as knowing God wholly (*totaliter*).[6] On this basis Giles can agree that the Blessed in heaven see God whole *(totum)* but do not comprehend Him in every way in which He is understandable, and so do not know all things that shine forth in Him or could proceed from Him.

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[4] *Ibid.;* fol. LXVI^{r}: Unde et quia hujus scientiae speculatio sicut et vitae futurae perficitur in affectione dilectionis et fruitionis, dicitur a quibusdam quod ista scientia debet dici potius affectiva quam speculativa sed non est ita. Denominatio enim scientiae debet esse a fine suo intra, in quo stat ipsa cognitio intra limites suos.

[1] Giles, *Quodlibet* I, q. 21; *Quodlibeta* (Louvain, 1646). Glorieux, *La Litt. quodl.* I, p. 141, dates this Quodlibet as 1286. G. Suárez, "El pensiamento . . .", p. 80, puts it a year earlier, as does R. Zavalloni O.F.M., *Richard de Mediavilla et le controverse sur la pluralité des formes* (Louvain, 1951), in the chronological tables, pp. 505-507. According to Glorieux it is indisputable that *Quodlibet* I, q. 5, of Godfrey of Fontaines was written Christmas, 1285; if it is correct that this was in answer to Giles' *Quodlibet* I, 21, then the latter would have been written Easter, 1285.

[2] Gregory, *Dial* IV, 33; PL 77, 575.

[3] Giles, *Quodl.* I, 21, In Contr: in divina essentia relucent infinita, nam ibi non tantum sunt rationes factorum, sed etiam faciendorum et possibilium. Cum ergo talia sint infinita, intellectus bonorum, qui est finitus, quantumcumque videat divinam essentiam non poterit videre omnia, quae sunt in ipsa.

[4] Ps. Dionysius Areopagita, *De Div. nom.*, 5, nn. 6 and 7; PG 3, 820-822, gives the examples of numbers existing in unity, of lines being in a point, and of powers in the soul.

[5] Cf. St. Thomas, *De Veritate*, q. 8, a. 4.

[6] Giles, *Quodl.* I, 21; p. 45^{b}: Quare . . . cum constet, eum, qui intelligent unitatem, non intelligere omnes numeros, qui possunt ab unitate procedere. . . . non necessario cognoscere omnes proprietates et omnes passiones quae subjecto inesse possunt; . . . sic videntes Deum non est necessarium videre omnia quae sunt in Deo, aut omnes effectus qui possunt ab ipso procedere. Unde et communiter dici consuevit quod aliud sit cognoscere Deum totum et aliud sit cognoscere Deum totaliter. Where Giles differs from St. Thomas is not with regard to the knowledge which the Blessed might have of God's possible effects (cf. St. Thomas, *De Veritate*, q. 8, a. 4, ad 11m), but with regard to their knowledge of God Himself. For St. Thomas this knowledge does not differ specifically from God's knowledge of Himself; for Giles it does not differ specifically, thanks to a different formal aspect.

Giles' position here is not quite as simple as I have sketched it. His own example of things being in God as conclusions in principles is subtle. Take the principle: "Every whole is greater than its part". This is understood by anybody knowing the subject and predicate. Still the principle is not wholly understood until one knows all the ways in which it can be understood and all the conclusions it can support.[7] This is true enough. One does not have scientific knowledge of a principle, until one sees how it applies in the various sciences, until one has achieved the commensurate universal.

St. Thomas explained the *dictum* of Gregory in much the same way.[8] Gregory could be talking about our possession of a sufficient medium of demonstrating all things, which the essence of God certainly is, without, however, our thereby knowing all things through the inability of our minds to comprehend. Or he could be understood to be referring to that knowledge of God necessary for the substance of beatitude. Beatitude, St. Thomas agrees, does not arise from the ability which the vision of God gives of knowing more creatures, but from the knowing God more perfectly.[9]

At first sight it would seem that Giles is saying exactly the same thing. In answer to Gregory's *dictum* he says that the Blessed do not see God comprehensively, but only to the extent that is required for beatitude; for this it is not necessary to know all things.[10] We know that elsewhere Giles has already said that this means knowing God under a special aspect only. This could be simply another way of saying with St. Thomas that we do not know God in the mode of His infinity.[11] But what makes one certain of a difference is Giles' insistence that beatitude is not so much in the seeing as in loving. Godfrey, however, in a *Quodlibet,* written Christmas 1285, fastens on the "special aspect" for attack.

IV. GODFREY OF FONTAINES, *QUODLIBET* I, 5 (Christmas, 1285)

In the fifth question of his first *Quodlibet* Godfrey asks if the object of theological science is God simply and absolutely or under some special aspect.[1] The very formulation of the problem has Giles in mind. In fact the question is taken up largely with the refutation of Giles' claim that God as restorer and glorifier is the subject.[2]

Godfrey explains why Giles limits theology to considering God thus.[3] Giles confuses the accidental circumstances under which it is taught with what is essential. It is accidental that theology be taught to repair our fall.[4] By concentrating on this aspect Giles set an arbitrary limit to what theology by its nature is fitted to consider. This can happen in any science: natural science may restrict its consideration of movable bodies to their relation to change of place, though the science is fitted to deal with movable bodies as such. The defect of Giles' position is that it looks to God only as efficient cause of our restoration. But God glorifies also formally and objectively in that He is seen in Himself and quite absolutely *(absolutissime)* according to the way He exists most perfectly in His own nature. As St. John says: we shall see Him as He is.[5]

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[7] *Ibid.*: Potest enim quis intelligere illud principium totum 'omne totum est maius sua parte', quia potest intelligere subjectum et praedicatum hujus propositionis. Non tamen intelliget totaliter ipsum, nisi intelligat omni modo, quo est intelligibile illud principium, et nisi intelligat omnes conclusiones, quae possunt roborari per ipsum. Non oportet ergo sanctos qui vident in patria Deum totum, et non vident ipsum totaliter, videre omnia quae sunt in ipso.

[8] St. Thomas, *De Veritate*, q. 8, a. 4, ad 8m.

[9] *Ibid.*, ad 13m: nec etiam intellectus videns Deum, qui plures creaturas cognoscit, ex cognitione creaturae beatificatur, sed ex hoc quod perfectius Deum cognoscit.

[10] Giles, *Quodl.* I, 21; p. 46^b: Sed quia sancti . . . tantum vident eum, ut requirit notitia bonorum, sufficit quod videant omnia quae ad beatitudinem requiruntur.

[11] St. Thomas, *De Veritate*, q. 8, a. 4, ad 6m. But note that for St. Thomas God is seen according to His whole essence, as infinite, though not in an infinite manner. Cf. *C. G.* 3. 55; *Sum. th.* I, q. 12, a. 8.

[1] *Les Quatre premiers Quodlibets de Godefroi de Fontaines*, ed. M. de Wulf, A. Pelzer (*Les Philosophes Belges* II, Louvain, 1904), pp. 9-17: *Quodl.* I, q.5, is entitled: Utrum scientia theologia habeat pro objecto Deum simpliciter et absolute vel sub aliqua speciali ratione.

[2] *Ibid.;* p. 10, note 1, identifies Giles as the author of the opinion "aliqui dicunt quod Deus sub ratione qua reparator et glorificator vel hujusmodi est subjectum".

[3] *Ibid.*: pp. 10-11.

[4] In his *Quodl.* III, 2, Giles will explain the aspect of *reparator* and opt for that of *glorificator.*

In Giles' view metaphysics, whose subject is not God, would treat God more fully than theology, since, within the limits of its starting-point (creatures), it comes to know whatever it does about God as belonging to Him essentially and absolutely.[6] Godfrey here turns the tables on Giles who had said that metaphysics treats God only in one way, but theology in every way *(per omnem modum)*, though under a special aspect.

Godfrey then records the attempt of some to escape the inconvenience of this last position. They say that God, who is infinite, is the subject of theology, but not under the aspect of infinity.[7] But is is wrong to think that anyone would suggest that theology studies God under the aspect of infinity. Such an aspect is as special as any other. Infinity, like eternity, is an attribute of God's perfection, a quasi-property or passion, and so cannot be the formal *ratio* of God. Such a consideration supposes the subject already considered formally, as including indistinctly all that belongs to God absolutely and universally considered.

A further refutation is that it would be a strange reversal of due order to have God under a special aspect the object of His own knowledge, while He is the object of our knowledge under a more general and hence nobler aspect.[8] Giles, of course, does not want this; he insists that our knowledge of God is subalternated to that which God has of Himself. But how can a contracted science subalternate one uncontracted?

Godfrey concludes: "therefore it seems we must say that the subject in this science is God simply and absolutely under that general aspect according to which the faithful can attribute to Him all that is known".[9] As in metaphysics, so in theology God is the subject simply and absolutely and not according to some one determinate aspect to the exclusion of others.

With regard to the beatific vision God is seen by the Blessed in Himself and absolutely, i.e. under the absolute aspect which implicitly contains all the special aspects whereby God is knowable in Himself. If the Blessed knew God under certain aspects only, they would not be happy.[10]

Next Godfrey takes up the difficulty that only an infinite science could know God absolutely and in Himself, the consistent position of Giles in the

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[5] Godfrey, *Quodl.* I, 5; p. 11. Giles will give his own interpretation of the text from St. John in his *Quaestio de subjecto theologiae;* cf. *infra,* Section IX, 3.

[6] *Ibid.;* pp. 11-12.

[7] *Ibid.;* p. 12: Et ex hoc respondent dicentes quod scientia cujus objectum est Deus infinitus sub ratione infinita, ut scilicet ipsa ratio infinitatis est objectum, est infinita, non autem illa in qua ratio infinitatis est annexa ipsi objecto. Sed ista distinctio non videtur conveniens . . . The exclusion of the aspect of infinity is a later formula of Giles, though clearly a corollary of what he said in *In I Sent.,* d. 39, on God's knowledge of an infinite number of things, and of his teaching in *Quodl.* I, 21, on what knowledge of the divine esesnce gives us. From the first we gather that only God knows all the infinite number of things that shine forth in Him; we cannot, since only a finite number shines forth in our intellects. From the second passage we see that, however much we may see the infinite God, we do not see all the *infinita* in Him, but only what is required for our happiness. The verbal passage to the formula *non sub ratione infinitatis* is simple.

[8] *Ibid.;* p. 13.

[9] *Ibid.;* p. 14: Et ideo videtur dicendum quod Deus simpliciter et absolute sub ea ratione generali sub qua omnium cognoscendorum a fideli ad ipsum potest fieri attributio, sive secundum quod apprehendit omnes rationes secundum quas potest haberi de ipso cognitio a fideli, debet dici subjectum in hac scientia.

[10] Clearly against Giles, *Quodl.* I, 21.

Quodlibets. Whatever is in God is infinite, one, simple, and really indistinct. So under no aspect can God be known which is not infinite, and not really identical with any other aspect, although one can find a distinction of reason by comparing God's simplicity to a diversity in creatures. So, in knowing God's essence, one knows His infinity, which does not add anything, since God (to borrow Giles' favorite Damascenian definition) in His essence is *quoddam pelagus infinitum.*[11] To say that God is known under a finite aspect is to say that infinity is known under a finite aspect. But there is no finite or special aspect in God that does not pertain simply and essentially to His perfection.

The Damascenian definition does not mean that the *ratio* of deity and infinity are absolutely identical.[12] To posit God as subject of a science under the aspect of deity is not the same as doing so under that of infinity. All these aspects are really included in this subject, and are knowable by him whose science considers God absolutely and essentially. It would seem to be this attack which Giles has in mind in his *Quaestio de subjecto theologiae.*

Godfrey admits that theology often treats of God under special aspects, because it is supposed to help us poor wayfarers to our end, which is beatitude.[13] But it also treats of God absolutely and in Himself, as when it considers the Trinity.

It does not follow that our knowledge of God is infinite, as Giles thinks it would have to be, for God is not seen even by the Blessed in any but a finite way. The object is infinite, but the resultant knowledge is finite because of the finite knower. Giles will come close to this position in the *Quaestio de subjecto theologiae.*

Before Giles answers this attack Henry, in his *Summae quaestionum,* takes Giles to task again, particularly for leaving God as creator out of theology.

V. HENRY OF GHENT, *SUMMAE QUAESTIONUM*, a. 19 (ca. 1286)[1]

Henry maintains that God is the subject of theology, since the knowledge of God is that to which it looks principally.[2] In this it is like metaphysics, though the parallel is not perfect. Metaphysics is principally about substance, yet its subject is being as being or *ens simpliciter*. In the light of this position Henry answers a difficulty which asserts that God is the end and not the subject of theology, on the grounds that the end is sought but the subject presupposed.

The answer is that the end is the same as the subject under another aspect: one is to the other as perfect to imperfect.[3] Now the knowledge with which we start about God considered simply and absolutely is most imperfect. Any further knowledge of Him is sought as something belonging to the end of this science. So they (meaning Giles) are wrong who say that the subject is God under some special condition, such as principle of our restoration and glory. Were this so, this condition would have been presupposed, and is not something to be known through theology. Hence God as considered simply and absolutely is the subject of theology, and no preference is to be given to the aspect of restoration over that of creation or providence.

[11] John Damescene, *De Fide orth.* I, 9; PG 94, 836B.

[12] Godfrey, *Quodl.* I, 5; p. 15.

[13] *Ibid.;* p. 16.

[1] Henry of Ghent, *Summae QQ.*, a. 19, qq. 1 and 2. The *terminus a quo* for these questions is 1278, since Henry here attacks Giles' *In I Sent.* The *terminus ad quem* is 1287/8 since Giles' *Quodl.* III, 2, answers these questions.

[2] *Ibid.*, q.1; fol. CXV.

[3] *Ibid.*, q.1, ad 1m: Et quia illa cognitio imperfectissima est Dei, ut simplicissime et absolutissime consideratur, circa quem omnis ulterior notitia inquiritur tamquam aliquid pertinens ad finem hujus scientiae, patet aperte quomodo peccant dicentes quod Deus non est subjectum theologiae nisi sub aliqua conditione speciali, scilicet ut est principium nostrae restaurationis et finis nostrae glorificationis.

Again, hitting at Giles' views on the universality and unity of theology, Henry affirms that his own position befits the universality better: God is subject under that aspect which makes all things known in such a way that they can be attributed to Him.[4] This gives the science its unity. Though theology may pay more attention to God's restoring and glorifying us, this does not change the *ratio* of the subject (in other words, the formal object). Look at metaphysics: though primarily concerned with substance, its subject is being, not under the aspect of substance, but simply as being (which even Giles himself admits).

In the second question of this same article Henry stresses more strongly his objection to the omission of creation from theology. If Giles were right in restricting the subject to God as redeemer, then the work of creation would have to be left out.[5] Another argument is that before the fall of man and in the hypothesis of a continued state of original justice, theology would have had a different subject from the one Giles wants, since there would have been nothing to restore.[6]

Against the Augustinian he appeals to St. Augustine who says that Scripture is about things and signs as an integral whole.[7] Now Scripture, as we find it, is about God as made manifest in the work of creation as well as in that of reparation. Henry would not be satisfied with Giles' distinction between subject and matter of a science, which allows creation and creatures to be brought into theology under the rubric of matter. Theology may not exclude any aspect of God from its subject in Henry's view. This all-inclusiveness Giles will ridicule in his *Quodlibet* III, 2.

VI. GILES, *QUODLIBET* III, 2 (Easter, 1287 or 1288)[1]

This question entitled: "Is God under a special aspect the subject of the Sacred Page?", is neatly summarized by the editors of the 1646 edition: "Since God is an infinite sea, and the Sacred Page of theology does not deal with all things; moreover, since it is the means to beatitude, God is its subject under a special aspect, that of glorifier".[2] We shall consider first Giles' arguments for this position, and then his refutation of objections.

First, he has three arguments for not admitting that God as infinite substance is the subject of theology, even though Damascene's definition: "ocean of infinite substance", is the right one.[3] (1) Were God thus considered the subject, theology would be infinite, being specified by an infinite subject. This settles Godfrey, though Henry in his twelfth *Quodlibet* will return to refute it. (2) Again, were the subject God as infinite, one could see everything that shines forth in God and theology would then include even trifling and silly matters. This would run counter to St. Augustine's view that the vain, the harmful and the peculiar, which choke human sciences, have no place in theology. (3) Theology is an instrument for attaining beatitude as St. Augustine suggests. Hence it is limited to God as beatifier. St. Augustine's exclusion of the merely frivolous is also to the point here. What is vain and empty misses its end; and the harmful makes us deviate from it. Anything deviating from our end, beatitude, is of no concern to theology. This is further bolstered by another favorite Augustinian saying: *Quod illud tantummodo huic scientiae attribuitur quo fides saluberrima, quae ad beatitudinem ducit, gignitur, nutritur, defenditur ac roboratur.*[4]

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[4] *Ibid.*

[5] *Ibid.*, q. 2; fol. CXVII: Unde quidam alii attendentes quod opus reparationis est principalis materia hujus scientiae, dicebant subjectum ejus esse determinandum per respectum ad hujusmodi materiam, ut quod Deus non simpliciter debeat dici subjectum hujus scientiae sed solum inquantum redemptor aut reparator. Quod nullo modo potest stare . . . quia tunc nullo modo opus creationis posset dici esse de hac scientia aut materia, cum non se habeat per aliquam relationem seu attributionem ad Deum ut est redemptor sed solum ut est creator.

[6] *Ibid.* Giles will answer this in his *In II Sent.*, d. 21.

[7] *Ibid.* Augustinus, *De Doctr. christ.* I, 2; PL 34, 19: autem attendens ad totam materiam et creationis et reparationis etiam sub materia comprehendendo subjectum, dicit sacram scripturam esse de rebus et signis veluti de quodam toto integrali. Est enim tota scriptura de Deo in opere creationis et reparationis manifestato.

[1] Except for the difference it makes to the dating of *Quodlibet* I, it is not necessary to opt for either 1287 (G. Suárez's date) or 1288 (Glorieux), since Henry of Ghent's answer in *Quodl.* XII is Christmas, 1288.

[2] *Quodl.* III, 2; p. 127.

[3] *Ibid.;* p. 128: Prima via sic patet, nam si Deus, qui dicitur pelagus infinitum esset subjectum in hac scientia, tunc ista scientia esset infinita, et tenderet in Deum modo infinito. . . . Secunda via ad hoc idem sumitur ex his quae considerantur in ipsa scientia, nam si haec scientia haberet pro subjecto Deum, id est, pelagus infinitum per se, cum in hujusmodi pelago omnia relucent, posset haec scientia de omnibus considerare. . . . Posset ergo haec scientia de omnibus considerare cujuscumque conditionis essent illa, sive essent curiosa sive vana quod est contra Augustinum *De Trinitate* XIV, 1 [PL 42, 1037] dicentem: 'Non utique quicquid sciri ab homine potest in rebus humanis, ubi plurimum vanitatis, noxia curiositatis est, huic scientiae tribuit'. . . . Tertia via sumitur ex parte hujus scientiae, ut refertur ad felicitatem, et ad hunc finem data est homini propter beatitudinem adipiscendam, ut satis innuit Augustinus *De Trinitate* XIV, 1 [PL 42, 1037] ubi fidem et hanc (p. 129^{a}) scientiam vult propter adipiscendam beatitudinem esse datam.

Next Giles gives a positive treatment of his position by contrasting theology with human science, God's science and the knowledge of the Blessed under the headings of (a) the principal consideration, (b) the specifying aspect, and (c) the appropriate light.[5]

No human science has God as its subject, since sensible things are the subject or a part of it. No human science relates anything to beatitude. Finally, they all rely on natural reason alone. God and the theologian, however, consider God, the infinite ocean. God does so absolutely, as He is in Himself and *qua* infinite ocean. The theologian considers God under a special aspect, as beatifier. Furthermore, God sees through uncreated light, the theologian through a created and derived light. The knowledge of the Blessed is superior to the theologian's only by reason of the clarity of their light.

We have to note here the equivalence Giles makes between knowing absolutely and knowing comprehensively. To know God absolutely is to have an absolute knowledge, a perfect and infinite knowledge. He will not admit that there is any knowledge of God as He is in Himself which would not be infinite.

The objections which Giles answers are mostly Henry's. First there is the one about a science's subject being identical with its end, the only difference being that one is perfect, the other imperfect.[6] By the help of an imported principle, namely that a general knowledge is less perfect than a special knowledge, Giles draws the objection to a conclusion not quite Henry's. If God were known under a special aspect, theology would have achieved its end already. So the subject of theology must be God as known only imperfectly, hence only generally or absolutely.

Giles answers that only forms received in matter are imperfect in proportion to their generality.[7] Separate forms are perfect. To know them absolutely is to know more perfectly. Now in God there are to be found, in a unitary manner, all the perfections or forms which Plato had posited as separate and distinct.

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[4] Henry will quote this in *Quodl.* XII, 1, to his own ends.

[5] *Quodl.* III, 2; pp. 129^{a}-130^{a}. On human science he says (p. 129^{b}): Nulla enim scientia humana habet Deum pro subjecto. Nulla enim scientia humana est (loquendo de scientia proprie) quae non sit de sensibilibus, vel de iis, quae sint in sensibilibus, vel quae habent sensibilia partem subjecti. Ergo in re principaliter considerata differt haec scientia ab omnibus scientiis humanitus inventis, quod nulla talis scientia sit de Deo tamquam de subjecto. Rursus differt in secundo, in ratione sub qua considerat, quia in scientia philosophorum non quicquid considerant, considerant per relationem ad aeternam beautitudinem. Immo illam beatitudinem ignoraverunt philosophi. Tertio differt haec scientia a scientiis humanis, quantum ad lumen, cui innititur, et per quod considerat, quia scientiae humanae innituntur lumini rationis; haec autem innititur lumini fidei sive lumini divino.

[6] *Ibid.;* p. 127^{b}

[7] *Ibid.;* p. 130^{ab}: Et quia perfectiones illae quas posuit Plato separatas, nos ponimus unitive, ideo quanto magis secundum se et absolute cognoscitur Deus, tanto perfectiori modo cognoscitur. Unde ut (130^{b}) separemus hanc scientiam a scientia Dei, et ut ostenderemus istam imperfectiorem illa, dicimus quod Deus consideret se absolute et secundum se, nos autem in hac scientia consideremus sub speciali ratione.

So to know God absolutely is to know Him perfectly. As only God has this knowledge, theology cannot know God absolutely or generally.

A second objection says that, if God's knowledge has Himself as object as He is in Himself (*secundum se*), so has theology, since it is similar to God's knowledge.[8] Giles answers that such participation, given that participation means to take a part *(partem capere)*, means that the theologian cannot consider God in His totality in the way God does.[9] The theologian must consider God partially, hence under a special aspect.[10] Note again Giles' equivalents: knowing God absolutely is the same as knowing Him wholly *(totaliter)*, under every aspect *(sub omni ratione)*, and as He is in Himself *(secundum se)*. In the logic of this terminology he cannot do anything but insist on a special, partial aspect for theology.

A third argument is that theology, on Giles' suppositions, would have no subject had man not fallen.[11] But, even if theology is concerned principally with restoration, its subject can be general and absolute like that of metaphysics.

Giles answers by making "restoration" signify the making up for any deficiency: had man not sinned, there would still have been something missing, since he could not attain beatitude by his own strength.[12] Furthermore the primary conditions of "restorer" and "glorifier" are such that everything else in theology is considered in their light. Metaphysics does not consider God principally, because it considers everything under the viewpoint of being. Theology, on the other hand, considers God principally and according to these two conditions.

At the end of the question Giles gives a metaphysical answer to Godfrey's complaint that Giles' theology, treating God only as good, is second to metaphysics, which considers God as being.[13] In general, he answers, humanly discovered sciences can speak of God only as known through creatures, not as He is in Himself or by Himself. Theology alone speaks of God as God. So, whether the aspect be general or special, theology must be prior to any science that cannot have God as subject at all.

The objector agrees that theology may be more divine and have greater dignity, but metaphysics, considering God as being, is prior.[14] Giles has several answers to this. One is based again on the opposition between knowing God *in se* and *per creaturas*. Another gives the key to the whole problem, as he believes: *declarabitur quodammodo tota quaestio*.[15] The special condition "*qua* glorifier" does not make God theology's subject under the aspect of good to the exclusion of that of being or of the true. The way a thing is (i.e. has *entitas*) is also the way it is true; its relatedness to being *(esse)* is the same as its relatedness to being known *(cognosci)*, as Aristotle says.[16] Hence, if God as infinite ocean of entity were the subject of the science of the Blessed, He would be known by them in every way in which He is knowable, and that is impossible. Even Christ, who, as Man, has the highest beatitude, does not know God in this way. The Blessed cannot know God wholly, and do not need to see Him simply and absolutely to be happy, as Godfrey thinks. Even if God were to give the Blessed more knowledge than suffices for beatitude, they still would not know Him in every way that He is knowable. There must be a restricting condition such that they do not tend to God absolutely as infinite sea of entity or substance, but only to God as beatifying object.

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[8] *Ibid.;* pp. 127^{b}-128^{a}.

[9] *Ibid.*; p. 130^{b}: Participare autem idem est quod partem capere. . . . Ideo haec scientia Dei habet Deum pro objecto in illa totalitate et in illo pelago. Hoc autem aliquid participat de hoc et habet Deum pro subjecto sub speciali ratione.

[10] Henry will be very annoyed at this: *Quodl.* XII, 1, ad 1m.

[11] Giles, *Quodl.* III, 2; p. 128.

[12] *Ibid.;* p. 130^{b}: Si enim homo numquam peccasset nihilominus tamen ex puris naturalibus non potuisset consequi beatitudinem. Scientia ergo tunc tradita fuisset de Deo glorificatore et suppletore sive restauratore. Quaelibet enim restauratio est defectuum suppletio.

[13] *Ibid.*, ad 2m. The objection is on p. 126; the answer, p. 131^{a}.

[14] *Ibid.;* p. 131^{b}.

[15] *Ibid.;* p. 132^{a}: Dicemus enim quod haec conditio addita subjecto, videlicet quod Deus, in eo quod glorificator noster, vel in eo quod finis nostrae glorificationis, non hoc faciat quod Deus sit subjectum solum sub ratione boni, non autem sub ratione entis, vel sub ratione veri sit hic subjectum. Nam dispositio uniuscujusque rei in entitate est ejus dispositio in veritate, et sicut res se habet ad esse, sic ad cognosci, ut declarari debet *Metaph.* II [993a30]. . . . Si ergo Deus et quaelibet res, sicut se habet ad esse, ita se habet ad cognosci, si Deus absolute et secundum suum pelagus entitatis esset subjectum in aliqua scientia creata, esset ibi subjectum omni modo quo habet esse. Et per consequens omnino quo habet cognosci, quod est falsum et impossibile. . . . Sed in scientia beatorum est subjectum Deus sub hac conditione, prout ipsi per scientiam, quam habent, tendunt et sunt apti tendere in ipsum, tamquam in subjectum beatificans et tamquam in finem glorificationis. Non enim oportet quod videant omnia simpliciter absolute, sed videant omnia quae ad beatitudinem requiruntur, sine cognitione quorum beati esse non possunt.

Also in theology, the knowledge of wayfarers, God as beatifier is the subject. The theologian does not consider simply everything in God, otherwise he would have to consider even the empty and the frivolous (which, of course, St. Augustine does not allow).[17] Hence the added condition "as glorifier", which, though it does not make God the subject as being or as true, does restrict the way that God as being and true becomes theology's subject. This is so, because, although the first being is the cause of all *esse*, and is the first truth of every truth, theology cannot on that account consider all that is *essentia* and true, but only what, as being and true, leads to true happiness. This is the mind of St. Augustine according to the passage by now familiar.

Within a few months Henry of Ghent wrote his twelfth *Quodlibet*, and denied not only Giles' interpretation of St. Augustine here, but Giles' main thesis of the formal object of theology being God under a finite aspect.

VII. HENRY OF GHENT, *QUODLIBET* XII, 1 (Christmas, 1288)[1]

To the question: "Is God under an infinite aspect the subject or object of theology?" Henry gives first Giles' negative reply and summarizes two of his arguments.[2] The first is that otherwise infinite and finite knowledge would be identical. The second is that otherwise theology would take in everything that God knows. Henry gives the texts of St. Augustine to which Giles appeals, the one about theology not bothering with trivia, the other about its sole finality being beatitude.

Henry devotes his *Responsio* to both arguments.[3] The distinction which solves the first is that between an infinite aspect as object and the same aspect as merely annexed to the object. We know the infinite God simply as God, but not determinately as infinite. Here infinity specifies our knowledge by reason of the substance of theology's object, not by reason of the infinity. We can know that God is infinite, but not what His infinity is. Therefore we know the infinite God whole but not wholly. In this our knowledge differs from God's not specifically *(secundum speciem)*, nor according to the manner of considering the formal object, but according to the capacity of the receiving subjects.

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[16] St. Thomas, *In II Metaph.*, lect. 2, nn. 294-297, interprets the Aristotelian "as each thing is in respect of being, so is it in respect of truth"; *Metaph.* II, 1; $993^{b}30$, as referring to ontological or transcendental truth, not in the relative sense (of the conformability of things to intellect) but in the absolute sense of the absolute perfections or structures supposed by intelligibility. In this sense the being which causes the truth of things by causing them to be is the truest. As a corollary (n. 298) St. Thomas points out that the truth a thing has is in function of its being. If its being is caused, so has its truth a cause. If its being is contingent, so is its truth. This has a bearing on logical truth, since the *esse* of thing is what grounds our true estimate of it. Cf. *Sum. th.* I, q. 12, a. 6, ad 1m. Giles interprets Aristotle to mean that truth is just an abstract way of saying "to be known". As a thing is to entity so it is to truth, which is the same as saying that as a thing is to *esse* so it is to *cognosci*. He seems to infer a strict correlation between ontological truth in the absolute and relative senses. God, being absolute in being and truth, is known absolutely by Himself. We, not being absolute in being, cannot know absolute being absolutely. Equating 'absolutely' with 'comprehensively', and 'comprehensively' with knowing all the parts, he must, according to the very logic of his terms, say that we can know God only in part.

[17] Giles, *Quodl.* III, 2; p. 133^{a}: Infinitum ergo est pelagus quod beati vident, sed non vident ipsum ut est pelagus infinitum. Deus ergo in illa scientia est subjectum, sed non sub absoluta ratione, et ut est infinitum pelagus, sed sub aliqua ratione speciali restringente considerationem pelagi infiniti. . . .

[1] Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.* XII, 1. Glorieux, *La Litt. quodl.* I, p. 195, dates it as 1288.

[2] *Ibid.;* fol. 483^{v}.

[3] *Ibid.;* fol. 483^{v}-484^{v}. Henry illustrates the degrees of vision according to receptivity by comparing the abilities to see of an eagle, a man and an owl respectively. As far as the light is concerned, there is no difference. He also notes that the way in which God's knowledge of Himself subordinates ours is the reverse of the usual mode of subalternation. Usually the science that considers a thing simply is over one that considers it determinately, e.g. one that considers line simply is superior to one considering it as determinate, as a radius. But God considers Himself as determinate and infinitely comprehended; we consider Him simply (as deity).

Thus God's knowledge is of Himself as determinate and infinitely comprehended: His capacity being infinite, His intellect is informed by an infinite knowledge. Our capacity is finite: our intellect is informed by an infinite object, not by reason of its infinity, but simply by reason of the deity to which infinity is annexed. Hence our knowledge is finite.

But our finite knowledge is of the infinite God. Henry remarks that earlier he had said we know God *sub ratione absolutissima*, and not under any special aspect such as that of savior.[4] At any rate, any supposedly special aspect in God is infinite, whether it be deity or donkey. To attempt to differentiate a special from an infinite aspect is of no help in differentiating the sciences. Giles will refute this in his *Quaestio de subjecto theologiae*.

With regard to the second argument, Henry admits that in knowing God we do not know everything all at once in the way proper to God alone, i.e. according to the precise ways in which things are diverse.[5] But we do know them at least according to a common aspect whereby we attribute them all to God. St. Augustine is not referring to this second way but only to the first, when he limits theology to anything confirmative of the faith, which means to anything ordainable to God as to the end we are to enjoy.

Having solved these arguments Henry adds two more objections from Giles. Henry appears very annoyed at being quoted against himself. He says:

> Moreover they try to argue against me from my own writings. For I said: that the science of theology and also of the Blessed is a participation of divine science. From this (as they say) it necessarily follows that what is the the object of God's science under an absolute aspect is the object of a participating science under a partial or special aspect. Otherwise it would not be called a participative science.[6]

Henry answers that—"as I have said and still say"—participation here does not mean a special aspect, such as what Giles means by "restorer", but the non-comprehensiveness of theology with regard to God, who is its object under an absolute aspect.

A second objection is that theology would be acting beyond its competence did it consider God as more than glorifier, since theology is simply an instrument for the attaining of beatitude.[7] Henry agrees that theology aims at beatitude. But to say that God as glorifier beatifies is sheer redundancy: all this says is that God glorifies inasmuch as He is glorifier. But He does not glorify under a finite aspect, but as being absolutely infinite. So theology is not out of bounds in considering God under a more general aspect, for there is no more general aspect in God than that whereby He glorifies: "For this is the aspect of deity taken absolutely and looked at from the side of the thing seen; or it is God under the aspect of deity taken absolutely and looked at from the side of what is visible."

We may sum up Henry's attack thus: God glorifies as infinite, so Giles is wrong in holding that the subject of theology is God under a special or finite aspect, even if it be admitted that theology's finality is beatitude. Moreover, though to be beatified by the infinite God does not entail comprehension, neither does it exclude knowing God simply or absolutely. Giles took participation to mean taking a part, a too literal interpretation. As for theology being infinite for knowing God simply, that is nonsense: the imperfection of our knowledge is due not to the formal object, but to our incapacity as the receivers of knowledge. Our knowledge of God is finite; this not a knowledge of a finite aspect of God.

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[4] Henry, *Summae quaest. ord.*, a. 19, q. 1.

[5] Henry, *Quodl.* XII, 1; fol. 484^v. Giles replies to this in his *In II Sent.*, d.1, pars 1, q.1, a.3.

[6] *Ibid.*, ad 1m; fol. 484^v.

[7] *Ibid.*, ad 2m; fol. 484^v-485^v.

As an *argumentum ad hominem* we might add Henry's statement in the *In Contrarium,* to the effect that the Blessed would not be happy if they knew God under a finite aspect only, for their love is measured by their knowledge.[8]

VIII. GILES, *COMMENTARY ON THE SECOND BOOK OF THE SENTENCES,* d. 1 (ca. 1289)[1]

In three articles of the first distinction of his *Commentary on the Second Book of the Sentences* Giles deals with Henry's complaint of Giles' exclusion of creation from theology. Henry could hardly have been unaware of Giles' preamble to the prologue of the *First Book of the Sentences,* in which he had shown the matter of the *Second Book of the Sentences* to be creatures, or divine being by participation.[2] But this had been shown by Giles to be compatible with the limitation of the *subject* of theology to God as glorifier. But Giles had so insisted on the latter point that he seemed to leave no room at all for any consideration of God as creator. Without abandoning his position, Giles shows here to what extent the theologian may treat of creatures (art. 1), or may have to start with creatures, when talking to the uneducated (art. 2), or, finally, may even have to encroach on fields proper to philosophy, given the imperfection of either students of philosophy or their teachers (art. 3). Giles justifies the treatment of creation in the *Second Book of the Sentences* by the device of the suppositions and conditions of the formal object of theology, God as glorifier.

In the first article, entitled: "Should a theologian consider creatures?", Giles repeats his favorite idea that everything in Scripture is ordered to eternal life, and therefore theology considers how God beatifies us.[3] But we, the subjects of beatitude, are highly conditioned beings, having come into being, and as latecomers. So to know how we are ordered to our last end, the theologian must know our origin.[4] This entails considering God as creator, and knowing the whole coming-forth of things from Him. Thus Lombard's procedure of considering creatures in theology is justified.

With this key, namely that creatures can lead us to know God our glorifier through theology, Giles retroactively justifies his own treatment in the *First*

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[8] *Ibid.,* in Contr.; fol. 483^{v}.

[1] Giles, *Commentum in secundum librum Magistri sententiarum,* 2 vols. (Venice, 1581). This commentary was written over a period of years as G. Suárez, "El pensiamento. . .", shows. Hence the date of each distinction must be worked out separately. The *terminus a quo* for the first distinction, part 1, is approximately 1285-7, since d. 1, pars 1. q, 2, a.3 mentions the *Quaestiones disputatae de esse et essentia* written by Giles 1285-7. The *terminus ad quem* is 1290 since d. 1, pars 1, q.3, a.3 is mentioned by *Quodl.* V, q, 23 of 1290 (Glorieux) or 1289 (Suárez). Part 2 of the first distinction is later as it mentions the Commentary on the *Liber de causis* (1290). This reasoning supposes that no retouching in the light of later works was done; this is not proved. A surer indication is the answer which d. 1, pars 1, q. 1 gives to Henry's *Quodl.* XII, 1, ad 1m, of Christmas 1288.

[2] Giles, *In I Sent.,* prolog.; fol. 1^{va}.

[3] Giles, *In II Sent.,* d. 1, pars 1, q. 1, art. 1; I, pp. 5^{b}-6^{a}: Quidquid ergo in theologia consideratur hoc est in ordine ad Deum, ut est salus nostra, et finis nostrae glorificationis. Sic enim consideramus omnia, quae tanguntur in theologia, ut ad hoc nos ordinant, et ut hoc intendunt . . . (6^{a}). Cum ergo beatificatio nostra praesupponat conditionem nostram, quia relatio rerum in finem praesupponit earum exitum a principio, si spectat ad theologum determinare de Deo glorificatore nostro, oportet quod spectet ad ipsum determinare de Deo conditore, et creatore nostro. Et quia secundum veritatem homo fuit ultimo factus, non plene possumus scire quomodo homo factus est a Deo nisi sciverimus universalem exitum rerum ab ipso.

[4] Cf. St. Thomas, *Sum th.* I, q. 1, a. 7: omnia autem pertractantur in sacra doctrina sub ratione Dei, vel quia sunt ipse Deus, vel quia habent ordinem ad Deum, ut ad principium et finem.

Book of the Sentences of God as He is in Himself, despite the limitation of theology's subject. Reason leads us to know God as one; revelation, as triune. But after revelation reason can find much in creatures that points to the Trinity and much that leads us to God as containing innumerable perfections. Peter Lombard in his *First Book of the Sentences* treats of the unity of God's essence, then of the Trinity, and finally of the plurality of attributes. Creatures somehow lead us to all three.

The exact point of the argument is given only in the answers to the first difficulty.[5] The objection runs that theology's subject is God as glorifier, whereas creatures in no way are God. The first answer is that a science considers not only the subject, but anything helpful for knowing the subject. Now God in Himself and according to the infinite ocean of His substance is not the subject of theology. However, His being glorifier supposes Him to be something in Himself. Hence theology "determines" much about God as He is in Himself.

This answer, while an answer, does not satisfy Giles.[6] The one he prefers is that the theologian "determines" only what concerns God as glorifier. But the treatment of God as glorifier includes all that helps towards this "declaration". Hence creatures are included, and also God as something in Himself.

Having settled that theology rightfully turns an eye on creatures, Giles in the second article looks at the order of inspection.[7] In the *In Contrarium* he asserts that Peter Lombard in his *Sentences* wanted to give us a compendium of theology. He praises him for dealing with God in Book I and creatures in Book II. He agrees with this in the body of the article, but adds that lack of education in one's audience may call for reversing the order. Moses did this: he started with the creation of heaven and earth, and then spoke of God.[8] Giles gives four reasons why, absolutely speaking, theology must treat of God first. Only the first of these is immediately pertinent to our inquiry.

Giles recalls what he said earlier about the subject of theology being matters divinely inspired.[9] This entailed the exclusion of sensible things from being a part of the subject. In this is theology distinguished from humanly discovered sciences, for in it God alone is the subject, not, of course, according to the infinite ocean of His substance but as beatifier. Sensible things are handled by theology only *ex consequenti*. Its first task is to show us what beatifies us, that is the Triune God.

This fixed conviction that theology essentially treats only of the beatific settles the question of article 3 on the need or utility of non-theological sciences.[10] The restriction of theology shows that other sciences are not superfluous. In confirmation of this Giles quotes once more his favorite passages from St. Augustine, draws a conclusion which agrees with Henry's interpretation, but denies, in effect, that it proves Henry's point.

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[5] Giles, *In II Sent.*, d. 1, pars 1, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1m; p. 7^{a}: Verumtamen, ut dicebamus, quia Deum esse glorificatorem nostrum, praesupponit primo ipsum esse aliquid in se, ideo multa determinat theologus de Deo, quae competunt ei, ut ipse est aliquid in se.

[6] *Ibid.*: Si ergo Deus, ut est glorificator noster, est subjectum in hac scientia, quia in consideratione de subjecto includuntur omnia illa, per quae declaratur nobis subjectum, spectabit ad theologum considerare de creaturis, prout per eas manuducimur in Deum glorificatorem nostrum.

[7] *Ibid.*, a. 2: p. 7^{b}: Dicendum quod absolute loquendo spectat ad theologiam, ut est scientia vel ut est sapientia, prius tractare de Deo, quam de creaturis, sicut Magister suum librum ordinavit et bene. Dicimus autem absolute loquendo et prout theologia est scientia vel sapientia, quia forte in casu et et ex parte ruditatis nostrae, et prout theologia proponitur non per modum scientiae vel sapientiae, sed simplicis credulitatis, secus esset faciendum, quia sic se habentibus conditionibus posset contingere, quod secus facere expediret. . . . (p. 8^{a}) Prima ergo via sumitur prout scientia comparatur ad suum subjectum, de quo tractat. . . . Consequens est quod haec non tractet de sensibilibus nisi ex consequenti, quia non pertinent ad subjectum suum et ad id de quo considerat principaliter. . . . Hoc enim intendit tradere theologia quale sit istud objectum nos beatificans, quia est trinus et unus, sine cujus aperta visione beatificari non possumus. Ideo Magister de hoc determinavit prius in primo libro, et de aliis ut deserviunt huic veritati determinavit postea in libris aliis.

[8] *Ibid.*, ad 4m; p. 9^{b}; . . . quia Moyses loquebatur populo grosso et rudi, ideo incepit a quibusdam sensibilibus, ut a creatione coeli et terrae, ut per illa sensibilia manuduceret populum (p. 10^{a}) ad credendum quod non erant veri dii idola quae colebantur, sed erat unus verus Deus et omnipotens.

[9] Cf. *In I Sent.*, prol. pars 1, prin. 1, q. 2.

[10] *In II Sent.*, d. 1, pars 1, q. 1, a. 3; p. 10^{b}: Et quia scientia non superfluit, cum potest considerare aliqua, quae non potest alia scientia, ideo non superfluunt scientiae philosophicae, quia possunt multa considerare quae non spectant ad theologiam. . . . In

The conclusion drawn is that, because of its special aspect, theology will not consider, for example, how an extrinsic angle is the reason why a triangle's angles are equal to two right angles, except in general, inasmuch as God is the cause of everything. This last phrase Henry would approve, for he had said that, though we do not know all things in the way proper to God alone, we do know them inasmuch as we attribute them to God and inasmuch as they are ordainable to God, the end we are to enjoy. For Giles this only confirms his own view that theology does not consider God as infinite but as glorifier and beatifier.

Furthemore, if you compare theology's subject with that of other sciences, it will be clear that they are not superfluous.[11] They treat of creatures principally and *per se*, and so can handle much that does not concern beatitude. Theology deals with creatures, but only as aiding to our beatitude. So it is with the end of theology.[12] The other sciences are used by theology for its own end, but not as subalternate sciences, only as handmaids. Proof of this is that philosophy says much that theology of itself does not consider. If you find the theologian encroaching on philosophical territory, this is due either to the poor preparation of the students or to the errors committed by the teachers of philosophy. Theology should be able to start where philosophy leaves off, assuming without further explanation the conclusions of philosophy.[13]

In fine, theology and philosophy may deal with the same things, but not under the same aspect.[14] When theology considers creatures, it is really considering God our beatifier as made known to us by creatures. Thus does Book II of the *Sentences* consider the Creator rather than the creature. Philosophers cannot look at creatures from theology's point of view, for they do not look to beatitude, but to the acquisition of natural perfections obtainable by natural

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speciali tamen non spectat ad theologum considerare de omnibus effectibus Dei, nec spectat ad ipsum considerare quicquid potest sciri in rebus humanis et in effectibus Dei, ubi quantum ad beatitudinem nostram a philosophis multa sunt curiose et superstitiose tractata. . . . Quicquid ergo determinat sacra scriptura totum referendum est ad Deum glorificatorem et solum sub ratione illa pertinet determinare ad Scripturam (p.11^{a}) sacram. Propter quod aliae scientiae non superfluunt, intelligendo scientiam non superfluere quaecumque potest aliquid determinare quod ad aliam scientiam determinare non spectat.

[11] *Ibid.;* p. 11^{a}: Si ergo . . . scientia considerans de aliquo per se potest multa considerare de illo quae non potest scientia considerans per aliud, scientiae humanae quae considerant de rebus creatis per se poterunt multa considerare de eis, quae non pertinebunt ad theologiam, quae considerat de talibus solum per aliud, ut adminiculantur ad beatitudinem nostram, quae est ipse Deus immediate per seipsum nos glorificans, ad quod consequendum et habendum adminiculatur nobis cognitio, quam habemus de ipso per creaturas.

[12] *Ibid.;* p. 11^{b}: . . . quia theologus utitur omnibus aliis scientiis, et accipit ab omnibus eis non tanquam subalternata a subalternante, ut sicut perspectivus a geometria, sed tanquam dominus a servientibus, ideo de his, quae accipit, multa possunt considerare scientiae a quibus accipit de quibus per se considerare non spectat ad theologum, ut si accipit aliqua a naturali philosopho pertinentia ad corpus mobile, consequens est ut naturalis philosophus, qui per se considerat de corpore mobili, considerat multa pertinentia ad hujusmodi corpora, de quibus considerare per se ad theologum non spectabit. . . . Nunc autem oportet multa pertractare propter imperfectionem auditorum. Sic ergo excedere limites est in limitibus permanere, propter bonum publicum, quod inde consurgit.

[13] *Ibid.;* p. 12^{a}: Sed si auditores theologiae sufficientes essent, et philosophi sufficienter scientiam philosophiae tradidissent, ubi desineret philosophus, ibi inciperet theologus, et quantum ad declarata in philosophia, non oporteret declarationes iterare, sed solum propositiones declaratas assumere.

[14] *Ibid.;* p. 12^{a}: Nam etsi de eisdem aliquibus consideret theologus et philosophus, hoc non est sub eadem ratione. Sed theologus considerabit de illis, ut adminiculantur ad supernaturalem beatitudinem nostram. Propter quod cum theologus considerat de creaturis, magis considerat de creatore nostro beatificatore, ut innotescit nobis per hujusmodi creaturas, quam consideret de creaturis ipsis. Nam etsi in hoc secundo, ubi agitur de creaturis, deberet assignari subjectum, magis esset hujusmodi subjectum Deus creaturarum conditor, quam creaturae conditae.

powers alone. As Giles puts it in answering a difficulty, creatures are given to make us seek and love God.[15] Philosophers do not always intend this end immediately, but want to know the creature.

In these three articles Giles has maintained his distinction between the matter and the subject of sciences. It has enabled him abstractly to justify Peter Lombard's choice of material without sacrificing theology's unique subject which is determined by the sole end of theology, namely beatitude through love. The criterion for considering anything else is utility for that end.

At this period of Giles' career, 1288 to 1292, we find him in sole mastery of the field. It is not until two years after Giles has been elected Minister-General of his Order (1292), that Godfrey comes back to the attack in his eleventh and thirteenth *Quodlibets*. Henry of Ghent had ceased from public controversy on the subject of theology with his twelfth *Quodlibet,* and died five years later in 1293. So the next two sections of our article also belong to Giles, one handling his lone *Quaestio de subjecto theologiae,* and the other a question from his fifth *Quodlibet.*

IX. GILES, *QUAESTIO DE SUBJECTO THEOLOGIAE* (ca. 1290)[1]

The objections with which Giles opens this treatise are a summary of all the arguments he has seen raised against his position, the answers to which, as we shall see, reflect the somewhat new position he adopts in the body of the article. The *In Contrarium* contains a clear statement of his general position, without the nuanced explanation he will give.[2]

The Solution has five main points: (1) An explanation of the reduplication in "God as God" in the light of Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics;* (2) a further proof of this thesis in the light of his doctrine on the beatific vision; (3) answers to two objections, one of which is that of Henry of Ghent about deity differing from infinity; (4) the exegesis of three Scripture texts; and (5) a consideration of the divine names. In this last section he again answers Henry's difficulty about deity and infinity, so I shall omit any separate treatment of the third point.

1. *God understood reduplicatively.*

The knowledge which God has of Himself is differentiated from any other knowledge had of Him by its formal object being God reduplicatively. This means that God and God alone knows Himself absolutely, hence infinitely, because reduplication entails universality of consideration and immediacy.[3]

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[15] *Ibid.,* ad 3m; p. 12^{b}: creatura ad hoc nobis proponitur finaliter, ut Deus quaeratur, et diligatur. Philosophi tamen non semper in suis scientiis intendebant hunc finem immediate, sed ut ipsa creatura cognosceretur.

[1] *Quaestio fundatissimi doctoris Egidii Romani de subjecto theologiae pulcherrima* (ed. 1530). This edition has the same pagination as the Venice, 1504 edition, in which fols. 2-96 contain Giles' *Quodlibets*, and fols. 98-100 this question. The date of composition is not assigned by Bruni, Glorieux, Suárez. The *terminus a quo* would seem to be Christmas, 1288, since it deals with Henry's treatment in his *Quodl.* XII, 1, of the aspects of deity and infinity. At the earliest it would be Christmas, 1285, since the question modifies Giles' stand on the knowledge which the Blessed have of God; this seems to be an escape from a difficulty proposed by Godfrey's *Quodl.* I, 5. The *terminus ad quem* could be 1294, since Godfrey in a *Quodlibet* (XI, 1) of that year criticizes the "finite and contracting" condition which Giles attaches to theology, an expression found explicitly only in the *Quaestio de subj. theol.* As Giles was Master-General of his Order from 1292-1294 and wrote his last *Quodlibet* in 1291, the *terminus a quo* is more likely 1291.

[2] *Quaest. subj. theol.;* fol. 98^{ra}: credimus rationabiliter dictum quod Deus non secundum illud pelagus substantiae infinitum, i.e. in eo quod Deus, sed sub ratione speciali. i.e. sub aliqua ratione finita est subjectum tam in scientia beatorum quam viatorum, cum utraque hujusmodi scientia sit finita, et utrique repugnat infinitas. Propter quod infinitum sub ratione infiniti vel quod idem est Deus sub ratione qua Deus cum secundum Damascenum [*De Fide orth.* I, 9; PG 94, 836B] nomine Dei importetur quoddam pelagus substantiae infinitum. Deus sic acceptus in nulla scientia creata poterit esse subjectum.

[3] *Quaest. subj. theol.;* fol. 98^{rb}: Dicemus ergo quod Deus in eo quod Deus vel infinitum in eo quod infinitum vel pelagus substantiae infinitum in eo quod tale pelagus est subjectum in scientia quam habet Deus de

What Giles means by this double universality stems from his interpretation of Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* I, 4 and 5.[4] He illustrates his meaning by the example of the triangle having three angles. The possession of three angles is verified of some figures, but not of all. It is true of all triangles (universality of consideration), and that is because it is true of triangle as triangle, or reduplicatively. It is also true of all isosceles triangles, but not immediately. It is not because a triangle is isosceles that it has three angles. The immediate reason is that it is a triangle, which is so for all triangles (universality of immediacy). So, wherever you have a reduplicative consideration, there you have a consideration of the thing in all the ways it can be considered, and in all the ways that flow immediately from its nature.

Hence no knowledge of God other than that which God has of Himself (than which none is more immediate) can be of God absolutely, simply or without condition.[5] It cannot be of God with the universality which characterizes God's knowledge of Himself, otherwise there would be no difference. Hence it cannot be of God infinitely, but must be according to a finite, limiting, contracting aspect.[6] Godfrey will seize upon this later. The special aspect, of course, is God as glorifier, since the Blessed must know as much about God as will make them happy.[7]

2. *God reduplicatively as object of the beatific vision.*

Apparently under pressure from Godfrey's first *Quodlibet,* Giles shifts his

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seipso. Propter quod si quaeratur quid est subjectum in scientia quam habet Deus de seipso, dicemus quod est Deus absolute loquendo. Quod si quaeratur sub (f. 98^{va}) qua ratione, non assignabimus aliam nisi seipsum. Dicemus enim quod Deus in eo quod Deus est hujusmodi subjectum. Quid ergo faciet illa reduplicatio Deus in eo quod Deus respondebimus quod illa reduplicatio universalitatem considerationis et universalitatem immediationis.

[4] *Ibid.;* fol. 98^{rb}. The following text immediately precedes that quoted in note 3. It explains the universality of immediacy and consideration: Respondeo dicendum quod reduplicatio ut hoc in eo quod hoc semper importat aliquod primum et secundum quod ipsum, ut si dicamus triangulus in eo quod triangulus habet tres. Istud in eo quod vel ista reduplicatio non importat aliud nisi quod triangulo primo et secundum quod ipsum competit habere tres. De ratione autem primi et secundum quod ipsum, ut habetur ex *Primo Posteriorum* [Aristotle, *Anal. Post.* I, 4 and 5], est universale et immediatum, ut si triangulo primo et secundum quod ipsum competit habere tres. Oportet quod triangulus respectu habere tres habeat quandam universalitatem et immediationem, nam figura habet tres et aequilaterus habet tres, sed non immediate quia nec figura in eo quod figura, nec aequilaterus in eo quod aequilaterus, sed in eo quod triangulus habet tres. Ergo videtur habere tres solus triangulus super quem cadit reduplicatio, quia hoc habet in eo quod triangulus, habet immediatum ad habere tres. Rursus solus triangulus quantum ad hoc habet universalitatem. Figura enim et aequilaterus deficiunt ab universalitate habendi tres, quia figura deficit ab universalitate subjectorum, quia non omnis figura habet tres. Aequilaterus vero deficit ab universalitate causae, quia in aequilatero non est universalis in aliis speciebus trianguli. Solus ergo triangulus cui competit reduplicatio respectu habere tres habet immediationem et universalitatem respectu passionis praefatae. . . . Cum ergo aliquid cum reduplicatione ponitur subjectum in aliqua scientia, oportet quod secundum illam reduplicationem respectu illius subjecti accipiatur in illa scientia tam universalitas immediationis quam universalitas considerationis.

[5] *Ibid.;* fol. 98^{va}: His autem praelibatis patet quod in nulla scientia creata Deus in eo quod Deus potest esse subjectum, quia in tali reduplicatione importatur duplex universalitas, scilicet considerationis et immediationis. Sed in nulla scientia creata potest Deus sic reduplicatus esse subjectum, quia tunc illa scientia esset infinita, quia esset de infinito sub ratione infinita.

[6] *Ibid.;* fol. 98^{vb}: Sicut ergo absolute, nec in scientia beatorum, nec viatorum, debet poni Deus in eo quod Deus esse subjectum, tamen cum aliqua conditione addita potest hoc poni, nam ut potest patere ex habita tam universalitas considerationis quam immediationis concluditur quod Deus in eo quod Deus non potest poni in scientia beatorum. Nam quantum ad universalitatem considerationum hoc poni non potest, quia beati non possunt considerare Deum omni modo quo considerandus est, nec possunt cognoscere. Deum omni modo quo cognoscendus est. . . . Sed in scientia beatorum ponitur subjectum Deus sub aliqua conditione ratione speciali, limitante et finiente eorum scientiam, quia non habent scientiam infinitam, multo magis in sacra pagina et in scientia viatorum talis limitatio et finitatio est de necessitate ponenda. Cf. fol. 99^{ra} for the full expression "ratione contrahente et specificante et finitante et limitante".

[7] In *Quodlibet* III, 18 and V, 5, Giles will explain how such knowledge is beatitude not formally but finally, and that only as a secondary object of the will.

ground somewhat with regard to the way in which God is the object of the beatific vision.[8] He admits now that from the viewpoint of immediacy God as God *(Deus in eo quod Deus)* is the subject or object of the knowledge of the Blessed and even the *ratio objecti*. Is this a volte-face? Not quite.

Giles' theory of the beatific vision comes in to save his thesis of the special aspect, or, in terms of the present discussion, of the less-than-universality of immediacy. In the beatific vision there is the light of glory through which the Blessed know God. This light is not God Himself, but something created, whereas in God's own knowledge of Himself the light is God Himself. In the case of the Blessed the light is an effect. Hence the resultant vision is something created, limited. Hence, absolutely speaking, God is not the subject of their knowledge. Why? Because, even if on God's part He is (*ex parte scibilis*), on their part He is not *(ex parte scientis)*. The fundamental limitation is that God is not our vision of Him formally but only efficiently. So there is no identity of consideration and immediacy here.

Giles reiterates and fortifies this position in his answer to the ninth objection.[9] He also brings out to some extent how the divine essence is the object of the beatific vision, though this will be clearer in the fourth section. The objection runs thus: the reduplication "as glorifier", which is the source of the difficulty, reduplicates either the divine power or the divine action or the divine effect. In the first and second cases the power and action are identical with God. This is not so in the third case, for the effect does not look to God objectively. Therefore God as glorifier cannot be the object of theology.

Giles replies that the divine power can be called the divine essence as virtually acting on the intellect of the Blessed in being their object immediately.[10] Also the divine action can be the *ratio objecti* through which the divine essence offers itself to their intellects. And the divine effect is the vision caused in them of the divine essence as being through itself both object and *ratio objecti*.

So the reduplication in the "as glorifier" applies to the divine essence and power as object, and to the divine action as *ratio objecti*. But, as for the divine effect, it is by a created vision and not by God Himself that we see Him. In other words, it is by a finite, special aspect that we see Him. The qualification "as glorifier" does not mean that on God's part He is not the object of our vision in His infinitude. It means that on our part, because our vision is created and finite, we cannot receive an infinite change: we cannot receive God whole and wholly, even though He offer Himself to us totally.

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[8] *Quaestio subj. theol.;* fol. 98^{vb}: Possunt enim ista duo stare simul, quod intellectus tendat in ipsam essentiam rei et habeat pro objecto ipsam essentiam rei, tamen tendit in essentiam per speciem, ut cognoscit essentiam lapidis per speciem lapidis. Sed in scientia beatorum respectu divinae essentiae non sic, quia non solum essentia divina est ibi immediate objectum, sed etiam per seipsam, non per aliam speciem est ibi objectum. Propter quod quantum ad ipsum objectum et quantum ad speciem quae est ratio videndi objectum potest concedi quod Deus in eo quod Deus est subjectum vel objectum in scientia beatorum. Sed quantum ad actus visionis et quantum ad lumen gloriae, sive quantum ad gratiam consummatam Deus in eo quod Deus non est subjectum vel objectum, quia ille actus visionis per quam beati vident essentiam divinam, licet immediate sit causatus a divina essentia, tamen hujusmodi actus non est ipse Deus vel divina essentia, sed differt ab ea, sicut effectus differt a sua causa. Sic etiam ipsum lumen gloriae vel ipsa gratia consummata per quam sancti vident Deum, non est ipsa divina essentia vel ipse Deus. Propter quod Deus in eo quod Deus sic absolute loquendo non potest poni subjectum in scientia beatorum, sed sub aliqua conditione debet hoc poni.

[9] *Ibid.*, arg 9; fol. 98^{ra}.

[10] *Ibid.*, ad 9m; fol. 100^{vb}: Cum ergo quaeritur quid reduplicat ibi, ut glorificator, vel in eo quod glorificator, dicemus quod reduplicat ipsam divinam essentiam vel virtutem divinae essentiae ut est objectum beatorum, et ut immutat intellectum beatorum quia per seipsam est tale objectum et per seipsam immutat intellectum beatorum. Sic etiam reduplicat divinam actionem quae est ipsa divina essentia ut est ratio objecti et ut est ratio videndi seipsam, quia sicut divina essentia non per aliud objectum videtur, sed per seipsam, quia non per aliam speciem sed per seipsam immutat intellectum beatorum. Sed quantum ad reduplicationem effectus, cum effectus hujus immutationis vel hujus objecti et rationis objecti sit ipsa divina visio quae non est ipsa divina essentia, dicere possumus quod Deus non per seipsum, sed per illam visionem quae est quid creatum et quid finitum videtur a beatis.

Is Giles saying anything different from what Henry of Ghent said in his twelfth *Quodlibet,* namely that we know God whole but not wholly? Yes, because as we shall see in the next section, the beatific vision for Giles is not the reception by our intellect of God in His essence, but the creation in it of a vision.

3. *Exegesis of Scripture on the beatific vision.*

The first text Giles quotes is: "Now I know in part; but then I shall know even as I am known" (*I Cor.* xiii, 12).[11] As God knows me through His essence, this proves that I shall know Him through that same essence, and in exactly the same way in which He knows me. Now, according to St. Augustine's doctrine of the divine Ideas, God knows us according to His production of us: His knowledge is causal. Since he produces each thing as constituted by its own diverse and special *ratio,* so He knows each according to a diverse and special *ratio.* Only thus can any creature, wayfarer or Blessed, be represented in God's essence. Hence one of the Blessed, knowing God as God knows him, must likewise know God according to a special *ratio* or aspect only, and not according to that infinite ocean of substance *(in illo pelago infinito).* This *tour de force* answers Henry who had said that "donkey", as existing in God, is infinite. Giles uses St. Augustine to show that neither "donkey" nor "man" nor "Blessed" exists in God's essence except as a special and not an infinite *ratio.*

The second text is: "We shall see him as he is" (*I Jo.* iii, 2).[12] Here below we know God through negations, through what God is not, but in heaven "as he is". The "as" (*sicut*) does not mean equality, but similarity. God's knowledge will always surpass ours, which were not the case were we to see God in His infinity.

The third text enunciates the first half of the first text: "We see now through a glass in a dark manner: but then face to face".[13] Since "through a glass" means seeing God not in Himself but through creatures, so in heaven we shall see God in His essence. However, this does not mean under an infinite aspect. The analysis of "face to face" proves this.

One face through its eyes sees another face. So through its intellect a blessed soul sees God. Now, just as a face that is seen generates in the eye of another the act of seeing it, and does not generate there any species that would really differ from that vision or act of seeing, as St. Augustine has it, so God is seen by the Blessed by imprinting not an alien species in their intellects, but the very act of understanding or intellective vision. Since this vision is finite, God is seen under a finite or special aspect. And thus this vision differs from God's vision of Himself, which is infinite, being God Himself.

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[11] *Quaestio subj. theol.;* fol. 99^{va}: Si ergo sicut res sunt notae a Deo, sic sunt productae, cum omnia sint producta a Deo secundum speciales rationes, omnia erunt nota a Deo secundum speciales rationes. Quilibet ergo beatus est notus a Deo per essentiam Dei, prout illa essentia est ratio specialis cognoscendi illum beatum. Et quia sicut Deus cognoscitur a beato sic beatus cognoscitur a Deo, cum hoc sit sub speciali ratione, quod dictum contingit ex finitatione et limitatione creaturae, et quia omnis creatura est certis limitationibus circumscripta, ideo sub speciali ratione repraesentatur in Deo et habet ideam in Deo ut patuit per Augustinum capitulo de ideis [*De Diversis quaest.* LXXXIII, q. 46; PL 40, 29-31]. Videt ergo beatus Deum per essentiam Dei, sed non in illo pelago infinito, sed sub quadam speciali ratione. Ex hoc igitur poterit sumi una ratio quare Deus sub speciali ratione erit subjectum vel objectum in scientia beatorum et per consequens viatorum.

[12] *Ibid.;* fol. 99^{vab}: Sed in patria videbimus sicuti est. Sed sicut et sicuti et caetera talia adverbia dicunt similitudinem, non (99^{vb}) aequalitatem, videbimus ergo eum sicut est, et similes erimus ei cognoscendo ipsum. Non tamen propter hoc erimus aequales ei, etiam in cognitione, quia Deus in patria erit vincens scientiam nostram. Quod non esset si videremus Deum in illa infinitate. Videbimus ergo et rem infinitam, sed sub ratione finita et sub speciali ratione. Cf. St. Thomas, *Sum. th.* I, q. 12, a. 6, ad 1m.

[13] *Ibid.;* fol. 99^{vb}: Sicut ergo facies per oculum quem habet videt aliam faciem sic in patria anima beata per intellectum quem habet videbit Deum. Et sicut facies visa ab oculo generat in oculo actum videndi seipsam, et non generat ibi aliam speciem differentem realiter ab illa visione vel ab illo actu videndi, ut plane vult Augustinus *De Trinitate* X, 2 [PL 42, 975], sic Deus in patria non imprimendo aliam speciem in intellectu beatorum sed solum ipsum actum intelligendi vel illam visionem intellectivam videbitur a beatis. Et quia ille actus intelligendi vel illa visio intellectiva est quid finitum, oportet quod Deus sub ratione finita, quam vocamus rationem specialem, videatur a beatis in patria.

What this amounts to is that God's infinite essence is the object of the beatific vision only efficiently. Between the intellect and God's essence is a created vision.

4. *The name "God" implies a positive infinity.*

The last part of the solution is a short treatise on the divine names, showing how they are applied to God positively and negatively. Under the heading of negative attributions "infinity" is once more discussed in relation to "deity".

Giles thinks that this section is invaluable for understanding the peculiar difficulty of his own position.[14] Given, he says, that there is a first cause, the unlimited *esse* whence all proceeds, "God" is the name given this cause's substance or nature. The names "just", "wise", etc. are given to attributes of that nature. As God's nature has an infinite number of perfections, so the attribute-names are infinite (or could be). You may even say that they too are imposed on the divine nature, but only materially, by way of identity with that nature: they are not in themselves formally synonymous. Such names do not bespeak God's nature but only something "according to His nature".

As the attribute-names are infinite in number, and are imposed on the perfections of God's nature, so that nature, the very thing which is God, is an infinite sea of perfections. So (here I am bringing in the discussion of the omitted section)[15] to say that God reduplicatively is the subject of theology would be to make the creature's knowledge be of an infinite object as such. This answers Henry's claim that, as deity is synonymous with infinity, God reduplicatively can be the object of theology without making theology be an infinite knowledge.

But how does "deity" differ from "infinity"? Giles sees them differing simply as positive and negative infinity, since "deity" implies infinity better than "infinity" itself does. That is because "God", as John Damascene implies, is incomprehensible in nature. But incomprehensibility entails infinity positively, since it means a sea of perfections beyond all created knowing. Hence, as the final section concludes, "God" differs from "infinite" in two ways.[16] The latter is said of God's nature attributively and negatively; the former *per significationem* (signifying the nature) and positively (signifying the positive infinity of that ocean of divine substance). Now both infinities, positive and negative, are excluded from created knowledge, and the positive more perfectly so. For, given the existence of a subject, nothing negative will belong to it unless something positive first belong to it. Hence the knowledge of the Blessed and of wayfarers cannot have the infinite for subject, still less God as God, since the latter implies infinity even more than "infinity" does. This is confirmed by the text from *Exodus* in which God is signified through *esse, esse purum,* not received in another, nor limited by another, hence infinite with no admixture of potency.

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[14] *Ibid.*: Dicit enim hoc nomen Deus substantiam et naturam illius rei infinitae. Sed si nomen imponatur perfectionibus naturae et substantiae illius rei infinitae, sicut imponuntur nomina ipsis attributis, ut justus, sapiens, potens et caetera talia, et quia perfectiones competentes naturae divinae sunt infinitae, ideo hoc modo Deus potest esse infinitorum nominum, quia in Deo congregantur secundum Philosophum perfectiones omnium generum. Quod verum est non solum quantum ad perfectiones quae actu sunt, sed etiam quantum ad perfectiones quae possunt esse. Quas constat esse infinitas, secundum quem modum merito dictus est Deus infinitus. Hujusmodi autem attributa non dicuntur esse imposita divinae naturae sed perfectionibus competentibus illi naturae.

[15] *Ibid.*; fol. 99^{rb}: Tamen alia est ratio infinitatis et alia est ratio deitatis. Ideo volumus declarare quod infinitas magis importatur nomine dei vel nomine deitatis quam nomine infiniti vel infinitatis. Nam ut accipit Damascenus *De Div. Nom.*, Lib. I, cap. 4 [PG 3, 592], etsi hoc non diceret, ipsum dictum est per se clarum, videlicet quoniam est Deus, manifestum est, quod vero est secundum substantiam et naturam incomprehensibile est hoc et omnino ignotum. Si ergo quid est Deus secundum substantiam et naturam est incomprehensibile et omnino ignotum, quid aliud hoc est dictum, nisi quod ipse Deus est quaedam incomprehensibilitas et quaedam infinitas. Et quod ipsa substantia dei vel ipsa natura vel ipsa deitas est quaedam incomprehensibilitas et quaedam infinitas. . . . Attamen ut magis possimus obturare ora loquentium dicemus quod . . . infinitas magis importatur nomine dei quam nomine infiniti, nam nomine infiniti importatur negative, nam hoc infinitum, i.e. non finitum. Sed nomine Dei importatur infinitas positive, nam eo modo quo importatur infinitas nomine infiniti possumus intelligere infinitum, quia secundum Augustinum *De Trinitate* V, 7 [PL 42, 916] negatio est in eodem genere cum affirmatione. Quod ideo verum est quia non intelligitur negatio nisi per affirmationem. . . .

[16] *Quaestio subj. theol.*; fol. 100ra: Hoc nomen infinitum dicitur de natura divina per attributionem et negative, sed hoc nomen deus importabit illam naturam infinitam per

In this question Giles, despite his admissions on God's essence as object, remains entrenched in his basic position, thanks to his theory of the beatific vision. He has yet to explain how this vision of God under a limitation can suffice for beatitude.

X. GILES, *QUODLIBET* V, 5 (1289 or 1290)

In 1287/8 Giles wrote *Quodlibet* III, 18, entitled: "In what act is beatitude found? In an act of the will or of the intellect?"[1] His answer was that formally it is in an act of the will.[2] One point of immediate interest to our topic is that, according to Giles, only the will tends to God as He is in Himself. The intellect, for him, is joined to God by its act only to the extent that God is something in us.[3] This suggests a reason why vision of God must be limited, why it reaches God under a special and contracted aspect only. This is made clearer in *Quodlibet* V, 5, written two years later. In the latter *Quodlibet* he asks if the rational creature is united to God more through love than through understanding. The answer, as usual, is that it is through love. The development of this answer is important for bringing out some aspects of Giles' theory on the beatific vision, which lie behind the whole question of the subject of theology.

Giles gives three reasons for the union of love being greater. They flow from the nature of the act, the nature of the object, and the mode of action. First, then, if you compare the natures of understanding and love, you will see that the

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significationem et positive; . . . . Quare est inconsequens in scientia beatorum vel viatorum dicere infinitum in eo quod infinitum esse subjectum, multo minus, immo magis (f. 100^{rb}) est inconsequens dicere quod Deus in eo quod Deus est ibi subjectum, nam magis importatur infinitas nomine Dei, quia importat infinitatem positive, quam nomine infiniti, quia importat negative infinitatem.

[1] On the dating, cf. *supra,* Section VI, note 1.

[2] *Quodl.* III, 18; p. 187^{a}: Propter primum sciendum quod nihil aliud sit beatitudo, quam illud in quod finaliter voluntas tendit . . . Secundum hoc ergo distinguemus de beatitudine finaliter et de beatitudine formaliter: ut semper beatitudo finaliter sit voluntatis objectum, et beatitudo formaliter sit voluntatis actus, per quem voluntas formaliter tendit in objectum. The principal end is the final end or object, since the will does not tend to its own act. Final beatitude is considered either simply, and this is God, the uncreated good; or in a limited sphere (*in aliquo genere*), and then it is the vision of God, as an object of the will. Formal beatitude, taken simply, is that act of the will by which the will tends immediately to God as final beatitude simply. Taken *in aliquo genere* it is that act of the will by which the will tends immediately to the vision of God. Hence we arrive at the following hierarchy of beatitudes:

1. God Who is our beatitude most principally;
2. The act of the will by which we tend immediately to God.
3. Our vision of God, a final but less principal beatitude. Note that it is a beatitude as object of the will.
4. The act of the will by which we tend to the vision of God (and through it mediately to God).

To ask if we are joined to God more through will than through intellect does not make sense, since if it is beatitude we are talking about we are joined to God by the will alone. One can ask if the will is joined more closely by its own act or through the act of another power, the intellect. To ask the question is to see the answer, since beatitude is *per se* an act of the will.

[3] *Ibid.;* p. 190^{a}: Dato tamen, quod magis conjungeretur Deo intellectus per suum actum, quam voluntas, tamen quia ipsa voluntas non magis, immo multo minus conjungitur Deo per actum intellectus quam per proprium actum, ideo conjunctio ad Deum, ut habet rationem felicitatis, et ut est voluntatis finis, magis accipienda est, qua conjungitur voluntas Deo per actum proprium quam per actum intellectus.

former assimilates, the latter transforms.[4] For knowledge all you need is a likeness in the soul and not the thing itself.

Giles grants that in the beatific vision God is known by His essence and not by a likeness. But this is not because a likeness cannot give perfect knowledge.[5] It is just that no other formal expression or likeness of the divine essence is possible, since it is a pure form with no admixture of potentiality. Actually in the case of angelic self-knowledge there is a more perfect knowledge through a likeness (i.e. through God's essence as representative of the angel) than through essence (that of the angel). The point of this is that a formal expression suffices for knowledge. If intellect should desire the actual presence of the intelligible object, this would be only for the sake of knowing it. Such a contingency would arise when the intelligible object has no other formal expression of itself. This cannot happen with love. The lover as such wants the presence of the beloved not for the sake of the love, but for the sake of the beloved to whom he wants to be joined and into whom he longs to be transformed.[6] Divine love produces ecstasy, puts lovers outside of themselves, giving them a union with God greater than any other union.

The second proof of this thesis is from an anaylsis of the object.[7] This, Giles says, also answers the lone objection, which is to the effect that love goes out to what is external, whereas understanding, by its interiority, gives a greater union. This, he says, is a *non sequitur.* Certainly the object of love is the thing in itself, while the object of intellect is the thing as it is in us. So, if in heaven God is known only to the extent He is in us, our union with Him would be according to our mode of being only. Union by love, however, is according to the way God is in Himself and hence according to the divine mode of being.

This fits in well with Giles' constant assertion that the vision of God is never of God in an infinite mode, according to the mode proper to God, the infinite ocean of substance. Only in love is a union according to the divine mode possible. Vision is always our vision. God is seen as in our vision, as He is in us, hence as limited, as contracted, even though He be in our vision by His essence and not by a likeness. For, as the *Quaestio de subjecto theologiae* showed, even though God offer Himself entirely to us, we cannot receive Him entirely, but only within the limits of our created vision.

It worries Giles not at all that union by vision is limited. No more is needed for the knowledge sufficient for beatitude. Since beatitude is an act of the will, to have beatitude simply all that is needed is an object simply beatifying along with an immediate will-act by which we tend immediately and directly to the uncreated God. The role of the beatific vision seems to be merely to make God known as an uncreated good; the simple will-act takes over from there and is beatitude formally, simply and principally. The vision of God, as we learn from *Quodlibet* III, 18, is beatitude only in a secondary sense, and then only to the extent that it is object of the will.[8]

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[4] *Quodl.* V, 5; p. 277^a: . . . actus intelligendi assimilat sed actus amoris transformat.

[5] *Ibid.*: Quare, si objiciatur de divina essentia, quod non per aliam similitudinem, sed per seipsam sit apta nata perfecte cognosci, dicimus hoc non esse quod perfecta cognitio non possit esse nisi per similitudinem, sed quia divina essentia est pura forma nihil habens de potentialitate admixtum. Immo per aliam expressionem formae, quam per seipsam essentialiter cognosci non possit, tamen si res essentialiter cognosci possit per aliquam expressionem formalem aliam a seipso, non erit inconveniens perfectiorem esse hujusmodi cognitionem quam sit ipsa cognitio per essentiam.

[6] *Ibid.;* p. 277^b: Si ergo intellectus, secundum quod hujusmodi, vult praesentiam intelligibilis, hoc est, propter ipsam intellectionem, ut quia forte non potest id intelligere plene, nisi per praesentiam ejus. Ut, si id intelligible non habeat aliam formalem expressionem, aut quod per nihil aliud possit essentialiter intelligi quam per seipsum; sed amans, secundum quod hujusmodi, non vult praesentiam amati solum propter ipsam rem amatam, cui, quantum potest, vult se conjungere. Immo, secundum quod hujusmodi, quantum posset, vellet seipsam in ipsam transformare. . . . Divinus ergo amor, id est amor, quo diligimus Deum, est faciens extasim, id est ponens amantes extra seipos, non permittens eos amare sive amantes esse sui-ipsorum, sed facit eos esse amantes amatorum, id est, rerum amatarum.

[7] *Ibid.;* 278^a: Intelligitur enim res secundum quod est in nobis; diligitur autem, ut dicebamus, prout est in seipsa. Ex his enim verbis, quibus innitebatur argumentum, volens ostendere quod intellectio plus nos uniat rei intelligibili quam amor rei amatae, non arguebat propositum sed oppositum. Nam, si Deus etiam in patria intelligetur secundum quod erit in nobis, et diligetur a nobis, ut est in seipso, consequens est quod per intelligere uniemur Deo secundum quod erit in nobis et secundum modum nostrum; sed per diligere uniemur ei ut est in seipso et secundum modum divinum.

A third reason is a *tour de force.*[9] It is an application of a supposedly general principle that whatever is prior in origin is less perfect. Now as love, the act of the will, follows the act of understanding, love must be more perfect.

A final answer to the one objection is that love as transforming does not really go out at all to something extrinsic to the lover, but rather to what is identical with him.[10]

This priority which Giles gives to love will be attacked by Godfrey of Fontaines in his *Quodlibet* XI, 1.

XI GODFREY, *QUODLIBET* XI, 1 (1294), XIII, 1 (1296), XIV, 2 (1297)[1]

The first question of *Quodlibet* XI would seem to be a refutation of the position adopted by Giles even in his *Commentary on the First Book of the Sentences,* namely that theology is primarily affective, leading to love of God.[2] Giles claimed there that, though it is affective, it is more speculative than practical. Godfrey says this is a contradiction: if love is in any way the end of theology, theology is practical, and not speculative.

This also enables Godfrey to refute Giles' claim that theology and the vision of God consider God under a special aspect only. To treat of God under the limitation of His relation to our appetite leaves the field wide open for a speculative science that would deal with God considered absolutely and not according to any relationship to creatures. Godfrey puts the question thus: if you say that the subject of theology is the beloved God in so far as He is loved *(secundum quod dilectus)*, do you implicitly make love the subject?[3] He says you do, if the reduplication is "God as loved", but not if it is "God as lovable". But even this latter aspect implies a relation at least of reason to the act of love. Hence theology would have to treat of love either *per se* and primarily, or *per se* and not primarily. In either case it would be a practical and quasi-moral science.

Notice also that to treat of God as lovable is to deal with that characteristic of God whereby He causes love of Himself.[4] To have God as object under this condition is certainly to have a contracted and limited view. But the object of speculative intellect is being simply and absolutely considered without relation to appetite. Hence there is a speculative science higher than the one concerning God as lovable, and it treats God absolutely as He is in Himself.

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[8] Cf. *supra,* note 2.

[9] *Quodl.* V, 5; p. 278^{a}: Utroque ergo modo uniemur rei, per intelligere et amare, (p. 278^{b}) sed hujusmodi unio in intelligendo inchoatur, sed in amore consummatur. Origine praecedit unio per intelligere, sed perfectione praecedit unio per amare.

[10] *Ibid.;* p. 278^{b}: Uniri ergo rei, ut est in seipsa, prout in ipsam rem transformamur, non est uniri rei ut est extranea, sed magis ut est eadem.

[1] The dates are those given by Glorieux, *La Litt. quodl.* I, p. 150.

[2] *Quodl.* XI, 1 (*Les Philosophes Belges* V, fasc. I-II, Louvain, 1932), pp. 1-6. This question could be also against Giles' *In II Sent.*, d. 11, were this latter prior to 1294, though I am taking it as being later.

[3] *Ibid.;* p. 2: Et ex hoc patet quod sive dicatur Deum esse subjectum alicujus scientiae ut dilectus sive ut diligibilis, oportet etiam illam scientiam considerare per se et primo vel saltem per se, licet non primo, de dilectione. Et si dicatur Deus sic esse subjectum in theologia, ista erit scientia practica et quasi moralis, non speculativa; quia est de actu appetitus vel voluntatis ut de subjecto vel ut formali ratione subjecti modo supradicto, vel per se et primo, vel (p. 3) per se licet non primo.

[4] *Ibid.*; p. 2: Si autem quaeratur utrum dicere quod Deus secundum quod diligibilis est subjectum alicujus considerationis sit idem quod dicere quod ipsa dilectio sit subjectum, dicendum quod non. Deum enim esse diligibilem per se et primo non dicit actum in ipso diligente, sed dicit rationem et proprietatem in objecto dilectionis secundum quod est causativum illius. Nunc autem objectum actus non est ipse actus. Nec principia essentialia et intrinseca objecti sunt principia essentialia et intrinseca actus. Et ideo consideratio qua consideratur Deus secundum quod diligibilis primo et per se habet pro objecto illam condicionem vel proprietatem effectivam vel causativam quantum est de se talis actus sive ipsum Deum sub hac condicione vel ratione. Et ex consequenti considerat de ista dilectione in quantum ratio diligibilis importat relationem secundum rationem ad dilectionem quam nata est efficere. . . .

A possible escape is to say that God is lovable acccording to all that we can consider in Him and belongs to Him in Himself.[5] Giles had made this point, more or less, in his *Commentary on the First Book of the Sentences.*[6] This is no solution. True, God is simple and has no parts. But the consideration of God as He is in Himself is a more absolute and abstract and universal consideration than one considering Him in relation to appetite, or according to what is suitable for the creature, or in so far as the creature is moved by God. Godfrey repeats his conclusion strongly: it simply is not right to say that God cannot be the subject of theology under an absolute aspect, but only under a contraction.[7]

Godfrey then answers the one objection which runs thus:[8] the object of intellectual knowledge bears the same relation to that knowledge as the object of sight to seeing. A bit of colored wood is the object of sight as colored, i.e under the aspect of color. Hence color *per se* is the object of sight. So too, since the beloved God as loved is the subject of theology, love *per se* is the subject.

Godfrey admits this objection to be logically conclusive to the extent it concerns God as loved.[9] It does not apply to God as lovable, because being lovable does not *per se* and immediately include love but only its object. "Visible" and "lovable" are names of the object or formal aspect. "Seen" and "loved" are named imposed from the acts. This has an important application to the vision of God and to beatitude.[10]

Beatitude or the act of beatitude, as far as the intellect is concerned, is rightly placed in the vision of God inasmuch as He is visible, because the object of such an act is God Himself, the uncreated. But it may not be placed in the vision of God as seen, because the object of this act is something created, the vision itself (unless the reduplication bear not on the act but on the object). Hence Godfrey admits that the vision of God *qua* seen is beatitude only formally, not objectively (the terminology is reminiscent of Giles' *Quodlibet* III, 18). But—and here is a major disagreement with Giles' whole position—this distinction cannot be made with regard to the vision of God as *visible* or intelligible:

> The vision of the intelligible God as intelligible in every way and according as there is reduplication of God and intelligibility is beatitude, because the vision, whereby not only God is seen, but also God's intelligibility, is beatitude, since it is one and the same thing.[11]

For Giles God alone can reduplicatively know God in His full intelligibility and according to His infinity. This Godfrey will not allow.

Giles' view that theology is affective kept bothering Godfrey in his remaining *Quodlibets*. Thus in *Quodlibets* XIII, 1, of 1296, in which Godfrey discusses the question of theology being speculative or practical, we find as the third objection that theology is only affective, the reason being that a science is named by the end, which in this case is love.[12] Godfrey answers by affirming that sciences are specified primarily and *per se* by the object, and that diversity of end follows diversity of object.

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[5] *Ibid.;* p. 3.

[6] Giles, *In I Sent.*, prol., pars 1, prin. 2, q. 3.

[7] Recall Giles, *Quaestio de subj. theol.*, ad 9m.

[8] Godfrey, *Quodl.* XI, 1; p. 1.

[9] *Ibid.*; p. 3 (*ad finem*).

[10] *Ibid.;* p. 6: Si igitur dicatur quod beatitudo in Deo viso, secundum quod visus est, consistit et in objecto beatifico et in actu quo ipse videtur, et non in alio, est beatitudo formaliter; sic videtur quod visio Dei vel Deus visus secundum quod visus est beatitudo, quia hoc nihil aliud est quam quod visio qua videtur Deus est beatitudo. Sed si dicatur sic: visio Dei vel Deus visus secundum quod visus, id est visio qua videtur, est beatitudo objective, sic falsum est.

[11] *Ibid.*: Sed non sic potest distingui respectu intelligibilitatis, quia visio Dei intellibilis secundum quod intelligibilis omnibus modis est beatitudo et secundum quod fit reduplicatio Dei et etiam intelligibilitatis; quia etiam visio qua non solum videtur Deus, sed etiam intelligibilitas Dei est ipsa beatitudo, quia est unum et idem.

In the body of the question Godfrey expounds his own view on the nature of theology. Theology is both speculative and practical simply. It would be out of place to go into his reasons for this view. For present purposes it is enough to point out that Godfrey insists that the speculation of the beatific vision is what unifies, as extrinsic end, the *agibilia* and the *speculabilia* of theology. This leads him to a strong assertion of his opposition to Giles.[13] Since God absolutely and in Himself and not His love, whereby we love Him, nor His glorification or beatification, by which He beatifies or glorifies us, is the subject of this science, theology is more speculative than practical.

Finally, in 1297, in *Quodlibet* XIV, 2, Godfrey repeats what he said in *Quodlibet* XI, 1.[14] In saying that theology looks principally to the love of God, Giles is wrong in calling it affective; he should have said it was practical. With such an end theology's subject is not God, nor is it theology, but only a moral science.

XII. GILES, *COMMENTARY ON THE SECOND BOOK OF THE SENTENCES,* d. 11 (ca. 1300)[1]

Even if the dating of this distinction be not correct, Giles still had the last word in the controversy. Henry died in 1293. Godfrey, though a Master of Theology until 1304, seems to have said no more on the subject after the last of his *Quodlibets* in 1297. Giles came back to the debate in his *Commentary on the Second Book of the Sentences,* both in distinction 11 and distinction 21, the latter being definitely after 1301.

In distinction 11 Giles seems to be hitting directly at Godfrey, *Quodlibet* XI, 1. The occasion is an objection about angels growing in the vision of God, since all operation is for some gain: they must intend to reap some reward.[2] Giles answers that operations are for further perfection, only when the end has not been attained.[3] When the operation includes the end or is the end, perfection is already present. There is no further end, unless you distinguish an order among ends. In heaven, for example, there is a threefold end. And it is here that Giles' phraseology is strongly reminiscent of Godfrey's attack. This threefold end is (a) vision, (b) love, and (c) God as seen and loved by us, *(ut est visus et dilectus a nobis)*. Vision is ordered to love as to something more perfect, and both are ordered to God as object. It was to this limitation that Godfrey objected. Vision and love are operations concerned with their end, God. God is our end simply;

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[12] *Quodl.* XIII, 1; p. 169.

[13] *Ibid.*; p. 177: Unde cum Deus secundum se et absolute, non ejus dilectio, qua scilicet ipsum diligimus nec ejus glorificatio vel beatificatio, qua scilicet nos glorificat vel beatificat, ponatur sujectum hujusmodi scientiae, ipsa magis est speculativa quam practica.

[14] *Quodl.* XIV, 2; p. 333 (*ad finem*): Unde non bene videntur dicere . . . etiam illi qui ponunt eam, ut dictum (p. 334) est, principaliter intendere dilectionem Dei, et tamen ponunt subjectum theologiae Deum; et etiam dicunt eam non esse practicam sed affectivam.

[1] *The terminus a quo* of this distinction is 1291, since dist. 1, pars 2, mentions the *de Causis* of 1290. The *terminus ad quem* is 1301, since dist. 12 is after that date, according to G. Suárez, given that it cites the *In Hexaemeron* of that year. Inasmuch as dist. 11 seems to answer Godfrey's *Quodl.* XI, 1, it would seem to be after 1294. The first period in which it is likely that Giles, after his elevation to the bishopric of Bourges in 1295, would have some opportunity for continuing the commentary would be 1300-1301, after his return to Bourges from a three-year stay in Rome. It is, however, still possible that dist. 11 was written prior to 1294, and that dist. 12 was written earlier also and later done over.

[2] *In II Sent.*, d. 11, q. 2, a. 1, 2a obj; I, p. 506^{b}: Angeli ergo cum sint creaturae ex custodia quam exercent circa nos, aliquod meritum reportare debent. Aliquid ergo accrescit eis quantum ad visionem divinam, quae est ejus praemium, et quam mereri intendunt ex operibus suis.

[3] *Ibid.*, ad 2m; p. 508^{a}: Erit enim in patria triplex finis: videlicet visio, dilectio, et Deus ut est visus et dilectus a nobis. Sed haec tria habent ordinem ad invicem, quia visio ordinatur ad dilectionem, tanquam ad aliquid magis perfectum, et utrumque, videlicet tam visio quam dilectio, ordinatur ad ipsum Deum, tamquam ad objectum.

we attain Him by open vision and consummated love. Man has beatitude when his will rests satisfied in the vision of God and love of him, though it is more perfectly delighted in the love.

Giles calls on Aristotle for support. Happiness for Aristotle is an operation of the soul according to its perfect power. This will be both vision, elicited by the power of wisdom, and love, elicited by the habit of charity; this latter is more perfectly our happiness. In either case felicity is an operation ordered to an object. Hence God, as the object of vision and love, is our end simply.

Giles has added nothing new to his distinction between final and formal ends, or to the hierarchic gradation of ends, though he is more ready to admit that the vision of God is an operation apprehensive of the end, and as such constituting a beatitude. He does not stress the point that beatitude is only in the will, or that God is attained through vision only mediately by the will.

XIII. GILES, *COMMENTARY ON THE SECOND BOOK OF THE SENTENCES,* d. 21 (post 1301)[1]

While debating the definition of temptation Giles discusses the methods of philosophy and theology. He recapitulates and draws together his positions on the subject and nature of theology.

Theology settles theological questions in accord with the end of theology.[2] Now the end of theology is not knowledge. If knowledge were all that they strove for, theologians would be a most miserable lot. Why? Because the knowledge which theology gains, even when it uses the other sciences as its handmaids, is not strictly knowledge (*scire*) but belief (*credere*), not vision but hearsay. It is only in heaven that we will know and see.

So there must be a further aim or end for theology: it can only be love or charity.[3] This he proves by an analysis of the usual scripture texts: *1 Cor.* xiii, etc. He concludes that the end of theology is not to know God on His own account *(propter se)*, but for the sake of loving Him *(propter diligere Deum)*. The knowledge theology brings helps us love Him more, since the more lovable a thing is, the more it is loved in proportion to its being known. A theologian must work hard at knowing God so that he may be moved thereby to love God.

A possible objection arises, and it is Godfrey's.[4] The objector reasons that love is an operation, hence theology must be dubbed practical. Giles distinguishes actions: exterior actions make for the practical, but not so the interior. Interior actions are of two kinds. Intellectual action simply looks at things; a science with this action in view is speculative. Voluntary action loves things; a science with this action as end is affective. This is proved from the limitation inherent in theology from the viewpoint of knowledge. Knowledge cannot be the principal end, as Scripture shows clearly. Since the principal end names a science, theology must be called affective. What precisely is the limitation intrinsic to theology?

It is that theology cannot know God as God.[5] God is an infinite sea of clarity.

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[1] *In II Sent.*, d. 21, q. 1, a. 2, dubium II. On the dating, cf. *supra*, Section XII, note 1.

[2] *Ibid.;* II, p. 172^{a}: Miserabiliores enim essemus omnibus hominibus si nos theologi, propter hunc finem in theologia studeremus, ut propter scire, quod possumus habere ex ipsa. . . .

[3] *Ibid.*: Oportet ergo ulteriorem finem dare theologiae, quam scire, et iste finis est diligere et charitatem habere. . . . Non ergo finis theologiae est scire Deum propter se, sed propter diligere Deum, quia quod est omni modo diligibile, quanto magis scitur, magis diligitur.

[4] *Ibid.*; p. 172^{b}: Sed dices: ipsum diligere est aliqua actio et aliqua operatio, ut ex hoc theologia debeat dici practica. Dicemus quod si sic vellemus appellare scientiam practicam, cum ipsa speculatio sit aliqua actio, scientia speculativa dicetur practica. Propter quod oportet nos dicere quod est actio exterior et interior. . . . Sed sicut est actio exterior, ita actio interior. Et hic est duplex, quia vel respicit intellectum, et hic est speculator, et scientia hoc intendens ut finem est speculativa. Vel respicit effectum (affectum?) et voluntatem et haec actio est dilectio. Et scientia hoc intendens ut finem debet dici dilectiva vel affectiva.

[5] *Ibid.*: Scientia enim theologiae, et maxime quae potest haberi in via de Deo, est tanquam de subjecto. Sed cum Deus sit quoddam infinitum pelagus claritatis, non potest esse de Deo ut Deus, nec de infinito ut

The infinite as infinite cannot be theology's subject, for this is impossible even for the knowledge of the Blessed. Hence there must be a finite mode to our knowledge of the infinite God. Whatever that finite mode be which specifies theology, "*qua* glorifier" or "*qua* restorer", it is the special aspect according to which God is theology's subject. Giles then explains how it is better to take "*qua* glorifier" as the special aspect. But all this is beside the point, which is that the knowledge we can have of God here is not the end of the divine law, of Sacred Scripture, or even of theology, since the principal end of all of these is love.

XIV. CONCLUSION

From the above exposition it should be clear that, as we noted in the beginning, Giles, in the face of the attacks by Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines and despite some concessions, steadfastly maintained his view that the subject of theology is God, not taken *reduplicative,* but under the special aspect of author of our beatitude and finisher of our glory.

Giles' view is put forward under the aegis of Saint Augustine, as might be expected from the first Parisian Master of Theology of the Hermits of Saint Augustine and, later, the Master General of the Order. Who else should uphold the pure doctrine of the Saint? Giles is the Saint's champion against Henry and Godfrey and even against Saint Thomas Aquinas, his former teacher. Had these men understood Saint Augustine, they could not have said anything else than that theology's end is beatitude, and that beatitude is a matter of love, and hence theology must exclude from its subject, though not necessarily from its consideration, all that does not pertain to that end. A true Augustinian must hold that theology is affective.

Whatever be the merits of this interpretation of Saint Augustine, Giles' position is governed logically by the two principles of (a) the necessity of seeing God in the beatific vision under limited aspects only, and (b) the primacy of union by love. If the Blessed know God under a special aspect only, *a fortiori* must the wayfarer. And, since it does not really matter that the beatific vision be thus limited, for its presentation of God is sufficient to enable the will to reach out to God in His infinite being, then it matters not that the subject of theology be circumscribed, provided it allow theology to achieve its ultimate end, love.

Presupposed in Giles' view is the Damascenian definition of God as infinite ocean of substance and interpreted in a way that equates God, in almost quantitative fashion, with the sum of exemplar perfections infinite in number. This equation of God, in effect, with an infinite intelligible world, makes it impossible for Giles to agree with Saint Thomas that for the substance of beatitude it suffices to know God as He is in Himself, absolutely, but not in every way in which He is knowable, comprehensively. For Giles, to know that infinite ocean absolutely is to know it comprehensively, that is according to the infinite number of exemplar perfections. He cannot accept Thomas' view that, though the Blessed do not know God perfectly, yet there is no part of Him they do not know. Not to know comprehensively is to know only in part; it is to participate (*partem capere*) God's knowledge of Himself, hence to know God not under an infinite aspect *(reduplicative),* but only under a finite, contracted, special aspect. Giles seems unable to distinguish God's knowledge of Himself from ours except by

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est infinitum. Quia tunc scientia quae habetur de Deo in via esset infinita, quod non potest competere scientiae, quae habebitur de Deo in patria. Oportet ergo dare aliquem modum finitum, secundum quem habeamus scientiam de Deo infinito et illum modum finitatis, secundum quem theologia reponitur in suo esse specifico. . . . Redeamus ergo ad propositum et dicamus quod cognitio Dei, quae potest haberi in via, non est finis legis divinae, nec scripturae sacrae vel theologiae, sed hujusmodi finis principalis est dilectio. Et quia a fine principali est omnia appellari . . . ideo non speculativa sed dilectiva vel affectiva scientia theologia est appellanda.

grounding a difference of formal object in the extent of the material field considered.

It is true that Giles finally did admit that God's essence, as such, is the object and even *ratio objecti* of the beatific vision as far as the divine visibility is concerned. But as far as there is actual sight of God, God is in that created vision only under a limited aspect. Though Giles wants to have God offer Himself whole and entire to the created intellect of the Blessed, he stops short of making God's essence be to that intellect *ut forma,* which is St. Thomas' solution. The reason lies partly, I think, in the different way Giles conceives the function of *lumen gloriae.*

The light of glory is not in Giles, as it is with St. Thomas, a disposition by which the intellect is rendered perfectible by such a form as the divine essence. For Giles the light of glory is that which shows us the present God limitedly, as contrasted with the light by which God knows Himself unlimitedly. Giles seems to conceive the light of glory as fulfiling the same function as the light of the agent intellect. The latter renders an object actually intelligible to us to the extent in which a limited light can, and makes the object actually "seen". So too the light of glory renders God actually understood or "seen" by us. Of course there is no question of rendering God actually intelligible. In St. Thomas, on the other hand, the light of glory does not of itself render God actually "seen"; it is simply a disposition that fits the intellect to receive God's essence *ut forma,* which actual reception constitutes God as seen.

This discussion of the limitedness of the beatific vision is really beside the point for Giles, since beatitude is an operation of the will, and the highest union is by love. Here too he is in strong opposition to St. Thomas. He certainly knew St. Thomas' position that beatitude is in an operation of the intellect, and also Thomas' reason for this, namely that only an intellectual operation can attain the ultimate end as He is in Himself, whereas the will can only desire it, when it is absent, or delight in it, when present. He also knew that St. Thomas admitted the precedence of the will as a motive force, and that he appealed to Saint Augustine against the primacy of the will in reaching the ultimate end, "for there is no love of what is not known, as St. Augustine says *De Trinitate* X". But Giles would not admit that the intellect can attain God as He is, since God as He is in Himself and God as He is in a created intellect's operation differ as infinite and finite. This is confirmed by his assertion that for the perfection of knowledge all that is strictly required is a likeness in the knower. Actual presence of God in His essence is demanded in the beatific vision only because there is no likeness of God. And God's presence acts therein only as an efficient cause of the vision, not as a quasi-formal cause. Our knowledge, no matter how perfect, can never be more than a limited vision, attaining God limitedly, and according to our mode of being. Only the will, through transforming love, reaches God as He is in Himself and according to the divine mode of being.

This dual doctrine of participative vision and of union by love presupposes a commensurate psychology, which calls for a separate study and treatment. We need not be surprised to find a speculative treatment of intellect and will in Giles, despite his claim that theology is affective. Just as much as St. Thomas, Henry of Ghent, and Godfrey of Fontaines, he is within the current of the commentaries on Peter Lombard, the commentaries on Aristotle, and style of the *quaestiones disputatae.* Even more than Henry or Godfrey is Giles influenced by the rational mode of theology practiced by St. Thomas. He admits that, apart from the consideration of the ultimate end of theology (a purely extrinsic end, his adversaries say), theology is more speculative than pratical. It is enough for him to have set up the attaining of beatitude as the specifying characteristic of theology.

The *Arti Minori* in Florentine Politics, 1342-1378

MARVIN B. BECKER AND GENE A. BRUCKER

I

IN his *History of Florence* published in 1936, Ferdinand Schevill asserted that no phase of Florentine history was more controversial than the period between 1343 and 1382, between the overthrow of the dictatorship of the Duke of Athens and the collapse of the regime established after the Ciompi revolution. Schevill attributed much of the confusion and divergence of opinion to the failure of historians to agree upon the terminology applied to the various social and economic groups within the city.[1] The major issue in the controversy over the interpretation of this period has been the political position of the fourteen lower gilds in the commune. Were the artisans and shopkeepers of these lower gilds, the *arti minori,* a powerful and influential element in the government? Were they ever strong enough to dominate the regime? Or was the commune still controlled by the wealthy bankers, merchants and industrialists in the seven greater gilds (the *arti maggiori*), who had established their hegemony in the previous century and retained their hold upon the government until the *coup d'état* of the Duke of Athens in 1342?

That the lower gilds constituted the most powerful element in the commune after 1343 was the unanimous judgment of contemporary witnesses who recorded the history of their times. The chronicler, Giovanni Villani, wrote that the rulers of Florence were "artisans and manual laborers and idiots . . . who cared little for the *repubblica* and knew less about governing it."[2] Giovanni Boccaccio had an equally low opinion of the men who governed the city, "who have come from Capalle, from Cilicciavole, from Sugame and Viminiccio, having been brought from the trowel and the plow." The author of the *Decameron* asserted that the *gente nuova* who had entered the government after the 1343 revolutions were responsible for lowering the tone of public morality: "Their minds are filled with insatiable avarice and overweening pride, so that, seeking not the public welfare but their own, they have brought misery to the city and now seek to enslave it."[3] Giovanni Villani was one of the victims of the Black Death which swept through Florence in 1348, but his brother, Matteo, continued the chronicle. Choosing as his favorite theme the maladministration of the city, Matteo sketched a dreary picture of Florence in the years after the great plague, where "every vile artisan wishes to become a prior."[4] Later generations of Florentine historians obtained the bulk of their material from these contemporary chronicles and incorporated in their own writings not only the facts but also the interpretation of their predecessors. Thus, the belief that the artisans and shopkeepers constituted a powerful and influential political force in the city after 1343 became a part of the Florentine historical tradition.[5]

This interpretation continued to find adherents in the nineteenth century, when historians were turning to documentary materials in the archives and libraries to supplement the literary sources. In 1860 Gino Capponi published his *Storia della Repubblica di Firenze,* in which he stated that the fourteen lesser gilds dominated the commune after the expulsion of the Duke of Athens.[6] The most prominent exponent of this thesis is Niccolò Rodolico, who has maintained that the period from 1343 to 1382 was the golden age of *la democrazia fiorentina.* Asserting that the *arti minori* played a very important role in communal politics, Rodolico has maintained that the struggle of the lower classes, artisans and laborers, to achieve influence and power was a very significant factor in the social, religious, and intellectual life of the city.[7] The major general histories of Florence written since 1900 have all incorporated this interpretation.[8]

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[1] F. Schevill, *History of Florence from the Founding of the City through the Renaissance* (New York, 1936), p. 260, n. 1. A further reason for the conflicting interpretations of this period was advanced by A. Panella, namely, that the archival sources have not been adequately exploited; *Archivio Storico Italiano*, II (1916) ii, 234-235.

[2] G. Villani, *Cronica* XII, 43 (Milan, 1848).

[3] G. Boccaccio, *Lettere volgari* (Florence, 1834), p. 12. In his attack on the *gente nuova*, Boccaccio meant to include not only the lower gildsmen, but also the parvenus in the greater gilds who had recently achieved wealth, social status and political power.

[4] M. Villani, *Cronica* II, 2 (Milan, 1848). Writing later in the fourteenth century, the chronicler, Marchionne Stefani, advanced a similar view; *Cronica fiorentina di Marchionne di Coppo Stefani*, ed. N. Rodolico, *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores*, new ed., XXX, part 1 (Città di Castello, 1903-1955), rub. 617.

[5] Cf. Leonardo Bruni Aretino, *Historiarum Florentii populi libri* XII, ed. E. Santini, *Rerum Ital. Script.*, new ed., XXX, part 3 (Città di Castello, 1914), 169-171: F. Guicciardini, *Le cose fiorentine*, ed. R. Ridolfi (Florence, 1945), p. 72; *Istorie fiorentine di Scipione Ammirato* I (Florence, 1647), pp. 482-483.

This theory has not, however, been accepted by all scholars who have studied the Florentine Trecento. The French historian, Perrens, was the first to express doubt that the lower gilds had achieved an effective voice in the government. He contended that neither the character nor the policies of the regime had been significantly altered by the addition of a pair of shopkeepers to the Signoria.[9] In his study of the Florentine gild system, Alfred Doren conceded that the lower gilds constituted the dominant element in the government from 1343 until about 1350, but he argued that political control of the commune then passed into the hands of the oligarchic group which had ruled the city before the advent of the Duke of Athens.[10] The most comprehensive attack upon the traditional thesis was made by Scaramella in a monograph published in 1914, in which he maintained that the *arti maggiori* retained control of the commune until the Ciompi revolution in 1378.[11]

Given these conflicting views, there appears to be ample justification for a reappraisal of the political role of the lower gilds in the commune from 1342 to 1378. The problem has several aspects, one of which is the numerical strength of the *arti minori* in the government, as compared to the greater gilds. Moreover, by investigating the economic interests, social status, and political views of the men who were chosen to represent the lower gilds in the government, it may be possible to discover whether they were truly representative of the artisan-shopkeeper class. Finally, did the *arti minori* constitute a clearly defined social and economic group in the city, with their own political program, or were the lower gildsmen so divided in their interests and objectives that they were unable to formulate a coherent policy? By reexamining the pertinent evidence, one may hope to shed new light upon these problems which are fundamental for an understanding of Florentine history in the fourteenth century.

II

The legislation of Walter of Brienne has been regarded by modern scholars as extremely favorable to the economic and political interests of the *arti minori.*[12] During his brief tenure as dictator of Florence (September, 1342—July, 1343), the Count of Brienne and Lecce, and titular Duke of Athens, sought to create support for his government among the members of the fourteen lower gilds and the skilled workers under the jurisdiction of the seven greater gilds. To the vintners' gild he granted a moratorium on all debts owed to the commune.[13] Tax concessions were decreed for the benefit of the sellers of oil, the retail food merchants and the vendors of fresh meat.[14] The dyers and washers of wool were given the right to form their own gild and were freed from the control of the cloth manufacturers in the Lana gild.[15] A cask maker and an ironmonger were chosen to sit in the Signoria, and a dealer in used clothing became *gonfaloniere di giustitia.*[16]

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[6] G. Capponi, *Storia della Repubblica di Firenze* I (Florence, 1875), p. 243.

[7] N. Rodolico, *I Ciompi* (Florence, 1946), pp. 38-62. This is a restatement of a viewpoint which the author advanced earlier in his monograph, *Il Popolo minuto: note di storia fiorentina* (Bologna, 1899). In two recent works on Trecento art, it has been suggested that important changes in Florentine artistic taste in this period resulted in part from the greater influence of the *gente nuova*, the artisans, shopkeepers and immigrants from the *contado* who shared political power with the old mercantile oligarchy: F. Antal, *Florentine Painting and its Social Background* (London, 1947), pp. 159-213; M. Meiss, *Painting in Florence and Siena after the Black Death* (Princeton, 1951), pp. 70-73.

[8] Cf. R. Caggese, *Firenze dalla decadenza di Roma al Risorgimento d'Italia* II (Florence, 1912-1921), pp. 192-196; Schevill, *op. cit.*, pp. 260-261; A. Panella, *Storia di Firenze* (Florence, 1949), pp. 107-121.

[9] F. Perrens, *Histoire de Florence* IV (Paris, 1877-1883), pp. 343-348.

[10] A. Doren, *Die Florentiner Wollentuchindustrie von vierzehnten bis zum sechszehnten Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart, 1901), p. 239, n. 3. This interpretation is reflected in a recent essay by E. Sestan, "Il Comune nel Trecento," in a publication by the Libera Cattedra di Storia della Civiltà fiorentina, *Il Trecento* (Florence, 1953), p. 23.

[11] G. Scaramella, *Firenze allo scoppio del tumulto dei Ciompi* (Pisa, 1914). Cf. the doubts expressed about Scaramella's thesis in Panella's review, *Arch. Stor. Ital.*, II (1916) ii 230-235; and in Schevill, *op. cit.*, p. 260, n. 1.

While the *arti minori* did win certain economic anl political advantages during the eleven months of Walter's lordship, they remained under the rigid control of the duke. Lower gildsmen were chosen as priors, but under a dictatorship the office was honorific. Although Walter liberated the dyers and wool washers from the yoke of the Lana gild by granting them the right to form their own association, they were permitted to act only "with the consent and approval" of the dictator.[17] Before 1342 the consuls of the greater gilds had appointed a foreign judge to hear all cases involving disputes arising between the merchants and industrialists of the greater gilds and members of the *arti minori* or the unorganized employees of the cloth manufacturers. Two months after Walter seized power, he obtained the right to appoint this official.[18] He also secured control over the military companies which were established in November, 1342. The wool carders were permitted to organize a company of this type and were granted their own coat of arms. The organization, however, was controlled by an *officialis scardessiorum* appointed by the Duke.[19]

Decrees in favor of the *arti minori* were counterbalanced by numerous concessions made to the members of the powerful trading and banking gilds and the nobility. These *popolani grassi* and magnates were recipients of tax reductions, judicial dispensations and immunities.[20] A survey of the legislation passed during the dictatorship indicates that the upper classes were the chief beneficiaries of Walter's largess. Although a small number of the lower gildsmen remained loyal to the Duke, the majority of the artisans and shopkeepers joined the opposition to his regime when they realized that they had no influence in the government.[21]

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[12] C. Paoli, *Della Signoria di Gualtieri Duca d'Atene* (Florence, 1862), p. 37; Rodolico, *I Ciompi*, pp. 34-36.

[13] *Archivio di Stato di Firenze* (hereafter cited as *ASF*). *Balie*, 2, fols. 22-23.

[14] *Balie*, 2, fols. 24-25. The butchers were extended the same privilege, fols. 14-15.

[15] Paoli, *op. cit.*, pp. 82-83. Paoli erroneously refers to the source of the document as the *Provvisioni* instead of its correct location in the *Balie.*

[16] *ASF*, *Tratte*, *filza* 92. In 1343 the Signoria, the supreme executive office of the commune, was composed of eight priors, two being chosen from each quarter of the city, and one *gonfaloniere di giustizia.*

[17] Paoli, *op cit.*, p. 83.

[18] *ASF*, *Arte della Lana*, *Statuti* I, rub. 5 (August 7, 1338). The *popolani* consuls of the Lana gild elected the "officialis forensis." On November 12, 1342, Walter was granted the authority to appoint this important official; *Lana*, 41, fol. 71^{r}.

[19] *ASF*, *Camera del Comune*, *Entrate*, 1, fol. 25^{v}. Rodolico is mistaken when he refers to the wool carders as forming an "arte dell' angiolo." The carders were never organized into a gild before 1378, nor did they ever participate in the government. Cf. Stefani, *Cronaca*, rub. 566; Rodolico, *La democrazia fiorentina nel suo tramonto, 1378-1382* (Bologna, 1905), p. 118.

[20] See M. Becker, "Gualtieri di Brienne e l'uso delle dispense giudiziarie," *Arch. Stor. Ital.*, (1955), 245-251. Of the 126 cases in which fines for criminal offenses were reduced during Walter's regime, only four involved member of the *arti minori*. As an example of ducal legislation favorable to the greater gilds, a decree was enacted in October, 1342, which granted to merchants and bankers a moratorium of three years on the payment of debts to creditors; *Balie*, 2, fols. 11-12.

[21] Cf. M. Becker and G. Brucker, "Una lettera in difesa della dittatura nella Firenze del Trecento," *Arch. Stor. Ital.*, (1955), 251-261. In a letter written by two artisan supporters of Walter after his expulsion, it was admitted that the majority of Florentines opposed the dictator, *ibid.*, 258.

Together with the nobility and the great *popolani* families, they participated in the rebellion which led to Walter's expulsion in July, 1343.[22]

The overthrow of the dictator was followed by the establishment of a regime in which, for the first time, lower gildsmen were admitted in considerable numbers into the government. On October 20, 1343, an election *(scrutinio)* was held to select citizens eligible for the Signoria and the two advisory colleges, the twelve *buon' uomini* and the sixteen *gonfalonieri* of the companies. Giovanni Villani described the electoral procedure in some detail. Over 3000 citizens were nominated for these offices, but less than one-tenth received the necessary two-thirds vote to qualify for office.[23] According to Villani, the lower gilds were to have three representatives in each signoria,[24] but the chronicler asserted that in practice they obtained a greater share of the seats than had been assigned to them.[25] It was to this numerical preponderance that Villani attributed the dominant influence of the lower gilds in the government: "Now we are ruled by the artisans and the *popolo minuto*."[26]

An examination of the sources, however, reveals certain errors of fact and interpretation in Villani's description of the procedure for selecting the priors, which have been accepted and repeated by later scholars. The prior lists prove that the lower gilds never obtained a numerical majority in the Signoria. The number of *minori* representatives in the supreme executive of nine was never greater than four.[27] The description of the selection process in effect between 1343 and 1348, which is found in Velluti's chronicle, is more in accordance with the evidence. Velluti stated that the Signoria was to be filled by six members from the greater gilds and two representatives from the *arti minori*. This ratio between *maggiori* and *minori* was not rigid, however. Whenever citizens extracted for office could not serve in the Signoria, substitutes from all twenty one gilds were drawn indiscriminately from another *borsa*.[28] It is this practice which accounts for the fact that in many of the priorates which were selected, *minori* representation was greater than two.

An important political reform was instituted in Florence in the summer of 1348, when the Black Death was ravaging the city. A special communal commission was appointed and granted extraordinary powers *(balìa)* to meet the abnormal conditions which resulted from the plague.[29] A new *scrutinio* was held to choose citizens for the Signoria and the colleges, since the list of eligible citizens elected in 1343 had been greatly depleted by the plague. Moreover, the procedure for selecting priors was modified, so that the number of lower gildsmen in the Signoria would never exceed two.[30] *Minori* representation in the supreme executive was thus permanently fixed at less than one-fourth. The officials of the *balìa* also reduced the number of lower gilds from fourteen to seven. The political objective of this reform was to reduce the number of lower gildsmen who participated in the *scrutinio* for the Signoria, since each gild was automatically represented in the electoral body by one of its consuls *(capitudini)*.[31] The reforms of 1348 constituted an attempt by conservative groups in Florence to restrict the participation of the lower gilds in the government. In the 1348 *scrutinio,* only 35 members of the *arti minori* qualified for the Signoria and the colleges, as compared with 240 members of the greater gilds.[32] Although the number of eligible artisans increased in the 1352 *scrutinio,* and in each succeeding election, there was a corresponding increase in the representation of the seven greater gilds, so that the ratio between *maggiori* and *minori* was never less than 4: 1.[33]

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[22] G. Villani, *Cronica* XII, 16.

[23] G. Villani, *Cronica* XII, 22.

[24] Stefani, *Cronaca*, rub. 594, agrees with Villani that the *artefici minuti* were to have three seats in the Signoria, the *popolani grassi*, two, and the *mediani*, three. The terminology used by the chroniclers has caused much controvery. Certain writers have maintained that the *mediani* cited by Villani referred to five of the fourteen lower gilds, so that the *arti minori* had a majority of six in the Signoria. Cf. Schevill, *op cit.*, p. 260; Rodolico, *I Ciompi*, pp. 39-40. It is difficult to accept this interpretation, for it is highly improbable that Villani would have approved this original plan, as he did: L'ordine fu assai comune e buono, quando non fosse poi corrotto; *Cronica* XII, 22. More plausible is the theory that Villani did not use the term *mediani* to apply to gilds, but rather to those members of the seven greater gilds, such as notaries, druggists and furriers, whose economic status was inferior to the bankers, merchants and industrialists of the *popolani grassi*.

[25] Villani may have been correct in his statement that there was an original agreement to apportion representation in the Signoria in the manner which he described. If true, this agreement was never put into effect. According to the chronicler, the office of *gonfaloniere di giustizia* was to be held in turn by each of the three groups. In practice, it was a monopoly of the seven greater gilds.

[26] Ora siamo al reggimento degli artefici e del popolo minuto; Villani, *Cronica* XII, 23.

[27] There were four lower gildsmen in the priorates seated in January and September, 1344, in September and November, 1346, and in January, 1348. In the remainder, *minori* representation was three or less. Of the 261 members of the Signoria chosen between November, 1343, and July, 1348, approximately 80 were from the lower gilds. The prior lists for this period are recorded in Stefani, *Cronaca*, rubs. 602, 614, 630, 632-633.

[28] *La cronica domestica di Messer Donato Velluti, scritta fra il* 1367 *e il* 1370, eds. I. del Lungo and G. Volpi (Florence, 1914), pp. 167, 192-193. Velluti was present at the *scrutinio* of 1343. The borsa from which substitutes were drawn included the names of nominees who did not receive the two-thirds vote of the electoral body, but whose vote was relatively high. The majority of replacements were lower gildsmen because they were rarely affected by the *divieto* restrictions, which limited office holding by members of the large and powerful families of the *popolani grassi*.

This small representation of the lower gilds was not limited to the Signoria; it was the general pattern for the entire administration. In the Signoria's two advisory colleges, the representation of the *arti minori* was never more than one-third.[34] The lower gilds furnished less than one-tenth of the personnel in the legislative councils.[35] Only a small number of lower gildsmen were chosen to fill the military and administrative posts in the *contado,* and they were barred almost entirely from diplomatic missions, where the personal prestige of the ambassadors was often an important factor.[36] Furthermore, spokesmen from the *arti minori* are rarely recorded as participants in the discussions of the Signoria and its advisory bodies. Only the names of a handful of lower gildsmen are found in the minutes of these meetings, recorded in the volumes of the *Consulte e Pratiche.*[37] The conclusion to be drawn from this evidence is unequivocal: the commune remained under the control of the seven greater gilds after 1343, and only a limited number of artisans and shopkeepers actively participated in the government.

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[29] A copy of the *balìa* decrees is in *ASF, Manoscritti,* 269, fols. 1-15.

[30] In the system adopted in 1348 two lower gildsmen from one quarter were chosen as priors; two months later, another quarter was represented by two *minori.* Cf. the prior lists for Sept., 1348, *et seq.,* Stefani, *Cronaca,* rub. 633. For a detailed description of the entire electoral procedure, see the rubric of the Statute of the Capitano del Popolo of 1355, printed in D. Marzi, *La cancelleria della Repubblica fiorentina* (Rocca S. Casciano, 1910), pp. 557-565.

[31] This reform decree does not appear in the copy of the *balìa* proceedings, but the reform was certainly enacted by that commission. In the decrees of the *balìa* of August 25, 1348, the seven reconstituted lower gilds are listed by name. This reform was repealed in 1350; *ASF, Provvisioni,* 38, fol. 127^{r}.

[32] Although the complete *scrutinio* lists for this period have not survived, they may be reconstructed from the *Tratte* records, *filze* 186-193, 205-218, in which are recorded the names of those who were extracted from the *borse* for the Signoria and the colleges, 1349-1378.

[33] In the *scrutini* of 1352, 1355, 1358 and 1361, the ratio between members of the greater and lesser gilds eligible for the Signoria was: 240:60, 276;68, 377:93, and 411:115.

[34] Between 1343 and 1348, when the lower gilds were most strongly represented in the government only 84 of 264 citizens chosen to the office of the twelve *buon' uomini* were from the *arti minori;* the ratio in the college of the sixteen *gonfalonieri* of the companies was 74:216.

[35] In five councils of the Popolo chosen between 1373 and 1377, *minori* representation was 7% of the total; in five councils of the Commune chosen during the same period, lower gild representation was less than 5%. Names of the councillors are recorded in *Tratte, filze* 218-220.

[36] No lower gildsmen are included in the incomplete list of ambassadors of the commune, 1340-1400. printed in *Della eccellenza e grandezza della nazione fiorentina* (Florence, 1780), pp. 1-126. Artisans and shopkeepers were chosen, on rare occasions, for military and administrative posts in the *contado.* Thirteen *minori* were included among the 182 men extracted for *contado* posts in 1377: *Tratte,* 220, *filze* 79-91.

[37] In the fifteen volumes of the *Consulte e Pratiche* records from 1349 to 1378, which are incomplete, the names of no more than twenty lower gildsmen are recorded as participants in the debates.

III

The numerical preponderance of the greater gilds in the regime established in 1343 is reflected in the legislation enacted by the communal government. Some scholars have maintained that the provisions passed in the early years of the regime reveal a marked "democratic character,"[38] but the bulk of this legislation was designed to favor the interests of the wealthy business class. The commune's financial policy clearly reveals this tendency. Although the great banking companies, the Bardi, Peruzzi and Acciaiuoli, were all forced into bankruptcy after 1343, the commune sought to shield them from their foreign creditors, to give them time to liquidate their resources and pay off their debts.[39] The funding of the commune's public debt by the establishment of the *Monte* in 1345 was also beneficial to the monied classes in Florence. Wealthy citizens were enabled to invest their capital in the *Monte* and to obtain a secure and permanent source of revenue.[40] At least one financial measure was adopted which was positively detrimental to the economic interests of the artisan-shopkeeper class. The cloth merchants of the Lana gild induced the government to introduce changes in the Florentine coinage system by raising the value of the gold florin, in which the merchants received payment for cloth, while depreciating the silver coinage, with which the merchants paid workers, artisans and shopkeepers for goods and services.[41]

Gild legislation passed during the first decade of the new regime also subjected the interests of the artisan class to those of the mercantile and industrial groups. The reduction in 1348 of the number of lower gilds from fourteen to seven has already been noted.[42] To prove his contention that the legislation of this period was democratic in character, Rodolico has cited certain regulations enacted in 1344 which permitted stone masons, winesellers, innkeepers and butchers to ply their trade without joining any gild. Later the commune granted to anyone the right to join one of the lower gilds upon payment of 40 *soldi.*[43] Although these regulations, designed to alleviate the labor shortage created by the plagues of 1340 and 1348, were certainly beneficial to the artisans immigrating to Florence, they did not help those who were already matriculated in the *arti minori*. The effect of these decrees was to increase competition among the artisans and shopkeepers, and consequently, to lower prices and profits. Thus, they could be justified as contributing to the general welfare of the city. Support for these measures in the communal government did not come from the artisans, whose interests were adversely affected,[44] nor the salaried laborers, who were unrepresented, but rather from those important consumers of goods and services, the *popolani grassi*.

Although the attitude of the dominant bourgeois class in the commune toward the lower gilds was not notably favorable, neither was it deliberately hostile. Whenever the interests of the *minori* did not constitute a threat to the economic position of the greater gilds, the latter were willing to consider the wishes of the *arti minori* sympathetically. Thus, with the improvement of economic conditions after 1350, the commune apparently abandoned its policy of unrestricted freedom of labor in the lower gilds, and again permitted the traditional control of economic activity through restricted gild membership, price and wage controls.[45] The consuls of the *arti minori* were also permitted to extend their authority over various unorganized groups which had previously existed outside of the gild structure.[46]

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[38] Cf. A. Panella, in *Arch. Stor. Ital.*, II (1916) ii, 234; Doren, *Wollentuchindustrie*, p. 239, n. 3; Rodolico, *I Ciompi*, p. 41.

[39] A. Sapori, *La crisi delle compagnie mercantile dei Bardi e dei Peruzzi* (Florence, 1926), pp. 186-198; A. Panella, "Politica ecclesiastica del comune fiorentino dopo la cacciata del Duca d'Atene," *Arch Stor. Ital.*, I (1913) i, 281-296.

[40] Panella suggests that the establishment of the *Monte* is evidence of the democratic tendency in communal legislation, but Barbadoro has shown that wealthy speculators, who bought up credits at reduced prices, profited most; B. Barbadoro, *Le finanze della Repubblica fiorentina* (Florence, 1926), p. 657. The records of the *Monte* in the Florentine archives reveal that a large number of small creditors turned over their credits to a few wealthy individuals.

[41] G. Villani, *Cronica* XII, 97. A provision in the Statute of the Podestà of 1325 prohibited the use of gold florins for business transactions by anyone except merchants of the *arti maggiori; Statuti della Repubblica fiorentina* II, ed. R. Caggese (Florence, 1910-1921), p. 279.

[42] Cf. *supra*, p. 97. For the factors which led to the repeal of this provision, cf. *infra*, p. 102.

[43] Rodolico, *Popolo minuto*, docs. 12, 16, 17, 23.

[44] In August, 1349, the consuls of the seven lower gilds petitioned the Signoria to appoint a commission to revise the decrees pertaining to the "posture et monopoli" of the *arti minori*, since, according to the consuls: quam ordinamenta aliqui peccant in plus, aliqui in minus; *Provv.*, 36, fol. 151.

The commune's attitude toward the lower gilds is well illustrated by the relations between the government and the butchers' gild. The butchers were traditionally the most unruly and ubiquitous of the *arti minori,* eager to take the lead in popular movements and insurrections against authority. With the other lower gilds, the butchers had suffered a loss of their privileges through the commune's policy of encouraging economic revival by prohibiting certain restrictive practices of the *arti minori.* The sale of meat had been thrown open to all, and the consuls of the butchers' gild were warned to refrain from any attempts to restrict the free trade in meat.[47] The butchers reacted to the commune's policy by violating the regulations concerning the sale of meat. In a *Consulte* meeting in July, 1354, the controversy between the commune and the butchers was discussed at length.[48] The speakers differed sharply in their views on the problem, some urging that the butchers be punished for their illegal conduct, while others favored a policy of leniency. The majority advised the Signoria to take no action or to punish the offenders *misericorditer.*

That the meat problem had not been solved was revealed six months later by a reference in a *Consulte* discussion to a ban placed on the sale of meat. The Signoria was advised to punish the butchers if they did not obey communal regulations.[49] Describing his tenure of office as a prior in the autumn of 1356, Donato Velluti wrote: "On account of the evil practices of the butchers, and at the instigation of the colleges, the office of consul of the butchers' gild was abolished."[50] Velluti insisted that he and the other priors were opposed to this drastic action, but the butchers considered him primarily responsible, for, according to the chronicler, "They always regarded me with great enmity."

The result of this controversy was the enactment of a provision in the spring of 1357 which strictly regulated the sale of meat and authorized the judicial authorities of the commune to enforce observance of the decrees.[51] A decade later, however, the problem arose again, and additional regulatory legislation was enacted.[52] The *Consulte* discussions reveal the dilemma which confronted the communal authorities: a strong concern for the public welfare with respect to the meat problem, and an unwillingness to antagonize the butchers by arbitrary and precipitate action.[53] For the merchants and industrialists who dominated the communal government, the butchers epitomized the problem of the *arti minori*. While unwilling to grant concessions to the lower gilds which were opposed to their own interests or to the public welfare, they endeavored to keep the artisans as pacified and cooperative participants in the government.

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[45] A. Doren, *Le arti fiorentine* I (Florence, 1940), pp. 127-128. The rubric in the Statute of 1355 stated that the policy of unrestricted labor in the *arti minori* was to be in force for five years.

[46] A provision of 1355 stated that all pottery makers were to be placed under the jurisdiction of the consuls of the oil vendors' gild; *Provv.,* 42, fols. 116^{v}-117^{r}. For other examples, cf. Doren, *Arti fiorentine* I, pp. 200-201.

[47] The butchers were forbidden to establish "aliquam doganam monopolium conventionem vel pactum super carnibus;" Rodolico, *Popolo minuto,* doc. 27.

[48] *Cons. e Prat.* I, fols. 93^{r}-94^{v}. Even one of the lower gildsmen, Matteo di Federigo Soldi, a wineseller, advocated punitive action against the butchers. This problem had been discussed a month earlier, *ibid.,* I, fol. 81^{r}.

[49] *Ibid.,* I, fol. 123^{v}.

[50] Velluti, *Cronica,* p. 222.

[51] *Provv.,* 44, fols. 114^{r}-114^{v}, April 24, 1357. This provision was passed after it had twice been rejected by the Council of the People. A considerable minority evidently supported the butchers.

[52] *Ibid.,* 55, fols. 1^{r}-2^{v}.

[53] Typical statements which illustrate the willingness of the counselors to negotiate with the butchers are those of Messer Paolo Vettori: Super facto beccariorum, domini deputent aliquos cives . . . qui audiant beccarios et secum praticent; and Simone Peruzzi: Quod domini sciant a beccariis si contentantur; *Cons. et Prat.,* 8, fols. 62^{r}, 78^{v}. The concern for the public welfare is reflected in

As the butchers' dispute demonstrated, the problem of controlling the lower gilds was simplified by the inability of the *minori* to unite among themselves in defense of their individual and collective interests. There was apparently little sentiment of cohesion among the members of the various gilds;[54] the ties of loyalty within each gild were much stronger.[55] The most visible evidence of this lack of unity is the readiness with which individual artisans sponsored legislation in company with, and for the benefit of, the merchants, bankers and manufacturers of the greater gilds. This tendency is apparent from the beginning of *minori* participation in the government. On September 16, 1343, an armor maker arose in the Council of the People to support a measure advocated by a banker. In December, a wine vendor supported provisions which had been proposed by one of the Strozzi, and a shirtmaker spoke in favor of laws authorizing payments to be made to wealthy creditors of the commune.[56]

Even more noteworthy is the support given by some artisans to legislation designed to increase the authority of the conservative, oligarchic group in the commune, and to diminish the influence and representation of the parvenu elements in the government. A baker named Bernardo di Simone supported a provision enacted in October, 1346, which declared that only those individuals could hold office who themselves, or their fathers or grandfathers, were born in Florentine territory. The effect of this law, as Villani candidly admitted, was to exclude from office a large proportion of the artisans who had recently migrated to Florence.[57] A second law, supported by the oligarchic group which controlled the Parte Guelfa, was designed to achieve a similar objective. It denied office to all Ghibellines and to those who had ever participated in any rebellion or conflict against the commune since the year 1301. This provision was also supported by two lower gildsmen in the councils.[58] In August, 1347, the captains of the Parte Guelfa presented a petition to the Signoria which provided for heavy penalties against anyone who sought to repeal or change the anti-Ghibelline law, which had aroused much opposition in the city. One of the *minori* priors at that time, a wine vendor named Francesco Fabrini, was instrumental in obtaining the Signoria's approval of this petition, and he was commended for his devotion to the Parte in the organization's official register.[59]

A partial explanation for the remarkable degree of cooperation between the representatives of the greater and lesser gilds in the commune may be found

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this statement by Simone dell' Antella: Super facto beccariorum, domini videant modum per quam honor civitatis et bonum singularium civium conserventur; *ibid.*, 8, fol. 78^{v}.

[54] Doren, *Arti fiorentine* I, pp. 193-194. There are very few examples of artisans supporting legislative measures which benefitted their fellows in other lower gilds. In 1345, a sword maker and a baker advocated the adoption of a petition by the butchers' gild, but it was rejected by the council; *ASF, Libri Fabarum*, 24, I. 32^{v}.

[55] Dissension within the gilds was not unknown, however. In 1368 and 1373, the gilds of the bakers and the shoemakers were disturbed by conflicts between factions within each gild: *ASF, Atti del Esecutore degli Ordinamenti della Giustizia*, 553, fol. 5^{r}; 699, fol. 145^{r}.

[56] *Lib. Fab.*, 22, fols. 37^{r}, 52^{v}, 55^{r}; *Provv.*, 32. fols. 59^{r}, 80^{r}, 86^{r}. Numerous other examples of collaboration between *minori* and members of the greater gilds on legislation can be cited, e.g., *Lib. Fab.*, 23, fol. 35^{v}; 26, fols. 106^{v}, 129^{r}; 27, fols. 85^{r}, 103^{r}; 28, fol. 19^{v}; *Provv.*, 33, fol. 26^{v}; *Dup. Provv.*, 6, fols. 140^{r}, 171^{v}; 7, fol. 28^{r}.

[57] *Provv.*, 34, fol. 93^{r}; *Lib. Fab.*, 26, fol. 94^{r}. See Villani's comment, *Cronica* XII, 72. For the subsequent political career of Bernardo di Simone, cf. *Lib. Fab.*, 24, fols. 7^{r}, 76^{v}: *Tratte*, 136, fol. 12^{r}.

[58] *Dup. Provv.*, 6, fol. 165^{v}; *Lib. Fab.*, 26, fol. 128^{r}; 27, fol. 100^{r}. Cf. Villani, *Cronica* XIII, 79.

[59] *Delizie degli eruditi toscani* XII, ed. I. di San Luigi (Florence, 1770-1789), pp. 324-326. A large minority, which certainly included many artisans, voted against all three measures. The votes on the three laws in the councils were: 189-39 and 171-46; 187-62 and 193-45; 154-54 and 151-59.

in an examination of the socio-economic status of the lower gildsmen. The chroniclers implied that the artisans were from the lowest stratum of Florentine society, indistinguishable from the laborers and even the vagabonds in the city. Later scholars, too, have been prone to lump artisans and laborers into the same class and to assume that these groups had similar if not identical interests.[60] This conclusion, however, does not appear to be valid. The artisans and shopkeepers who participated in the government were all independent masters of their shops. They were not salaried laborers, nor were they legally subordinate to the merchants and industrialists of the greater gilds.[61] While the economic status of some artisans was scarcely distinguishable from that of the laboring class,[62] a large number did possess respectable financial resources. Over 500 members of the lower gilds are recorded in the registers of the 1345 *Monte*, with credits varying from less than one florin to over 1000 florins.[63] These *minori* were credited with an average investment of 18 florins in the *Monte*.[64] In a society in which wealth, power and privilege were in the hands of the greater gilds, the artisans did not seek to humble their social and economic superiors, but rather to emulate them and rise to their level. Like the petty bourgeoisie of later industrial societies, their great enemies were not the rich and the powerful, but the poor and lowly laborers. They willingly joined forces with the *popolani grassi* to keep their inferiors in subjection.[65]

The remarkable degree of harmony which prevailed among artisans and bankers in the communal government suggests a community of interest and objective which is somewhat artificial, and which does not accurately reflect the realities of Florentine society. Since the seven *arti maggiori* controlled the electoral machinery, they were able to co-opt those lower gildsmen with whom they wished to associate in office. Naturally, they chose men who were most akin to themselves in wealth, social status and political conviction. Many of the lower gildsmen in the Signoria were not truly representative of the artisan-shopkeeper class; they were the wealthiest members of that group,[66] whose political and economic interests generally coincided with the merchants and industrialists of the *arti maggiori*. Included in this "oligarchy" of the *arti minori*, men who were consistently chosen to the Signoria, whose opinions are recorded frequently in the *Consulte e Pratiche*, were certain individuals whose economic interests and resources ranked them with the wealthiest businessmen in Florence. In the *Monte* records of 1345 are listed the names of two wine vendors, Mone Fantini and Betto Giandonati, and a dealer in used clothing, Giovanni Goggio, who possessed credits exceeding 1000 florins.[67] Six lower gildsmen, all selected as eligible for the Signoria, were partners in Florentine companies which used the port of Pisa to engage in international trade.[68] A ropemaker named Maso Neri was one of the ten wealthiest men in the quarter of San Giovanni, according to the *prestanza* records of 1378.[69] The wine vendor, Matteo di Federigo Soldi, played an important role in communal politics and was one of the famous *otto santi* who directed the war against the Papacy, 1375-1378.[70] The prominent Brancacci family, which derived its wealth from linen manufacturing, counted four of its members among the priors who represented the lower gilds in the Signoria.[71]

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[60] Rodolico, *I Ciompi*, p. 29, includes both members of the lower gilds and unorganized workers in the term "*popolo minuto*." Cf. also Rodolico, *La democrazia fiorentina nel suo tramonto* (Bologna, 1905), pp. 112 ff.; A. Doren, *Le arti fiorentine* I, pp. 212-216.

[61] The lower gildsmen occupied a more independent position than did the dyers who were technically members of the Lana gild, but were in fact subordinate to the cloth manufacturers. Both Doren and Rodolico regarded the conflict between dyers and *lanaiuoli* as an aspect of the struggle between the *popolo minuto* and the wealthy merchants and industrialists, but the dyers cannot be considered in the same class as salaried laborers. They were masters of their own shops, and as a group, they were quite prosperous. In the records of the 1345 *Monte*, the dyers owned credits with an average value of 36 florins.

[62] In the records of the forced loan (*prestanza*) of April, 1378, some artisans (blacksmith, shoemakers, innkeepers, swordmakers, etc.) were assessed the same low rates as were the salaried laborers of the cloth industry (carders, washers, weavers, beaters, etc.); *ASF, Prestanza*, 335, fols. 2-12. The majority of artisans, however, were assessed amounts considerably higher than the unorganized laborers.

[63] The 1345 *Monte* registers in the *Archivio del Monte* consist of four large volumes, one for each quarter.

[64] To indicate the value of the florin in this period, a typical shop (*bottega*) in the center of Florence rented for 3—4 florins per year; A. Sapori, *Studi di storia economica medievale* (Florence, 1946), pp. 404-408.

[65] Nearly all the concessions which had been granted to the salaried laborers in the woollen cloth industry during the dictatorship of the Duke of Athens were cancelled after 1343; Rodolico, *Popolo minuto*, pp. 53-64.

[66] In the *prestanza* levied in August, 1364, the average amount assessed lower gildsmen in a section of the quarter of San Giovanni was four fl.; *Pres.*, 119, fols. 3-56. The average tax paid by those lower gildsmen who were selected as eligible for the Signoria was thirteen fl. Twenty of the *minori* in the latter category were assessed amounts exceeding twenty fl.

IV

The role which the *arti minori* played in the Florentine commune between 1343 and 1378 can now be elucidated with more clarity and accuracy. At no time during this period did the lower gildsmen constitute a dominant group in the commune; they never approached the hegemonic position which some chroniclers and scholars have attributed to them. They included within their ranks a wide variety of economic, social and political interests, and they did not develop a strong sense of unity or cohesion. Many of their number who were admitted to office did not genuinely represent the artisan class, but were closely allied in sympathy and outlook with the greater gilds.

For the bourgeoisie of the *arti maggiori,* there were certain advantages to be gained from *minori* participation in the commune. It strengthened the government by giving the artisans and shopkeepers a sense of identification with the regime, even though their actual influence was small. The ruling group realized that their interests were best served by granting the lower gilds token participation in the government, instead of antagonizing them and driving them into opposition. The *minori* could also be expected to join with the greater gilds to thwart any attempt by the magnates to regain political power in the city. It was the chronicler, Marchionne Stefani, who accurately expressed the viewpoint of the *popolani grassi* with respect to the admission of the lower gilds into the government: "If I have an artisan for a colleague, he will be subservient and reverent and will do as I wish. I won't give him a half share [of offices] so that if he doesn't do as I wish, there won't be so many of them that they would ruin everything."[72]

Having become firmly established in the communal structure, the *arti minori* gradually improved their position and status. According to Donato Velluti, the petition in 1350 by the locksmiths' gild to restore the lower gilds to their original number of fourteen was supported by the Albizzi faction, one of the *pessime sette* into which the ruling group was then divided. The chronicler stated that each faction "sought to increase its own authority at the expense of the others . . . and each attempted to win over the Ghibellines and the *artefici minuti* and make them more powerful. . . ."[73] A similar explanation was advanced by an anonymous writer in 1377, on the eve of the Ciompi revolution: "And from that time [1343] to the present [1377] the *artefici minuti* have been in the government, where previously there were no more than two per year. This has produced divisions among the citizens, for each has made use of them. Thus, they continue to enter into the offices . . . so that in our day they are even represented in the captaincy of the Parte Guelfa and the Mercanzia. May God pardon those who have done this, who have rejected the ancient and honorable citizens in order to take the vile artisans."[74]

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[67] *Monte of 1345, Santa Maria Novella,* fol. 101^r; *San Giovanni,* fols. 494^v, 1020^r. Fantini and Goggio had credits exceeding 1600 fl. All three were chosen as eligible for the Signoria.

[68] S. Peruzzi, *Storia del commercio e dei banchieri di Firenze* (Florence, 1868), p. 221. The *minori* were Goggio, Maso Neri, Miniato Nucci, Valeriano Dolcibene, Zanobio Truffe and Schiatta Ricchi.

[69] *Pres.,* 335, fol. 86^v. Maso's assessment was 37 fl., 14 *soldi.*

[70] Matteo was chosen seven times to the Signoria between 1352 and 1375; he was also a frequent speaker in *Consulte* discussions. His *prestanza* assessments were substantial: 40 fl. in 1364, 25 fl. in 1378; *Pres.,* 119, fol. 11^r; 335, fol. 12^r.

[71] Salvestro di Serotine Brancacci was included in the *scrutini* of 1348 and 1361; his brother, Tommaso, in 1352, 1355, 1358 and 1363; his son, Serotine, in 1358 and 1361; and a cousin, Piero, in 1355, 1358, 1361 and 1364. The Brancacci were patrons of the chapel in Santa Maria del Carmine which Masaccio decorated with his famous frescoes in the fifteenth century.

[72] Stefani, *Cronaca,* rub. 588.

[73] Velluti, *Cronica,* p. 242.

The fact stressed by these writers is that the political position of the *minori* was improved because their support was sought by the various factions within the ruling group. Evidence to support this conclusion may be found in the *Consulte* debates and the chronicle sources pertaining to the reform of the Parte Guelfa in November, 1366. An important feature of the reform law was the inclusion of two lower gildsmen in each group of eight Parte captains.[75] Velluti stated that the reform measure was initiated and pushed through the councils by Uguccione de' Ricci and his political allies, despite the opposition of the Albizzi group.[76] The purpose of the provision was two-fold. The Ricci faction sought to gain the political support of the artisans by posing as their benefactors. Proponents of the measure made several references to the need for merchants and artisans, the *mediorum et minorum concivium,* to unite in defense of their liberty against their enemies in the Parte Guelfa.[77] Furthermore, the Ricci hoped to weaken the hold of the Albizzi faction upon the Parte organization, by introducing new elements into the captaincy which would oppose the oligarchic tendencies of the Parte leadership.

The leading proponents of this provision were not from the lower gilds, but were merchants, bankers and industrialists from the *arti maggiori*. Their principal objective was not the advancement of the *minori* but a partisan victory over their political enemies. Only three of the thirty citizens who spoke in favor of this provision in the *Consulte* discussions were members of the lower gilds. In a very revealing statement, Ricco Taldi, a coppersmith, announced his approval of the provision in favor of the people, the commune and the Parte Guelfa, "rejoicing over the honor done to the artisans with respect to their admission to the office of the captaincy of the Parte."[78] A blacksmith identified only as Barnabo also spoke of the "honor" which had been bestowed on the lower gilds, in terms which implied a passive receipt of a favor rather than the achievement of a political victory by the efforts of the *minori* themselves.[79]

This evaluation of the *arti minori* indicates a need for a reinterpretation of Florentine history in the second half of the fourteenth century. The internal history of the commune cannot be postulated in terms of a conflict between the greater and the lesser gilds. The artisans and shopkeepers of Florence played a minor part in the city's political life. The swelling tide of unrest and discontent, among the lower classes, which Rodolico has documented in his work,[80] affected only one segment of the lower gildsmen, and was scarcely reflected at all in the communal government.[81] The struggle for power was fought outside of the gild structure and only partially within the communal organization. It involved the magnates and the bourgeois artistocracy as well as artisans and nouveaux riches. The fundamental problem is the identification of these warring factions and the determination of the issues which divided them. This study also suggests the need for further investigation of the Ciompi revolution, in which the role of the lower gildsmen has been considered very important. Finally, this re-evaluation of the political role of the *minori* in Florence may justify closer investigation of the internal histories of other Italian cities—Siena, Perugia, Rome, Genoa, Pisa—where, according to prevailing historical views, the artisan-shopkeeper class exercised an important influence in the fourteenth century.[82]

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[74] This account is printed in *Delizie degli eruditi toscani* IX, pp. 277-278. Stefani suggested that the rise of the *minori* was the result of the initiative of the artisans themselves, *Cronaca,* rub. 734.

[75] *Prov.,* 54, fols. 67^r-68^v.

[76] Velluti, *Cronica,* pp. 247-251. Velluti opposed the measure on the ground that it was too controversial.

[77] A spokesman for one of the colleges approved the reform provision and asserted that his group was prepared to support all measures: qui respiciant . . . unitatem civium et securitatem mediorum et minorum concivium; *Cons. e Prat.,* 8, fol. 1^r. Velluti, *Cronica,* p. 248, quotes Uguccione de' Ricci's argument in favor of the proposal: proponendo che intendeano sanicare Firenze e trarla di fedaltà e tirannia, e ch' e' mercatanti e artefici avrebbono buono stato e potrebbono fare loro mercatantie e potrebbono favellare . . . e raffrenare le male e ree operazioni di coloro che . . . teneano in fedaltà i mercatanti e artefici di Firenze . . .

[78] *Cons. e Prat.,* 8, fol. 12^r.

[79] *Ibid.,* 8, fol. 13^r.

[80] Rodolico, *I Ciompi,* ch. 2.

[81] For evidence of artisan opposition to the

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communal government, cf. M. Becker and G. Brucker, "Una lettera in difesa della dittatura." *Arch. Stor. Ital.*, (1955), 251-257.

[82] Cf. L. Salvatorelli, *A Concise History of Italy* (Oxford, 1940), pp. 268-270, 290-292, 301, 307-308; L. Simeoni, *Le Signorie* I (Milan, 1950), pp. 294-320.

An Old French Version of the Julian Episode in the Life of Saint Basil*

ALEX. J. DENOMY C. S. B.

I.

THE following, hitherto unedited, redaction of the Julian episode in the legendary Life of Saint Basil is contained in a unique manuscript: *Ms* Brussels, Bibliothèque Royale 10295-304. Paul Meyer noted its existence in 1901, described the manuscript, recorded its contents and printed the first 44 and last 12 lines of our poem.[1] Since that time, it has passed unnoticed by editors of other redactions of the legend in Old French and by historians concerned with the diffusion of the legend into the vernacular literature of Western Europe.

The author of the poem is insistent that he has used a Latin original as the source of his poem (ll. 11, 152). He affirms that he has labored mightily and has spent many a night translating and setting it in rime (ll. 13-4), that he has neither added to nor subtracted from it (l. 12). It is implied that his original was in prose, since he avers that any slight changes he may have made were occasioned and imposed on him by the exigencies of rime (*ibid.*).

The story he has to tell begins *approbate consuetudinis* (l. 6). These are the opening words of the sermon of Fulbert of Chartres on the Nativity of the Most Blessed Virgin Mary.[2] There Fulbert brings to bear reasons, based on her prerogatives as Mother of God, why it is an approved custom among Christians to honor her birthday, celebrate her virtues. Her very dignity and the love she has towards the triune God make her role an influential and authoritative one in regard to creatures. Fulbert recalls examples of that influence:

> Unde plurima scripta sunt exemplorum argumenta, de quibus ad praesens quaedam sufficiat memorare. Illa igitur olim in auxilium magni Patris Basilii misit sanctum angelum, et mortuum suscitavit, qui male viventem pessumdedit persecutorem ejus Julianum apostatam, et haec historia notissima est.[3]

It is quite obvious that Fulbert's cursory reference to the Julian episode in the Life of Saint Basil did not supply our poet with his source. Fulbert does speak of the *exemplum* as very well known; the legend was quite widespread in the hagiographical literature of Western Europe. Due to the intervention of the Blessed Virgin in answering the prayer of Saint Basil by raising Saint Mercurius from the dead and so accomplishing the death of the Apostate, the story found its way naturally enough into collections of miracles in prose and poetry.[4]

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* I wish to express my deep appreciation of the generosity and interest of FMC in the prepartion of this article.

[1] "Notice du Ms. 10295-304 de la Bibliothèque Royale de Belgique", *Romania,* XXX (1901), 295-300.

[2] Fulbert was consecrated Bishop of Chartres in 1007 and died April 10, 1028 or 1029. He dedicated the Cathedral of Chartres to the Blessed Virgin, established there the Feast of her Nativity and wrote hymns and sermons in her honor. For contemporary evidence of his devotion to Mary and acknowledgment of it in mediaeval authors, see Sister Mary Vincentine Gripkey, *The Blessed Virgin Mary as Mediatrix in Latin and Old French Legend prior to the Fourteenth Century* (Washington, 1938), p. 19.

[3] PL 141, 323.

[4] *Adgar's Marienlegenden,* ed. Carl Neuhaus (Heilbronn, 1886), pp. 77-9 (*Adgar*);

Deux Miracles de Gautier de Coincy, ed. Erik Boman (Paris, 1935), pp. 34-66 (*Gautier*);

Miracles de Nostre Dame par personnages II, ed. Gaston Paris and Ulysses Robert (Paris, 1878), pp. 173-226 (*Miracle*);

La Deuxième collection anglo-normande des miracles de la sainte vierge, ed. Hilding Kjellman (Uppsala, 1922), p. 7-14 (*AN*);

"Notice sur un manuscrit d'Orléans contenant d'anciens miracles de la vierge en vers français", *Notices et extraits des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Nationale,* XXXIV^1 (1895), 44-5, 50-3 (*Orleans*);

Behind the vernacular redactions are Latin versions which, although they adhere to the essentials of the legend, differ in detail. The legend of Julian the Apostate's death through the miraculous intervention of the Blessed Virgin first appears in the Life of Saint Basil falsely attributed to Saint Amphilochius, Bishop of Iconium, a contemporary and friend of the saint. It is a product of the late eighth or early ninth century and its translation into Latin is attributed to Ursus the Deacon (858-67).[5] As incorporated in the *Vitae patrum*, Ursus' translation omits the episode that forms the content of our poem.[6] It is found, however, in the *Acta Sanctorum*,[7] as an appendix to the *Vita* of the saint. The legend is as follows:[8]

1. In his expedition against the Persians, Julian passes by Caesarea. Saint Basil, the Bishop of the city, and his company go forth to meet him. Julian, addressing the Bishop, cries out: 'I have conquered you in philosophy, Basil'. The saint replies: 'Would that you had become a philosopher'. He presents the Emperor three loaves of barley bread as a gift. Insulted and angered at the insignificance of the gift, the Apostate has his attendants give the saint some hay in return. He promises to return after defeating the Persians; then he will destroy the city and make it fit, not for feeding and rearing men, but for agriculture.
2. Fearfully, Basil tells his people of Julian's threats and exhorts them to gather together their wealth and valuables as a gift to the Emperor when he returns. Thus he hopes to placate him. The citizens gather together their gold, silver and jewels. These Basil has placed in the Church treasury, each item marked with the owner's name, against the possibility that God will contrive the death of the Apostate and thus restore their treasure to them.
3. The saint orders the clergy and the entire population to gather in a Church of the Blessed Virgin on Mount Didymus. There for three days they fast and pray to be spared the Emperor's wrath and threats. One night Saint Basil has a wondrous vision. He sees Mary enthroned in the midst of a multitude of heavenly soldiery that covers the mountainside. He hears her command them to call forth Mercurius to go forth and kill Julian. Saint Mercurius presents himself before her, clad in battle array, and sets forth.

   Saint Basil receives a book from the Blessed Mother, a book that contains the story of creation. At its beginning is written the word 'Speak'; at its end the words: 'Have Mercy'. In her presence Basil reads to the words: 'Have Mercy'. In joy and fear, he sets aside the book.

   That very night, in Persia, Libanius the Sophist has exactly the same vision.

   When he awakes from his vision, Saint Basil, accompanied by a single companion, Eubulus, returns to the city and enters immediately the church

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"Notice sur le receuil de miracles de la vierge renfermé dans le *ms.* Bibl. Nat. fr. 818", ed. Paul Meyer, *ibid.*, 67-71 *(818)*.

In Germany, the legend was incorporated into the *Kaiserkronik*, 10936-11137, of the middle of the twelfth century, ed. E. Schröder, MGH Deutsche Chroniken I (Hannover, 1895), p. 281 ff. (*Kaiserkronik*).

In Spain, the legend is contained in Alfonso el Sabio's *Cantigas de santa Maria*, #15, ed. Real Academía española II (Madrid, 1889), p. 23 ff. (*Cantigas*);

For mediaeval versions in Italian, in prose, see Sister Mary Vincentine Gripkey, "Mary Legends in Italian Manuscripts in the Major Libraries of Italy", *Mediaeval Studies*, XIV (1952), 19 and XV (1953), 33 and 42. Arturo Graf has printed one Italian prose version in *Roma nella memoria e nelle immaginazione del medio evo* (Turin, 1923), p. 482, note 36.

[5] Cf. Otto Bardenhewer, *Geschichte der altkirchlichen Literatur* III (Freiburg, 1912), pp. 130, note 1 and 227.

[6] Cf. PL 73, 312B for the omission of the episode.

[7] *Acta Sanctorum Junii* III, pp. 423-5. This redaction is a translation made by Franciscus Combéfis O.P. from the Greek in his *SS. Patrum Amphilocii Iconiensis, Methodii Patarensis et Andreae Cretensis opera omnia* (Paris, 1644), 181C-2D. Manuscripts that contain Ursus' text are indicated by Boman, *ed. cit.*, pp. LIX-LX, and in Vincent de Beauvais, *Speculum historiale* XIV, 43-4 (Venice, 1494), fol. 176^{v}.

[8] The summary is made according to Boman, *ed. cit.*, pp. LX-LXII, from manuscripts indicated by him, and from the *Speculum historiale*, rather than from the *Acta*. Vincent begins his version: Amphilochius in vita sancti Basilii. . . .

consecrated to Saint Mercurius. There he cannot find the saint's body nor can he find the weapons of the saint that had been suspended above his tomb. The guardian of the church cannot explain their disappearance and, on oath, claims that they had been there that evening. Basil then understands that his vision had been true. Joyfully, while all are sleeping, he goes back to the Church of Our Lady on Mount Didymus, arouses the people and tells them of what has happened. Undoubtedly Julian is dead.

Then all return to the city, enter the Church of Saint Mercurius, and there they find Mercurius' lance at its accustomed place, but all bloodied. Basil enjoins prayers of thanksgiving to be offered to God and to His Mother in all the principle churches of the city.

4. At church, Saint Basil detects a Deacon casting amorous glances at a lady in the congregation when he should be signalling the Elevation. The Deacon is disciplined by fast, prayer and almsgiving and then forgiven. Orders are given that women are to be segregated during services. Basil exhorts the people to remain in prayers of thanksgiving for seven days.
5. On the seventh day, Libanius arrives, a fugitive, in Caesarea. He announces the death of Julian to the bishop and assembled people. Prostrate before the saint, he asks to be baptized and to be received into the Church as a Christian. His plea is answered and he is made an attendant like Eubulus.
6. The next day Saint Basil asks the people to take back the property that they had entrusted to him against the Apostate's return. Everyone agrees that what had been gathered together as a gift to a mortal Emperor should be given to their immortal Emperor and they ask the saint to dispose of the treasure as he sees fit. He returns a third to the people and uses the remaining two-thirds to restore and beautify his church. Many pagans come to him for instruction and baptism.

With minor changes, additions and omissions, this is basically the pattern of the Julian legend that was followed by the Middle Ages. All other versions than the *Vita*, vernacular as well as Latin, omit section 4 which, after all, is not germane to the story. They agree substantially in the events they relate but differ, even independently of each other, in detail.

The Brussels (*B*) redaction is distinctive in that it departs from the Latin *Vita* and from the vernacular redactions in the following details:

(1) Basil is Bishop of *Sebaste*.[9] That this is not an error is indicated by the fact that he is twice so styled (30, 76).
(2) Julian had been a monk and a deacon (35).[10]

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[9] It is not St. Basil but St. Mercurius who is associated in legend with Sebaste in Cappadocia. It is the result of the latter's attachment to the XL Martyrs of Sebaste. Cf. *infra*, p. 119, note 23. The Syriac Romance of Julian, composed at Odessa 502-32, relates that one of the XL Martyrs was Marqur(ios) and that he had made a prophecy that he would kill Julian. This Romance was translated into Latin in the twelfth century by Michael the Syrian. Cf. Paul Peeters, "Un Miracle des SS. Serge et Méthode et la vie de S. Basile dans Fauste de Byzance", *Analecta Boll.*, XXXIX (1921), 79, for the text, also 85; Stéphane Binon, *Documents grecs inédits relatifs à S. Mercure de Césaire* (Louvain, 1937), p. 9.

AN (46) reads *Athanasius* instead of the expected Basil. In Sozomen's *Hist. eccl.* VI, 2, written about the middle of the fifth century, it is about Athanasius rather than Basil that legends and traditions had gathered concerning Julian's death. Cf. W. R. Halliday, "St. Basil and Julian the Apostate: A Fragment of Legendary History", *Annals of Archeology and Anthropology*, VII (1914-6), 100-1.

These two departures in nomenclature from the Western versions would seem to argue some knowledge of the Eastern tradition on the part of the authors of *B* and *AN*, or more likely, on the part of their sources.

The *Kaiserkronik* does not speak of Sebaste or Caesarea, but simply says that Basil was abbot of a monastery in Greece and that it was there that Julian came upon him during his expedition against the Greeks (10939-46).

[10] *Adgar* (9-10) and *AN* (48-9) say that Basil and Julian had been fellow students. The same information is provided by two English manuscripts, one at Salisbury and the other at Cambridge. Cf. Boman, *ed cit.*,

(3) It makes specific the vilanies[11] that Julian had uttered against the Blessed Virgin and her Son: that Saint Joseph was His father and that she had not remained a virgin after her conception of Him (43-8).

(4) It describes the destruction of churches and the cruelties inflicted on Christians—men, women and children—by Julian on his march from Rome to Sebaste (65-72).

(5) Basil does not have his vision in Church, but at his 'hostel' where, wearied by prayer and watching, he had retired for sleep (145-50). He does dream that he is back in the church (155-6). He leaves his lodgings to go to the Church of St. Mercurius after the dream (203).

(6) The Blessed Virgin makes her apparition in the Church; she is enthroned on the altar in the midst of angels (158-60).[12]

(7) Mercurius had been martyred by Julian (162-8).[13]

(8) Mercurius departs on his mission accompanied by a fair company of the heavenly household (197-8).

(9) The striking rearrangement of the order of the story. Leaving the Church of Saint Mercurius where Saint Basil and the people had verified the disappearance of Mercurius' body and his arms, a fugitive *Sarasin* announces the death of Julian (239-80). Then Saint Basil and the people along with the messenger return to the Church and discover the body, the arms and the bloodied lance.[14] Only then does Basil tell of his vision.

(10) The White Knight and the white company[15] fight against the pagans under Julian in a pitched battle in aid of the Christians (250-64).

(11) It is the escaped *Sarasin* who describes the banner of the White Knight. Basil recognizes it from the description as belonging to Saint Mercurius (266-8). Later the messenger recognized the lance and banner hanging above Mercurius' tomb (307-10).

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pp. LXXI-LXXII. Jacobus de Voragine states that Julian had been a monk, but this is stated at the beginning of the legend concerning Julian that precedes ours: Julian and the Three Pots of Gold, cf. *Legenda aurea*, ed. Th. Graesse (Leipzig, 1850), p. 143. Cf. Arturo Graf. *op cit.*, pp. 468-9 and note 5 for the origin of the legend of Julian as a monk.

[11] These vilanies are hinted at in *AN* (157) and *Gautier* (267-8).

[12] *Cantigas* (#9) says that Basil fell asleep from weariness before the altar of the Blessed Virgin and that he had his vision there. The whole land about is described as obscured by the heavenly host. In *AN* (135-40) and *Gautier* (251-5), Mary appears apparently on Mount Didymus as in the *Vita* and the countryside is literally covered with the heavenly army. Neither *Adgar* nor *818* locate the apparition, but *818* does allow the interpretation that St. Basil had his vision in the Church and that the Blessed Virgin, seated on a throne, was surrounded by angels and archangels. So also the *Kaiserkronik* (10993) localizes the vision in the Church of the Blessed Mother.

[13] It is implied in *B* (213-4) that Basil had had Mercurius' arms hung above his tomb. Cf. *Cantigas* (#13). This and the fact that Mercurius had been martyred by Julian are first recorded by the *Kaiserkronik* (11041-56, 11082-9). The *Legenda aurea* is aware of this but locates the arms in the Church of Our Lady. Cf. *Legenda aurea, ed. cit.*, p. 145. In the *Legenda*, the story of Julian and St. Basil are recorded under Saint Julian, bishop and confessor, whose feast falls on January 25th, simply because of the similarity of names.

[14] In *Gautier* (452) and *818* (214), which follow the *Vita*, the coming of the messenger to announce the death of Julian is made to occur the seventh day after the vision, after the saint had announced the vision and the disappearance of the lance and its reappearance to signify the Apostate's death. These seven days had been spent in prayer and thanksgiving. In *AN* (169-210) and *Cantigas* (#12), the description of Julian's death is placed immediately after Basil's vision as a proof of the veracity of the saint and of the reality of the vision. Only after that description does St. Basil awake. In the *Cantigas* (#17), Alfonso has Libanius report the death of the Emperor a second time after the manner of the *Vita*. In the *Kaiserkronik*, Basil sees in vision the Blessed Mother call forth Mercurius, sees him go forth and kill Julian (11070-11117). There is no mention of a messenger to report the event; it is stated simply that, although Basil was certain of Julian's death, no one had told him how or when it happened but that God had revealed it to him (11117-22).

[15] In other versions, Mercurius is unaccompanied. *Gautier* (252) has described the knights seen by St. Basil in his vision as 'plus blans que lis'. He had not, however, applied that description to Mercurius. White, too, appears as the color of Mercurius' horse in *AN* (177) and in *Cantigas* (#11); the same detail is encountered in the English Latin prose versions; cf Boman, *ed. cit.*, p. LXIX. In *818* (127), the Blessed Virgin is clothed in a robe whiter than snow. In the *Cantigas* (#18), Libanius reports that a white knight had slain Julian.

(12) The White Knight is seen during the battle to attack Julian and to kill him with a lance thrust (272-3).[16]

In spite of these many departures in detail and in order, *B* offers certain similarities to other vernacular and Latin versions as against the *Vita*. With *Adgar*, for example, it omits section 2; with *AN*, there is a similarity in the order of the description of Julian's death. As in *818* (38-9) and *Kaiserkronik* (10951-64), Basil does not come forth to meet Julian, but sends a messenger to him with the gifts of barley bread (97).[17] Like *AN* (56) which does not specify the number of loaves, *B* has but one loaf (98) instead of the customary three.[18] As in *Adgar* (35), the church wherein Basil and his flock gather for prayer of intercession is not named (138);[19] in *AN*, the church is named but the mountain on which it is located is not. Like *Adgar* and *AN*, *B* suppresses the name of the fugitive[20] and omits Basil's companion Eubulus, who accompanied Basil to the Church of Saint Mercurius to seek the arms and body of the latter. Like *Adgar, 818* and the *Kaiserkronik, B* omits Julian's salutation: *te philosophia vici* and the saint's reply that are characteristic of the *Vita* versions. Like *Adgar, AN* and the *Kaiserkronik, B* omits Julian's cry at his death: *vicisti, o Galilaea* and section 6. Along with *818, AN* and the *Kaiserkronik, B* omits the vision of Libanius that is contemporary with that of Basil.

It is difficult to fit the *B* redaction into the classification made by Boman.[21] It does not enter into Group *A* which embraces those redactions that are closest to the *Vita* and which are characterized by the retention of the 'book' of section 3 and by an analagous treatment of section 5.[22] Nor can it be classified under Group *B* under which are grouped those redactions that seem to go back, independently of one another, to a common original or to like originals and which relate Julian's admission: *vicisti, o Galilaea* before he died.[23] Group *C* has this latter detail in common with Group *B* and under it are comprised those versions intermediary between *A* and *B*.[24]

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[16] In *818* (211-6), the army sees but a single knight attack Julian but is powerless to prevent him killing the Emperor. *Cantigas* (#11) has Mercurius strike Julian down in the sight of all. In *AN* (175-90) and *Kaiserkronik* (11099-103), the single knight, unseen by all except the Emperor, strikes him down. In *Gautier* (475-97), the single knight pierces Julian with a lance in spite of the guards who surround him.

[17] *818, Kaiserkronik* (10945-8) and the Latin prose redactions cited by Boman, *ed. cit.*, p. LXXII, relate that Julian sent word to St. Basil to bring food to the army.

[18] The *Legenda aurea* is the sole redaction to give the number of loaves as four. *Cantigas* (#3), like *B*, has but one loaf; the *Kaiserkronik* (10951) gives the number as five.

[19] The other French poetic versions follow the *Vita* in saying that it is the Church of the Blessed Virgin on Mount Didymus.

[20] The fugitive messenger is known to *Gautier* (454) as Libanion, to *818* (203) as *li henios* (*read* Libanios) and to the *Cantigas* (#17) as Libano. *B* (327-8) distinctly says that the author did not know the messenger's name, either his pagan or Christian name. The *Kaiserkronik* omits all reference to the messenger; cf. *supra*, note 14.

[21] *Ed. cit.*, p. LXIV.

[22] Under Group *A*, Boman, *ed. cit.*, pp. LXVI-LXVIII, includes *Gautier*, the *Miracle* and *Cantigas* both of which are influenced by *Gautier*, and the Italian prose versions. To judge by the few verses that remain of *Orleans*, it too might be added to the group.

The brevity of the *Cantigas* makes it difficult to judge its relationship to the other redactions. With its recurrent refrain, characteristic of the *Cantigas*, it comprises just twenty eight-line stanzas. It is true, the reference to the 'book' (#13), given by Mary to Basil in his vision, the treatment of section 5, make it eligible, as it were, for Group *A*. However, there are divergencies from the *Vita* and from *Gautier*: the number of loaves of bread, the omission of sections 2 and 6, the description of Julian's death during Basil's dream. These must have lead Valmar, *ed cit.*, p. 104, to conclude that in the case of this particular legend Alfonso need not have known *Gautier*, but that they may have drawn from the same common source; the different purposes for which they wrote would explain the divergencies, p. 105. Boman's statement, therefore, is not quite accurate: Teresa Marullo [*Archivum Romanicum*, XVIII (134), 495-539] soutient l'ancienne thèse de Valmar selon laquelle le roi aurait connu l'oeuvre de Gautier; *ed cit.*, p. LXVII.

[23] *Adgar* and *AN* belong to this group. Cf. Boman, *ibid.*, pp. LXXIII-LXXIV.

[24] *818*. Cf. Boman, *ibid.*, p. LXXIV. *818* (30) says that when Julian came to Caesarea, he set up 'paveillons' for himself and his army. It is interesting to note that *Ms* Paris, B.N. *lat.* 10770, states that Mercurius slew Julian 'in Babilone vel in papili-

Known redactions, then, Latin and vernacular, do not furnish the direct source of *B*. The author insists that he has followed that source closely *sans mettre et sans oster* (12). The fact that he does say that he does not know the Christian or pagan name of the *Sarasin* who reported Julian's death and received baptism (327-8), the fact that he does not use the *te vici philosophia* would seem to eliminate the *Vita* and like versions. The fact that he makes no use of the legendary admission of defeat on the part of Julian would seem to eliminate too the *Legenda Aurea* and allied versions.[25] There remains, of course, the possibility of a lost or as yet unfound and unpublished version. Just as Kjellman posited a lost Latin copy that must have intervened between the Oxford text and the Anglo-Norman group of miracles that he edited to explain divergency of details,[26] just as Boman is of the opinion that there existed another version of the legend close to the *Vita* but with details unknown to the latter,[27] so it is possible that our poem goes back to a redaction that is as yet unknown or lost as to its direct source.

II.

The poem is written in twelve-syllable lines, divided by a cesura at the sixth syllable, and gathered into quatrains by both rime and assonance. The cesura is fairly well observed: it is irregular, for example, at 38, 198, 257 and weak in a number of lines of the type of 5, 115, 145, 261, 329 etc. At 56, 129, 135, 183 the sixth syllable is made up of atonic *e*.[1] Overflow lines occur at 77-8, 151-2, 159-60, 201-2, 217-8 and from stanza to stanza at 212-3, 224-5, 300-1.[2] Hiatus occurs but rarely: 94, 118, 120, 135, 328. *Angeles* 159 etc. and *viergene* are accounted disyllabic. There is some hesitation in the value of *cristianus* and its derivatives; ordinarily trisyllabic, *crestiien* 34, 79, *crestiiens* 60, 126 are two syllables in length and *crestienté* three.

Thirty three of the eighty three quatrains are in assonance. What is characteristic of the poem is the epic-like character imposed on it, not only by the varied use of assonance, but also by the use made of *laisses similaires* wherein the theme is repeated for greater effect with change of rime or assonance: stanzas 9-10 (33-40), 26-7 (101-8), 34-5 (133-40), 37-9 (145-56), 85-6 (337-44), and by the use of interlocking lines linking together stanzas by repetition of words and phrases to secure emotional effect: 4-5, 32-3, 52-3, 60-1, 68-9, 80-1, 112-3, 204-5, 220-1, 228-9, 296-7, 308-9, 320-1, 336-7. Compare also 44 and 46, 90 and 93, 192 and 194, 247 and 249, 283 and 285.[3]

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one suo'. Cf. Boman, *ed. cit.*, p. LXXI and note 1.

Kaiserkronik bears very little relation to either Group *A* or *B*. It is a straight narrative of the essentials of the legend and, as such, omits the characteristic 'te vici philosophia' of the *Vita* and the 'vicisti, o Galilaea'. It differs from the *Vita* and Group *B* redactions in that Basil is made an abbot and not a bishop in Greece. It is unique among the versions in that there is no mention made of the 'hay' that is given by Julian in exchange for the loaves, the space it gives to Mercurius, his martyrdom at the hands of the Apostate. In fact, Mercurius is the main character and Basil is made a bystander, an audience. The people of the household and following of Basil are hardly mentioned. It does, however, have certain minor similarities in common with the Old French redactions: cf. *supra*, p. 109. There is a major similarity between it and *818*: *Kaiserkronik* (11108-13), *818* (227-38): the burial of Julian in Constantinople and the fate of his body. Both aver that they draw this information from their sources. They differ in that *818* says that Julian's knights buried him; in *Kaiserkronik*, the Romans fled after Julian's death; who buried him is not stated.

[25] Certain similarities ally *B* to the *Legenda aurea*: that Julian had been a monk; that Mercurius had been martyred by the Apostate; the suppression of all names; the attribution of the story in the *Legenda* to Fulbert and in *B* the use made of the incipit of Fulbert's sermon.

[26] *Ed. cit.*, pp. xvii-xviii and xxix.

[27] Boman, *ed. cit.*, pp. LXII, LXXIII-LXXIV, LXXV.

[1] In a little more than 25% of the lines, a word ending in feminine *e* occurs at the cesura followed by a word beginning with a consonant; in about 12%, the second hemistich begins with a vowel in the same circumstances.

[2] Compare the technique of our poem with that of the *Vie de sainte Dieudonnee*, contained in the same manuscript; ed. Hermine Dirickx-van der Straeten (Liége, 1931), p. 124.

[3] Cf. M. K. Pope, "Four *Chansons de geste*:

The unique manuscript of this Old French poetic version of the Julian episode in the Life of Saint Basil, *Ms* Brussels, Bibliothèque Royale 10295-304, as described by Paul Meyer,[4] betrays two hands. The first stops at fol. 206^r and appears sporadically in the second section. The first section is a compilation of saints' legends in prose and poetry. It belonged to the library of Charles de Croy, prince of Chimay, the godfather of Charles V and was begun by Jehan Wag' (Wagon or Wagus)[5] in 1428 and was completed August 28th, 1429. The transcription was made at Ath in Belgian Hainault, some fifty kilometres to the southwest of Brussels, on the left bank of the Dender.[6] Our poem, which occupies fols. 29^v to 34^r, was, therefore, apparently done in 1428 in Belgian Hainault territory. The dialectal traits apparent in it are not incompatible with its place of transcription.

(1) Vulgar Latin open *e*, tonic and checked, diphthonizes fairly regularly: yestre 9, 10; adiés 23; viers 23, 121, 203; pucielle 47, 48; Pierse 50, 106, 121 etc.; toursiel 100; bielles 142, 230, 284; apriés 148; bielle 150, 197, 280, 301; pierdre 179; apielle 211; pierce 214; ouviers 223; nouvielles 242; fiers 292; infier 316; siert 345, 346. But estre 4, adés 24; pucelle 43, 338; nouvelles 89, 246; Perse 109; apelle 206.

The same diphthonization occurs in pretonic position: siervir 20, 22; siervi 27; apiella 99; apieller 140; appiellés 171; apiellerent 183; aviesprer 223; siermons 231; ciertaines 242; miervelle 254, 261; conviertis 335. But appella 170; appellés 207; servir 304.[7]

(2) The triphthong *iée* resulting from yod followed by Latin *-áta* is reduced to *ie*: nuitie 14; engrossie 44; essillie 58; mai(s)nie 198, 302.

(3) Pretonic *e* followed by palatal *l* or *n* is raised to *i*: signeur 1, 239; villiet 14; villier 28, 139, 145, 153; essillie 58; sonmillier 148, 154; apparilliés 189; agenillier 190; esvilla 199, 201; ensigniés 241; monsigneur 261, 293, 305, 342. But pareilles 262. The same trait is seen in the case of *a* in travillier 146, but bataille 275. Pretonic *o* before *s* that has its origin in yod is written *i*: orissons 141; orisons 146, 149, 156; orison 202; congnissoit 264.

(4) Initial close *o* in contact with a labial consonant appears as *u*: frumés 204, 205; desfrumés 208, 222; frumé 220. Pretonic *e* in esporons 270 has apparently been assimilated to tonic *o*, an Anglo-Norman trait according to Pope, *From Latin to Modern French*, #1139.

(5) The diphthong *oi* is reduced to *o* in the only example istore 4, 5, 9; *ie* is reduced to *e* in matere 25, *ai* to *a* in fas 33.

(6) Tonic close *e*, followed by a nasal, appears as *ain*: fain 100, 103, 131; paine 80.[8]

(7) The triphthong *eau* has differentiated to *iau* in coutiaus 69; pourciaus 70; hiaume 167.

(8) Close *o*, tonic and free, appears as *ou* in peceour 21, 347; douçour 22; labour 24.

A Study in Old French Epic Versification", *Modern Language Review*, VIII (1913), 359, 363, and Werner Mulertt, *Laissenverbindung und Laissenwiederholung in den Chanson de Geste* (Halle, 1918), 37-44, 91-3, 137-8; in the latter pages, the author indicates other Old French compositions that betray the same characteristics.

[4] *Romania*, XXX (1901), 295-316. Cf. also Léopold Hervieux, *Les Fabulistes latins* I (Paris, 1883), p. 636.

[5] Cf. A. J. Denomy, "An Old French Life of St. Barbara", *Mediaeval Studies*, I (1939), 150, note 14.

[6] Fol. 158^r: et ossi priiés pour celi
qui l'eut escript par samedi
la nuit de la fieste a At,
que il eut fait par nuit bien tard
l'an iiij^c et xxviij
avecques mil, je le vous dy.

[7] Les copies dont on admet qu'elles sont redigées dans la fr. Flandre ou le Hainaut . . . offrent surtout la forme diphthonguée. Charles Gossen, *Petite grammaire de l'ancien Picard* (Paris, 1951), p. 46.

[8] Ce trait distingue l'ancien picard de tous les parlers avoisinants. Gossen, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

(9) Nasalized *a* appears for nasalized *e*: samble 21, 345; tamps 31; manace 122; anuy 125, 128; asamblé 290.

(10) Atonic *e* in hiatus is retained in beneie 1; peceour 21, 347; roine 86, 341; euist 88; veu 217.

(11) Yod, which developed out of the diphthong *ie*, and juxtaposed to a diphthong in yod, persists in being represented. This is characteristic of the poem. (Cf. Pope, *op. cit.*, #701). priieres 23; the proper name Juliien *passim*; crestiien and paiien forms *passim*; paiis *passim*, but païs 246; caiiere 160; ostoiier 166; aiiés 239.

(12) Metathesis appears in fourment 83; frumés 204, 205; desfrumés 208, 222; frumé 220.

(13) The stressed form of *bonum* is retained with the spelling *boin*: 27, 304; boine 76, 77, 299 etc.; boins 350 and in deboinaire 283.

(14) The dipththong *ou* has differentiated to *eu* in peu 51; seut 257; to *au* and *o*: ot 51, 184, 202 etc.; sot 93; pot 145; vot 160, 168.

(15) Glide *e* is developed in orgieus 88; gentieus 127.

(16) Parasitic *i* appears; fuist 15; conçuist 48; pleuist 86; fuissent 87; euist 88; euwissent 253.

(17) The stop articulation of *k*, initial in the word or syllable, before *e* and *ie* originating from Latin *a*, is retained: cloques 137, 230; huquier 238; blanque 310. The value of *c* in peceour 21, 347; trebucier 66; escorcier 67; trencier 68; detrencier 69; pierce 214; prescier 231; blance 255, 258, 277; blances 256, 260; cief 338 may be *k*. *Ch* appears in chevaus 72, 103, 256; acheminé 75; chiens 102; regularily in chevalier; chier 176; cheval 270.

(18) The stop articulation of *k*, initial in the word or syllable, before Latin *a*, *au*, is preserved: cardons 118, caiiere 160; capelain 179; cose 226; escapa 259; broca 270; escappés 275; cascun 348.

(19) *K*, initial in the syllable or word, before Latin *e* or *i*, *k* followed by yod initial or intervocalic, initial *ti*, which in francian develop to the sound *ts*, written *c*, appear as *ch*, probably with the value of *tsch*.[9] The graphy is ordinarily *ch* but the scribe does uses *c* quite frequently. The result is a set of doublets: conmenche 6, 306 and conmence 91, 210, 220 etc.; conmenchier 16 and conmencier 5; chieus 86 and ciel 85; chis 217, 346 and cis 214; lanche 271 and lance *passim*; reconmenchier 286 and reconmence 229; the forms rechitee 9; chité regularily; essaucha 55; anonchier 239.

(20) The group *ts* is reduced to *s*; the symbol *z* does not appear.

(21) Final unsupported *t* after tonic vowels is retained in villiet 14; estet 34; clergiet 138, 287; alet 278; escut 307 but escu 167; irascu 219; clergié 232; esté 253. *T* in this position has fallen in the third singular preterite: siervi 27; souffri 36, 163; brandi 271; feri 272.

(21) Preconsonantal *l* has vocalized to *u* in chieus 86; autretieus 87; orgieus 88; gentieus 127; celestiau 198.

(22) The interconsonantal glide between the groups *n-r* and *l-r* is undeveloped in vorai 26; engenra 46, 114; vora 56; revenray 110; faura 124. The glide *b* regularly appears in samble and its derivatives.

(23) A labial glide has developed between vowels in hiatus in euwissent 253; owistes 262; leuwier 346.[10]

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[9] Ce traitement de la palatale unit le normand au picard et distingue ces deux dialectes du wallon et des autres parlers d'oïl. Gossen, *op. cit.* p. 71. Cf. M. K. Pope, *From Latin to Modern French* (Manchester, 1934), N. #1, p. 487: originally characteristic of the whole Northern region, this pronunciation lost ground both in Normandy and the N.E. region before the end of Later Old French.

[10] Ce trait appartient à la scripta picard du nord-est, ainsi qu'à la scripta wallone et lorraine. Gossen, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

(24) *L* final has fallen in querné 116.

(25) Preconsonantal *s* is dropped in voit 7; blamer 176; forques 276; mainie 302. It is added in aist 132.

(26) *Rr* is found for *r* in parrt 278, 279 possibly to indicate a long *a*.

(27) Palatalized *l* is represented ordinarily by *ll*: voelle 59, 62, 92 etc.; voellent 95; viellars 101, 105; voel 173, 174, 241 etc.; voelliés 200, 315; mervelle 224; miervelle 254, 261. Cf. also ensengne 348.

(28) The future, third singular of avoir appears without the labial element in ara 95, 346; the present indicative, first singular of faire as fac 161, 265; mute *e* within the word before *r* is omitted in the future demora 115; it is introduced in averay 109; croistera 118; soufferai 180; etymological forms of the imperfect subjunctive of faire appear in fesissent 66 and in the preterite fisent 71; the third person, present subjunctive of tenir appears as tingne 351, of deffendre as deffenge 351.

(29) The feminine possessive pronominal adjective appears but once as te 113; the feminine personal pronoun, direct object as le 14, 151, 304, 345 etc.; the feminine definite article as le frequently, 86, 164, 210 etc.; the masculine definite article in the nominative is regularly li, but le 2, 26, 236 and les in the plural 225, 250, 253; *ego* appears once as jou 13; du as dou 2, 26, 164 and douquel 269; il as i 298; the demonstrative cils as cis 214, 265 and chis 217.

(30) The Old French declension of nouns, adjectives and participles is preserved fairly well. The proper name Juliien appears regularily in the nominative and oblique without flexional *s*; Basilles regularly except Basille 288, 325. Without fexional *s* in the nominative singular are crestiien 34; un 259; Sarasin 238, 321; peuple 290. Analogical *s* appears in fevres 44, 46; hons regularly; traitres 124. In the nominative plural analogical *s* appears in justes 21; prelas 87; venus 181; larons 225; tous les Sarasins 274; paiiens 252; crestiiens 253. The only example of analogical *e* in third classical feminine adjectives is quelle 278.

The dialectal traits will be seen, therefore, to belong to the Northern region, especially to the Northeast, proper to the place of the poem's transcription.[11]

With regard to the dialect of the poet, an examination of the rime and syllable count reveal the following:

(1) Tonic *i* followed by feminine *e* is rimed with *ie* the reduction of *iée*: tonic *i* is in assonance with *i* of *ie* the reduction of *iée*: estudie: nuitie: oïe: aïe 13-6; felonnie: vilonnie: mie: engrossie 41-4; mahommerie: essillie: Marie: aïe 57-60; compagnie: mainie: courtoisie: faintise 301-4.

(2) Close *o*, tonic and free and followed by *r*, rimes with close *o*, tonic and checked: peceour: douçour: jour: labour 21-4.

(3) The rimes of coutiaus: pourciaus: maus: chevaus 69-72 indicate that the triphthong *eaus* resulting from the Latin suffix *-ellum* before a consonant had not differentiated to *-iaus*.

(4) *E* and *a* followed by a nasal are in rime and assonance: exemple: fiance: deffendre: entente 17-20; ment (mendit): gent: mescreant: degastant 61-4; fiance: samble: deffendre: fiance 133-6; fiance: fiance: poissance: deffendre 233-6.

(5) Open *o* and close *o* in checked position are in assonance: recors: or: estors: corps 269-72.

(6) Tonic open *e* followed by *u* final, tonic open *e* followed by *l* plus consonant,

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[11] Compare the dialectal traits of this poem with those of *Le Vie sainte Barbe*, ed. A. J. Denomy, *loc. cit.*, 151-3. Both poems are found in the same manuscript, some thirty folios apart, and their transcription is due to the same scribe.

close *e*, resulting from tonic *a*, followed by *l* plus consonant, tonic open *o* followed by palatalized preconsonantal *l*, are in assonance: Dieu: chieus; autretieus: orgieus 85-8.

(7) The diphthong *ei* from tonic close *e* in free position is levelled to open *e* and rimes with and is in assonance with final *ai*: moy: feray: feray: aloy 105-8; comanday: say: estoit: gissoit 213-6; plaist: mais: avoit: cognissoit 261-4.

(8) In the case of conter: autel: aporté: reposer 157-60; autel: regarder: demandé: desreubé 209-12; it is difficult to determine whether we are dealing with rime or assonance. Given the effacement of *l* after close *e* arising from tonic *a* and the effacement of *r* after high vowels in the Eastern and Southeastern regions, the rime would be in close *e*.

(9) Syllable count of the verse demands hiatus: beneie 1; roine 86 and possibly 344; euist 88; beneiçon 194; veu 217. Hiatus of *e* in crut 55 would emend a line that otherwise lacks one syllable. On the other hand, *e* in hiatus has no value: pleuist 86; aseure 110; beneiçon 192; seut 257 and has gone in juner 28; preschier 28; conçuist 48; prescier 231. The future demora 115, without mute *e* is justified; on the other hand, forms with developed intertonic *e* are needed for syllable count in averay 109; croistera 118; soufferai 180. Fesissent 66, the etymological form, if emended to fissent, would correct the verse. The analogical aime 104 is needed for correct count.

(10) The form jou 13 possibly belongs to the poet's use to avoid elision. The sole feminine form of the third Latin declension adjective with analogical *e*, quelle 278, is justified by count. The nominative plural masculine nouns, adjectives and participles normally retain the traditional flexionless forms. In the phrase justes et peceour 21, the analogical *s* may be a device to avoid elision. Other nominative forms with analogical *s*: crestiiens 112; desbaretés etc. 274 are demanded by rime. In avenu 254, retrouvé 291, both justified by count and rime, there is failure to agree with a feminine subject and with a preceding direct object. Debonnaire 283, the nominative singular, is justified by rime. The poet makes use of the proper name Mercure-Mercurion in the oblique according to the demands of the verse: 162, 171, 183, 210, 267. The addition of *s* in the oblique singular: chevaliers 165 spoils the rime and possibly should be corrected.

(11) If rime be intended in 109-12, riens 110 has assumed a non-etymological *s* as has the first person present indicative tiens 111. The feminine intentions 120; visions 150, with the Old French *-s* are proven by rime. In the case of hons 142, 268, preudons 149, analogical *s* is justified by rime as is the first present indicative dis 8. In the case of avons 164, if rime is intended, the poet may have used the Western suffix *-on*, which, however, was also used in francian into the fifteenth century.

It is difficult to determine the locale of the poem, the dialect of the author, the time of composition. The evidence of rime and assonance, of verse, seem to point to the Northern and Northeastern territory: to Picard, Lorraine, Wallonia, the district of French speaking Belgium. The rime of *ie* developed from *iée* and francian *ie* points in that direction. The rime of close *o* followed by *r* in free and checked syllables is characteristic of the Eastern Lorraine dialect as well as to Walloon in the Northeast. The rime of *ei* which developed to *oi* and *ai* as open *e*, on the other hand, points to the Western region which shared that characteristic with the North. The assonance of *a* and *e* followed by *n*, though not Northern, is found also in Lorraine. The relative conservatism and consistency of the Old French declensional system at a fairly late date is characteristic of the North; so also is the future of verbs with svarabhaktic *e* suggestive of the North: to Wallon and Picard, as well as to Lorraine. Item No. 3 and No. 6 are Francian.

Paul Meyer judged the *Vie saint Basille* to be of the fourteenth or, at the earliest, of the end of the thirteenth century. In view of the relatively few examples of the preservation of hiatus *e*, of the persistence of *a* in hiatus in traître, the almost total lack of feminine *e* in adjectives of the third Latin declension, the relative conservatism of the declension system, there does not seem to be any good reason for qualifying or changing the date suggested by Meyer.[12]

III.

LA VIE SAINT BASILLE[1]

fol. 29v Or escoutés, signeur![2] Que Dieus vous beneie,[3]
Le Glorieus dou ciel, li Fils sainte Marie!
Je vous voel raconter de la vierge Marie
Une mout haute istore qui doit bien estre oÿe.

L'istore, dont je voel or comencier mes dis,
Conmenche *approbate consuetudinis*[4].
Et qui ne m'en voet croire, voit lire les escris[5],
Il trouvera pour voir tout ce que je vous dis.

L'istore doit bien yestre devant clers rechitee
Et devant laie gent ne doit yestre celee,
Car elle est de latin en françois translatee
Sans mettre et sans oster fors tant qu'elle est rimee.

Jou ay au translater mise grant estudie
Et, pour le mieus rimer, villiet mainte nuitie
Que de toutes gens fuist plus volentiers oïe.
Je voel or conmenchier. Dieus m'en soit en aïe!

A saint Basille doient[6] preudonme prendre exemple:
En la vierge Marie avoit mout grant fiance
Qui bien set ses amis au grant besoing deffendre,
Ceus qui en li siervir ont mise leur entente.

Bien doient, ce me samble, justes et peceour
Siervir si haute damme ou tant a de douçour,
Qui adiés en priieres est viers Dieu nuit et jour
Et pour nous racorder[7] est adés en labour.

Or voel a mon matere d[es][8] or mais retourner.
Dou courtois saint Basille vorai premiers parler

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[12] Cf. the conclusion arrived at by the editor of the *Vie de sainte Dieudonnee*, *ed. cit.*, p. 129.

[1] Paul Meyer has printed the first 44 and last 12 lines, *Romania*, XXX (1901), 298-9.

[2] Meyer: segneur.

[3] Långfors does not register the incipit of our poem. He does list it, however, as that of the *Doctrinal sauvage; Les Incipit des poèmes français antérieurs au XVI^{e} siécle* (Paris, 1917), p. 258, cf. also p. 377. For the *Doctrinal sauvage*, composed by a Picard poet of the third quarter of the thirteenth century, in alexandrine monorimed quatrains, see Robert Bossuat, *Manuel bibliographique de la littérature française au moyen âge* (Melun, 1951), #2680.

[4] The incipit of the fourth sermon 'De Nativitate beatissimae Mariae virginis' of Fulbert of Chartres' *Sermones ad populum;* PL 141, 320-4. Cf. *supra*, p. 105.

[5] *Les escris* would suggest sources other than Fulbert. On the other hand, the poet does say that the *istore* was translated almost verbatim from a Latin original (11). Cf. *supra*, p. 105.

[6] Meyer: doivent.

[7] *racorder*: to reconcile us with or bring us to (God).

[8] The second hemistich lacks one syllable. The obvious emendation was suggested by Meyer.

Qui siervi nostre Damme de boin coer, sans fauser,
De juner, de villier, de preschier et d'orer.

Sains Basilles li Grans, dont raconter vous doy,
Evesques de Sebaste en Capadoce estoit.
fol. 30r A celui tamps a Romme .i. emperere avoit;
Juliien l'Apostate ensi nonmés[9] estoit.

Juliien l'Apostate, dont je fas mension,
Avoit[10] estet crestiien et de religion:
Moines fu et diacres et par sa traison
Renoya Jhesucrist qui souffri passion.

Juliien l'Apostate, dont vous m'oés conter,
Fist maint grant tourment en sainte crestienté:
Maintes dignes eglises par terre craventer
Et mains glorieus sains a martire livrer.

Juliien l'Apostate, par sa grant felonnie,
Dist de la mere Dieu mainte grant vilonnie:
Que, quant elle enfanta, pucelle n'estoit mie
Et que Joseph li fevres si l'avoit engrossie.

Juliien l'Apostate, qui oncques Dieu n'ama,
Dist que Joseph li fevres Jhesucrist engenra,
C'oncques la mere Dieu pucielle n'enfanta;
Que pucielle conçuist, ce ne creroit il ja.

Et quant li maus tirans oÿ dire et conter
Que li paiis de Pierse estoit crestienné,
Tel doel ot et tel ire a peu n'est foursené.
De par tout son empire a Sarasins mandé.

De par tout son paiis les paiiens assambla;
Quant il furent venu, l'affaire leur conta:
Conment crestienté crut [11] et essaucha
Et que tout par force destruire les vora.

Juliien l'Apostate, par sa mahommerie,[12]
Jura crestienté sera toute essillie;
Or l'en voelle [Jhesus][13] li Fils sainte Marie,
La douce mere Dieu soit crestiiens en aïe!

La douce mere Dieu, qui ne faut ne ne ment,
Voelle au jour d'ui aidier la crestiienne gent!
fol. 30v Lors s'esmurent de Romme li paiien mescreant;
Toute crestienté aloient degastant.

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[9] Meyer: noumes. On Julian the Apostate, cf. H. Leclercq, *Dictionnaire d'archéologie chrét. et de liturgie, s.v.* VIII^1 (Paris, 1928), 397-9; J. Bidez, *La Vie de l'empereur Julien* (Paris, 1930). On the legends of his life and death, cf. "Kaiser Julian in der Dichtung alter und neuer Zeit", *Studien zur vergleichenden Literaturgeschichte* V (Berlin, 1905), pp. 1-120. The latter does not concern itself with the later development of the legend or its role in mediaeval literature; it restricts itself to the vision in its simplest form.

[10] Meyer suggested *ot* as a reading for *avoit* to normalize the line. Perhaps it is better to retain the manuscript reading and account *crestiien* as disyllabic as elsewhere: 60, 79, 126. The popular suffix *-ien* has replaced the disyllabic *ïen*.

[11] The second hemistich lacks one syllable. Read: creut (?).

[12] *mahommerie*: literally the Moslem faith or practices recalling those of Islamism. Here, very likely, by extension, heretical or unchristian beliefs and practices.

[13] The first hemistich lacks two syllables. The insertion of *Jhesu* would emend the line: May Jesus, the son of the blessed Mary, be angry with or hate him.

Li paiien ne trouvoient eglise ne moustier
Parmi crestienté ne fesissent[14] trebucier;
Les crestiiens faisoient trestous vis escorcier
Et as autres faisoient tous les menbres trencier.

Fenmes grosses faisoient detrencier a coutiaus,
Les enfans sans batesme jettoient as pourciaus;
Parmi crestiienneté fisent maint autres maus
Et es dignes eglises herbergent leur chevaus.

Li felon Sarasin, par leur grant cruauté,
Ont maintes villes arses parmi crestienté;
Droit parmi Capadoce se sont acheminé
Jusques devant Sebaste, celle boine chité.

En celle boine ville sains Basilles estoit
Evesques. Li sains hons sainte vie menoit
Et au peuple crestiien boin exemple donnoit;
Pour avoir paradis mout de paine enduroit.

Pour avoir paradis menoit mout sainte vie:
De pain d'orge vivoit, de vin ne buvoit mie;
Ne de pain de fourment, denree ne demie,[15]
Ne grans reubes fourees ne convoitoit il mie.

Riens sous ciel ne queroit fors que l'amour de Dieu.
Pleuist or a nostre Damme, le roine des chieus,
Que les autres prelas fuissent tout autretieus,
N'en toute sainte eglise n'en euist plus d'orgieus!

Quant li sains hons oÿ les nouvelles conter
Que Sarasin venoient crestienté gaster,
La douce mere Dieu conmence a reclamer
Que crestienté voelle des Sarrasins garder.

Quant sains Basilles sot que Sarasin venoient,
Un mesage envoia savoir que il voloient;
S'il voellent de ses biens, il en ara grant joie
Mais que de son paiis appertement s'en voisent.

fol. 31r Tel pain com il mengoit d'orge leur envoi[a].[16]
Et quant li Apostates le pain d'orge esgarda,
Uns de ses Sarasins maintenant apiella;
Un grant toursiel[17] de fain au saint honme envoia.

Adont se li manda: "Fel viellars esragiés,
Tu m'as envoyé pain dont tu noris tes chiens
Et je t'envoie fain dont mes chevaus maintiens.
Garde toy bien de moy! je ne t'aime de riens.

Fel viellars esragiés, garde toy bien de moy!
Au revenir de Pierse destruire te feray,

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[14] The second hemistich is hypermetric. Fesissent: fissent (?).

[15] *denree ne demie*: not at all, not the least bit. Literally, not so much as could be bought with a penny or (even) half of that. The phrase thus connotes the lowest or smallest amount of anything. Cf. Godefroy *Dictionnaire de l'ancienne langue française*, 10 vols. (Paris, 1881-1902) and Tobler-Lommatsch, *Altfranzösisches Wörterbuch* (Berlin, 1925—) *s.v.*

[16] *Ms*: envoie.

[17] *toursiel*: a bundle or truss.

Toy et tes crestiiens pendre ou ardoir feray;
Tes eglises abattre et confondre t'aloy.[18]

Quant j'averay en Perse destruis les crestiiens,
Je revenray par toy—ne t'aseure de riens—
Tes eglises abattré par la loy que je tiens
El despit de Jhesu que aeurent crestiiens.

El despit de Marie te ville arse sera
Et de Jhesu son fil que Joseph engenra;
Ne moustier ne maison droite n'i demora
C'on pora le querné[19] mener tout contreval.

Je feray tout abattre, eglises et maisons,
Que il n'i croistera qu'espines et cardons,
Que pour demorer[20] honmes n'iert abitations
Que on i puist trouver. Tel est m'ententions".

Adont se departi, viers Pierse s'en ala;
Manace crestiiens que tous les destruira.
Mais s'il plaist a celui qui le monde estoia[21]
Et a sa douce mere, li traitres faura.

Li preudons demora qui ot au coer anuy
Pour les autres crestiiens plus que n'avoit pour lui.
He! gentieus mere Dieu, car nous deffendés hui
Des felons Sarasins de tourmens et d'anuy.

He! fel apostates, Dieu avés renoyé.
Tel pain com nous mengons vous avoie envoiié
Et pour pain nous avés vostre fain envoiié.
Or prie a Jhesucrist qu'il aist de nous pitié.

fol. 31v Li preudons sains Basilles qui ot en Dieu fiance
N'envoya pas querir gens d'armes, ce me samble,
Ne Bretons ne Engles pour la chité deffendre,
Car en la mere Dieu avoit mout grant fiance.

Li preudons sains Basilles fist les cloques soner;
Clergiet et laie gent fist a l'eglise aler
Faire pourcessions et villier et juner,
Et la vierge Marie doucement apieller.

L'espasse de .iii. jours furent en orissons:
Maintes bielles priieres recorda li sains hons;

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[18] *aloy*: with a legal connotation, I pledge or promise. The direct object of the verb: aloy would be the infinitives abattre et confondre: I pledge the demolition of your churches and your own confusion. Cf. Godefroy, I *alier*.

It is difficult to realize Julian's extreme anger at the exchange of gifts. Lines 117-20 make allusion to what must have been its real cause. It probably derives from a symbolical custom relating to land tenure. Julian is angry because he discovers that he has been tricked into granting Basil right of pasturage. Cf. W. R. Halliday, "St. Basil and Julian the Apostate: A Fragment of Legendary History", *Annals of Archaeology and Anthropolgy,* VII (1914-16), 95. The *Vita* retains the basis for Julian's anger and threats: Audiens autem Julianus, quod velut Imperator gratiam suam revocare non posset, furore percitus . . .; *Acta Sanctorum Junii* III, 423F and Fr. Combéfis' note, 427E.

[19] *querné*: battlements. The forms with metathesis: kernel, kerneus, quernel are registered by Tobler-Lommatsch, *s.v.* crenel, and by Godefroy, *Complement*, IX, 244c. For the effacement of final *l*, cf. M. K. Pope, *op. cit.*, #391 and #392. Here, apparently, the suffix *-ellum* is treated in the same way as *-alem > el > é;* cf. Gossen, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

[20] *demorer*: used transitively: there will not be a dwelling to shelter people.

[21] *estoia*: preserved, watched over, from V.L. studiare.

Pour cause de brieté recorder nel poons,
Mais les hautes miracles raconter vous volons.

Quant li sains ne pot plus endurer le villier,
En orisons son cors pener et travillier,
A l'ostel le couvint un petit repairier;
Apriés mengier ala .i. petit sonmillier.

En orisons s'ala endormir li preudons;
En dormant li avint mout bielle visions.
Se volés escouter, nous le vous conterons
En françois, qu'en latin escript trouvé l'avons.

Quant li sains ne peut plus endurer le villier,
Par nature le faut .i. petit sonmillier;
A vision li vint qu'il estoit au moustier
La ou ses orisons voloit reconmencier.

Avis fu au saint honme, dont vous m'oés conter,
Qu'il vit la mere Dieu descendre sur l'autel:
Grant compagnie d'angeles qui li ont aporté
Une caiiere d'or. La se vot reposer.

En celle digne eglise, dont je fac mension,
Fu enterrés li cors de saint Mercurion:
Uns preudons chevaliers qui souffri passion
Par le main dou tirant dont parlé vous avons.

Et quant on mist en terre le vaillant chevalier(s),
On mist dessus sa tombe son harnas ostoiier:[22]
fol. 32r Son escu et sa lance, son hiaume d'acier;
Et son autre harnas n'i vot on oubliier.

Quant la vierge Marie fu sur l'autel assise,
Les angeles appella et leur dist en tel guise:
"Appiellés saint Mercure,[23] mon chevalier nobille,
Pour moi aler vengier de la gent sarasine.

Je voel mon chevalier de mort resusciter;
Par celui voel paiiens desconfir et mater.
Juliien l'Apo[s]tate[24] ne puis plus endurer
Qui moy et mon chier Fil suet tantes fois blamer.

Juliien l'Apostate me dist grant vilonnie

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[22] *ostoiier*: to put or place, to fix. The only example listed by Godefroy, *s.v.*, is intransitive. Cf. LaCurne de Saint-Palaye, *Dictionnaire historique de l'ancien langage françois* (Paris, 1875-82), *s.v.* 2. Should *mist* read *fist?*

[23] Mercurius of Caesarea was a soldier who rose to high rank. Under Decius he confessed Christianity and, after severe torture, was beheaded December 25th. His feast is celebrated on November 25th. Cf. *Synaxarium ecclesiae Constantinopolitanae,* ed. Hippolyte Delehaye, *Acta Sanctorum Novembris* (Brussels, 1902), pp. 258-9. For an analysis of his life and martyrdom from Greek Lives, cf. Stéphane Binon, *Essai sur le cycle de saint Mercure* (Paris, 1937), pp. 35-7; for his association with Julian's death, *ibid.*, pp. 11-29. The most complete treatment of his connection and relationship with Basil and with Julian is that of Robert Graf Nostitz-Rieneck, "Vom Tode der Kaisers Julian", *Jahresbericht des öffentl. Privatgymnasiums an der Stella Matutina zu Feldkirch*, XVI (1906-7), 1-33. For documents on his life and legend in Greek, cf. Stéphane Binon, *Documents grecs inédits relatifs à saint Mercure de Cesarée* (Louvain, 1937); for the evolution of his name from the Syriac Mar (saint) Qurios, one of the XL Martyrs, cf. Stéphane Binon, *Essai*, pp. 19-22, and Paul Peeters, "Un Miracle des SS. Serge et Théodore et la vie de S. Basile dans Fauste de Byzance", *Analecta Boll.*, XXXIX (1921), 84-7.

[24] *Ms* apotaste.

Et qu'el despit de moy yert crestienté honnie:
Mon capelain, ce dist, fera pierdre la vie
Et ma chité destruire. Je nel soufferai mie".

Les angeles sont venus dessus le sepulture;
Le tombe destournerent qui fu de piere dure
Et si apiellerent le courtois saint Mercure.
Quant il fu appellés, de demorer n'ot cure.

Quant sains Mercures fu des angeles apellés
Par le conmant la Danme, ne s'est pas oubliés;
De la fosse issi hors li cors sains honnourés.
De trestoutes ses harmes s'est illuecq(ues)[25] adoubbés.

Et quant li chevaliers se fu apparilliés,
Devant la mere Dieu se va agenillier
Et la vierge Marie se va contre drecier;
Sa beneiçon li donne et puis s'est redreciés.

Et quant li chevaliers qui fu resussités
Ot sa beneiçon, d'illuecq s'est desevrés.
Un grant destrier li fu illuecques presentés;
Li chevaliers i monte par les estriers dorés.

De la se departi a bielle compagnie
Qui estoient de la celestiau maisnie.
Li preudons s'esvilla et dist: "Sainte Marie,
Voelliés as crestiiens au jour d'ui faire aÿe".

Li preudons s'esvilla, qui pour la vision
fol. 32v Ot au coer mout grant joie, et pour faire orison
Viers le moustier s'en va sans faire arestiion;
Les huis trouva frumés entour et environ.

Et quant sains Basilles trouva les huis frumés,
Le secretain[26] apelle qui n'estoit pas levés.
Cils se leva atant quant il fu appellés;
Tous les huis de l'eglise a illuecq desfrumés.

Li preudons entra ens et vint devant l'autel,
Le tombe saint Mercure conmence a regarder;
Le secretain apielle et li a demandé:
"Amis", dist li preudons, "qui nous a desreubé

Les armes saint Mercure que je te comanday,
Qui pendoient a le pierce?"[27] Et cis dist: "Je ne say".
"Et ou est li cors sains qui ou sepulcre estoit
Ou celle grosse piere[28] sur la fosse gissoit?"

Et chis regarde en haut. Quant il n'a pas veu
Les armes saint Mercure, tous esbahis en fu;

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[25] The second hemistich has one syllable in excess. The correction of the manuscript *illuecques* to *illuecq* seems indicated; cf. 193, 208.

[26] *secretain*: that is, the sacristan.

[27] *pierce*, i.e., *perche*, literally a rod or pole. It is also a Gothic architectural term: nom donné à certains piliers menus et hauts, joints ensemble au nombre de cinq ou six, et se courbant par le haut pour former les arcs et les nervures qui retiennent les pendentifs; Littré, *s.v.* 8. This would be the normal place to hang or lodge St. Mercure's weapons. Cf. 217-8. The first hemistich is hypermetric; perhaps *pendoient*: *pendoit* with a collective subject.

[28] The relative pronoun is omitted. Cf. Lucien Foulet, *Petite syntaxe de l'ancien français* (Paris, 1923), #403.

Et voit la fosse wide, s'en devint irascu
220 Et conmence a jurer: "J'ai bien frumé les huis".

Li secretain conmence fermement a jurer
Que les huis de l'eglise ne furent desfrumés
Ne ne furent ouviers puis hier a l'aviesprer:
224 "De ce ay grant mervelle par ou en sont alé

Les larons qui anuit ont l'eglise desreubee,
Se ce n'est, par miracle, cose espirituee
Que vous n'i trouvés huis ne verriere quassee".
228 Et li sains hons se taist, ne dist pas sa pensee.

Li sains hons reconmence a faire afflictions,
Les cloques fist sonner bielles pourcessions.
Lors conmence a prescier et a faire siermons
232 Et a dit au clergié: "Ne nous desconfortons!

Se nous volons avoir en Damnedieu fiance
Et en sa douce mere en cui j'ai ma fiance,
Li paiien ne poront sur nous avoir poissance;
236 La douce mere Dieu nous pora bien deffendre".

fol. 33r Ensement com les gens issoient del moustier,
Leur vint .i. Sarasin qui conmence a huquier:[29]
"Signeur, or aiiés pais! Je vous vien anonchier:
240 Desconfit sont et mort Sarrasin et paiien.

Ensigniés moy l'evesque, je voel a lui parler,
Car ciertaines nouvielles li voel dire et compter".
On mena le paiien a l'evesque parler
244 Qui la desconfiture li comence a conter.

"Frere", dist sains Basilles, "bien soies tu venu!
Or me contes nouvelles: de quel païs viens tu?"
"Sire, je vien de Pierse d'avoecq les Sarrasin.[30]
248 Oncques en Jhesucrist jusqu'au jour d'ui ne cru.

Sire, je vien de Pierse d'avoecq les Sarasins.
Les crestiiens se sont a le deffense mis:
Contre .xx. crestiens a bien .c. Sarasins;
252 Nonpourquant tout sont mort paiiens et desconfit.

Les crestiiens euwissent tantost esté vaincu,
Quant une grant miervelle i est lors avenu:
La blance compagnie, si blance riens ne fu!
256 Blans chevaus, blances armes avoient et blans escus.[31]

Et ne seut on a dire dont il vinrent lors.
La blance compagnie[32] a les Sarrasins mors:

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[29] *huquier*: to call out in a loud voice, to shout.

[30] *Sarasin* provides a bad rime. The second hemistich is, as a matter of fact, highly suspect. The entire line is repeated verbatim again in 249. This is not habitual or characteristic of the poet. His procedure is to transpose part of the line—the third line of the stanza—with a change in rime or assonance to the opening line of the succeeding stanza. Cf. 91 and 93; 192 and 194; 283 and 285.

[31] The second hemistich is hypermetric. Omit *blans?* or correct *avoient* to *avoit* to agree with the singular collective subject *compagnie?* Cf. 258.

[32] The *blance compaignie* is reminiscent of the vision purported to have been seen on June 28, 1098, by the Crusaders during the battle against the Turks lead by Kerboga to relieve the siege of Antioch. At the critical stage of the battle, the Anonymous author of the *Gesta Francorum* relates the

De tous les Sarrasins n'en escapa c'un lors
260 Que par les blances gens ne fuissent trestous mors.

Monsigneur, escoutés miervelle, s'il vous plaist!
Bien croy que les pareilles n'owistes oncques mais:
En celle compagnie .i. grant en y avoit;
264 On ne set dont il vint. Nus ne le congnissoit.

Sire, cis chevaliers, dont je fac mension,
Avoit en soucq[33] sa lance .i. ytel confanon".
Lors a nonmé les armes de saint Mercurion;
268 Au coer en eut grant joie Basilles li sains hons.

"Li grans chevaliers, Sire, douquel je vous recors,
Broca son grant cheval des esporons a or
Et puis brandi la lanche, le confanon d'estors;
272 L'emperere en feri trestout parmi le corps.

fol. 33v Juliien l'emperere la fu [a][34] mort livrés
Et tous les Sarassins furent desbaretés.[35]
De la fiere bataille n'en est uns escappés
276 Forques moy seulement; sui en fuie tournés.

Lors s'est esvanuie la blance compagnie.
Quel parrt il sont alet ne de quelle partie,
Ne de quel parrt il sont je ne vous sai a dire;
280 Ne de si bielle gent oncques parler n'oistes".

Quant li Sarasins ot tout raconté l'affaire,
Sains Basilles conmande pourcessions a faire.
A l'eglise retourne li sains homs debonaire,
284 Et des bielles miracles ne me repuis[36] plus taire.

A l'eglise retourne li preudons sains Basilles
Qui voet reconmenchier a faire le siervice;
Clergiet et laie gent fist raler a l'eglise.
288 Le message enmena avoecq lui saint Basille.

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following: Ceperunt vero turme ex utraque parte exire nostrosque undique circumcingere jaculando, sagittando, vulnerando. Exibant quoque de montaneis innumerabiles exercitus, habentes equos albos, quorum vexilla erant alba. Videntes itaque nostri hunc exercitum, ignorabant penitus quid hoc esset et qui essent, donec cognoverunt esse adjutorium Christi, cujus ductores fuerunt sancti Georgius, Mercurius et Demetrius. Haec verba credenda sunt quia plures ex nostris viderunt; *Gesta Francorum* IX, 29; ed. and trans. Louis Bréhier, *Histoire anonyme de la première Croisade* (Paris, 1924), p. 154. The *Gesta* alone of the historians of the First Crusade describes the vision. Others, such as Raymond of Aguilers, Albert of Aix, who were present at the battle are silent. Fulcher of Chartres says simply that the Turks fled the field of battle as if frightened away by a heavenly sign. *Gesta Francorum Jerusalem expugnantium* I, 23; ed. *Historiens des Croisades* III, p. 349.

[33] *Soucq*: i.e. soc, literally a ploughshare. There are no examples given by Godfrey, *s.v.*, of the use of the word as an iron head attached to a lance, or under the diminutive *souchet*. DuCange, however, s.v. *soket*, in a quotation from Matthew of Paris describes such a weapon. In describing a tournament held in 1252, Matthew relates how Roger de Lemburn fatally wounded Arnold de Montigny. When bystanders attempted to withdraw the lance which had pierced Arnold's throat, the wooden staff came out but the iron head remained in the wound. When this was cut out, it was examined by knights who were present: it was found to be very sharp at the point, like a dagger, though it ought to have been blunt, and about as broad as a small knife: its shape was like that of a ploughshare on a small scale *unde vulgariter vomerulus vocatur, Gallice soket*. He adds: *nos etiamnum soc, vomerem dicimus unde soquet vomerulus.* Cf. *Matthew of Paris's English History*, 1252; trans J. A. Giles (London, 1853), II, p. 513.

The poet here is using the form *soc* rather than the diminutive form. It would describe an iron head attached to the tip of the lance, an iron head in the form of a ploughshare, keen and barbed.

[34] Sense and syllable count require the restoration of the preposition *a*.

[35] *desbaretés*: cut to pieces.

[36] *repuis*: the prefix *re-* has a reiterative value. Cf. raler 287.

Le paiien Sarrasin a avoecq lui mené.
Et quant le peuple fu a l'eglise asamblé,
Les armes saint Mercure ont illuecq retrouvé,
292 Mais li fiers de la lance estoit ensanglenté.

Le cors saint ont trouvé monsigneur saint Mercure
Tout ensi com devant gisant en son sepulture[37]
Et la tombe susmise qui fu de piere dure.
296 Lors leur a sains Basilles contee l'aventure.

Lors leur a sains Basilles la vision contee
Qu'i vit la mere Dieu, courtoise et honnouree,
Susciter saint Mercure par boine destinee
300 Pour aller revengier le gent crestiienee,

Et issir de l'eglise a bielle compagnie
Qui estoient trestout de la Jhesu mainie.
Loee soit la damme ou tant a courtoisie!
304 Bien le doit on servir de boin coer sans faintise.

Quant li paiiens oï la vision conter,
Les armes saint Mercure conmenche a regarder
fol. 34r Et l'escut et le lance va mout bien raviser:
308 "Je vis de celle lance le chevalier jouster.

Vella", dist il, "le lance! Je l'ay bien avisee
A celle blanque ensegne qui est a or bendee;
De celle lance fu l'anme du cors sevree
312 Juliien l'emperere en icelle journee".

Quant li Sarrasins ot la vision oïe,
Il conmence a criier: "Dame sainte Marie,
A la journee d'ui me voelliés faire aïe!
316 Ne souffrés que mon ame soit en infier perie".

Quant li Turs ot oïe conter la vision
Et connue la lance a tout le confagnon,
Il reclama Jhesu par grant devosion
320 Et demanda baptesme par boine intension.

Quant li Sarrasin ot baptesme demandé,
Par le conmant l'evesque sont les fons apresté
Et pour le baptisier le saint cresme aporté.
324 Or conmence grant joie en la boine chité.

Le paiien baptisa monsigneur saint Basille.
Asses i ot de gens et parins et marynes;
Coment il avoit non en la loy sarasine
328 Ne en la crestiiene, je nel vous say a dire.

Et quant li paiiens fu baptissiés et levés,[38]
Lors conmença grant joie en la boine chité;
Lors fu li nons de Dieu hautement reclamés:
332 Mout forment s'esjoist sainte crestientés.

Lors conmença grant joie par trestout le païs

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[37] The second hemistich has a syllable in excess. Read sepulchre(?); cf. 215.

[38] *levés*: uplifted in the spiritual sense. Or perhaps *lavés* in the sense of his sins having been washed away.

Pour la desconfiture des felons Sarasins
Et pour le Sarasin qui estoit conviertis.
Or en soït aourés li dous rois Jhesucris!

Aouree soit[39] la Danme qui .ix. mois le porta
Et au cief des .ix. mois pucelle en enfanta!
Celle qui saint Mercure de mort resuscita,
Par qui les Sarasins desconfit et mata.

Loee soit la Danme! loee (soit)[40] la roine
fol. 34v Qui, parmi la priiere monsigneur saint Basille,
Garda crestienté de la gent sarrasine!
Loee soit la Danme tant com elle en est digne!

Mout est fols, ce me samble, qui ne le siert bien,[41]
Car chis qui bien le siert en ara boin leuwier;
Juste ne peceour ne s'en doit deffier,
Car elle voet cascun qui bien le siert aidier.

Prions devotement a le viergene Marie,
Qui as boins crestiiens fist secours et aïe,
Que de mal nous deffenge et tingne en son service
Et voelle mettre pais par toute sainte eglise. Amen.

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[39] The first hemistich is hypermetric. Omit *soit?*

[40] The second hemistich is hypermetric. Meyer suggests the omission of *soit.*

[41] The second hemistich lacks one syllable. It was noted by Meyer with no suggestion for correction.

A Short Treatise on the Trinity from the School of Thierry of Chartres

NICHOLAS M. HARING S.A.C.

THE miscellaneous manuscript, Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale *lat.* 14489, contains a hitherto unnoticed anonymous treatise dealing with the mystery of the Holy Trinity. The collection, compiled and written in the twelfth century, belonged to and was presumably written for the library of St. Victor's in Paris.[1] The scribe who wrote the manuscript hardly found the treatise as a separate tract in his exemplar, because he affixed it to an anonymous commentary on Boethius, *De Trinitate*, without any indication that it belongs to a different source. This commentary ends on fol. 62 with the words: *Et ista sufficiant* and our short tract begins on the same line with the words: *Tria sunt apud Graecos nomina* . . . The commentary on fols. 1-62 dates back to Thierry of Chartres, though it was probably not written by Thierry himself but taken down by what might be called a *reportator.*

Our tract covers folios 62-67 and is followed by the commentary on Boethius, *De Trinitate* (fols. 67-98), erroneously published in the notorious Herwagen edition as a work of the Venerable Bede.[2] This commentary is generally quoted by its incipit: *In titulo.*[3] However, judging by the arrangement in our manuscript, the introduction found in the printed edition belongs to a third commentary on the same Boethian work. In our manuscript the commentary known as *In titulo* begins with the words (fol. 67): *Prologus in libro Boethii de Trinitate. INVESTIGATAM etc. Circa hoc opusculum B(oethii) ista sunt praeconsideranda, scilicet quae auctoris sit intentio . . .*[4] At the end (fol. 95^v) we read: *Sunt tres quorum unusquisque est aeternus, et tres unus aeternus inveniuntur.*[5] Then in larger script: *Explicit. Incipit Boethius de Trinitate.* Written in the same hand, the introduction begins: *In titulo solent duo proponi: materia et nomen auctoris.*

Although the manuscript contains marginal references to the pagination in the Herwagen edition of this work, it is highly probable that Herwagen's edition was actually based on our manuscript, for they agree to a remarkable degree.[6] This would make it equally probable that the introduction *In titulo* (and the interesting biography of Boethius contained in it) belongs to the commentary, or rather gloss, on the Boethian *De Trinitate* that follows immediately after this introduction.[7] The Boethian text of this gloss was definitely written by the scribe who wrote the previous works, and it appears that the marginal and interlinear notes accompanying the text were also penned by the very same hand. Part of the contents of these glosses goes back to the commentary published under the name of John the Scot.[8] Some of the glosses, however, are characteristic of mid-twelfth century thought.[9] The author's concern about the subject matter (*materia*) and about Boethius' intention (*intentio*) fits in well with the method of interpretation used in this period.

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[1] L. DeLisle, "Invent. des man. lat. de Saint-Victor", *Bibl. de l'Ecole des Chartes,* XXX (1869), 18, sums up its contents as follows: Boetii liber de Trinitate, cum duplici expositione—De Juda proditore—Isidori expositio in Vetus Testamentum—Beda de muliere forti. See also Laistner-King, *A Handlist of Bede Manuscripts* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1943), p. 62.

[2] *Opera Omnia* VIII (Basel, 1563), pp. 1088 ff., partly republished in PL 95, 391 ff. The fact that our manuscript contains Bede's *De Muliere forti* may have something to do with the erroneous attribution.

[3] See W. Jansen, *Der Kommentar des Clarenbaldus von Arras zu Boethius De Trinitate* (Breslau, 1926).

[4] Ed. Basel. VIII, p. 1090.

[5] PL 95, 411D.

[6] However, Ch. W. Jones, *Bedae Pseudepigrapha* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1939), p. 15, remarks: So far as I know, no manuscript Herwagius used for any of his texts has been recovered.

[7] Despite the probability that the introductory part of the printed (Basel) edition belongs to another work, we shall follow the established usage and quote the entire commentary by its opening words: *In titulo.* Some errors of transcription (?) are worth recording. For instance, where the commentator points out that Plato and others derived a knowledge of the plurality of divine Persons from creation (PL 95, 393B) we read: Intellexerunt enim cogitationem et noyn, sed in tertio signo defecerunt magi Pharaonis quia, licet cogitationem et noyn . . . Instead of *cogitationem* the manuscript reads in both cases *togato* with a stroke over the second *o.* The word is a corruption of the Greek *to agathon.* The sentence (PL 95, 393C): Sed divina essentia est trium personarum: quare non sunt tres personae, should be corrected to . . . quare non est tres personae. The subject is essentia (see *infra,* note 12). Instead of: Dicit enim Fulgentius adferre Diaconum (PL 95, 403B), read: Dicit enim Fulgentius ad Ferrandum Diaconum. In the same column (403C) the

As we have seen, our short tract on the Trinity is interred and almost submerged between the first and second of three commentaries on Boethius, *De Trinitate*. The first of these is complete in the sense that it analyzes the entire *opusculum* and even adds brief discussions of some passages that were previously overlooked by the commentator or treated too cursorily. In fact, it would seem that these additional elucidations reflect questions raised by the audience at the end of the lecture series. The second commentary, published in the Herwagen edition (1563) of Bede's works, closely follows the text of the Boethian prologue[10] (fols. 67-72^{v}) but, after the first lemma of Boethius' first chapter (*Christianae religionis, etc.*), practically ignores the Boethian text and digresses freely into a number of more or less controversial questions concerning the Trinity and the Incarnation.

The fact that *In Titulo* was composed after 1148 is obvious from the remark (fol. 86^{v}): *Omnes enim hae constructiones*: *"Deus est a deitate" et "Tres personae sunt unius essentiae, unius naturae", et caeterae hujusmodi, sunt intransitivae sicut in Remensi Concilio sancitum est, ut hoc quaesivit archiepiscopus ab illo qui dux est illorum qui hujusmodi constructiones fortassis esse transitivas sentiebat.*[11] The commentator was definitely under the influence of Thierry of Chartres' teaching on the Trinity and must have known the *Summa sententiarum,* written about 1139. He calls Gilbert and his school a sect,[12] but is otherwise less abusive than Thierry was in his lectures. Although basically and widely in agreement with Thierry, he presents his doctrine with a much ampler display of patristic learning.

Our short tract on the Trinity and the commentary *In titulo* just described are no doubt very closely interrelated. For instance, our treatise begins by discussing the difference of terminology between the Greeks and the Latins. We learn that the Greeks have no fewer than four terms for the Latin word *substantia.* In the commentary *In titulo* we read towards the end (fol. 93^{v}): *Sed prius videamus quot modis accipiatur hoc nomen substantia. In Naturarum libro* dicitur enim substantia tum a su(b)stando, tum a subsistendo, tum ab utroque. *Ubi dicitur a substando sic a Graecis dicitur hypostasis, a nobis vero substantia proprie. Et in hac acceptione convenit materiae quae habet substare.*[13] The unitalicized part agrees literally with our tract. The rest is identical in thought,

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sentence: redundent illa vocabula ex parte Patris reads in our manuscript: redundent . . . ex parte parti. This reading is obviously correct.

[8] E. K. Rand, *Johannes Scottus* (Munich, 1906), pp. 30-80.

[9] See, for instance, fol. 98: Et potest legi transitive ut dicat: *monstra hominum* i.e. monstrabiles hominibus sicut portenta monstrari solent, vel intransitive: *monstra hominum* i.e. monstruosos homines vel homines qui sunt monstra. The meaning of this grammatical distinction is discussed in N. M. Haring, "Character, signum und signaculum", *Scholastik,* XXXI (1956), 68 f.

[10] The introduction and the commentary on Boethius' prologue is omitted in the Migne edition.

[11] PL 95, 403D reads: sentiebant

[12] Fol 87: Et quaerendum est adhuc ab illa secta quid sibi velit quod dicit: Nihil quod sit Christi est adorandum. Cf. fol. 75: Fuerunt enim quidam ignominiosi, quorum nomina jam aures catholicorum offendunt, qui ex parte subjecti non concederent unum Deum tres esse personas, hoc argumento seipsos confundentes vel illudentes: Nihil est id cujus est. Sed divina essentia est trium personarum. Quare non est tres personae.

[13] PL 95, 410A.

for both writers hold that, properly speaking, the term substance applies to matter.

Speaking of the word *usiosis*, the commentary *In titulo* identifies it with the Latin *subsistentia* and declares (fol. 93^v): *Sic convenit formae quae est vere subsistentia eo* quod sub se sistit fluxum materiae.[14] Here again the agreement with our tract is partly literal as indicated by the unitalicized words. The author of *In titulo* considers the soul a substance (fol. 94): *Anima autem dicitur substantia, non quod sit materia vel forma vel compositum ab utroque sed quia* retinet proprietatem compositi ex utroque.[15] The author of our treatise on the Trinity professes the very same doctrine in almost identical terms.

Both authors deal with the Boethian definition of person and its applicability to the Trinity. Both admit that, if wrongly understood, the definition would lead to the erroneous notion that the three Persons in God are three substances. The commentator then declares (fol. 94): *Contra eos dicimus hanc definitionem non esse datam secundum hoc quod substantia dicitur usia vel usiosis, immo secundum hoc quod substantia dicitur hypostasis.*[16] Following the same line of reasoning the writer of our tract concludes: *Ergo tres personae sunt tres individuae naturae rationalis hypostases.* The two authors admit that we could speak of three divine substances, if the Church had adopted such a terminology to designate the Persons.

After defining his terms, the author of our tract states and refutes the Arian heresy. He asserts that the Arians professed three gods rather than three Persons and that St. Augustine cited *Deut.* vi, 4 against them. The commentator deals with the Arians in the same manner, but at greater length.[17] Characteristic of both authors is the suggestion that St. Augustine "took refuge in mathematics" when (to use the wording of our tract) he wrote: *In Patre unitas, in Filio aequalitas, in Spiritu sancto unitatis aequalitatisque connexio.*[18] The commentator (fol. 77) is slightly more accurate in writing *connexio vel concordia,*[19] because the term *connexio* was not original, though popular in the school of Chartres.

He explains the quotation as follows (fol. 77): *Sed sicut ex formula verborum haberi potest, volens Augustinus quoquo modo insinuare quod ineffabile erat et incomprehensibile, confugit ad mathematicam. Arithmetici unitatem principium numerorum constituunt . . .*[20] Similarly we read in our tract: *Ad mathematicam, ut ex forma verborum datur intelligi, disciplinam confugit, ut saltem sic aliquam distinctionis personarum insinuaret notitiam. Arithmetici namque unitatem primum omnium constituunt numerorum principium.* In a manner characteristic of Thierry of Chartres, the Father is the explained as the One (*unitas*), the Son as the Equal one (*aequalitas*), the Holy Spirit as the Bond (*connexio*) connecting Father and Son.[21]

The author of our tract refuses to discuss another popular way of illustrating the Trinity by means of light (*radius, calor, splendor*) "because it is known to every one". The commentary *In titulo* does not touch upon this allegedly popular example. Its author affirms (fol. 78) that St. Hilary "took refuge" (*confugit*) in another illustration, viz., that of a candle.[22] In our tract this illustration is also dealt with, but the commentator describes it in much more detail.[23] The latter also mentions (fol. 67) the "grammatical" explanation of the three divine Persons, rejected as dangerous by the writer of our tract. Both writers agree also that wisdom and love in the soul furnish us with an even better illustration than those already mentioned.[24]

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[14] PL 95, 410B. Instead of *sistit* the manuscript reads *substit.*

[15] *Ibid.*

[16] PL 95, 411B.

[17] PL 95, 399A. *Ms.* Paris, B.N. *lat.* 14489, fols. 81^v ff.

[18] *De Doctr. christ.* I, 5, 5; PL 34, 21.

[19] PL 95, 395B.

[20] PL 95, 395BC.

[21] See Thierry of Chartres, *De Septem diebus;* ed. B. Hauréau, *Notices et extr.* I (Paris, 1890), 63 ff.

[22] PL 95, 396B.

[23] *Ibid.*

The commentator (fol. 79ʳ) later alludes to some scholar whom he accuses of misinterpreting St. Hilary's famous saying: *In aeterno infinitas, species in imagine, usus in munere.*[25] The accusation reads: *Quidam tamen aut haec verba non intelligens aut nova de more suo volens invenire transmutavit: In Patre aeternitas.* The scribe wrote on the margin (fol. 79ʳ): *Poreta.* In other words, Gilbert of Poitiers was supposed to have substituted the positive term *aeternitas* for the negative expression *infinitas.* But the commentator does not really care: *Sed de hoc non curo* (fol. 79ʳ).[26]

The substitution leads the commentator to the same discussion on the two theologies as we find in our short tract. He considers the word *infinitas* an expression pertaining to the theology of negation while the term "eternal" belongs to the theology of affirmation. Dionysius, he tells us, made use of both theologies (fol. 79ʳ): *Theologia autem alia est affirmationis, alia negationis, sicut beatus Dionysius utendo utraque bene declarat. Theologia affirmationis est per quam affirmamus de Deo quae digne possunt dici de Deo, ut cum dicimus: Deus est vita, Deus est veritas, et caetera hujusmodi.*[27] Later he points out (fol. 79ʳ): *Theologia negationis est quod per omnia rerum vocabula de Deo negamus sicut facit beatus Dionysius in Hierarchia sua dicens: Deus non est veritas, non est sapientia, non est virtus. Non multo post vero omnia vocabula, quae negaverat, affirmat de Deo per theologiam affirmationis dicens: Deus est vita, Deus est veritas; sapientia, virtus.*[28]

The author of our tract makes the very same distinctions and quotes the same texts with slight variations. Each of them declares that the terms used by Dionysius are *vocabula discretiva statuum,* as our tract puts it, and refer to the *statuum discretio,* as the commentator (fol. 80) phrases it.[29] The short tract ends with the interpretation of the saying of St. Hilary, quoted above. Here, too, it does not differ from the commentator's teaching,[30] though the latter is more explicit as usual.

The comparison we have made not only provides a brief summary of the doctrine contained in our tract, but also establishes the undeniable fact that the two works are very closely interrelated. All essential elements of our tract appear in the commentary *In titulo.* Especially the manner of handling the "mathematical" explanation of the Trinity, based on the Augustinian *dictum* cited above, offers impressive evidence to the effect that both works belong to the school of Thierry of Chartres. It is much more difficult to decide whether they were written by one and the same writer or not.

Judging only by internal evidence it is hard to prove or disprove the assumption that both works were composed by the same author. The agreement, as we have seen, is sometimes literal and generally so close, that one could easily be inclined to attribute them to the same scholar. At the same time, however, certain differences are worth noting. The commentator is not nearly as precise as the author of our tract. The manuscript is obviously responsible for a number of puzzling or meaningless statements found in his commentary. But the commentator reveals some notable weaknesses: he often rambles back and forth from trinitarian to christological questions; he quotes carelessly and even thoughtlessly, as in the case where he assigns to St. Basil the *Hierarchia* which he had previously attributed to Dionysius. And even in this attribution it appears that the text is actually taken from *De Divinis nominibus.* Some of his patristic quotations are only freely worded descriptions of ideas expressed by the

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[24] PL 95, 396D.

[25] PL 95, 397B. Cf. Hilary, *De Trinitate* VIII, 48; PL 10, 271B.

[26] PL 95, 397B.

[27] *Ibid.*

[28] PL 95, 397C.

[29] PL 95, 397D-398A.

[30] PL 95, 398D-399A.

Fathers. Thus the illustration of the trinitarian mystery by means of two candles, one receiving light from the other, and both diffusing the same light, is allegedly a quotation from St. Hilary,[31] though it is at best a fanciful elaboration of thoughts, the occurrence of which in St. Hilary cannot be totally denied.[32]

Where the commentator affirms that St. Augustine wrote: *Non amplius vocaberis Vigilantius sed Dormitantius,*[33] he confuses Augustine with Jerome.[34] Where he attributes to St. Augustine the statement: *Ab alia humanitate est Socrates homo, ab alia Plato,*[35] he is even less trustworthy than when he quotes St. Augustine as saying: *Absit ut in Christo partes esse dicamus.*[36] Such and similar inaccuracies do not inspire confidence in the author's ability. They create the impression that he strongly relied on secondary sources and on memory, if not imagination.

His treatment of the concept of faith[37] and his mathematical explanation of the Blessed Trinity show that he borrowed basic ideas from the school of Chartres and enlarged on them. In the same manner he used the *Summa sententiarum.*[38] He seems to have known Peter Lombard's commentary on St. Paul,[39] but not his *Sentences*. The fact that he made such free use of contemporary works substantiates the assumption that he also used our short tract on the Trinity and enlarged on it in his characteristic fashion.

This allows us to conclude that, in point of time, the commentary *In titulo* is posterior. It was probably composed in the early fifties, at a time when the so-called question of christological nihilism[40] began to overshadow the trinitarian problems. Accordingly, our short tract was presumably written some ten years earlier, viz., in the early forties, definitely before 1148. To strengthen this view we may note the author's relation to Abelard whose "grammatical" explanation of the Trinity[41] he rejects without mentioning Abelard's name. He probably learned from the same Abelard[42] that the Boethian definition of person could not be strictly applied to the Trinity. From the same source he may have borrowed the objection that, if God (the Father) begets a God (the Son), God either begets Himself or another God.[43]

The author's doctrine, we repeat, is so closely related to the teaching of Thierry of Chartres as to justify the view that he belonged to Thierry's school. Unfortunately, his name is still unknown, though the discovery of another manuscript may eventually reveal it. However, the text itself is very well preserved, much better than the text of *In titulo* contained in the same manuscript. Nevertheless a few corrections are necessary. These are duly marked in the footnotes which also provide references to the corresponding passages in the commentary *In titulo.*

<TRACTATUS DE TRINITATE>[1]

1. Tria sunt apud Graecos nomina pro quibus Latini hoc nomen substantiam habent. Sunt autem haec: *usia, usiosis, hypostasis.* Habent etiam quartum quod est *prosopa.* Vide ergo quod substantia dicitur tum a substando, tum a subsistendo, tum ab utroque i.e. tam a substando quam a subsistendo. Substantia, ut a substando dicitur, proprie est materia. Haec enim omnibus formis tam

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[31] PL 95, 396BC.

[32] Cf. Hilary, *De Trin.* VI, 12 and IX, 4; PL 10, 166A and 283B.

[33] PL 95, 394D.

[34] *Ep.* CIX, 1; PL 22, 907.

[35] PL 95, 394B.

[36] PL 95, 409B.

[37] PL 95, 391D-393A.

[38] Compare PL 95, 393D (Quam carnem et et creando assumpsit et assumendo creavit) and *Summa sent.* I, 15; PL 176, 71A. From the same chapter he derived the distinction of two natures and three substances in Christ (PL 95, 394A and PL 176, 70D). The long excerpt from St. Augustine in PL 95, 401BD is likewise copied from the *Summa sent.* I, 10; PL 176, 58BD.

[39] Compare PL 95, 408C and PL 192, 236C.

[40] Cf. PL 95, 407C.

[41] *Theol christ.* III; PL 178, 1257D-1258A.

[42] PL 178, 1258A.

[43] PL 178, 1240C.

[1] No title is given in the manuscript.

substantialibus quam accidentalibus substat. Ut vero substantia dicitur a subsistendo, sic proprie dicitur forma. Haec enim subsistit i.e. fluxum materiae sub se sistit. Forma enim materiam distinguit et terminat.[2]

2. Substantia quoque ab utroque dicitur: <vel quod>[3] est compositum ex utroque vel quod compositi ex utroque proprietatem retinet, licet non ex materia et forma sit compositum, ut anima. Haec enim et proprietatem materiae retinet, eo quod accidentibus substat, et proprietatem formae, eo quod certum quiddam et terminatum ad modum formae est. Ipsa tamen anima non ex materia et forma composita est. Corpus vero, quod ex utroque compositum est, et substat propter materiam et subsistit i.e. certum quid et terminatum est propter formam.[4]

3. Vide ergo quod *hypostasis* proprie dicitur substantia ut a substando. Unde bene dicitur *hypostasis* quasi substans. *Usiosis* vero accipitur <62v> pro substantia eo scilicet modo quo dicitur a subsistendo. Et dicitur *usiosis* quasi subsistentia, quae proprie est forma. *Usia* quoque dicitur substantia eo videlicet modo quo ab utroque dicitur. Et interpretatur proprie essentia. Res enim eo modo est sicut et subsistit et substat. Sed nec materia per se est, nec forma per se, quae a Graecis dicitur *usiosis*, a nobis subsistentia.[5]

4. Dicunt itaque Graeci quod tres personae sunt una *usia*, quoniam unius <naturae>[6] sunt. Fatentur quoniam sunt una *usiosis* eo quod unius sunt naturae.[7] Natura vero in rebus est forma. Tres autem *hypostases* esse catholice confitentur i.e. tres personas. Hoc enim nomen *hypostasis* ad personas translatum est: non quod Dei personae vel accidentalibus formis vel substantialibus habeant substare sed personae in rebus creatis substant formis. Hac occasione deductum est nomen in rebus creatis a quibus ad tres Dei personas translatum est a sanctis doctoribus.

5. Inde est quod B(oethius) ita describit personam: *Persona*, inquit, *est individua*[8] *rationalis naturae substantia*. Et ibi substantia ponitur pro *hypostasi*. Quamvis ergo illa descriptio conveniat tribus personis, quoniam tamen usus sanctae ecclesiae hoc nomen substantia contraxit, non licet inde concludere: ergo tres personae sunt tres individuae rationalis naturae substantiae. Sed potius debet inferri: ergo tres personae sunt tres individuae naturae rationalis *hypostases*, quoniam substantia ibi ponitur pro *hypostasi*.[9] *Prosopa* quoque persona dicitur a Graecis quo tamen nomine Graeci circa tres personas non utuntur, sicut in libro *De duabus naturis et una Christi persona* habetur. Et de diversis acceptionibus substantiae hoc sufficiat dixisse.

6. Sed antequam ad trium veniamus distinctionem personarum, ponenda est Ariana haeresis et refellenda. <63> Ponebat ergo Arius Christum esse Deum verum sed alterius naturae, contra Patrem, nec eundem Deum cum Patre, quoniam tres personas tres esse deos confitebatur impie. Sed Augustinus[10] contra: *Scriptum est*, inquit, *Audi Israel, Deus tuus Deus unus est*.[11] Si ergo hoc de solo Patre dictum est, Christus igitur Deus verus non est. Quod Arius dicebat. Si vero de solo Filio, Pater ergo Deus non est. Si vero dictum est de utroque, Pater ergo et Filius sunt unus Deus. Quod haereticus negabat.[12]

7. Rursus Christus voluntate Patris ante omnia constitutus est saecula, quod Arius dicebat. Filius ergo Patri coaeternus est. Quod idem negabat. Nihil enim nisi aeternum ante omnia fuit tempora. Quoniam ergo interrogabat haereticus, utrum Pater nolens aut volens Filium genuerat, ut, si responderetur: volens, inferret, ergo prior est voluntas Patris, unde scilicet Patrem fuisse ante Filium

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[2] *In titulo;* PL 95, 410AB.

[3] vel quod *om. Ms.*

[4] *In titulo;* PL 95, 410B.

[5] *Ibid.* Cf. Boethius, *Contra Eutychen*, 3; ed. R. Peiper (Leipzig, 1871), pp. 195 f.

[6] naturae *om. Ms.*

[7] *In titulo*; PL 95, 41OC.

[8] *Ms* in Deo.

[9] *In titulo;* PL 95, 411AC. Abelard, *Theol. christ.* III; PL 178, 1258A.

[10] Cf. *Coll cum Maxim.*, 26: *Contra Maxim.* I, 10 and II, 23, 1; PL 42, 741; 752; 796.

[11] *Deut.* vi, 4.

[12] *In titulo*; PL 95, 399B.

contendebat, interrogetur et ipse, utrum Pater volens aut nolens sit Deus, ut, cum dixerit: volens, redundet illatio vana.[13]

8. Quia vero rursus dicebat voluntate et praecepto Patris Filium virtute sua omnia visibilia et invisibilia ex nullis extantibus, ut essent, fecisse, quaeratur ab ipso, cum dicat Filium factum a Patre, utrum ex nihilo factum esse concedat. Quodsi non ex nihilo, est ergo Deus de Deo, quia nihil aliud erat. Unde constabit quod eadem est et Patris et Filii natura, quod ipse negabat, quoniam nulla res rem alterius naturae gignere potest. Quodsi dicat factum ex nihilo, respondeat: per quem factus a Patre? Per se ipsum enim fieri non potuit, cum nondum esset. Non per alium, quia *omnia per ipsum facta sunt*. Per neminem? Quomodo potuit a Patre fieri, cum per Filium, hoc est per ejus Verbum, omnia facta sunt?[14] Quia vero Pater misit et Filius missus <63v> est, conabatur astruere diversas eorum naturas, quasi hoc Pater non possit hominem Filium mittere unius ejusdemque substantiae, sed quia potest homo ab homine separari, quod non Filius a Patre.[15]

9. Ignis mittit splendorem: et missus non potest separari ab igne mittente. Sed non est hoc omnino simile quia splendor missus, si loqui posset, non vere dicere posset: Ignis, qui me misit, mecum est in pariete. Filius missus vere potuit dicere: Pater mecum est, dicente Filio: *Non sum solus quoniam Pater mecum est.*[16]

10. Rursus in Christo carnem et divinitatem tantummodo confitebantur Ariani quandoquidem, cum penderet in ligno, illud quod ait: *Pater, in manus tuas commendo spiritum meum,*[17] divinitatem ipsam volunt intelligi eum commendasse Patri, non humanum spiritum qui est anima. Sed audiant: *Tristis est anima mea usque ad mortem.*[18] Et illud: *Potestatem habeo ponendi animam meam.*[19] Rursus: *Majorem caritatem nemo habet, ut animam suam ponat quis pro amicis suis.*[20] Et iterum: *Quoniam non derelinques animam meam in inferno.*[21]

11. Sed si in eo moventur quod scriptum est: *Verbum caro factum est,*[22] nec illic anima nominata est. Unde contendunt quod Christus humanam carnem sine anima assumpserit, ita videlicet quod Christus non habeat humanam animam. Intelligant carnem pro homine positam, locutionis modo a parte totum significante sicut est: *Omnis caro ad te veniet.*[23] His itaque praedictis, ut fundamentis rectae fidei positis, nulla possit prorsus haeresis pullulare, necessarium duximus de ista divinitatis et sanctae Trinitatis distinctione pauca a sanctis doctoribus juxta meram et catholicam fidem escepta edisserem.

12. Procedat igitur Augustinus <64> in medium qui trium personarum distinctionem sub hac forma verborum diligens veritatis speculator assignat: *In Patre*, inquit, *unitas, in Filio aequalitas, in Spiritu sancto unitatis aequalitatisque connexio.*[24] Sanctae Trinitatis statum non de facie ad faciem intuens, ad mathematicam, ut ex forma verborum datur intelligi, disciplinam confugit, ut saltem sic aliquam distinctionis personarum insinuaret notitiam. Arithmetici namque unitatem primum omnium constituunt numerorum principium. Ipsam vero primam et sine principio ponunt ita scilicet ut omnem pluralitatem unitas praecedat, ideoque mutabilitatem.[25]

13. Addunt etiam quod gignit[26] ex se unitas aequalitatem, ex quibus connexio unitatis aequalitatisque procedit. Ut ergo in nullo lectoris mens titubet, in arithmetica dicitur generatio: unitatis vel alicujus numeri per se ipsum vel per alium multiplicatio. Unitas itaque per se ipsam multiplicata nihil amplius reddit

[13] *In titulo*; PL 95, 399C.
[14] *In titulo*; PL 95, 399D.
[15] *In titulo*; PL 95, 400A.
[16] *Ibid.* *John* xvi, 32.
[17] *In titulo*; PL 95, 410A. Luke xxiii, 46.
[18] *Ibid.* *Matth.* xxvi, 38.
[19] *Ibid.* *John* x, 18.
[20] *John* xv, 13.
[21] *In titulo*; PL 95, 401A. Ps. xv, 10.
[22] *Ibid.* *John* i, 14.
[23] *Ps.* lxiv, 3.
[24] *In titulo*; PL 95, 395B. *De Doctr. christ.* I, 5, 5; PL 34, 21.
[25] *In titulo*; PL 95, 395BC.
[26] *Ms* ginnit.

quam unitatem. Semel enim unum unum est. Multiplicata igitur per se ipsam unitas sui ipsius gignit[27] aequalitatem sed in una eademque unitatis natura. Nec enim duae sunt unitates gignens et genita, sed unum prorsus sunt in substantia.

14. Cum enim unitas per se multiplicatur, nulla fit ab unitate recessio. Ideoque in nullam unitatum pluralitatem fit processio. Sic enim multiplicatio illa jam in binarium caderet, quare in alteritatem.[28] Ideoque in mutabilitatem. Quis vero sanae mentis dixerit, si semel unum protuleris, inde binarium provenisse? Nihil enim nisi unum inde provenit. Sed nec illud dixeris quod unitas se ipsam genuerit, licet unitas gignens[29] et unitas genita unum et idem sint in <64v> substantia. Neque enim ista multiplicatio fit, ut sit et dicatur "unitas" sed potius ut et sit et dicatur "unitatis aequalitas." Si enim unum dixeris, jam unitatem habes. Sed cur vel unum sit vel dicatur aequalitas, non habes.[30]

15. Si vero, cum prius unum dixeris, semel unum proferas, tantum dices esse hoc quantum quod prius protuleras. Ecce non habebas prius, quare "tantumdem" diceres. Multiplicatione facta, quare dicas "tantumdem", jam habes. Sed tantumdem aequalitatis nota est. Videsne quomodo faciat multiplicationis ratio, ut sit et dicatur "unitatis aequalitas", cum prius non aequalitas diceretur vel esset sed unitas? Unitas ergo nec se ipsam gignit[31] nec aliam unitatem.[32]

16. Sed cum clare (ut arbitror) monstratum est, cassa igitur et subtilis est illa haeretici illatio: *Si Deus genuit Deum, aut se ipsum aut alium Deum genuit,*[33] sicut ex eis quae de unitate et ejus aequalitate[34] dicta sunt colligi potest. Cum ergo unitas gignat[35] aequalitatem, aequalitas vero quodammodo respiciat unitatem, aliqua est utriusque connexio quae ab utraque procedit. Neque enim unius tantum nexus est sed duorum. Sic vero connexae sunt sibi unitas et unitatis aequalitas, ut sint idem in substantia. Connexio ergo, quae ab unitate procedit, etiam ab unitatis aequalitate, ejusdem est cum eis, ex quibus procedit, substantiae. Una itaque unitatis et aequalitatis connexionisque est substantia.[36]

17. Sed illud vigilanter perspiciendum est quod connexio ab unitate et aequalitate non gignitur[37] sed procedit. Nulla enim fit vel unitatis vel aequalitatis multiplicatio ad hoc, ut sit vel dicatur connexio. Non ergo gignitur[38] quoniam generatio in arithmetica nihil aliud est quam <65> multiplicatio. Itaque licet unitatis aequalitatisque pariter et connexionis una sit eademque substantia, hanc tamen recipit distinctionem unitatis Trinitas, ut nec unitas gignens[39] unitatis sit aequalitas, nec connexio aequalitas unitatis vel gignens[40] unitas. Nec tres tamen sunt unitates quoniam unum prorsus sunt in substantia. Unde nec triplex unitas ab arithmeticis dicitur sed trina.[41]

18. Age ergo, si digna fieri possit comparatio: sicut unitas ex se per multiplicationem sui ipsius gignit[42] unitatis aequalitatem et in eadem prorsus substantia, sic Pater ex sua genuit prorsus substantia ab aeterno Filium sibi ipsi aequalem in eadem divinitatis natura. Et sicut connexio ab unitate et aequalitate procedit, nec gignitur,[43] ita quoque Spiritus sanctus a Patre et Filio procedit: sed non gignitur[44] ita scilicet quod salva trium personarum distinctione una est Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti substantia. Sicut etiam unitas, unitatisque aequalitas, et ab his procedens connexio non tres unitates ab arithmeticis dicuntur sed unitas trina, sic nec tres deos sed unum et trinum fides recipit catholica.

19. Hoc igitur est quod ab Augustino dicitur: *In Patre unitas, in Filio aequalitas, in Spiritu sancto unitatis aequalitatisque connexio.* Illam enim de radio et calore

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[27] *Ms* ginnit.

[28] *Ms* alternitatem.

[29] *Ms* ginnens.

[30] *In titulo*; PL 95, 395C.

[31] *Ms* ginnit.

[32] *In titulo*; PL 95, 395C.

[33] *In titulo*; PL 95, 395D. Abelard, *Theol. christ.* III; PL 178, 1240C. Cf. *Sent.* I, 4, 1; ed. Quaracchi (1916), p. 39.

[34] *Ms* qualitate.

[35] *Ms* ginnat.

[36] *In titulo*; PL 95, 395D.

[37] *Ms* ginnitur

[38] *Ms* ginnitur.

[39] *Ms* gingnens.

[40] *Ms* gingnens.

[41] *In titulo*; PL 95, 396A.

[42] *Ms* gingnit.

[43] *Ms* gingnitur.

[44] *Ms* gingnitur.

solisque splendore similitudinem, quoniam cunctis nota est, praetereo. At vero nec illam facile reperiemus, quam plures inducunt, similitudinem. Dicunt enim quia sicut unus et idem homo, ut de se loquitur, persona prima est; ut ad eum quis loquitur, secunda; ut de eo quis, tertia, sic Deus idem uno <65v> respectu Pater,[45] alio Filius, alio dicitur et est Spiritus sanctus.[46] Qui sic Deum modificat, fere ad Sabellianam haeresim declinat. Nec Deus modificandus est. Nec in solis verbis consistit Trinitas.

20. Sic a Catholicis Trinitas distinguetur ut, cum unus tantum sit Deus juxta fidem catholicam, uno modo Pater, alio Filius, alio dicetur Spiritus sanctus? Absit. Unum equidem Deum sed trinum unamque solam divinitatis substantiam pie et catholice confitemur. Sed nec in divinitatis modificatione nec in diversa modorum[47] consideratione Trinitatis distinctionem ponimus. Ut ergo salva unitate substantiae trium personarum distinctionem catholice et juxta sanae fidei doctrinam assignemus, paulisper attentione opus est, ut nec ad unitatem substantiae confusa videatur impie Trinitas nec ad trium personarum distinctionem nefarie modificari substantiae unitas.

21. Stilum ergo transferamus ad illam de flamma et de lumine similitudinem.[48] Accendatur candela ita tamen, ut alia ei prorsus in omnibus sit aequalis, lumen ab ea mutuetur et recipiat. Vides ergo quod prius accensa nihil de lumine suo perdidit. Quae tamen ad eam accendebatur, lumen prius accensae ab ea totum recipit. Si enim ejus partem sumpsisset, et prius accensa aliquid de lumine suo (quod falsum esse constat) perdidisset. Totum itaque lumen ex toto sumitur. Totum in prius accensa remanet, totum tamen a posterius accensa modo quodam mirabili habetur. Totum est unde sumitur. Totum est quod sumitur. Quamvis tamen ejus, unde sumitur, et luminis sumpti eadem prorsus sit substantia, sumptum tamen non est unde <66> sumitur: nec hoc unde sumitur sumptum est. Si enim lumen sumptum digito monstraveris, nihil ab eo sumptum fuisse veraciter pronuntiabis. Quodsi rursus ejus unde sumitur demonstrationem facias, illud non esse sumptum nihilominus veraciter pronuntias. Videsne igitur quam admiranda sit ejus, unde sumitur, et luminis sumpti distinctio, cum tamen idem prorsus sint in substantia?

22. Sed nec a lumine sumpto vel ab eo, unde sumitur, lumen procedere negabis quod a neutro quidem sumitur sed ab utroque procedit. Quis enim ab utroque splendorem et ideo lumen procedere negabit? Et quia totum a prius accensa habetur lumen et totum a posterius accensa, lumen totum ab utroque lumine procul dubio procedit. Luminis ergo, unde sumitur, sumptique pariter et ab utroque procedens una eademque prorsus substantia est. Quamvis tamen ejusdem prorsus sint substantiae, tam mirabili lege distincta sunt, ut, si lumen quod procedit ab utroque designaveris digito, nec ab illo sumptum aliquid nec illud ab alio sumptum[quam] veraciter astruere possis.[49]

23. Si ergo fieri possit ut hoc illocaliter cogitares et absque ulla conjunctione in diversa intelligeres, ex similitudine ista, quantum humana capere potest ratio, trium personarum distinctionem in una substantia Dei intellige. Quomodo autem tres personas absque trium concursu et conjunctione indivisas[50] intelligere debeas, ex eis quae sequuntur licet colligas:

24. Vide ergo quod mens ex se gignit sapientiam, absque ulla scilicet recessione, <66v> ita ut ab ipsa mente sapientia recedat nullo modo. Mens rursus sapientiam suam diligit ita vide<licet>[51] ut haec dilectio separetur a neutra.[52] Haec ergo tria non conjuncta sed absque ulla conjunctione facile possunt intelligi

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[45] potest *corr.* to Pater.

[46] *In titulo*; ed Basel (1563), p. 1090. *Ms* Paris, B.N. *lat.* 14489, fol. 67. The criticism seems to be aimed at Abelard, *Theol. christ.* III; PL 178, 1257D-1258A.

[47] *Ms* morum.

[48] *In titulo*; PL 95, 396BC.

[49] *In titulo*; PL 95, 396C.

[50] *add. man. rec.* tamen.

[51] licet *om. Ms.*

[52] *In titulo*; PL 95, 396D.

indivisa, quod per aliquam[53] qualemcumque similitudinem ad tres personas licet transferre.

25. Ille vero beatus Pictavorum episcopus Hilarius trium personarum distinctionem sub hac forma verborum insinuat: *In aeterno*, inquit, *infinitas; in imagine species; in munere usus.*[54] Vide ergo quod theologice locutus est cum ait: *In aeterno infinitas.*[55]

26. Theologia vero duplex est: alia affirmationis, alia negationis. Sed theologia negationis omnia vocabula a Deo plane abnegat. Unde beatus Dionysius utens theologia per negationem in *Hierarchia*[56] inquit: *Deus nec vita est nec virtus nec spiritus nec sapientia.*[57] Scis quid[58] hoc est? Vocabula discretiva statuum et a discernendo status reperta. Hoc ergo nomen *vita* quemdam statum ponit, ita scilicet quod illum et a virtutis statu et ab alio statu discernit. Similiter autem et caetera vocabula. Quoniam ergo in Deo unum sunt, sequens theologus verborum inventionem, quae statuum sunt discretiva, juxta theologiam negationis et ejus proprietatem bene, nec contra fidem catholicam, illa omnia a Deo negavit vocabula cum ait: *Deus nec vita est nec virtus*, etc.[59]

27. Paulo postea subjunxit: *Deus et vita est et virtus et spiritus et sapientia*,[60] utens theologia affirmationis quae per translationem et haec et caetera, quae de Deo digne affirmari possunt, affirmat vocabula. Non ergo sibi contrarius theologus ille. Sed cum superius usus fuisset theologia per negationem, paulo post <67> usus theologia per affirmationem, scilicet utrique reddens proprietatem. Qui ergo theologia negationis utitur, omnia negans a Deo vocabula, Deum[61] in quadam sua aeternitatis obscuritate considerat.

28. In aeternitate vero est infinitas. Quamvis igitur Filius aeternus, Spiritus sanctus aeternus, et idem aeternum cum Patre, quia tamen in Patre est et aeternitatis et illius infinitatis auctoritas, ideo distinguendo Patris personam inquit Hilarius: *In aeterno infinitas.* Distinguendo personam Filii subjunxit: *In imagine species* quoniam Filius est imago Patris. Ad distinctionem vero Spiritus sancti addidit: *In munere usus*, hoc ideo quoniam Spiritus sanctus mittitur et sic eo utimur[62] et donis gratiarum ejus.

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[53] *Ms* aliquem.

[54] Cf. *De Trin.* VIII, 48; PL 10, 271B. The immediate source seems to be Augustine, *De Trin.* VI, 10, 11; PL 42, 931.

[55] *In titulo;* PL 95, 397B.

[56] The word is written in some sort of Greek letters resembling: YHPIPKYA.

[57] Cf. *De Div. nominibus;* PL 122, 1116D.

[58] *Ms* quod.

[59] *In titulo*; PL 95, 397B and 398A.

[60] *Cf. De Div. nominibus*; PL 122, 1117B.

[61] *Ms* deinde.

[62] *Ms* utitur. Cf. *In titulo;* PL 95, 399A: Bene autem addit ‘usus”. Per dona enim Spiritus sancti utimur Deo.

Non Alleluia Ructare

PAUL E. BEICHNER C.S.C.

Non alleluia ructare sed allia norunt;
Plus in salmone quam Salomone legunt.

THE first line of this couplet of Peter Riga might serve as a kind of text for this paper, since "alleluia" will scarcely be audible whereas the garlicky eructations of satire will be more noticeable. The first portion of the paper will be concerned with the double-entendre of *ructare* or *eructare* ("to belch" and "to speak out")—especially with Chaucer's play on the word in the "Summoner's Tale." And the latter part will deal with the second line of the couplet, *Plus in salmone quam Salomone legunt*, which appears to have become a ready-made jibe at habitués or patrons of a Paris tavern—"They gather more in The Salmon than they read in Solomon."

In the "Summoner's Tale" the friar harangues the sick and helpless Thomas in hope of securing a benefaction or a legacy for his convent. One of his claims is that the prayers of friars are more efficacious than those of lay folk because friars live in poverty and abstinence and lay folk in riches and abundance of food and drink:

Oure orisons been moore effectueel,
And moore we seen of Cristes secree thynges,
Than burel folk, although they weren kynges.
We lyve in poverte and in abstinence,
And burell folk in richesse and despence
Of mete and drynke, and in hir foul delit.[1]

After *exempla* to show that prayer must be accompanied by fasting, he reiterates his claim:

And therfore may ye se that oure preyeres—
I speke of us, we mendynantz, we freres—
Been to the hye God moore acceptable
Than youres, with youre feestes at the table.[2]

He goes even further and attacks the value of the prayer of clerical possessioners—worthless as gas on the stomach—in the spirit of the Latin satirical writers of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries:

'Blessed be they that povere in spirit been.'
And so forth al the gospel may ye seen,
Wher it be likker oure professioun,
Or hirs that swymmen in possessioun.
Fy on hire pompe and on hire glotonye!
And for hir lewednesse I hem diffye.
Me thynketh they been lyk Jovinyan,
Fat as a whale, and walkynge as a swan,
Al vinolent as botel in the spence.
Hir preyere is of ful greet reverence,
Whan they for soules seye the psalm of Davit;
Lo, 'buf!' they seye, '*cor meum eructavit!*'[3]

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[1] *Canterbury Tales,* III (D), 1870-1875. Unless otherwise noted the text used throughout this paper is *The Complete Works of Geoffrey Chaucer*, ed. F. N. Robinson (Cambridge, Mass., 1933).

[2] *C.T.*, III (D), 1911-1914.

[3] *C.T.*, III (D), 1923-1934.

The Summoner is no more delicate in the last line than he was in his prologue concerning the satanic habitation of friars and no more genteel than he will be later in the tale concerning the gift of Thomas to the friar and an ingenious solution for its distribution. Hence, any attempt to minimize the importance of the double meaning of *cor meum eructavit*[4] in order to emphasize the inappropriateness of *Psalm* xliv as a prayer for the dead is an effort to shift attention from what is primary to what is secondary or accidental. Professor Hamilton, however, has asserted that commentators

> seem to have assumed that the whole point of the joke lies in the pun on *eructavit*, uttered by an ecclesiastic in his cups. If that were the case, the reading of the Ellesmere and other texts (Lo, but they seye, "Cor meum eructavit") would indeed be meaningless, whereas the substitution of *buf* for *but* not only makes the line intelligible, but enforces the double meaning of *eructavit.*
>
> A preoccupation with this play on words has caused modern interpreters to overlook the grain in favor of the chaff.[5]

I therefore run the risk of dealing with chaff. However, by the time Mrs. Hamilton comes to the close of her article she seems to have modified her evaluation with a change of the figure from one of winnowing to one of a two-edged blade:

> Both manuscript readings of *The Summoner's Tale* retain the essentials of the two-edged jest, the pun on *eructavit* and the picture of bibulous clerics reciting the joyful *Cor meum eructavit* when they should be chanting the solemn *De profundis* for the dead. There is only a choice of emphasis. The commonly accepted rendering with "buf" calls attention to the pun; the Ellesmere with typical Chaucerian irony contrasts what might be expected in a reverent prayer for the dead with what actually takes place.[6]

Now the *Ellesmere Ms* and the others which read *but* for *buf* would still be meaningful even if "the whole point of the joke" or the chief point of the passage were tied up in the meaning of *cor meum eructavit*, for either *but* is the sound of an eructation just like *buf* (as the reading *buth* of *Ms Royal* 18 C II evidently is), or it means "except":

Hir preyere is of ful greet reverence,
Whan they for soules seye the psalm of Davit,
Lo, but [except] they seye, '*cor meum eructavit!*'

In the second case the Latin does not merely indicate what psalm is said, right or wrong; it carries within itself the full play on double meaning but without the benefit of sound effects. It would have been understood, for commentators on *Psalm* xliv had made it impossible for their mediaeval readers to be unaware of the literal root meaning of *eructavit*, as will be shown later. There is no real difference in meaning or emphasis between the *Ellesmere Ms* and those commonly followed. In those with the reading *but*, even if one interprets it as "except," the eructation is to be inferred from the Latin set in a context of excessive eating and drinking; and in those with the reading *buf*, the *ful greet reverence* of the possessioners is made ironic by everything implied in *cor meum eructavit*. In both cases the important thing is the Latin—just as important as in that other little Latin joke of Chaucer's:

For al so siker as *In principio,*

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[4] "My heart has spoken out" or "My stomach has belched."

[5] Marie P. Hamilton, "The Summoner's 'Psalm of Davit,'" *MLN*, LVII (1942), 655.

[6] *Ibid.*, 657.

Mulier est hominis confusio,—
Madame, the sentence of this Latyn is,
'Womman is mannes joye and al his blis."[7]

Three manuscripts with the reading *buf* have a different Latin phrase. There is an eructation and there is a play on meaning; and this variant too made sense and humor for scribe and reader. The humor is essentially the same as that of the ordinary reading—humor through a facetious remark after an uncouth bodily function:

Lo, 'buf!' they say, *cor mundum creavit!*"[8]

A clean heart (stomach) has created it (the psalm and the *buf*). When I first read this variant, I thought immediately of the *Miserere*, which is used not only as one of the psalms of the Office of the Dead but also as one of the Penitential Psalms—just like the *De profundis*, which Professor Hamilton thought the monks ought to have been saying. *Ps.* l, 12: *Cor mundum crea in me Deus, et spiritum rectum innova in visceribus meis.* The scribe who first substituted *cor mundum creavit* for *cor meum eructavit* was also capable of playing on *spiritum* (spirit—wind) and *visceribus* (heart—stomach).

If there is still need to demonstrate that the eructation and the facetious remark in Latin is the essential thing in the lines under consideraion and not any inappropriatness of a particular psalm to which the Latin alludes, try reading *frendes* for *soules.* After all, Thomas is not yet dead:

Hir preyere is of ful greet reverence,
Whan they for *frendes* seye the psalm of Davit;
Lo, 'buf!' they seye, '*cor meum eructavit!*'

The humor of the passage remains essentially unchanged.

The assertion was made above that commentators on *Psalm* xliv had made it impossible for the mediaeval reader to be unaware of the literal root meaning of *eructavit* in connection with the Psalm. The interpretations of the commentators were gradually absorbed by generations of ecclesiastics, monks, canons, friars, and others who chanted or recited the Divine Office or who used the psalms as private prayers. From Patristic times the traditional interpretation of *Eructavit cor meum verbum bonum* usually took one of two forms, and in most instances the commentator thought it not amiss to explain the literal meaning of *eructavit* while interpreting the passage in a spiritual sense. Although the context and spirit of a commentary are indeed reverent and edifying, the handling of the literal meaning of *eructavit* is often such that it must have brought a gleam of humor to the eye of the reader or a smile to the lips of an audience who heard the Psalm explained. And it is likely that statements were remembered, often out of context, to be the source of monastic humor in the refectory or elsewhere.

The following short passage from the exposition of Cassiodorus on *Psalm* xliv gives a neat literal definition of *eructavit* and immediately applies it in a spiritual sense to the Psalmist. The enthusiasm of Cassiodorus is delightful:

> "Eructavit cor meum verbum bonum" . . . *Eructavit* dicimus, quando satietas multa ciborum digestiones saluberrimas evaporat. Sed quam magnis spiritualibus epulis fuerat vir iste completus, ut tam boni odoris eructaret arcanum! *Cor meum*, sinus mentis intellige . . .[9]

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[7] *C.T.*, VII, 3163-3166 (B², *4353-*4356).

[8] See variants from *Mss* Ha³, He, and N1 in John M. Manly and Edith Rickert, ed., *The Text of The Canterbury Tales* VI (Chicago, 1940), p. 201.

[9] Cassiodorus, *Expositio in Psalmos*, Ps. xliv; PL 70, 319B. Later writers often borrowed from the earlier, for example, St. Bruno Herbipolensis Episcopus, *Expositio Psalmorum*, Ps. xliv; PL 142, 186D: Eructare

And the following quotation from Rufinus represents the second type of spiritual interpretation—God the Father's generation of the Son:

> Cor Dei Patris verbum eructavit, quia ejus secreta et divina essentia Filium generavit . . . *Eructavit* (inquit) *cor meum verbum bonum*, id est, ex meipso aeternaliter genui Filium.[10]

This interpretation becomes quite common, often with the analogical similarity to an eructation being pointed up so that the commentator's real meaning cannot be missed. Thus Saint Bruno, the Founder of the Carthusians, writes:

> Cum autem ponit, *Eructavit,* innuit quod illum ex secreta essentia protulit et genuit, ante mundi principium ineffabiliter, a similitudine ructatus, qui ex interioribus et secretis corporis partibus profertur . . . sic exponitur: *cor meum,* id est secreta essentia mea, *eructavit,* id est protulit, genuit *verbum.*[11]

It would appear therefore that *eructavit*[12] as understood by these commentators cannot be adequately translated by so colorless a word as *uttered*, even when applied to the Psalmist; as St. Bruno d'Asti says: "So that we may understand how firm and stable and of what great power is the whole content of the Psalm."[13]

In any event the literal meaning of *eructare*, "to belch," is never far from the memory of a commentator on the Psalm, whereas it is uppermost in the mind of a satirist who uses the word. And the Summoner's satire on the gourmet tastes of the friar in his tale (ll. 1838-1847) as well as that friar's satire on the gluttony of non-mendicant clerics is in the tradition of goliardic satire.

In his note on line 1934 of the "Summoner's Tale" Robinson wrote that his attention had been called

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dicimus, quando satietas ciborum digestiones saluberrimas evaporat. Unde iste vir sanctus coelesti largitate satiatus eructavit, unde fidelis populus abundantissime pasceretur. Cor meum, sinum mentis intellige. Verbum bonum: Filium Dei vocat.

Haymo of Halberstat also applies "Eructavit cor meum" to the Psalmist and makes sure that his readers know what *eructavit* means literally. *Explanatio in Psalmos*, Ps. xliv; PL 116, 348A: Vox prophetae, et antequam transeat ad laudem sponsi, ponit commendationem ipsius laudis quam facturus est, cum dicit: 'Cor meum eructavit.' Hic propheta ex saturi similitudine loquitur, quia satus aliquis non potest retinere cibum quin eructet, sic propheta plenus Spiritu sancto, necessario eructavit, ut aliquid manifestaret, eructavit dico 'verbum', id est, Filium Dei: quia si quis psalmum attendat, poterit vere agnoscere Christum Dei Filium esse.

[10] Rufinus, *Commentarius in LXXV Psalmos*, Ps. xliv; PL 21, 820A. Remigius of Auxerre follows this interpretation and suggests that the language of the Psalm is to prevent us from thinking anthropomorphically of the Father's generation of the Son. *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, Ps. xliv; PL 131, 377C: *Eructavit cor meum verbum bonum.* Ne putaremus Dominum Patrem indigere conjugio in generatione Filii sui, ostendit nobis ipsam generationem non ab alio sed a se ipso factam, sic dicens: *Cor meum*, id est, intima substantia mea et secreta essentia mea *eructavit*, id est, genuit, *verbum bonum*, id est, Filium mihi aequalem et consubstantialem. De hoc Verbo dictum est: *In principio erat Verbum, et Verbum erat apud Deum, et Deus erat Verbum* (Joan. 1).

[11] S. Bruno, *Expositio in Psalmos*, Ps. xliv; PL, 152, 826B. Ven. Bede, (*Dubia et spuria*) *Exegesis in Psalmos*, Ps. xliv; PL 93, 715D: . . . ideo Deus Pater per similitudinem loquens profunde incipit dicens: *Cor meum eructavit verbum bonum.* Qui enim eructant, de imo flatum emittunt. . . .*Eructavit*, id est, ineffabiliter generavit ex se *verbum bonum.* Nec mirum si Pater dicat de intimo cordis Verbum eructatum. . . . Gerhohus Praepositus Reicherspergensis, *Commentarium in Psalmos*, Ps. xliv; PL 193, 1565A: Satietas stomachi procreat eructationem corporis; plenitudo vero sapientiae generat eructationem cordis. Deum de corde eructare est de plenitudine Divinitatis Filium sibi aequalem generare.

[12] The Greek verb has the same literal and the same figurative meaning as the Latin.

[13] S. Bruno Astensis, *Expositio in Psalmos*, Ps. xliv; PL. 164, 854C: *Verbum bonum*, hunc per psalmum dicit, quem non ore cantasse, sed de cordis secretario se eructasse fatetur. Ut per hoc intelligamus quam firmum et stabilem, et quantae auctoritatis sit totum hoc quod in hoc psalmo continetur. I translate "quantae auctoritatis" as though the expression had been applied to strong wine. *The Latin Poems Commonly Attributed to Walter Mapes*, ed. Thomas Wright (London, 1841: Camden Society), p. xliii: album [vinum] tamen a dextris ponitur, quia majoris auctoritatis est, et rubeum a sinistris.

> to a similar representation of a drunken man's repetition of a psalm in a Latin prose satire under the name of Golias (The Latin Poems attributed to Walter Mapes, ed. Thos. Wright, Camden Soc., London 1841, p. xliv): " . . . eructitando inchoat, 'Laudate Dominum, *puf*, omnis gens, laudate, *puf*, et omnis spiritus laudet, *puf*.' " But in this case there is no pun on the text of the psalm.[14]

The satire deserves more attention than Robinson could afford to give it in the limited space of his notes. It is an *ex professo* satire on an abbot, a possessioner, who of course eats at a private table and not with his monks. He is both a gourmand and a gourmet. Before speaking about his thanks after meals, the satirist describes for two pages the Gargantuan appetite[15] of the abbot for food and drink and his rationalizations when he eats things forbidden by the rule:

> He is truly a martyr, who by these fasts, these vigils, these bibblings afflicts his body and disposes himself with these restraints. When dinner is finished, however, and the board cleared, he cannot rise unless he supports himself with both arms, like a cow sunk in a pit of pitch; and then following the custom of giving thanks, lest he make them too prolix, he skips the *Miserere mei Deus*, and belching begins: "Laudate Dominum, *puf*, omnis gens, laudate, *puf*, et omnis spiritus laudet, puf." He does not join words to words psalmodizing, but because of interpolated eructations these words are stolen away and those are halved.[16]

The abbot is guilty not only of gluttony but also of shortening his prayers. In monastic institutions the *Miserere* (*Psalm* l), which consists of nineteen verses exclusive of the introduction, is usually said after dinner as part of the thanks, sometimes on the way from the refectory to the chapel, whereas the *Laudate Dominum* (*Psalm* cxvi) consisting of two verses is said as a part of the grace after the evening meal. But even in trying to recite the two verses of *Psalm* cxvi the abbot becomes confused and finishes with the last verse of *Psalm* cl: *Omnis spiritus laudet Dominum.*

Satire on the appetites of monks was not limited to strict works of satire. In his art of poetry Matthew of Vendome, using the couplet *Non alleluia ructare* . . . as an example to illustrate his definition of paronomasia, applies it to monks who dine sumptuously. These monks whose dark meanness is cloaked beneath the garment of false religion *eructant* spiced thanks to the Highest:

> Vel sic de monachis sumptuosis, quorum fuscata malignitas falsae religionis

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[14] Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 812.

[15] Even the catalogues remind one of Rabelais' manner of writing. Wright, *op. cit.*, p. xliii: Praeter praedicta, ova comedit saepissime. . . . Sed quia rigore regulae coarctatur, ne quinarium numerum excedat, comedit quinque dura, v. mollia, v. frixa, v. lixa, v. cumino dealbata, v. pipere denigrata, v. in artocreis, v. in artocaseis, v. pulmentata, v. sorbilia, v. in brachiolis conflata, quae licet per computationem sunt lv., divisim tamen sumpta non sunt nisi v. . . . Vina porro ponuntur coram domino abbate diversi coloris, albi scilicet et rubei; album tamen a dextris ponitur, quia majoris auctoritatis est, et rubeum a sinistris, et de utroque sumens primitias, novies bibit, ut gustet quid vinum sapiat. Cum vero bibit et intentione, bibit semel sed multum pro pace et stabilitate ecclesiae, bis pro praelatis, ter pro sibi subditis, quater pro captivis, quinquies pro infirmis, sexies pro aeris serenitate, septies pro maris tranquillitate, novies pro peregrinantibus, decies pro domi sedentibus, undecies ut parum comedant monachi, duodecies ut multum comedat ipse, tredecies pro universis Christianis, quaterdecies pro rebus humanis, quinquies et decies ut Dominus Deus rorem mittat super montem Gelboe, quo messes albeant, vineae floreant, et germinent mala punica, et sic numero impari numerum potationum concludit juxta illud, 'Numero Deus impari gaudet.'

[16] Translation mine. See Wright, *ibid.*, pp. xliii-xliv. Eructitando inchoat, 'Laudate Dominum,' will bring to mind Langland's description of Sloth, 'prest and parsoun' (*The Vision of William Concerning Piers the Plowman*, 2 vols., ed. W. W. Skeat, Oxford Press, 1896), Passus V, 397-398:

> He bygan *benedicite* with a bolke and
> his brest knocked,
> And roxed and rored, and rutte atte
> laste.

> sepelitur indumento, qui in ventris ergastulo multifariis dapibus incarceratis pigmentatas gratias eructant Altissimo. De quibus quidam sic:
>
> Non alleluia ructare, sed allia norunt;
> Plus in salmone quam Salomone legunt.[17]

The somebody (*quidam*) whom Matthew quotes without naming is Peter Riga. The couplet occurs in the speech of Daniel berating and accusing the two elders before the assembly in the "Story of Susanna." Although the whole poem, like most of Peter Riga's early work, is very rhetorical, at one point Daniel's speech becomes indeed an exhibition of word play:

Vis tibi depingi breuius premissa? Sequuntur
  Vtres seu uentres, dolia siue dolos.
Curant non aras sed haras, non uera sed era,
  Non equum sed equos, non inopes sed opes.
Herent seu uanis seu uinis siue uenenis:
  Querunt uana, colunt uina, uenena uomunt.
Libras non libros relegunt parentque monetis
  Non monitis, pretio non prece quemque iuuant.
Non alleluia ructare sed allia norunt;
  Plus in salmone quam Salomone legunt.
Talibus ergo fides inclinet uestra fauorem?[18]

One should, however, not be hasty to conclude that this display of rhetoric was without provocation. First, in the Vulgate Daniel begins his cross-examination of the first elder with name-calling and accusations—a procedure which would be considered abusing a witness if it were employed in one of our courts. And second, the effective recurrence of the same sounds appears to be deliberate rhetoric. Especially noteworthy is the passage beginning with *operabaris prius* and ending with *opprimens*:

> . . . et dixit ad eum: Inveterate dierum malorum, nunc venerunt peccata tua, quae operabaris prius, iudicans iudicia iniusta, innocentes opprimens et dimittens noxios, dicente Domino: 'Innocentem et iustum non interficies.' Nunc ergo, si vidisti eam, dic sub qua arbore videris . . . *Dan.* xiii, 52-54.

While this is close to alliterative prose or 'polyphonic prose,' the address to the second elder has the rhetoric of matter without strong verbal patterns.[19] In

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[17] Matthew of Vendome, *Ars versificatoria* III, 9 (Edmond Faral, *Les arts poétiques du XII^e et du XIII^e siècle* [Paris, 1924], p. 169).

[18] Peter Riga, *Aurora, "Daniel,"* 613 ff. (from my edition of *Aurora* in preparation). Written as an independent poem, "De Susanna" tells the story through the speeches of the two elders and Daniel. Although it is found in some manuscripts of Peter Riga's collection of short poems, *Floridus aspectus*, it is not included in the oldest *Ms* British Museum *Egerton* 2591 (dated ca. 1181). For bibliography on *Floridus aspectus* see Paul E. Beichner, C.S.C. "The *Cursor Mundi* and Petrus Riga," *Speculum*, XXIV (1949), 240, footnotes. When Peter Riga added the "Book of Daniel" to *Aurora*, he incorporated "De Susanna" as part of it; and still later in his redaction of *Aurora* Aegidius of Paris made it appear less like a debate and more like a narrative by rearranging parts and adding short connecting sections. For texts of both versions see J. H. Mozley, "Susanna and the Elders: Three Medieval Poems," *Studi Medievali*, n. s., III (1930), 27-41. Since Faral (*op. cit.*, p. 3) places the *Ars versificatoria* before the year 1175, "De Susanna" which it quotes must have been written even earlier.

[19] *Dan.* xiii, 56-58: . . . et dixit ei: Semen Chanaan et non Iuda, species decepit te, et concupiscentia subvertit cor tuum. Sic faciebatis filiabus Israel, et illae timentes loquebantur vobis; sed filia Iuda non sustinuit iniquitatem vestram. Nunc ergo, dic mihi sub qua arbore . . .

The most extreme example of alliterative prose is Richard Rolle's *Melum contemplativorum.* Many long excerpts from it are given by Hope Emily Allen in *Writings Ascribed to Richard Rolle, Hermit of Hampole, and Materials for His Biography* (New York, 1927). The following is the beginning of a passage on page 483: Conditor carissime, quem cupio constanter, tui desiderium in me descendebat, vt dulciter diligerem te sine dolore, quemadmodum cucurri capere consolamen creantis caloris, non cantici carnalis. Ita cum recessero a lingua loquaci et labii labore, non caream corona in illa any event, the Susanna episode in *Daniel* offered enough suggestions to a poet of the twelfth century already in a rhetorical system of poetic to invite him to use all of the word tricks in his repertory.

The use of puns or plays on words became common in twelfth and thirteenth-century satires on contemporary monks and ecclesiastics. Thus in the satire on the abbot, which has already been discussed in this paper, the following occurs: *Plus enim meditatur de eo* [*stomacho*] *quam de Deo, plus de salsamentis quam de sacramentis, plus de salmone quam de Salomone; nec mirum; ipsius enim venter sibi Deus est.*[20] Puns on "Luke—lucre," "Mark—mark," and "pounds—books" (*libras—libros*) are almost sure to be used if the satirist is speaking of greed, for example:

Est Leo pontifex summus, qui devorat;
qui libras sitiens libros impignorat;
marcam respiciens, Marcum dedecorat;
in summis navigans, in nummis anchorat.[21]

Sic lucrum Lucam superat,
Marco marcam praeponderat
Et librae librum subjicit.[22]

Coram cardinalibus, coram patriarcha,
Libra libros, reos res, Marcum vincit marca.[23]

Praesul amat marcam plus quam distinguere Marcum,
Plus et amat lucrum quam facit ipse Lucam.[24]

In the quotations used thus far the play on the words *salmone—Salomone* is limited by context to meaning "a salmon or fish" and "Solomon or the Books of Wisdom," namely in the Susanna story where the application is made to the two elders, in Matthew of Vendome's description of the feasting monks, and in the goliardic satire on the abbot. But in at least two other instances the context is not so restrictive; and if clerks or students are being described, *salmone* could be *Salmone*, The Salmon, if such a tavern existed. By sheerest chance extant records show that in the second half of the fourteenth century The Salmon was frequented by the English Nation of the University of Paris—but more of these records later. Just when the management of this tavern first hung out its sign and students visited The Salmon for their comfort, we do not know; but whatever the date, the line of Peter Riga, *Plus in salmone quam Salomone legunt,* took on an added dimension. Students "study" more in The Salmon than in books.

Alan of Lille (ca. 1128-1202), the poet and theologian who shares with Albert the Great the title of *doctor universalis,* in his *De Arte praedicatoria* laments like professors of all centuries that the students do not read enough:

> For clerks of our time would rather attend the schools of Antichrist than of Christ, being more given to gluttony than glosses; they would rather collect coin than read books; they look with more pleasure on Martha than on Mark [on a girl than a gospel]; they prefer congregating in The Salmon

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claritate cui conformari continue cuipui. Iustus es, o Ihesu, qui iudicas gentiles, gerens iusticiam, in te iubilaui et amor arripuit animam herentem epulis eternis, nam nisi pro necesse vtor hiis escis, cum noverim naturam persistere non posse si non sustinetur. . . .

[20] Wright, *Latin Poems of Walter Mapes,* p. xli.

[21] "Apocalypsis Goliae Episcopi" (Wright, *Latin Poems of Walter Mapes,* p. 7).

[22] "Planctus super Episcopis" (*Political Songs of England, from the Reign of John to that of Edward II,* ed. Thomas Wright [London, 1839; Camden Society], p. 11).

[23] "Contra avaros" (Wright, *Political Songs,* p. 31).

[24] *Speculum stultorum* (*Anglo-Latin Satirical Poets and Epigrammatists of the Twelfth Century,* ed. Thomas Wright [2 vols., London, 1872; Rolls Series], I, p. 110).

> to reading in Solomon. Now all learning is debased, each lesson lukewarm; there's no one who reads books![25]

Although there is no doubt about the attraction of a tavern to students—*Meum est propositum in taberna mori*—I have assumed in this translation what cannot be proved, namely, that there was a tavern or hostelry called The Salmon in the time of Alan of Lille.

Some time before the end of the thirteenth century in what appears to be a sermon for university people John of Paris, the Dominican, gave a punning account of one who turns aside from study and falls into excesses.

> Some turn aside from the service of God to the service of their belly through gluttony. About them the Apostle says, "whose god is their belly," because according to the exposition of some saint, their church is the food-kitchen, their altar of holies the table, their offering of sacrifices the replenishing of dishes, their smoke of incense the odor of sauces, their order of ministers the multitude of cooks. Thus a certain person turned aside who was first studious and became a voluptuary; about him somebody wrote—and I believe it was Adam of St. Victor—First, he said, you used to sing 'alleluia,' now you belch garlic; first you used to study in codices, now in cups; first in Solomon, now in The Salmon; first in Plato, now in a flagon; first in postils, now in pretzels. And the following in verse:
>
> Non equum sed equum queris, non vera sed era,
> Non aram sed [h]aram, non inopes sed opes.
>
> Behold him who turned aside; therefore the Lord was not with him . . .[26]

I have not found a comparable passage in Adam of St. Victor, but neither is John of Paris sure of the attribution. He actually seems to be recalling parts of the speech Peter Riga put into the mouth of Daniel, especially the couplet:

Non alleluia ructare sed allia norunt;
Plus in salmone quam Salomone legunt.

And his quotation in verse is a garbled version of

Curant non aras sed haras, non uera sed era,
Non equum sed equos, non inopes sed opes.

But what of the phrase *prius in salomone nunc in salmone?* I have translated it as an aluusion to The Salmon, because this tavern was probably in business at this time and building up to the reputation it possessed a half century later as one of *the* places to go.

The couplet with which we are dealing was so current by the middle of the fourteenth century that when a monk of Clairvaux quoted it, he did not give the second line in full but expected his readers to fill it out from the *et cetera.* This was Petrus de Ceffona,[27] or Pierre de Cettona,[28] who wrote *Centilogium* or *Epistola Iesu Christi ad Innocentium* in 1353 in answer to *Epistola Luciferi ad malos principes ecclesiasticos*, which had appeared two years earlier. Since *Aurora* was one of the most frequently copied books of the middle ages,[29] it is to be expected that in mentioning the source of his quotation the author would name *Aurora* and not "De Susanna" or *Floridus aspectus.* Pierre de Cettona writes:

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[25] Alanus de Insulis, *Summa de arte praedicatoria,* xxxvi: Exhortatio ad doctrinam; PL. 210, 180D: Clerici namque nostri temporis potius sequuntur scholas Antichristi quam Christi, potius dediti gulae quam glossae; potius colligunt libras quam legant libros: libentius intuentur Martham quam Marcum; malunt legere in Salomone (sic) quam in Salomone. Jam omnis scientia vilet, omnis lectio torpet, non est qui legat libros.

[26] *Ms* Paris, B. N. *lat.* 3557, fol. 280^{v}: aliqui declinant a seruicio dei in seruicium ventris sui per gulam, de quibus dicit apostolus, 'quorum deus venter est,' quia secundum expositionem cuiusdam sancti, ecclesia eorum est coquina ciborum, altare sanctorum mensa eorum, oblatio sacrificiorum innouatio ferculorum, fumus incensorum odor salsamentorum, ordo ministrorum multitudo coquorum. Taliter declinauerat quidam qui prius fuerat studiosus et factus erat voluptuosus, cui scribit quidam et creditur fuisse adam de sancto victore: prius, inquit, decantabas alleluia nunc eructas allia; prius studebas in codicibus nunc in calicibus; prius in salomone nunc in salmone; prius in platone nunc in flascone; prius in postillis nunc in pastillis. Et sequitur metrice: 'Non equm sed equm queris, non vera sed era,/Non aram sed [h]aram, non inopes sed opes.' Ecce qui declinauerat, ideo non erat cum eo dominus. . . .

See also Félix Lajard, "Jean de Paris, Dominicain," *Hist. litt. de la France*, XXV (1869), 244-270.

> The horns of the miter are said by some to represent both testaments, of which the bishop and prelate is obliged not to be ignorant. But it is to be feared lest the saying of the fool is true who added that the two other things hanging down from the miter signify that the bishop is ignorant—ignorant of both testaments. For many of them study more *in salmone quam salomone,* and a pound is dearer to them than a book, and money than the Deity. As Peter says in *Aurora*: "Non alleluia ructare sed allia norunt; / Plus in salmone, et cetera." Therefore let the sound of your devout preaching spread over the whole earth . . .[30]

Regardless of its unknown beginning The Salmon was respectable and famous by the second half of the fourteenth century. It was frequented not just by students of the University of Paris but by the faculty as well. Although the Faculty of Arts of the University was composed of four Nations, by chance for the English Nation only have the registers of the procurators been preserved almost complete since the year 1333. By chance also the name of the tavern where the Nation or the masters of the Nation occasionally assembled to celebrate by drinking or eating together was recorded by the stewards and treasurers of the company. The annual feast of St. Edmund,[31] patron of the English Nation, was always the occasion for a celebration. The day before the feast in 1369 the Nation decided to go to the tavern *in platea Sancti Jacobi in Salmone,* and there they consumed *XXI solidos et VIII denarios,* of which the newly elected procurator paid a franc, and the balance the masters present wished to be added to the bill for the following day. On the feast itself they held their banquet *in hospicio Salmonis,* and for everything the treasurer paid out *XIII libras, III solidos et VI denarios.*[32]

Not only did the English Nation celebrate the feast of their patron, but whenever a new procurator or treasurer took office, or whenever a new master joined the company to begin his teaching career (*propter jocundum ejus introitum* —a delightful way of saying it), or when examiners for degrees were appointed, the newly chosen had to pay his colleagues some rounds of wine according to a fixed rate.

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[27] Casimir Oudin, *Commentarius de scriptoribus ecclesiae antiquis illorumque scriptis tam impressis quam manuscriptis* . . . III (Leipzig, 1722), col. 1037.

[28] *Hist. litt. de la France,* XXV, 253. Concerning the *Epistola Luciferi* see *Hist. litt. de la France,* XXIV, 34-35.

[29] Paul E. Beichner, C.S.C., "The Old French Verse *Bible* of Macé la Charité, a Translation of the *Aurora,*" *Speculum,* XXII (1947), 227, note 8. As further evidence of the great number of manuscripts of the *Aurora* one might add that within the last few years three manuscripts were sold by New York booksellers. Two were secured by the Library of the University of Notre Dame—an excellent, mid thirteenth-century French manuscript and a Spanish manuscript of the end of the same century; the third manuscript, a fourteenth-century French copy of *Aurora* with the interpolated matter of Aegidius of Paris frequently marked with an obelus, was purchased by a private scholar.

[30] *Ms* Paris, B.N. *lat.* 3315 (formerly, *Colbert* 1502, and *Regius* 4205), fol. 21^{v}, col. 2: Mitre cornua a ullis dicitur utrumque representare testamentum, quod non nescire tenetur episcopus et prelatus. Sed verendum est ne vox verificetur fatui qui subiunxit quod alia duo in mitra pendentia episcopum ignorare, utrumque ignorare testamentum, designant. Nam eorum multi plus in salmone quam salomone student, cariorque est eis libra libro et numine nummus. Vtque dicit petrus in aurora: Non alleluia ructare sed allia norunt;/ plus in salmone, et cetera. Vestre ergo deuote predicacionis sonus in omnem terram exeat. . . .

[31] November 20. For his life see the *Golden Legend.*

[32] *Auctarium Chartularii Universitatis Parisiensis,* ed. Denifle et Chatelain. Tome I et II: *Liber procuratorum nationis Anglicanae, ann.* 1333-1466 (Paris, 1894 et 1897), I, col. 344. See also Emile Chatelain, "Notes sur quelques tavernes fréquentées par l'Université de Paris aux XIV^{e} et XV^{e} siècles," *Bulletin de la Société de l'Histoire de Paris et de l'Ile-de-France,* XXV (1898), 87-109, especially pages 87 and 107.

On the feast of their patron in 1373, which fell on a Sunday, the English Nation again went to The Salmon. Although the recorder does not mention a banquet, he does state that the newly elected procurator and a new master each paid his franc:

> Et intravit nacio in prefata die *salmonem*, et ibi dictus novus procurator solvit francum. Et in eadem domo eodem die magister Johannes de Berka propter jocundum ejus introitum solvit francum.[33]

A few months later, in January, 1374, the examiners for the licentiate and the examiners of bachelors paid their comrades in The Salmon—the latter examiners paid "three pints of better [stuff]:"

> Item in dicta congregacione deliberabat nacio intrare tabernam *ad salmonem* ubi examinatores licenciandorum in Sancta Genovefa III francos exposuerunt, et examinatores determinancium solverunt III pintas de meliori.[34]

On July 22, 1375, Master Bernardus Luttyc, who was about to go to the Roman curia, requested that his name be inscribed on the roll during his absence. His petition was granted in the customary way—a trip to The Salmon and a treat:

> . . . cujus supplicacio erat concessa in forma consueta. Et intravit nacio tabernam *ad salmonem*, ubi dictus Bernardus solvit francum pro jocundo introitu in primam congregacionem.[35]

Although The Salmon is not mentioned again in this set of records until 1418, it would be unfair to The Salmon and the good customs of the English Nation to suspect that it was not patronized during the forty-year interval:

> . . . XI^a mensis Februarii . . . et intravit nacio tabernam *ad signum salmonis*, et solvit receptor nacionis IIII solidos, et procurator solvit eciam quatuor solidos.[36]

All things considered—a very quotable couplet from one of the "best-sellers" of the Middle Ages, a thirst among students and scholars for good fellowship and good wine, a tavern destined to have its name recorded and remembered through the Book of the Procurators of the English Nation—one could easily be led to fancy that The Salmon received its name because of the line:

Plus in salmone quam Salomone legunt.

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[33] *Liber procuratorum* I, col. 435.

[34] *Ibid.*, I, col. 441.

[35] *Ibid.*, I, col. 476.

[36] *Ibid.*, II, col. 241.

The Vernacular Translations of the *Navigatio Sancti Brendani*: A Bibliographical Study[1]

CARL SELMER

THE *Navigatio Sancti Brendani* enjoyed immense popularity throughout the Middle Ages. Based on a text of the tenth century, it is preserved in innumerable Latin manuscripts. Its composition, early history, and dissemination have been studied and the Latin text edited by various scholars. Translations into the vernacular tongues appeared soon after it had been written down. They were made for the benefit of the laymen whose knowledge of Latin was scanty: *Por faire entendre as laiens jans,* as an Old French translator remarked in the explicit of a thirteenth-century manuscript.[2] The motif underlying the early translations was no doubt religious—to exhort laymen to follow the good example given by St. Brendan, the hero of the legend, and his followers: "to amend their lives and merit Paradise."[3] Towards the end of the Middle Ages, however, this original religious motif gradually yielded to more secular purposes, such as satisfying the curiosity of burghers and instructing seafarers, adventurers, cartographers, and economists. For all of these a translation into the vernacular was very welcome.

A. Translations into Germanic languages[4]

In view of the extraordinary popularity of the Brendan legend in the Low Countries and Germany (36c) one is not surprised to discover an unusually rich development of vernacular translations in the Germanic speaking countries. In the Low-Frankish parts of the North the Latin legend was first translated into Old Dutch and appeared as *Leven ende Pilgrimadse des heiligen abts Brandanus* together with other *Vitae Sanctorum* in an Utrecht manuscript which shows a Cologne provenance (1). Likewise, in the far South in High German territory, at the Court of Albrecht III of Bavaria, the same *Vita* was translated into High German, *durch vleyssige anhaengende bett, flehen und schaffen der hochgeporrnen fürstin frawen Anna von Braunschweyg, gemahel der durchleuchtign hochgeporn fürsten hertzog Albrecht, phaltzgrave bey Reyn, hertzog in Bayren und grave zu Vohburg,* by Dr. Johannes Hartlieb in 1468[5] (2). It would be difficult to decide what motive persuaded Duchess Anna to have this translation made; perhaps sentimental reasons, interested as she was in that saint who played such an important role in the folklore of her native Brunswick, or political reasons, dazzled by the economic and political possibilities suggested by the new Portuguese discoveries in her time. Only one of Dr. Hartlieb's Middle High German versions has been edited (3), while the others still remain unpublished. Along the Baltic Sea in Low German territory, where the Irish seafarer enjoyed particular popularity with the Hanseatic population, the *Navigatio* was translated into Low German and incorporated into the *Lübeck Passional* which appeared in early prints from the shop of Steffan Arend in Lübeck (4). A separate print of the *Navigatio,* again in Low German, was made by Johannes Snell, Lübeck (5), of which, however, only a fragment is left. This Low German version was soon translated into High German by Valentin Vorster and printed by Adam Petri in Basel (6). Petri's High German edition of the year 1517, finally, was the basis of Gabriel Rollenhagen's edition of *Vier Bücher wunderbarlicher Reysen* (7) which renders the *Navigatio* for the first time into Modern High German. The same text, with some changes, was re-edited by Ludwig Kosegarten in his collection of *Legenden* (8); his changes are, however, not always fortunate and at times even contradictory of the tone of the story. Adalbert von Keller (9) was the interpreter of St. Brendan's odyssey in the nineteenth century; he erroneously believed in a French origin of the *Navigatio,* and consequently printed it in his edition of *Altfranzösische Sagen.* Twentieth-century German literature shows only a modern revival of an Eulenspiegel joke which is related to one of the episodes of the Brendan legend; it is a comedy, performed on the German stage in the thirties, entitled *Die Mütze des heiligen Brandan.*[6] (10).

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[1] This article contains the complementary bibliography of the vernacular translations with which the author had promised to follow up the bibliography of his Latin edition of the *Navigatio,* submitted for publication.

[2] *Ms* Paris, Bibl. Nat. *fr.* 7534, fols. 262^v, ed. A. Jubinal, "De saint Brandans, qui erra vii ans par mer, et des merveilles qu'il trouva," *La Légende latine de s. Brandaines,* (Paris, 1836), p. 164.

[3] The end of an OFr. text (transl. by P. Tuffrau, p. 195) reads as follows: *Or la grâce divine, qui agissait par lui, agit maintenant par le récit de sa vie. Plusieurs, qui l'ont lue, ont renoncé au siècle et sont devenus de grands saints. Puissiez-vous, l'ayant lue à votre tour, vous amender à leur example et mériter comme eux le Paradis—in saecula saeculorum. Amen.* A similar remark is found in another OFr. text (transl. by J. Marchand, p. 77). The concluding passage reads as follows: *grâce à lui, au royaume de Dieu, où il est allé, les hommes entrent par milliers.* The translation of the Anglo-Norman text into Latin (*Ms* Bodl. e Musaeo III; ed. Ch. Plummer, *VV. SS. Hib.* II, pp. 292) says: *Exemplo quidem eius multi eorum honestate morum iustiores fiebant.*

[4] The numbers in parentheses refer to the bibliographical notes of the selective bibliography at the end of this article.

[5] The year 1488 customarily given as the year of Hartlieb's translation is of necessity wrong, because Hartlieb died in 1468. Even doctoral dissertations (e.g. W. Meyer, *Die* [Göttingen, 1918], p. 125) overlook this error. About Hartlieb's life, see Karl Drescher, "Johannes Hartlieb, sein Leben und seine schriftstellerische Tätigkeit." *Euphorion,* XXV (1924), 254-70; 569-89.

Brendan's *Navigatio* was so popular in Germanic lands that in addition to the above-mentioned translations of the Latin text there also appeared a special Middle High German adaptation which we may conveniently call the "German version". It is based on a Middle High German poem composed by an unknown poet toward the middle of the twelfth century, at a time when Middle High German literature entered the period of its greatest productivity. A dialectical study of this new version would suggest the Rhineland as the probable region of origin (11, 12a). The contents, while identical with the Latin text in most episodes, shows at times a considerable number of deviations.[7] Thus the original seven-year voyage now becomes a nine-year voyage; the Barintus story is replaced by the angel story, and, quite in keeping with the character of the *Spielmannspoesie* whose product this version is, the original religious tenor of some of the episodes appears changed into a fantastic rendition of extravagant adventures. It shows the same fabric and structure as most of the contemporary Middle High German epics, such as Oswald, Herzog Ernst, Tundalus, Maurice of Craon, Orendel, Albanus, and Paulus, all of which also happen to share the Rhineland as a common background. Indeed, the authors of these epics must have been familiar with the Brendan story, because so many references to Brendan appear in their works (36b). This "German Version", which was to make such deep inroads into German (36b) and Dutch literature[8] served first as a *Vorlage* for another metrical High German version of the thirteenth century (12b, i), composed in the Middle German dialect. Somewhat later it was translated into Middle Low German and appeared in Northern Germany (12b, ii; 13). Recent research discovered even a Low German prose version which, derived from the "German Version", is available in a shortened text in the dialect of Lübeck (14). Once more the Rhenish poem was used as a source for a new translation. This time it was converted into a Middle Netherlandish metrical version, extant in two manuscripts, those of Comburg and Hulthem. Quite a number of Dutch and German scholars have occupied themselves for decades with the problems offered by these texts. Attention to these manuscripts was originally called by F. D. Graeter (15) and E. Kausler (16); they were studied and discussed by F. J. Mone (17), J. Jonckbloet (18), and E. Wilken (19); they were erroneously connected with the Low German poetical version by A. Martin (20), and with a French source by W. G. Brill (22). Four editions of these texts were made—by Ph. Blomaert (21), W. G. Brill (22), E. Bonebakker (23) and, in recent times, by M. Draak (24). Their relationship and common source were made the subjects of special studies by E. Verwijs (25), Carl Schröder (12), J. Bergsma (26), H. Zimmer (27), Hermann Suchier (28), and Wilhelm Meyer (11). Other studies, concerned with some side issues of the *Navigatio*, were contributed by A. G. van Hamel (29), J. de Goeje (30), and J. W. Muller (31). In High German territory, too, this "German Version" caused a rich development. There the original metrical text was rendered into prose and became a widely read *Volksbuch*, printed again and again (32). Modern German editions of this text were made available by Carl Schröder (12b, iii), Richard Benz (33) and F. Podleiszek (34). Contributions to the study of the genesis and history of the Brendan legend and individual episodes were made in more recent times by Gustav Schirmer (35), Carl Selmer (36), Rudolf Palgen (37), Sebastian Merkle (38), Eugen Kölbing (39), C. H. Baer (40), Torsten Dahlberg (42), John Hennig (43), and J. Runeberg (44).

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[6] For this information I am indebted to Professor L. Weisgerber of the University of Bonn.

[7] Identical in both versions are, for example, the story of the theft of the bridle, Iasconius, the food sent from Heaven, and Judas.

[8] An imitation of the *Navigatio* in Dutch literature is the prose novel *Malegijs* (*Historie van Malegijs*, 1563, reprinted by Kniper, Amsterdam, 1903).

There are indications of the existence of even a third and more mystic version of the *Navigatio* in the early Middle High German period, which connected the Brendan story with the Arthurian legends. Sporadic traces of such a version can be found in various Middle High German epics such as the *Wartburgkrieg, Lohengrin, Zabulons Buch,* and *Aurons Pfennig* (36a). It is quite conceivable that the third version represents a fusion of both stories, originating possibly in Bretagne, since both legends were regarded as breton lais in Old French literature.[9] A further study of these two Celtic sagas, their overlappings and fusion would be very desirable.[10]

The Hanseatic cities, situated along the North and Baltic Seas between the Low Countries and Pomerania, were the logical disseminators of the *Navigato* towards the North, i.e. Scandinavia. The use of the Low German language as a business language in their Scandinavian trading posts[11] seems to have had a favorable effect upon the diffusion and exchange of sagas and other forms of poetry.[12] Known all along the *Waterkant* from Bruges to Stralsund, Brendan's *Navigatio* must have appealed particularly to the descendants of Leif and his Vikings who centuries after St. Brendan are believed to have crossed the ocean. Therefore, it is not surprising to find the *Navigatio* translated into Norwegian (41) or glorified in Norwegian poems (45).

Seafaring England, too, was not slow in contributing her fair share to the literature of the *Navigatio*. There, various factors happily combined to prepare a home for this tale in England. A favorable basis for the reception of the

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[9] Cf. *Roman de Renard,* ed. J. Méon, II, pp. 96, vv. 2149 ff.: *Je fot savoir bon lai Breton / Et de Merlin et de Foucon, / Del roi Artu et de Tristan, / Del Chievrefoil et de saint Brendan,* etc.

[10] A far-off echo may be found in the later *Dietrichsaga* whose hero Iron, Vice-King of Arthur, ruled over a territory called "Brandinaburg," which probably is the old "Brendanburg", now called "Brandenburg" (36d).

[11] Olav Brattegard, "Die mittelniederdeutsche Geschäftssprache des Hansischen Kaufmanns zu Bergen," *Skrifter fra Norges Handelshøyskole,* (Bergen, 1945).

[12] About the spread of the Dietrichsaga with its Arthurian-Brendanian tinge from Northern Germany to Scandinavia, cf. Gerhard Eis, "Die Vorstufen der Ironsaga," *Arkiv för Nordisk Filologi,* LXVII (1952), 182-197.

Brendan story was laid in early times by the cultural exchange with her immediate neighbors, Ireland, Scotland, and particularly Wales. All these three cultures were acquainted with the Brendan legend.[13] It is, therefore, quite natural that a local Welsh tradition, reinforced by oral reports from Ireland, found its way into English monasteries.[14] The nomenclature of English villages, churches and landmarks gives full evidence of the penetration of the Brendanus cult deep into the tradition of England at an early time, so much so that paradoxically St. Brendan was soon regarded as a native English saint.[15] Some influence may have been exerted even from the continent. Indeed, there are two isolated Brendan manuscripts found on English soil, both of the twelfth century, one at Whitby, the other at Durham.[16] Although their provenance and history are still unexplored, there can be no doubt to the student of the Brendan manuscripts that they are copies of Latin manuscripts from the continent. Subsequently, at the opening of the fourteenth century, when legendaries began to make their appearance in English literature, the *Navigatio* was taken over into Middle English legendaries and together with other Lives of Saints was edited by Th. Wright (47a) and Carl Horstmann (48); an analysis of the Brendan legend in the Glouster Legendary was made by Martha Bälz (49). On the basis of his metrical edition Th. Wright also edited a prose version (47b) which can be found in Wynkyn de Worde's English edition of the Golden Legend of the year 1527 (46). A separate edition, made by the same author, appeared in 1840 (47c). Both versions, metrical and prose, were reprinted by D. O'Donoghue in 1893 (50). Numerous are the contributions to the study of the various phases of development of the *Navigatio* made by modern scholars, such as the Marquess of Bute (51), Charles Plummer (52a), Eleanor Hull (53), James Wilkie (54), James F. Kenney (55), Joseph Dunn (56), and George A. Little (57). Individual episodes were treated by S. Evans (58), W. Creizenach (59), Sebastian Merkle (60), P. F. Baum (61), A. C. L. Brown (62), M. M. Williamson (63), and Ludwig Bieler (64). The Voyage was glorified in verses by Denis F. McCarthy (65), Matthew Arnold (66), J. Hudson (67), and Dominick Daly (68). Finally, a modern persiflage, ridiculing the Brendan story, was made in an American film manuscript by D. L. Moore (69).

B. Translations into Romance languages

A very rich development of vernacular Brendan literature can be found in the Romance speaking countries, especially in Northern France. Situated between the Rhineland in the East, Flanders in the North, and Brittany in the West, it was exposed to literary currents and legendary tradition from three sides. The earliest contact with the Brendan tale was made, no doubt, through Brittany, where, according to the *Vita*,[17] on one of his travels St. Brendan had founded a monastery near St. Malo. A near-by village, called "St. Brendan" today still perpetuates his name and the native population still reveres him in prayers.[18] The Navigator's influence can also be observed in Old Breton literature in connection with St. Malo, the national saint of Brittany. The *Vita Sancti Machuti,* written towards the end of the ninth or at the beginning of the tenth century, contains a goodly number of chapters found in a similar form in the *Navigatio*; moreover, St. Brendan is made a British Abbot and St. Malo his disciple.[19] This superposition, quite a common phenomenon in Celtic hagiography, has also found its expression in the *Navigatio* itself, where a few Latin manuscripts contain an interpolation which makes St. Machutus (St. Malo) one of the fourteen companions of St. Brendan.[20] The spread of the Navigator's *Gloria posthuma* from Brittany to France and the East seems to have occurred at the beginning of the tenth century (919-20), when the complete destruction of Brittany by the Normans brought about the unhappy exodus of the whole population.[21] Carrying with them the relics of their saints and the manuscripts salvaged from the marauding Normans, thousands of priests, monks and nuns took refuge in the neighboring countries, in France, Lotharingia, Flanders, and Germany, thus spreading their folklore and hagiographical writings to the East and North. In this connection it is interesting to observe that the barbaric conquerors, after establishing themselves in the new homes and accepting the customs and language of the conquered, themselves became intrigued by the maritime exploits of St. Brendan. Only thus can one account for the translation of the *Navigatio* in the first decades of the twelfth century (70) into Norman French, the first translation made into a Romance language. At the request of Adeliza (or Matilda) of Louvain, the wife of Henry I, the Norman poet Apostolicus Benedict (71) composed a lengthy poem in which with only very slight changes he adapts the various adventures of the *Navigatio* as they are found in the Latin version. This metrical version, edited repeatedly by modern scholars such as Hermann Suchier (72), Francisque Michel (73), Th. Auracher (74), Margaret M. Sherwood (75), Karl Bartsch (76), and E. G. R. Waters (77), has appealed to the Normans to such a degree that, quite ignorant of the evidence of the Latin original Latin source, they re-translated[22] it from Anglo-Norman, first into Latin prose (78) and then into Latin verse (79, 80). Numerous studies have been made of the many aspects and features of this Anglo-Norman text: Johann Vising established the stemma of the manuscripts (81), K. Brekke studied the morphology (82), Richard Birkenhoff the metrical structure (83), Wilhelm Hammer the dialectical pecularities (84), Max Wien the interrelation of the manuscripts (85), Heinrich Calmund the phonology (86) and Erich Pfitzner the Latin source (78). There also existed several other Old French versions, most of them in an abridged form and adapted for use as legendaries and other religious purposes. The most important texts were edited by Achille

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[13] Concerning the historial voyages of St. Brendan to Scotland and Britain cf. D. P. Grosjean, "Vita S. Brendani Clonfertensis e codice Dubliniensi," *Analecta Bollandiana*, XLVIII (1930), 111, 113.

[14] One of the most famous storehouses and centers of dissemination of Celtic literature was Glastonbury; for "The Lives of Irish Saints" and "The Irish in Glastonbury", cf. James F. Kenney, *The Sources for the Early History of Ireland* I (New York, 1929), pp. 606-08.

[15] The fact that St. Brendan was regarded as an English saint is also shown by William Caxton who, when he enriched his *Legenda Aurea* with English saints, also added the Brendan legend to his list; cf. Rudolf Kapp, *Heilige und Heiligenleben in England* (Halle, 1934), p. 34; also F. Bond, *Dedications and Patron Saints of English Churches* (1914), p. 98.

[16] Cf. G. Becker, *Catalogi Bibliothecarum Antiqui* (Bonn, 1885), no. 109, Whitby (c. 1180), p. 227: *Vita sancti Brendani;* no. 117, *Ecclesia Dunelmensis, saec.* xii, p. 242: *Vita sancti Brendani.*

[17] D. P. Grosjean, *op. cit.*, p. 113: *Et in alia regione in Brittania monasterium nomine Ailech sanctissimus Brendanus fundavit.* Ailech is the present Alet, near St. Malo.

[18] In the neighborhood of this village is also a grotto, dedicated to St. Brendan. Of

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this grotto D. F. Plaine in his *Vie de s. Malo* (Rennes, 1886), p. 58, n. 4 says: *On montre encore, sur le rocher aujourd'hui dénudé et inhabité de Césembre la grotte, dite de Saint Brendan.* According to Baring-Gould and Fisher, *Lives of the British Saints* I (London, 1907), pp. 233-62, it was formerly the custom of girls of this neighborhood to invoke St. Brendan to obtain a husband by saying: *Bienheureux S. Brendan, baillez-nous un homme. On vous donnera un cierge, tant plus tôt, tant plus gros.*

[19] Cf. J. F. Kenney, *op. cit.*, p. 417-18.

[20] The interpolation reads as follows: *inter quos fuit preclarus ac Deo dignus adolescens Macutus qui ab infancia sua est electus quique usque ad finem vite sue permansit in Dei laudibus. Quod si quis noscere voluerit perlegens eius venerabilia gesta inveniet eius opera prima et novissima que preclara habentur.* Only ten (among more than one hundred) manuscripts show this interpolation, viz. Paris, B.N. 5348 and 2333A; Chartes 51; Rouen 661 and 1393; Brussels 7672-4 and 4241; Brit. Mus., *Cott. Vesp.* A XIV and BX; Dublin, Trin. Coll. E 3.8. In age they range from the twelfth to the seventeenth century. *Ms* Rouen 661 is the oldest (twelfth century).

[21] Cf. A. de la Borderie, *Histoire de Bretagne* II (Paris, 1898), p. 364 ff.; E. Durtelle de Saint-Sauveur, *Histoire de Bretagne* I (Rennes, 1935), p. 101 ff.

[22] The recent discovery of another translation from the same A.-N. poem into Latin, identical in contents, yet independent of the first one, will make it advisable to re-examine Erich Pfitzner's thesis (78) in which he corrects Charles Plummer (52a) concerning the question: Which is primary, the Latin or the Anglo-Norman text? This second translation is being prepared for publication.

Jubinal (87) and Carl Wahlund (88). Textual studies were made by Alfred Schulze (89), Louis de Backer (90), and Alphonse Bayot (91); modern French translations were made available by Paul Tuffrau (92) and Jean Marchand (93). Turning from Northern France to the South and to Provence, one observes only a rather modest interest in vernacular translations. In Old Provençal only one Brendan manuscript has come down to our times. It is a shortened version in the form of a legendary, edited by Carl Wahlund (94).

St. Brendan's *Gloria posthuma* also reached Italy, where his *Navigatio* was known particularly in the Northern parts.[23] The centers of interest obviously were seafaring cities such as Venice and Genoa, the starting places for so many mediaeval expeditions. The few Old Italian translations[24] extant, all of them of more recent date, were edited by E. G. T. Waters (95), Francesco Novati (96), and Mario Esposito (97a). M. Esposito also commented on the relationship between the Italian versions and the Latin original (97b).

Aside from a Catalan translation (98) no traces of vernacular translations or studies can be found in the languages of the Iberian peninsula, although its population seems to have been acquainted with the *Insula Sancti Brendani.* Peninsular folklore reports of a *Insula de San Borondon* (=*Insula Sancti Brendani*), in which—a far-off echo of the Arabic invasions—King Roderich of Spain and Don Sebastian of Portugal are said to have found refuge. At the times of modern discoveries the *Navigatio,* because of its nautical aspects and colonial possibilities, was no doubt studied largely for practical reasons. Discoverers, explorers, and economists of the Peninsula had, however, little need for vernacular translations of the story, for their languages were so close to Latin and, indeed, many may even have been familiar with Latin itself. These facts may account for the absence of vernacular translations in the tongues of the Iberian peninsula.

C. Translations into Celtic languages

Since Ireland, Scotland, Britain and Brittany form the background of the Brendan story, the *Vita* as well as the *Navigatio*, one might justly expect to find a plethora of vernacular writings in Gaelic, Welsh and Breton, ancient as well as modern. It was within these territories that the seafaring abbot had made his actual, historical travels and set up his monastic foundations. It was here through his clan and monastic *familia* that his popularity and reputation were established, developed, handed down from generation to generation, and are still preserved today. Written proofs of this tradition, however, as far as the *Navigatio* is concerned, are not available. They are either lost in the turbulent periods of political and economic strife, from which these lands had suffered so greatly, or they are still part of that mass of unedited writings which patiently wait for the resuscitating hand of a skilled celticist. True, there are some related writings extant in Old Irish and Middle Irish, such as the *Betha Brenainn* (52b), a Middle Irish poem in honor of St. Brendan (99), and a few stories dealing with St. Brendan's life, such as his birth, his conversation with an angel, his conversation with Bishop Moinenn on the subject of death, the fish story of Dobar-chú, and the story of the three clerical students; but they have no relationship to the *Navigatio*. Among all these manuscripts only one might be significant in this connection, a Gaelic variant of the *Navigatio* (100). It contains five episodes (the fish story, the whirlpool, the glance into hell, Judas, and the *Terra repromissionis*) which can be identified with similar episodes in the *Navigatio*.[25] The manuscripts, however, are of rather recent date, and their origin and provenance is unknown. Their position in the large field of Brendaniana deserves further investigation. At any rate, the absence of any direct reflection of the *Navigatio* from mediaeval Celtic literature will certainly not contradict, but rather confirm, the view expressed in recent research, namely that the *Navigatio*, both in origin and development is indigenous to the continent. There are, however, several contributions to the Brendan story by modern Gaelic authors, the most important one by John O'Kelly (101). Most of these authors are concerned with one particular and no doubt attractive question which the *Navigatio* ultimately proposes to the modern scholar of geography: does the *Terra repromissionis* of St. Brendan's *Navigatio* represent a pre-Viking discovery of "God's own country": America? Fascinating though this question is, the answer to it has no immediate relevance to the conclusions presented in this study.

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[23] The idea of a possible influence exerted by early insular writers in such places as Bobbio, Vercellae, Verona and others is perhaps not too far-fetched to deserve serious consideration. "Scottish" (insular) influences are quite apparent in the early MSS coming from these places, as shown by E. A. Lowe, *Codd. Lat. Antiqu.* (passim), and others.

[24] Dante's connection with the Brendan story is treated by P. Villari, "La Leggenda di S. Brandano," *Antiche Leggende e Traduzioni che illustran la Divina Commedia* (Pisa, 1865), pp. 82-109.

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[25] For manuscripts and editions, cf. J. F. Kenny, *op. cit.*, pp. 419-20.

(i) "Von sente Brandan," pp. 51-93; Middle German poem of the 13th cent. Parchment. *Ms*: Berlin, *Germ. Oct.* 56, fols. 13^v-50^r; 1934 verses. *Inc.* Ein herre der was ûz Trierlant; *expl.* des hilf uns, herre Jêsû Crist. Amen (ii) "Van dem hilgen sunte Brandan," pp. 127-52; Middle Low German poem of the 15th cent. Parchment. *Ms* Wolfenbüttel, *Helmstädt* 1203, fols. 81^r-107^v. 1165 verses. *Inc.* In goddes namen heve ek an; *expl.* des help uns, hêre Jêsû Crist (iii) "Von sand Brandon, ein hübsch lieblich lesen, was er wunders auf dem mör erfaren hat," pp. 163-192 (incunabulum, Augsburg, undated); *inc.* Es was hie vor ein heiliger apt; *expl.* Des helf uns der vatter, der sun und der heilig geist. Amen.

(13) Paul Jacob Bruns, "Reisen des h. Brandanus," *Romantische und andere Gedichte in alt-plattdeutscher Sprache aus einer Handschrift der akademischen Bibliothek zu Helmstädt* (Berlin, 1798), fols. 159-216. *Ms* Wolfenbüttel, *Helmstädt* 1203, fols. 81^r-107^v. Paper; 15th cent. 1165 verses; *inc.* In goddes namen heve ek an; *expl.* des help uns, hêre Jêsû Crist.

(14) Carl Selmer and Carl F. Bayerschmidt, "An unpublished Low German Prose Version of the *Navigatio Sancti Brendani*," *Germanic Review*, XXX (1955), 83-91. Four unnumbered leaves of the *Legenda Aurea* (5851 e e 16) of the British Museum, London. *Inc.*: Sanctus Brandanus wasz ein hilliger abt, *expl.*: und schedede darmit van em.

(15) F. D. Graeter, "St. Brandan," *Zeitschr. Odina und Teutona* (Breslau, 1812).

(16) E. Kausler, *Die Reimchronik von Flandern* (Tübingen, 1840), p. 3.

(17) F. J. Mone (a) *Uebersicht der niederländischen Literatur alter Zeit* (Tübingen, 1838), p. 100 ff. (b) "Die Sage von Judas Ischariot," *Anzeiger für die Kunde der deutschen Vorzeit,* VII (1838), 552 (c) review of Ph. Blomaert's edition in *Anzeiger, loc. cit.,* VIII (1839), 255-59.

(18) J. Jonckbloet, *Geschiednis der middelnederlandsche Dichtkunst* I (1851), p. 412.

(19) E. Wilken, *ed., Reinaert* (Amsterdam, 1836), p. xvii.

(20) A. Martin, "St. Brandans Reise," *Zeitschr. für deutsche Philologie,* XI (1869), 162.

(21) Ph. Blomaert (a) "Reis van sinte Brandaen," *Oudvlaemsche Gedichten der xii, xiii^e en xiv^e Eewen* I (Ghent, 1838), pp. 91-120; II, pp. 1-28. Paper; circa 1410; 2198 verses. *Ms* Brussels, Royal Libr. Coll.; dialect: West Middle Netherlandish with Flemish admixture; *inc.* Hoe dicke se gode baden; *expl.* ende alle die horen lesen euwelike (b) *Oudvlaemsche Gedichten, op. cit.,* II (Ghent, 1841), pp. 1-28. Paper; circa 1370; 2284 verses. *Ms*: Stuttgart, *Comburg Coll.,* fols. 179^r-192^v; dialect: West Middle Netherlandish with Brabant admixture; *inc.* Nu verneemt hoe over lanc; *expl.* dor diere liever moeder eere.

(22) W. G. Brill, "Van sinte Brandaen," *Bibliotheek van Middelnederlandsche Letterkunde* VI (Groningen, 1871), pp. 1-77; cf. 21b.

(23) E. Bonebakker, *Van sente Brandane naar het Comburgsche en het Huthemsche Handschrift, opniew uitgegeven* (Amsterdam, 1894); cf. 21a, b.

(24) Martje Draak, *De Reis van sinte Brandaan* (Amsterdam, 1949); cf. 21a, b; comprises Blomaert's variants and Brill's text. (Translation into modern Dutch by Bertus Aafjes (*ibid.*).

(25) Elco Verwijs (a) "Het Middelnederlandsche Gedicht van sinte Brandane," *Verslagen en Mededeelingen der K. Ak. van Wetensch., Afd. Letterk., 2de reeks,* II (1872), 231-54 (b) "Dr. Brill's uitgave van Sinte Brandaen," *De Taal- en Letterbode,* III (1872), 235-56.

(26) J. Bergsma, *Bijdrage tot de wordingsgeschiedenis en de critiek der Middelnederlandsche Brandaen-teksten* (Groningen, 1887).

(27) H. Zimmer (a) "Keltische Beiträge. Brendans Meerfahrt," *Zeitschr. für dt. Altertum,* XXXIII (1889), 129-220; 257-338 (b) "Ueber die Bedeutung des irischen Elements für die mittelalterliche Cultur," *Preuss. Jahrbücher,* LIX (1887), 220-56.

(28) Hermann Suchier, "Brandans Seefahrt. Anglonormannischer Text der Hs. Cotton Vesp. B. X," *Böhmers Romanische Studien,* I (1875), 559-63.

(29) A. G. van Hamel, *Primitieve Ierse Taalstudie* (Amsterdam, 1946).

(30) J. de Goeje, "La Légende de Saint Brandan," *Actes du 8ᵉ Congrès International des Orientalistes, tenu en 1889 à Stockholm et à Christiania, sect. sémitique* (Leide, 1893), 43-76.

(31) J. W. Muller (a) "Brandaris en Sint-Brandarius," *Nederl. Tidskr. en Letterk.,* XVI (1895) (b) "Nog iets over Sint-Brandarius," *ibid.,* XVIII (1897) (c) "Sporen van Oudgermansche en andere overleveringen in middeleeuwsch-Nederlandsche Geschriften," *ibid.,* XXX (1911).

(32) *Gesamtkatalog der Wiegendrucke* IV (Leipzig, 1930), nos. 5004-12.

(33) Richard Benz, *Sanct Brandans Meerfahrt* (Jena, 1927), pp. 5-75; modernized edition of the Volksbuch, based on *Ms* Heidelberg, *cod. pal. germ.* 60 of the 15th cent.; *inc.* Hie hebt sich an Sanct Brandans Buch / Was er Wunders erfahren hat. / Es war hievor ein heiliger Abt; *expl.* Das helf uns der Vater, der Sohn und der heilig Geist. Amen.

(34) F. Podleiszek, "Deutsche Literatur. Volks- und Schwankbücher II," *Volksbücher von Weltweite und Abenteuerlust* (Leipzig, 1936), pp. 37-57; modernized edition of the Volksbuch; *inc.* Es was hie vor ein heiliger apt; *expl.* Das helf uns der Vatter, der Sun und der Heilig Geist. Amen.

(35) Gustav Schirmer, *Zur Brendanus-Legende* (Leipzig, 1889).

(36) Carl Selmer (a) "The Beginnings of the St. Brendan Legend on the Continent," *Cath. Hist. Review,* XXIX (1943), 169-76 (b) "The Brendan Legend in Old German Literature," *Journal of the American Irish Historical Society,* XXXII (1941), 161-69 (c) "The Irish St. Brendan Legend in Lower Germany and on the Baltic Coast," *Traditio,* IV (1946), 408-13 (d) "The Origin of Brandenburg (Prussia), the St. Brendan Legend, and the *Scoti* of the Tenth Century," *Traditio,* VII (1949-51), 416-33 (e) "St. Brendan, the Navigator, in an Old German Cisiojanus of the 15th century," *Symposium,* IV (1948), 408-11 (f) "A Study of the Latin Manuscripts of the *Navigatio Sancti Brendani,*" *Scriptorium,* III (1950), 177-82 (g) "An Unknown Manuscript of the *Navigatio Sancti Brendani* in U. S. A.," *Scriptorium,* IV (1951), 100-103.

(37) Rudolf Palgen, *Brandansage und Purgatorio* (Heidelberg, 1934).

(38) Sebastian Merkle, "Die Sabbathruhe in der Hölle," *Römische Quartalschrift,* IX (1895), 484-509.

(39) Eugen Kölbing, "Christian von Troyes' Yvain und die Brandanuslegende," *Zeitschr. für vergl. Literaturgeschichte,* N.F., XI-XII (1897-98), 442-48.

(40) C. H. Baer, "Des Heiligen Brendan Kapelle und Legende in Basel", *Basler Jahrbuch* (1939), 31-62.

(41) C. R. Unger, *ed., Heilaga Manna søgor* (Christiania, 1877); transl. into German by Carl Wahlund, "Ein norweg.-isl. Brendan-Fragment," *Die altfranzösische Prosaübersetzung von Brendans Meerfahrt* (Upsala, 1900), pp. xliv-xlviii; dialect: Norwegian with Icelandish admixture; contents: the theft of the bridle, the procurator, the isle of the sheep, the Easter celebration, and the birds' island.

(42) Torsten Dahlberg, "Der hochdeutsche Zweig der Brendanüberlieferung," *Suomalaisen Tiedeakatemian Toimituksia* (*Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae*), Ser. B, LXXXIV (1954), 53-66.

(43) John Hennig, "A Note on Ireland's Place in the literary Tradition of St. Brendan," *Traditio,* VIII (1952), 397-402.

(44) J. Runeberg, "Le Conte de l'Ile-Poisson," *Mémoires de la Societé Néo-philologique à Helsingfors,* III (1902), 343 ff.

(45) Hans A. Djurhuus, *Sankta Brandan* (Tórshavn, 1936).

(46) W. Caxton, "St. Brandan," *The Golden Legend or Lives of the Saints as Englished by W. Caxton* VII (London, 1900-1935).

(47) Thomas Wright, *Sanct Brandan; a Medieval Legend of the Sea, in English Verse and Prose* (Publ. by Percy Society, XVI, London, 1844). (a) "The metrical Life of St. Brandan," pp. 1-34. *Ms Harl.* 2277, fols. 41^v-47^v; 14th cent.; *inc.* Seint Brendan the holi man was ʒund of Irlande; *expl.* Nou God ous bringe to thulke joye that his soule wende to. Amen (b) "Prose Life of St. Brandan," *ibid.*, pp. 34-56; this is Wynkyn de Worde's English version of the Golden Legend of the year 1527, dissolved into prose; both versions are reprinted in Denis O'Donoghue, *Brendaniana* (Dublin, 1893), pp. 359-79, 380-93; *inc.* Here begynneth the Lyfe of Saynt Brandon. Saynt Brandon, the holy man, was a monke; *expl.* that he have mercy on us, to whom he gyven laude, honour, and empyre, world withouten ende. Amen (c) *The Lyfe of Saynt Brandon* (London, 1844); reprint of the edition of the Percy Society; one copy preserved in the Greenville Library of the British Museum.

(48) Carl Horstmann, "Sanct Brandan," *The Early South-English Legendary or Lives of Saints, EETS* LXXXVII (London, 1887), pp. 220-240; metrical version of the 13th cent.; 736 verses. *Ms Laud.* 108, fols. 104^r-110^v, and coll. of *Harl.* 2277, *Ashmol* 43, *Vernon* 107, *Lambeth* 223 and Trin. Coll. Cambr. R. 3, 25; *inc.* Seint Brendan, þe holi man, was here of ovre land; *expl.* ase is bodi was i-do. Gode bringue us to þulke Ioye: that is soule wente to. Amen; reprinted in *Archiv für das Studium der Neueren Sprachen und Literatur,* LIII (1874), 16-48.

(49) Martha Bälz, *Die Mittelenglische Brendanlegende des Glousterlegendars* (Berlin, 1909).

(50) Denis O'Donoghue, *Brendaniana. St. Brendan, the Voyager, in Story and Legend* (Dublin, 1893), pp. 359-93.

(51) The Marquess of Bute (John P. C. Stuart), "Brendan's Fabulous Voyage," *The Scottish Review,* XXI (Jan. and April 1893), 35 and 73; also *idem,* "St. Brendan," *County Louth Archaeolog. Society Journal,* II (1909), 109-23.

(52) Charles Plummer (a) "Some new Light on the Brendan Legend," *Zeitschr. für Celt. Philologie,* V (1904), 124-41 (b) *Bethada Náem nErenn* I (1922), pp. 96-102; II, pp. 93-98, 337-38.

(53) Eleanor Hull, "The Legend of St. Brendan," *The New Irish Review,* IV (1896), 356.

(54) James Wilkie, *S. Brendan, the Voyager and his Mystic Quest* (London, 1916).

(55) James F. Kenney (a) *The Sources for the Early History of Ireland* (New York, 1929), pp. 419-20 (b) "The Legend of St. Brendan," *Royal Society of Canada. Proceedings and Transactions,* XIV (1920), 51-67 (c) "The Legend of St. Brendan," *Revue Celtique,* XXXIX (1922), 283-95.

(56) Joseph Dunn, "The Brendan Problem," *Cath. Hist. Review,* VI (Jan. 1921), 395-477.

(57) George A. Little, *Brendan, the Navigator. An Interpretation* (Dublin, 1946).

(58) S. Evans, "Judas Iscariot's Paradise," *Brother Fabian's Manuscript* (London and Cambridge, 1885).

(59) W. Creizenach, "Judas Ischarioth in Legende und Sage des Mittelalters," *Beitr. zur Gesch. der dt. Sprache und Lit.,* II (1876), 177.

(60) Sebastian Merkle, "Die Sabbatruhe in der Hölle," *Celtic Review*, I (1905), 135-47.

(61) P. F. Baum (a) "The Metrical Legend of Judas Iscariot," *PMLA*, XXXI (1916), 481-632 (b) "Judas' Sunday Rest," *Mod. Language Review*, XVIII (1923), 168-82.

(62) A. C. L. Brown (a) "The wonderful Flower that came to St. Brendan," *The Manly Anniversary Studies in Language and Literature* (Chicago, 1923), pp. 295-99 (b) "Barintus," *Revue Celtique*, XXII (1893), 339-44.

(63) M. M. Williamson, *Some Observations on the Legends of St. Brendan; a Comparison of an Episode in the Navigatio with one in Perlesvaus and the Voyage of Maelduin* (Chicago, 1933).

(64) Ludwig Bieler, "Casconius, the Monster of the *Navigatio Brendani*," *Eigse*, V^2 (1947), 139-40.

(65) Denis Florence McCarthy, "The Voyage of St. Brendan," *Dublin University Magazine*, XVI (Jan. 1848), 60-74.

(66) Matthew Arnold, "St. Brendan," *Poems by Matthew Arnold* (London, 1885).

(67) J. Hudson, "Saint Brendan, a Poem," *Scots Magazine*, XXIV (1899), 342.

(68) Dominick Daly, "The Legend of St. Brendan," *Celtic Review*, I (1905), 135-47.

(69) David Lewis Moore, *The Life, Love, and Death of Saint Brendan. The spiritual Pilgrimage of America's Patron Sinner. A Movie* (Hoboken, 1946), pp. 1-250.

B. The Romance Languages

(70) R. L. G. Ritchie, "The Date of the Voyage of St. Brendan," *Medium Aevum*, XIX (1950), 64-66.

(71) E. Wahlberg, "Sur le nom de l'auteur du Voyage de Saint Brendan," *Studia Neophilologica*, XII (1939), 46-55.

(72) Hermann Suchier, "Brandan's Seefahrt," *Böhmers Romanische Studien*, I (1875), 553-86. Metrical version of 1835 verses of the twelfth cent.; dialect: Anglo-Norman. *Ms* Brit. Mus. *Cotton Vesp.* B.X., fols. 1^r-11^v; also contains variants of fragm. *Ms* Oxf., Bodl. *Rawl.* D 913, fol. 85 (310 verses); *inc.* Donna Aaliz la reine; *expl.* par lui enuunt plusur que mil.

(73) Francisque Michel, *Les Voyages merveilleux de Saint Brandan à la recherche du paradis terrestre, publié d'après le manuscrit du Musée Britannique avec introduction. Légende en vers du xii^e siècle* (Paris 1878); cf. (72).

(74) Th. Auracher, "Der Brandan in der Arsenalhandschrift BLF 283," *Zeitschr. für Romanische Philologie*, II (1878), 438-57. Written 1276; dialect: Franco-Piccardish. *Ms* Paris, Arsenal 3516 (formerly BLF 283), fols. 96^r-100^v.

(75) Margaret Meriam Sherwood, *Le Voyage de Saint Brandan. Anglo-Norman Poem of the twelfth Century* (New York, 1918), pp. 1-235. Typewritten.

(76) Karl Bartsch, "Saint Brandan," *La Langue et les littératures françaises depuis le ix^e jusqu' au xi^e siècle* (Paris, 1887), vv. 1-354.

(77) E. G. R. Waters, *The Anglo-Norman Voyage of St. Brendan by Benedeit* (Oxford, 1928). *Ms* Brit. Mus. *Cotton Vesp.* B.X. (1), 1^r-11^v. Metrical version of 1840 lines. Coll. with *Ms* York 16 K 12, Dean and Chapter Lib., 23r-36r; Oxf., Bodl. *Rawl.* D 913, fol. 85; Paris, Bibl. Nat. *nouv. acqu. fr.* 4503, 19^v-42^r; Arsenal 3516 (cf. 74). Latin text in footnotes.

(78) Erich Pfitzner, *Das anglonormannische Gedicht von Brendan als Quelle einer lateinischen Prosafassung* (Halle, 1910); also in *Zeitschr. für Rom. Phil.*, XXXV (1911), 31-66.

(79) Ernst Martin, "Lat. Uebersetzung des altfranz. Gedichtes auf St. Brandan," *Zeitschr. für dt. Altertum,* XVI (1873), 289 ff. Metrical translation of the Anglo-Norman poem into Latin of the 13th cent.; 311 quatrains. *Ms* Brit. Mus. *Cotton Vesp.* D IX, fols. 1^r-9^v; *inc.* Vana vanis garriat pagina pagana; *expl.* Vigeat et valeat Alexander meus. Amen.

(80) P. F. Moran, *Acta Sancti Brendani: Original Documents connected with the Life of St. Brendan, Patron of Kerry and Clonfert* (Dublin, 1872), pp. 45-84.

(81) Johann Vising, *Etude sur le dialect anglo-normand du xii^e siècle* (Upsala, 1882).

(82) K. Brekke, *Etude sur la flexion dans le Voyage de S. Brandan, poème Anglo-Norman du xii^e siècle* (Paris, 1884).

(83) Richard Birkenhoff, *Ueber Metrum und Reim der altfranzösischen Brandan-legende* (Marburg, 1884); also in *Ausgaben und Abhandlungen aus dem Gebiete der Romanischen Philologie,* XIX (1884), 1-95.

(84) Wilhelm Hammer, *Die Sprache der anglo-normannischen Brandanlegende* (Halle, 1885); also in *Zeitschr. für Romanische Philologie,* IX (1885), 75-115.

(85) Max Wien, *Das Verhältnis der Handschriften der anglo-normannischen Brandanlegende* (Halle, 1886).

(86) Heinrich Calmund, *Prolegomena zu einer kritischen Ausgabe des ältesten französischen Brendanlebens* (Bonn, 1902), pp. 1-207.

(87) Achille Jubinal, *La Légende latine de s. Brandaines, avec une traduction inédite en prose et en poésie romanes* (Paris, 1836), pp. 1-164. (a) "De Saint Brandainnes le Moine," pp. 57-104; 12th cent. *Ms* Paris, Bibl. Nat. *fr.* 7595, fols. 254^r-267^v; *inc.* Brandainnes fu uns sains hom; *expl.* et là fina-il les jors de se uie em pais. Amen. Chi défine de sains Brandainnes et des merveilles k'il trouva en le mer d'Irlande (b) "De Saint Brandans, qui erra vii ans par mer, et des merveilles qu'il trouva," pp. 105-164; written 1247 at Ernoul, Metz; metrical version; *inc.* Entendés ci de Saint Brandan; *expl.* Quanques Dius lor et révelé. *Ms* Paris, Bibl. Nat. *fr.* 7534, fols. 254^r-262^v.

(88) Carl Wahlund, *Die altfranzösische Prosaübersetzung von Brendans Meerfahrt, nach der Pariser Hdschr. Nat.-Bibl. fr. 1553* (Skrifter utgifna af K. Humanistiska Vetenskaps-Samfundet IV, Upsala, 1900), pp. 1-335. (a) "De saint Brandainne le moine," pp. 3-101; prose, written about 1280; dialect: North East French. *Ms* Paris, Bibl. Nat. *fr.* 1553, fols. 255^r-287^v; *inc.* Brandainnes fu uns sains hom; *expl.* et la fina il les iors de se uie em pais. Amen. Chi define de saint Brandain et des merueilles k'il trouua en le mer d'Irlande (b) "De monseigneur saint Brandan," pp. 103-201; 13th cent.; dialect: Franco-Picardish. *Ms* Paris, Bibl. Maz. 1716, fols. 36^r-43^v; *inc.* mō . . . ur . . . Bran . . . qui moult; *expl.* qui uit et regne et regnera auec cui nos puissōs regnier in secula seculorum. Amen. (c) On pp. xxxix-xliii and 205-13 Wahlund gives sample pages (and photographs) of seventeen Old French Brendan legendaries.

(89) Alfred Schulze (a) "Textkritisches zum altfranzösischen Prosa-Brendan," *Zeitschr. für Romanische Philologie,* XXXI (1907), 188-189 (b) "Zur Brendanlegende," *Zeitschr. für Romanische Philologie,* XXX (1906), 257-79.

(90) Louis de Backer, "La Légende flammande de S. Brandon et sa bibliographie," *Edouard Rouveyre et Oct. Uzanne: Miscellanées bibliographiques* (Paris, 1878), pp. 1-34.

(91) Alphonse Bayot, "Le Voyage de S. Brendan dans les légendiers français.

Essai de classement des manuscrits," *Mélanges d'Histoire offerts à Charles Moeller* I (Louvain, 1914), pp. 456-67; cf. (88c).

(92) Paul Tuffrau, *Le Merveilleux voyage de Saint Brandan à la recherche du paradis. Légende latine du ix*^{e} *siècle* (Paris, 1925), pp. 1-199; translation of four conflated texts.

(93) Jean H. Marchand, "Le Voyage de Saint Brendan à la recherche du paradis, par Benoît,' *L'autre Monde au Moyen Age: Voyages et Visions* (Paris, 1940), pp. 2-77.

(94) Carl Wahlund, "Eine altprovenzalische Prosaübersetzung von Brendans Meerfahrt," *Beiträge zur Romanischen und Englischen Philologie. Festgabe für Wendelin Foerster,* (Halle, 1902), pp. 175-98; shortened version of the 13th cent. *Ms* Paris, Bibl. Nat. *fr.* 9759, fols. 210^{r}-253^{v}; dialect: High-Languedoc; *inc.* Lo benaurat sant Branda mot foc de mot noble linatge; *expl.* en las mas dels seus discipols mot gloriosament sen anec a Jhu Xpt finic a xii dies de iun en lan de la incarnacion de Jhu Xpt mccxi; the Latin text is inserted from 249^{v}-253^{v}.

(95) E. G. T. Waters, "An Old Italian Version of the *Navigatio S. Brendani,*" *Publ. of the Philological Society,* X (1931), 42-78; written about 1300. *Ms* Tours, Bibl. Mun. 1008 (214 R), fols. 214^{r}-227^{r}; *inc.* Questo est lo libro del legere di sancto Brandano et dei suoi fratri. Sancto Blandano (sic!), filiuolo de Finloca; *exp.* E i dì dela sua vita quine finicte in pace coll aiuto del nosso singuore Jesù Christo qui cum Patre et Spiritu Sancto vivit et regnat in secula seculorum. Amen. Explicit liber sancti Blandani. Deo Gratias. Amen.

(96) Francesco Novati, *La Navigatio s. Brendani in antico Veneziano* (Bergamo, 1896). *Ms* Rome, Bibl. Naz. *Palat.* 120, fols. 1^{v}-37^{r}. *Inc.* Misier sen Brandan, filio de finlochia; *expl.* defina lo di dela soa morte. Amen.

(97) Mario Esposito (a) "Un fragment de la *Navigatio Sancti Brendani* en ancien Venetien," *Mélanges philologiques,* V (1921), 22 ff. (b) "Sur la *Navigatio Sancti Brendani* et ses versions Italiennes," *Romania,* LXIV (1938), 328 ff.

(98) L. Riber, "Els camins del Paradís perdut," *Biblioteca Literària,* XXXI (1920), 42-189. Reprint in L. Riber, "Les meravelloses navigaciones de Sant Brandan i els seus monjos," *Obres Completes* (Barcelona, 1949), pp. 1245-1319. Used by F. Novati (96).

C. The Celtic Languages

(99) Kuno Meyer, "Ein mittelirisches Gedicht auf Brandan, den Meerfahrer," *Sitzungsberichte der kgl. Preuss. Akademie der Wissenschaften,* LXXVI (1912), 436-43.

(100) Rudolf Thurneysen, "Eine Variante der Brendan Legende," *Zeitschr. für Celtische Philologie,* X (1915), 408-20; text and German translation. *Ms* Dublin, Royal Ir. Academy *Liber Fergusiorum,* fols. 50^{v}-61^{r}; 15th century. Coll. with other copies of the 15th cent.

(101) John Joseph O'Kelly, *Beatha Bhréandain. A imtheachta is a iomrámha* (Dublin, 1915), pp. 1-93.

Myth and Mediaeval Literature: *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight*

CHARLES MOORMAN

IT SEEMS obvious that much of the current interest in the place of myth in literature, as manifested in an ever-increasing number of books and articles on the subject, stems from the fact that myth study can be said to be the logical successor, not in terms of literary influence, but of "intellectual fashion,"[1] to the New Criticism. It will be conceded that the New Critics have achieved their ends; they have succeeded in making even the most conservative academicians concentrate their efforts, both in print and in the classroom, toward bringing their peripheral studies of aesthetics, sources, biography, and literary history to bear directly upon the illumination of a text in hand. The myth critics, on the other hand, bid fair to returning the serious study of literature to a point of view which the New Critics originally banded together to attack. These mythographers have forsaken that basic doctrine of the New Criticism which insisted on the integrity of the individual work of art, and have returned for inspiration to those sections of the library given over to myth, folklore, anthropology, psychology, and comparative religion.

A glance at the critical barrage directed at *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight,* and for that matter at almost any other place of mediaeval literature, which seems particularly susceptible to this sort of treatment, will show how the myth critic has shifted the focus of interest away from purely literary values and back again to the most sterile sorts of source hunting and parallel finding. Just as the typical nineteenth-century academician regarded *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight* only as a storehouse of information on mediaeval armor, architecture, and venery, so do the myth critics insist that the poem is only a repository of myth patterns and thus direct their efforts to elucidating Gawain's relationship to the British Jack-in-the-Green, the Celtic sun god, and the omnipresent vegetation god. A very brief review of two of these myth-minded critical treatments of *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight* should serve to demonstrate that, despite their pieties in theory, the myth critics have in practise shown that they believe that once they have discovered the myth pattern inherent in a piece of literature, they have illuminated and settled once and for all the critical problems presented by that particular work.

Our first critic, the late Heinrich Zimmer, is a follower of C. G. Jung, the disciple of Freud. The Jungian school takes as a point of departure Jung's concept of a "collective unconscious" in which mythological archetypes "correspond to certain *collective* structural elements of the human psyche in general, and like the morphological elements of the human body, are *inherited.*"[2] The Jungian critic thus first "circumscribes" the central archetype present in the work (which can never be exactly described because "it does not refer to any thing that is or has been conscious"[3]), demonstrates its universality by bringing to light a number of parallel manifestations of the myth, and finally, by way of conclusion, states that in this particular poem we find an unconscious manifestation of the archetype. Professor Zimmer follows this general pattern rather closely in examining *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight* in the course of a volume entitled *The King and the Corpse,*[4] the unifying thesis of which is, as I understand it, that the hero's quest is essentially a psychiatric process by means of which the innocent hero, in undergoing the *rite de passage* which initiates him into the life of the whole man, gives up his conscious self and intellectual identity in order to be guided by his brute instincts to the bottom of his personality and there unite conscious and unconscious, intellectual and animal existences.

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[1] The phrase is Stanley Edgar Hyman's: "Myth, Ritual, and Nonsense," *Kenyon Review,* XI, 3 (1949), 455. The reader is directed to this article for a useful critical summary of the currently popular beliefs regarding the place of myth in literature.

[2] C. G. Jung and C. Kerenyi, *Essays on a Science of Mythology,* trans. R. F. C. Hull (New York, Bollingen Series XXII, 1949), p. 102.

[3] *Ibid.,* p. 104.

[4] New York, Bollingen Series XI, 1948.

In his extended discussion of *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight,* Zimmer finds that the archetypal pattern which the poem reflects is that of the initiation of the hero, the *rite de passage*, which in turn involves the death-rebirth archetype: "Through the valley of death he [Gawain] is conducted to the aloof and lonely sanctuary of life renewed, and then, having withstood the trial, is reborn."[5] But while no one would deny that the poem involves testing and initiation, it is difficult to understand in reading Zimmer's analysis just how this general statement of theme, applicable surely to a great many myths, is entirely and consistently relevant to a particularly finished and beautifully articulated fourteenth-century poem. For example, in order to superimpose his death-rebirth archetypal pattern on the poem, Zimmer states that the Green Knight represents Death and his wife Life.[6] Zimmer bases these statements on the facts that (1) "in folklore and fairy tales the dead not uncommonly carry their heads under their arms . . . ," that (2) "pale green is the color of livid corpses," and that (3) Life is traditionally Death's bride.[7] It seems evident to me that Zimmer goes too far afield in his speculations here. It would be wiser, and certainly more justifiable in terms of the poem, (1) to assume that the Green Knight picks up his head and tucks it under his arm because Gawain has just hacked it off and it is rolling about the hall, (2) to note that in English poetry (Zimmer cites Tibetian art at this point) the color green is traditionally associated with Life, if indeed it represents any one thing consistently, rather than with Death,[8] and (3) to object that the assignment of a symbolic role to Bercilak's Lady, not on the evidence of any personal characteristics, but simply on the grounds of her marriage, is at best a highly arbitrary business.

The rest of Zimmer's discussion consists not, as one would expect, of a detailed analysis of the progress of the romance, but instead of a helter-skelter examination of the myth pattern as it appears in the probable sources of *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight*. The reason for this retreat into the sources of the poem is evident: Zimmer states that "in the present version the point of the challenge, temptation, and trial is not made quite clear. The romance seems to miss something of its own suggested depth. . . . One cannot even be sure that the thirteenth and fourteenth century French and English poets . . . consciously intended the reading that inevitably emerges . . . ."[9] In short, the poem and the myth do not agree. As an example of the *Gawain* poet's ignorance of his proper duties as myth recorder, Zimmer points out that the presence of Morgan le Fay in the poem may be attributed to the fact that "themes that must once have been enacted on a higher mythical stage now appear obscured and encumbered with the trappings of chivalric pride and family intrigue."[10] But it must be clear to even the most casual reader of the poem that since Morgan is, according to the poet, the instigator of the testing device and thus the prime mover of the plot-action, she cannot be done away with quite so easily and on grounds as tenuous as these without materially distorting the intent of the poet and the structure of the poem.

In short, Zimmer refuses to deal with the poem on its own terms; if Morgan le Fay, or if anything else for that matter, does not fit in with the myth and the archetype, then it is denounced as a late addition or put down as an example of the poet's failure to understand the myth involved, and so done away with as irrelevant to the proper study of the poem. This, it seems to me, is to underestimate gravely the skill, the understanding, and the intent of the poet and, worse than this, to ignore completely the literary qualities and the integrity of the text itself.

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[5] *The King and the Corpse,* p. 76.

[6] *Ibid.,* p. 77.

[7] *Ibid.*

[8] Note that two pages later the "green girdle of death" mysteriously becomes the "talisman of rebirth" (p. 79).

[9] *The King and the Corpse,* pp. 79-80.

[10] *Ibid.,* p. 81.

Our second critic, John Speirs, though offering a more carefully wrought analysis, makes the same mistake in emphasis. Speirs begins his discussion of the poem[11] by attacking those scholars and editors of the poem who have, according to him, "ignored its uniqueness" and deliberately refrained from examining the "object, the English poem as what is positively is."[12] So far, nearly everyone would agree with Mr. Speirs' aims, if not with his language and tone. Yet what is the next point made in the analysis? Morgan le Fay is dismissed from serious consideration since she, as a character in the poem, is not "realized as Lady Macbeth is realized."[13] What Mr. Speirs apparently cannot see is that none of the characters in the poem, including Gawain himself, is "realized as Lady Macbeth is realized"; since the *Gawain* poet is a mediaeval romancer, and not an Elizabethan dramatist, he quite naturally does not "realize" his characters as Shakespeare does. Had he done so, he would have violated every canon of the art which he so skillfully practised. Aside from this consideration, Mr. Speirs suffers, as did Professor Zimmer, from the mistaken notion that it is possible to add or subtract the parts of a poem regardless of all considerations of mechanical, much less organic, unity. In short, although Mr. Speirs states that he intends to look at the poem "as what in itself it is,"[14] he begins his analysis by deleting the character who motivates the entire action and in doing so eliminates the only explanation given us of what actually happens in the poem; Bercilak's statement of the meaning of the test becomes a "bone for the rationalizing mind to play with and be kept quiet with."[15] Yet four lines later, Speirs speaks of the poem as a "great unified work of art."

Mr. Speirs next proceeds to more fertile matters of discussion. The poem is a "midwinter festival poem,"[16] and he immediately sends us away from the poem and off to the source books. The Green Knight is not Death this time but the "Green Man . . . the Jack in the Green or the Wild Man of the village festivals of England and Europe," who is in turn the "descendent of the Vegetation or Nature God of . . . almost universal and immemorial tradition whose death and resurrection mythologizes the annual death and re-birth of nature . . . ."[17] This conclusion could have been foreseen, since Mr. Speirs, judging from his outlook and from the sorts of evidence he brings forward and the authorities he cites, is a thorough-going ritualist, a disciple of the Cambridge school represented chiefly by Frazer, Miss Harrison, Cornford, Murry, and Miss Weston. Thus the long analysis which follows corresponds to the basic party line of the group, summarized by Stanley Edgar Hyman as the belief that myth is the "spoken correlative of a ritual, the story which the rite enacts or once enacted,"[18] and contains the usual Celtic mythologist talk about Gawain, none of which is particularly applicable here. For instance, we are told that Gawain's traditional role was that of "the hero, the agent who brought back the spring, restored the frozen life-processes, revived the god—or (in later versions) cured the king."[19] How this can be said to illuminate the poem, I cannot see. In *Sir Gawain and*

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[11] "Sir Gawain and the Green Knight," *Scrutiny* XVI, 4 (1949), 274-300.

[12] *Ibid.*, 275-6.

[13] *Ibid.*, 276.

[14] *Ibid.*, 275.

[15] *Ibid.*, 277.

[16] *Ibid.*

[17] *Ibid.*, 277-8. It is always distressing to note these disagreements among the mythographers. Here Zimmer's death symbol becomes Speirs' life symbol. In the same way, Gawain's axe, a symbol of the primitive, pre-Christian nature of Death in Zimmer's analysis, becomes a fertility symbol in Speirs' discussion.

[18] *Art. cit.*, 463.

[19] Speirs, *art. cit.*, 278.

the Green Knight, Gawain is indeed the hero, but he unfreezes no life-processes (he himself is almost frozen, as a matter of fact), revives no god, cures no king.

The rest of Speirs' analysis is, for the most part, made up of strange attempts to find ritualistic backgrounds for details of the poem,[20] and Speirs goes on to make the usual and expected identifications: the old woman is the "old year" and Bercilak's Lady is the "new year."[21] The hunts are "symbolically the doing-to-death of the qualities of the natural man which Courtesy has to vanquish"[22] (this in spite of the fact that Speirs does not consider the poem to be about Courtesy and Chivalry at all), which symbolic hunts in turn are said to be related to "animal sacrifices of fertility rituals."[23] The Green Chapel is the "secret source of life"[24] (this in spite of the fact that it is the "corsedest kirk" that Gawain ever saw). And so it goes.

Mr. Speirs ends his analysis by reminding his readers how studiously he has avoided the "error of regarding it [the poem] simply as a recorded myth, the record of the story of a ritual."[25] Yet it is hard to see that Speirs has in fact avoided such a pitfall. He has certainly said nothing illuminative concerning the poem, except to cite as a general theme "a kind of adjustment, if not reconciliation between man and nature" and to add, lest this seem vague, that "in a more limited sense, the courtly order has been put to the test of nature."[26] Yet even here it is hard to see just how this statement of theme fits the facts of the poem (the mixed nature of Gawain's success; the function of Morgan le Fay in the action) and the facts of Speirs' own interpretation (the relation between the testing of the courtly order, the Old and New Year symbolism, and the vegetative god). I cannot understand how Mr. Speirs' analysis, for all its ingenuity and sincerity, accomplishes anything other than to repeat what essentially has always been said of the poem—that Gawain undergoes a series of tests and that this testing is the theme of the poem.

So might, with illustrations, run the case against myth criticism as currently practised. There is, however, a more sensible, and, I believe, a more productive attitude toward the place of myth in literature. Like these critics, I believe that the application of the fruits of myth study to literature furnishes the critic with a tool of interpretation by which he can arrive quickly and with great precision at the heart of a piece of literature. Yet I believe also that it is impossible to leave the problem, as do these critics, at the stage of identification; the myth is not the poem, and we must always remember that a definition must contain both *genus* and *differentia*, both identification and separation. In literary scholarship, it has never been sufficient to delineate a source; the scholar must show how that source is used in the work at hand, how it itself becomes a tool of creation. To be able to show how the poet uses myth and, in doing so, to concentrate not on the identity of the myth, but on its function, not on its closeness to the known pattern, but on the changes which the poet effects in that pattern, not on origin, but on use would seem to me to constitute the proper aim of the myth critic.

[20] For example, the lords and ladies of Arthur's court kick the Green Knight's head away as it rolls towards them not out of "cruelty" or "horror," but because the "head of the sacrificed beast in fertility rituals was believed pregnant with magical power" (p. 283). Speirs offers as documentation for this statement a scholarly footnote relating the incident to the origin of football among primitive tribes. Speirs is so eager to connect everything in the poem with specific rituals and village festivals that he claims that Gawain's arms are described in great and glittering detail because Greek, Roman, and English dancers were so arrayed in festival dances (p. 285); that mediaeval English knights might have been so arrayed he seems not to have considered. Having stated that the towers of Bercilak's castle are "as innumerable stalks thrust upward from the ground in spring" and that the castle is thus a fertility symbol, close to the "hidden source of life" (p. 287), Speirs adds a footnote remarking that "editors here interpose the red herring of 14th century architecture."

[21] *Ibid.*, 289.

[22] *Ibid.*, 290.

[23] *Ibid.*

[24] *Ibid.*, 297.

[25] *Ibid.*, 299.

[26] *Ibid.*, 298.

It would seem that any criticism following such a strategy must rest *ab initio* upon two major assumptions concerning the nature of myth itself: (1) that myth is in itself meaningful (the problem of myth origin); (2) that myth is used in literature, whether consciously or unconsciously, for a meaningful purpose (the problem of myth transmission). The first of these assumptions has been sufficiently examined to have become almost self-evident; no matter whether a critic holds to the ritual, the euhemerist, the Jungian, or to any variation of these doctrines, he will agree that myth is in some fashion and to some degree meaningful. Moreover, it seems to me that the critic has the right to hold to and use any reasonable theory of myth origin as long as the method of critical analysis which he raises on the structure of that theory is capable of throwing light upon a literary text.

The second of these two assumptions, that involving myth transmission, has a closer relationship to the problem of the function of myth in literary art. Here I would propose a distinction. I can understand very easily the use made of myth by modern artists who share our own ideas of the nature and composition of myth, by, for example, Yeats, Auden, Eliot, and Charles Williams. Theirs is a conscious and knowing use of myth; when Yeats speaks of a "Ladaean body" and Eliot of the "bloody wood," they hope by allusion to myth to bring to a poem, usually for purposes of identification and comparison, the whole context of the myth of which they refer. What Eliot wishes us to understand in that brief allusion to the "bloody wood" in *Sweeney among the Nightingales* and to apply to Sweeney's situation in the tavern is not simply the story of the ritual assassination of the priest-king at Nemi, but the consciousness of a whole complex of meaning which is itself represented by the murder of the priest-king and which takes on a still further relevancy and meaning when seen in relation to the complex of meaning, or lack of meaning, represented by Sweeney. In short, those modern writers who use myth use it consciously, with a clearly defined purpose, and, in the works of the men mentioned above at any rate, with good effect.

The writers of the Middle Ages present an entirely different problem, different not only in degree, but in kind, which has as yet not been sufficiently recognized, let alone dealt with. Here the use of myth seems to me to be in the great majority of instances unconscious. For example, we can say that the references to figures of the Christian myth (whether the *Gawain* poet would in fact consider these Old Testament characters "mythical" does not here affect the point) in the following passage from *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight* are designed to do little more than serve as ordinary metaphorical references, used here as "authorities" in typically mediaeval fashion to make a traditional anti-feminist point about the nature of women:

> Bot hit is no ferly þaȝ a fole madde,
> And þurȝ wyles of wymmen be wonen to sorȝe,
> For so watȝ Adam in erde with one bygyled,
> And Salamon with fele sere, and Samson eftsonȝ—
> Dalyda dalt hym hys wyrde—and Dauyth þerafter
> Watȝ blended with Barsabe, þat much bale þoled (2414-19).[27]

But while the use of myth in this single passage is perfectly clear, can it be said that the ancient myth of initiation which underlies the poem as a whole is used consciously by the poet?[28] John Speirs states, without evidence, that it is.[29] I assert, using the same evidence, that it is not, and pending the discovery of concrete proof, I would maintain that mine is the more satisfactory point of view. Yet it is clear that the *rite de passage* pattern is repeated in essence, if not in detail, in *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight* and that some theory of transmission must be brought forward to explain the phenomenon.

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[27] The quotations from *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight* which appear in the text of this article are taken from the edition of the poem edited for the Early English Text Society by Sir Israel Gollancz (No. 210 in the Original Series) in 1940. All line references in the text are also to that edition. In quoting from the poem, I have omitted the italics with which Dr. Gollancz designates expansions of abbreviations. This edition is especially useful for its summary of most of the scholarship devoted to the poem prior to 1940.

I would at this point prefer to fall back upon what might be called common sense rather than upon metaphysics or psychology in suggesting a possible explanation. The *rite de passage,* in all its tremendously varied forms, would appear to represent an almost universal theme, appearing as it does over and over again in myth and in formal literature. It is not necessary, however, to be a follower of any school of myth interpretation to explain its universality. Certainly there would appear to be relatively few general literary themes which are of real importance to the human spirit. Of these, the passage of the soul through its difficulties to its triumph, *ad astra per aspera,* through the valley of the shadow of death on to the Celestial City, is constantly observable, clothed in an immense variety of forms, both in our own personal experience and in the vicarious experience of literature. The passage of the spirit, seen in its most articulate and naked form in the progress of the myth hero in the quest, is part of the general experience of being human. Thus, in the initiatory rites of savages, in the Holy Week of the Christian year, in the great myths of all peoples, this natural and omnipresent human problem and hope is elevated, by symbolic action, to universal and archetypal and, in most cases, religious heights. It seems entirely natural to me, therefore, that this theme should appear at all times and in all places and that it should appear in literary forms in which it would seem to be unconscious in that it is given a local habitation and a name instead of being transcribed in the broad and general terms which are natural to philosophy but alien to art. Myth therefore becomes, if nothing else, a touchstone useful in isolating and labeling the characteristics which this universal theme inherently assumes in art and useful also in defining the particular form, the nature of the *differentia,* which the pattern manifests in the work in hand.

In the Middle Ages, the prevailing use of the allegorical, rather than the symbolic, method would seem to bring nearer the surface of the literary work this unconscious mythic quality which to some degree underlies all literature.[30] Thus it is that these myth patterns become comparatively easy to trace in the literature of this period. Here again I would suggest a further partition for purposes of analysis. It would seem to me that this general theme (called variously death-rebirth, initiation, withdrawal-return) appears in one dominant form in the literature of the Middle Ages—that of the journey. It is apparent that mediaeval literature is full of accounts of journeys: Dante travels through the realms of the dead; travelers find their way into the Celtic underworld; pilgrims "seken straunge strondes," and, most important of all, hundreds of knights traverse hundreds of fields and forests in quest of objects strange and high. That all of these journeys are variants of a single basic pattern—the pattern of the archetypal journey-initiation-quest—appears to me at this time to be a possibility.[31] The application, therefore, of the journey myth, seen in terms of its initiatory, *rite de passage* aspect, to the specific journeys of mediaeval literature would be a useful task, provided always that the critic bear in mind that he must refrain from identifying myth and literature, that he must not neglect *differentia,* once he has established *genus.* No one would claim, of course, that such a line of action would further illuminate *The Divine Comedy,* where the pattern is revealed in such elevation and clarity as to render obvious its workings and its effects.[32] But that this method of critical analysis should throw light on the works of Chrétien de Troyes, on *Pearl* and *Piers Plowman*, on Malory seems to me to be more than sufficient justification for undertaking the labors of the task.

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[28] I accept, as will almost any serious reader, the fact that the initiation, *rite de passage,* withdrawal and return pattern underlies the poem and directs its structure and theme.

[29] *Art. cit.,* 299-300.

[30] For discussion of mediaeval allegory, the reader is directed to such primary sources as Dante's *Letter to Can Grande,* Boccacchio's *Vita di Dante,* and St. Thomas Aquinas' commentary in *Summa Theologica* I, q.I., a.10, and to such modern works as C. S. Lewis' *The Allegory of Love* (Oxford, 1936), Karl Vossler's *Medieval Culture* (New York, 1929), and T. S. Eliot's familiar study of Dante in *Selected Essays* (New York, 1932).

[31] For full discussions of the elements of the basic initiation-quest pattern, the reader is directed to those volumes devoted to defining and analyzing the pattern as it appears in myth, particularly to Van

This is, to say the least, a long preamble of a tale. Yet in demonstration I would attach at this point an analysis of *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight.* I would hope that this analysis will have two virtues in its favor: (1) that it attempts to treat myth, and more particularly this peculiarly important journey myth, in *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight* according to its function in the poem and (2) that it attempts to use myth as a tool, in conjunction with other tools of structure and imagery, in arriving at some statement of the theme of one of the most puzzling of all poems. We may very well begin with the structure of the poem.

The whole poem is very neatly enveloped by a framing reference to the noble Trojan ancestry of the British race and, more significantly, by the reveling at the court of King Arthur which begins and ends the poem. Thus, the narrative is enclosed within an envelope which brings the reader full circle from New Year's through the seasons to New Year's, and from Arthur's court to the Green Chapel to Arthur's court again. Gawain's adventure with the Green Knight is self-contained and so made to stand independently from the Arthurian material generally. *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight* can in no sense be said to be an episode in a longer chronicle concerning the history of the Round Table; it is a complete action in itself, containing as it does no references, either direct or indirect, to other incidents in the familiar Arthurian cycle. In this regard, the tone of the poem is also at least superficially alien to the tragedy and corruption which are a part of the kingdom's later history. It is, for the most part, a Christmas poem, filled with revelry and holiday celebrations in each of its four fits. The poem is dominated by the Christmas colors: the Green Knight, the white snow, the red and gold of Gawain's trappings. If we are to find in the poem any coherent theme, we must thus take into account first of all the facts (1) that the poem is self-contained and (2) that it is at least superficially a gay Christmas poem.

It will also be seen that, in each of the sections, the main action is surrounded and enveloped by a picture of Christmas revelry and courtly life which serves to make the poem an almost continuous Christmas celebration. Certainly the court scenes serve to link the fits together by maintaining parallel structure and by establishing thereby a remarkable consistency of tone. There are festal meals in each fit: Arthur's New Year's celebration in Fit I, the welcoming dinner which Bercilak gives to Gawain in II, the knightly dinners at Bercilak's castle in III, and Arthur's celebration at the return of Gawain in IV. There are

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Gennep's *Les Rites des Passages* (Paris, 1909), Lord Raglan's *The Hero* (London, 1949), and Joseph Campbell's *The Hero with a Thousand Faces* (New York, Bollingen Series XVII, 1949).

[32] It is interesting to note, however, that even in *The Divine Comedy* some attention to the initiatory aspects of the journey might be profitable. Dante criticism and scholarship has, in devoting itself to an analysis of the journey, neglected the character of the journeyer. Even so eminent a Dante authority as Karl Vossler states that "the poet has sent forth his personality for us monumentally, statically; he has not developed it dynamically" (*Mediaeval Culture* II, 216). It is good to see that Francis Ferguson's study of the *Purgatorio, Dante's Drama of the Mind* (Princeton, 1953), treats a development of the hero's character and perception in the second division of the work.

also descriptions of the arming of knights in each fit: the Green Knight in Fit I, Gawain in II, the hunters in III, and Gawain again in IV. There are also many parallel incidents which serve to make connections backwards and forwards in the poem and so serve to keep the major action of the poem constantly before the reader. For example, the slaughtering of the captured animals suggests the beheading game; the exchange of gifts at the end of each day in the castle and the New Year's gift game at Arthur's court suggest the exchange of blows; each of Gawain's two journeys suggests the other by the repetition of the description of the terrain. These, like the descriptions of arms and dress, serve both to maintain structural unity and to establish the background of pomp and splendor upon which a great deal of the action takes place.

The elaborate nature descriptions, however, all of which are done on a gigantic scale—the three journeys of Gawain, "fer floten fro his frendeȝ" (l. 714), the hunting scenes, the description of the Green Chapel—contrast with the courtly scenes and so keep before the reader an atmosphere which shifts continually from the pleasant court life to the wild roughness of the world outside the court. We shall return to this point. Moreover, since so much of the poem (well over half) is taken up with this sort of descriptive detail, it, like the form of the poem, must be taken into account in any statement of the theme of the poem. For example, Professor Henry Savage has already pointed out the very close parallels which exist between the hunting descriptions and the temptation scenes in Gawain's bower.[33] In the hunting scenes, it is clear that the nature of the hunted animal—the shy deer, the aggressive boar, the deceitful fox—suggests very powerfully the tactics which Gawain uses to put off the Lady's advances; he first attempts to put her off by evasion, then by demanding her intentions, and finally, to save his life, by accepting and hiding the green girdle. Such interpretation shows quite clearly that the balanced structure of the poem and the great abundance of balanced descriptive material—the feasting, arming, and nature passages—must be relevant to the theme of the poem.

The *Gawain* poet has also constructed a clear series of parallel incidents within the poem which serve to link the adventures of Gawain into a meaningful and balanced pattern. The function of many, if not all, of these parallel incidents is, I think, to establish for purposes of comparison two levels of courtesy and chivalry within the poem, that of Arthur's court and that of Bercilak's castle. It is at this point that we may best introduce the function of the initiation myth in the poem.

It is clear from the beginning that Gawain's task is spiritual rather than physical. It is usual to state, of course, that almost any given quest in the mediaeval romance is undertaken in behalf of a worthy cause and so has as its aim a non-physical and thus, in a sense, "spiritual" goal. But aside from such obvious exceptions as the Grail quest in the Arthurian cycle, the knightly quest is undertaken primarily in the service of the secular ideal of chivalric duty and not from any purely religious or spiritual motives. However, the quest of Gawain in this poem, although emanating from the chivalric virtue of loyalty to one's oath, is described in such terms as to transform it into a semi-religious quest for what can only be described as a spiritual object or set of values. Briefly stated then, the journey of Gawain to the domain of the Green Knight amounts, in mythical terms, to a *rite de passage* by which Gawain is initiated into a full understanding both of himself and of the values by which he lives and, by way of that knowledge (to return to the terms of the poem), to an understanding of the true nature of the chivalry of Arthur's court. Certainly the stages of the initiatory rite, as seen by Van Gennep[34] and the other commentators, are reflected in the poem; Gawain, having received what Joseph Campbell designates a "call to adventure,"[35] journeys forth from his usual world (Arthur's court in the poem) and retires into a strange land, where he undergoes various tests (the assaults of the Lady) and receives a gift of great value to his people (the green girdle). He returns bearing this saving gift, but is scorned and so is unable to redeem his people by means of this curative device.[36] The application of these general stages of the *rite de passage* to the poem will, I think, become clearer in detailed analysis.

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[33] "The Significance of the Hunting Scenes in *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight*," *JEGP*, XXVII (1928), 1-15.

[34] *Les Rites des Passage*, chapter iii.

Gawain's quest is plainly intended to be taken as a spiritual task. As Professor Denver Baughan points out, Arthur is not able to qualify for the adventure; he can only swing the Green Knight's axe wildly about, unable to strike with it.[37] Gawain alone can deal the blow effectively. The element of magic in the poem reinforces this interpretation; the beheading game is from the beginning no ordinary chivalric adventure. Since this is true, it is likewise clear that Gawain's search for the Green Chapel becomes a spiritual quest; note that Gawain can find the castle of Bercilak only after he has prayed that he find "sum herber þer heȝly [he] myȝt here masse" (l. 755) and that he discovers the castle *immediately* upon ending the prayer with the words "Cros Kryst me spede" (l. 762). Gawain's journey becomes, in a sense, the journey of the individual towards a spiritual ideal higher than himself, made alone through the valley of the shadow "ne no gome bot God bi gate wyth to karp" (l. 696). Gawain's quest is also shown through imagery to be essentially religious in character. The pentangle device on Gawain's arms is described in great detail and in religious terms (ll. 620-69). He is said to undertake the journey "on Godeȝ halue" (l. 692). Few people live in the wilderness through which Gawain rides "þat auþer God oþer gome wyth goud hert louies" (l. 702). Gawain prays to Mary on his journey (ll. 737-39), and it is clear that Gawain is under the Virgin's special protection (l. 1769) and that his fate is in the hands of God (ll. 1967, 2136 ff.). Gawain twice says that in keeping his tryst with the Green Knight he is obedient to God's will (ll. 2156 ff., 2208 ff.) and in his final interview with Bercilak, Gawain receives what sounds like religious absolution from the Green Knight (ll. 2390 ff.).[38]

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[35] *Op. cit.*, pp. 49-59.

[36] This is, of course, not the only possible ending of the cycle; the hero may not succeed in convincing his people of the value of his experience. (see Campbell, *op. cit.*, pp. 193-238).

[37] "The Role of Morgan le Fay in *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight*," *ELH*, XXII, 241-51. It is possible to object to this general line of argument by pointing out that this sort of religious imagery is usual in the mediaeval romance. However, *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight* is in structure, tone, and imagery far more tightly constructed than the usual romance, so tightly constructed in fact that it would be dangerous to pass off any one of the poem's myriad details as "merely" traditional. What is most apparent in *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight*, even upon the most cursory reading, is that here, as in Chaucer, merely traditional elements become meaningful and functional when set by the author in the new context of the poem. The modest prologue with which Chaucer's Franklin introduces his Breton lay was surely a piece of the mediaeval writer's standard storytelling equipment. Yet Chaucer uses this conventional device to throw light upon the dramatic role of the Franklin. So here, the *Gawain* poet adapts the conventional and largely meaningless religious imagery surrounding the chivalric quest to his own purposes in defining the truly religious nature of Gawain's journey. It seems clear to me also that despite Speirs, Loomis, Weston, *et. al.* to the contrary, the *Gawain* poet is a Christian writer, not a Druid in disguise. There is nothing in the poem, aside from the hero pattern which is universal and thus Christian as well as Celtic, which the poet could not have taken directly from the Christian tradition.

[38] The general strain of religious imagery which runs throughout the poem serves to reinforce this interpretation of the spiritual nature of Gawain's quest. Mass is heard daily in the castles of both Arthur and Bercilak. Gawain calls three times upon God to aid him in undertaking the quest (ll. 390, 399, 549). Arhtur's court commends Gawain to God's protection on his departure (l. 596), and Gawain, having thanked "Jesus & say[n] Gilyan" for his safe arrival at Bercilak's castle (l. 774), blesses the porter who welcomes him there (l. 839). Gawain is said to be the comeliest knight that Christ ever made (l. 869). Bercilak's court rejoices that God has sent Gawain to them to be a model of courtly behavior ll. 920ff.). Gawain commends Bercilak to God's grace (ll. 1038ff.). The interviews with Bercilak's lady are filled with oaths and commendations to Christ. Upon leaving, Gawain com-

As I have said, the *Gawain* poet clearly contrasts the two courts. In the beginning, Arthur's company receives high praise:

> With alle þe wele of þe worlde þay woned þer samen,
> Þe most kyd knyȝteȝ vnder Krystes seluen,
> & þe louelokkest ladies þat euer lif haden,
> & he þe comlokest kyng þat þe court haldes;
> For al watȝ þis fayre folk in her first age,
> on sille. (ll. 50-55)

Guinevere is:

> Þe comlokest to discrye
> Þer glent with yȝen gray;
> A semloker þat euer he syȝe,
> Soth moȝt no mon say. (ll. 81-84)

There is certainly no sign of corruption or bad blood here. But when we compare these descriptions of Arthur's court with the later descriptions of Bercilak's court, it becomes apparent that Bercilak's court is just as elaborate as Arthur's and in several major respects closer to the courtly and chivalric ideal. First the lady of the castle:

> Ho watȝ þe fayrest in felle, of flesche & of lyre
> & of compas & colour & costes of alle oþer,
> *& wener þen Wenore, as þe wyȝe þoȝt.* (ll. 943-45, my italics)[39]

Second, Bercilak's court boasts the finer hospitality. Compare Arthur's welcoming of the Green Knight, who has said that he comes in peace (see l. 266):

> . . . 'sir cortays knyȝt,
> If þou craue batayl bare,
> Here fayleȝ þou not to fyȝt.' (ll. 276-79)

with the Green Knight's welcoming of the armed Gawain:

> 'I-wysse, sir, quyl I leue, me worþeȝ þe better
> Þat Gawayn hatȝ ben my gest at Goddeȝ awen fest.' (ll. 1035-36)

Arthur, we note, is almost rude and certainly high-handed, since the unarmed Green Knight has said nothing about fighting and, in fact, carries the holly branch of peace (ll. 206, 265). On the other hand, Gawain, armed to the teeth, is accepted as a guest and the modest court is delighted to have him (ll. 916-19).

It can be shown, moreover, that this contrast between the courtesy and chivalry of Arthur's court and that of Bercilak's furnishes the real motivation for the Green Knight's challenge. In his final explanation, Bercilak tells Gawain that he was sent to Arthur's court by Morgan:

> For to assay þe *surquidre*, ȝif hit soth were,
> Þat rennes of þe grete renoun of þe Rounde Table.
> (ll. 2457-58, my italics)

He announces to Arthur upon his arrival at Camelot that he cannot remain long:

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mends Bercilak's castle to Christ (l. 2067) and blesses and is blessed by the porter of Bercilak's castle (ll. 2071ff.). Bercilak and Gawain, after the conclusion of the beheading game, "[bikenen] ayþer oþer / To þe prynce of paradise" (ll. 2472-73).

[39] The comparison of Bercilak's lady to Guinevere affords a striking example of the *Gawain* poet's functional use of conventional material. Although "fairer than Guinevere" is a perfectly standard compliment in the mediaeval romance, used here in the midst of a comparison of the two courts and in a context involving the queen, the phrase surely constitutes more than a traditional compliment to the Lady. The obvious punning may represent the poet's way of calling special attention to the phrase.

Bot for þe los of þe, lede, is lyft vp so hyȝe,
& þy bur & þy burnes best ar holden,
Stifest vunder stel-gere on stedes to ryde,
Þe wyȝtest & þe worþyest of þe worldes kynde,
Preue for to play wyth in oþer pure laykeȝ,
& here is kydde cortaysye, as I haf herd carp,
& þat hatȝ wayned me hider, i-wyis, at þis tyme.
(ll. 258-64, my italics)

Thus, since the testing of the courtesy and chivalry of the Round Table is the cause of the exchange of blows, the differences between the two courts, seen in conjunction with the spiritual nature of the quest, becomes of considerable importance in determining the theme of the poem.

In an important three-fold parallel, moreover, the Green Knight and his lady heap aspersions upon the courtesy and chivalry of Arthur's court by exposing it to irony. First, when none of the knights of the Round Table rises to meet his challenge, the Green Knight says:

'What, is þis Arþures hous,' quoþ þe haþel þenne,
'Þat al þe rous rennes of þurȝ ryalmes so mony?
Where is now your sourquydrye & your conquestes,
Your gry[n]del-layk & your greme & your grete words? (ll. 309-12)

Second, when Gawain is adamant in resisting the overtures of the lady, she doubts that the man before her is the courtly Gawain of whose *gentilesse* she has heard:

'Now he þat spedeȝ vche spech, þis disport ȝelde yow!
Bot þat ȝe be Gawan, hit gotȝ [not] in mynde.'
. . . .
'So god as Gawayn gaynly is halden,
& cortaysye is closed so clene in hym-seluen,
Couth not lyȝtly haf lenged so long wyth a lady,
Bot he had craued a cosse bi his courtaysye,
Bi sum towch of summe tryfle at sum taleȝ ende.'
(ll. 1292-3, 1297-1301)

Third, when Gawain flinches at the Green Knight's first feint, Bercilak says:

'Þou art not Gawayn,' quoþ þe game, 'þat is so goud halden,
Þat neuer arȝed for no here by hylle ne be vale,
& now þou fles for ferde er þou fele harmeȝ;
Such cowardise of þat knyȝt cowþe I neuer here. (ll. 2270-73)

It would seem that the Green Knight, like his lady, finds something wanting in the courtesy and the chivalry of the Round Table. In each case these ironical thrusts follow passages in which the Green Knight and his lady have heaped extravagant praise upon the Round Table and upon Gawain. Thus, it would seem that the difference between the two courts is further reinforced by having Bercilak and the lady first praise the chivalry of the court of Arthur and then, having tested it by their own standards, find fault with it.

In arriving at a statement of the probable theme of the poem, then, we must keep before us at least four major aspects of the form of the poem—the fact that the poem is a self-contained action, the fact that the poem follows in general outline the pattern of the hero's *rite de passage*, the poet's balanced use of court life and nature description, and the prevailing contrast between the court of Arthur and the court of Bercilak.

I have said that the self-contained form and Christmas tone of the poem belie any theory which places great emphasis upon the tragic later history of the court. Yet it is equally clear that even in the hey-day of the Round Table, as seen in *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight,* there are disturbing elements which it will be best to list for the sake of clarity:

1. The Arthurian court generally, and Gawain in particular, are subjected at crucial moments to a searching irony which they cannot answer except by raging (ll. 316-22, 2284-85).

2. Arthur is plainly incapable of responding to the Green Knight's challenge (ll. 330-31), and although Gawain is the only knight capable of undertaking the quest, yet even he only partly succeeds in resisting the temptations set before him and so returns to the court, his victory tainted with dishonor.

3. Guinevere is singled out for attack by Morgan (ll. 2456-58), and she clearly suffers by comparison with Bercilak's lady (ll. 943-45).

4. Most puzzling of all, Morgan le Fay, whatever her design, fails, since although Arthur is humiliated by his failure to strike the blow, Guinevere, whom Morgan wished to kill by fear, remains alive.

If we allow ourselves for a moment to hold the assumption that the *Gawain* poet knew the legend in its entirety,[40] we will be able, I think, to fit these pieces of evidence into a meaningful pattern.

Morgan, a former mistress and student of the friendly magician Merlin (ll. 2448-51), is attempting to reform Arthur's court,[41] to "assay þe surquidre" and the "renoun" of the Round Table, by exposing it to the irony of a civilization, far more courtly and chivalrous, represented by Bercilak. Morgan's plan for reform takes the form of an exchange of blows, a knightly game, to be followed by a series of temptations designed to test the spiritual qualities of the company. Arthur, presumably because of his pride, cannot even qualify for the test, and only Gawain, because of his modesty the best of the knights (l. 354), can meet the challenge. Gawain, representing the best qualities of the court, embarks then upon an initiatory spiritual quest, a *rite de passage,* undergoes the necessary dangers and temptations, and returns bearing with him the green girdle which is a symbol both of his success and, ironically, of his failure. But even though Gawain's mission is not completely successful, it would seem that Morgan's plan had succeeded since Gawain has supplied the court with a strong object lesson in the value of chastity and faithfulness. Yet this is obviously not the case since Guinevere, whose death was an integral part of the plan, still lives. Then too, strangely enough, Gawain goes into an extended antifeminist harangue, presumably aimed at Bercilak's lady (ll. 2414-28). Yet we know that the responsibility for the failure of the mission lies solely with Gawain, that he accepted the girdle to save his own life, and that the Lady, far from being an evil temptress, was acting out a part written for her by Morgan and is, in fact, even more gracious than Guinevere. The antifeminist discourse must thus be aimed at Guinevere herself.

The point, I think, is this. The testing of Gawain is designed to warn the court of two potential dangers, sexual wantonness and unfaithfulness, which threaten its existence and which Morgan is attempting to remove. Wantonness is personified in the figure of Guinevere, who, we remember, is later to bring about the downfall of the court by her affair with Launcelot. Unfaithfulness, a breach in the chivalric code of loyalty, is manifested in the court itself, which later will indulge in the personal feuds which culminate in the treachery of Mordred. Thus, Morgan's plan fails on both counts because Arthur, though himself humiliated, is able to comfort and protect the queen (ll. 470-75), and Gawain, though able to resist the temptations of the Lady which are designed to test in him these two qualities, cannot keep complete faith with Bercilak. Both dangers remain in the court, and it is obvious from the knights' laughter (ll. 2513-15) that the court does not take seriously the green girdle, the gift of great value, which is a warning against both. Only the initiated Gawain perceives the danger.

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[40] It is almost certain that he did. See J. R. Hulbert, "The Name of the Green Knight", *Manly Anniversary Studies in Language and Literature* (Chicago, 1923), pp. 12-19) which demonstrates the *Gawain* poet's knowledge of the Vulgate Cycle.

[41] The reason for Morgan's action is, of course, not given in the poem. Most scholars agree, however, that Morgan's action stems from her traditional hatred of Guinevere (see G. L. Kittredge, *A Study of Sir Gawain and the Green Knight,* [Cambridge, Mass., 1916], p. 132) and that the introduction of Morgan into the poem represents a last-minute attempt to supply Bercilak with some sort of motivation for initiating the game. John Speirs, as I have said, calls Bercilak's explanation a "bone for the rationalizing mind to play with. . . ." J. R. Hulbert states that Bercilak's explanation is "inherently unreasonable" ("Gawain and the Green Knight," *MP,* XIII [1915-16], 454). Kittredge suggests the explanation which I have adopted and modified here, that the poet was influenced "by that form of the tale of the Magic Horn [from which only the faithful woman might drink] which represents Morgan as sending the talisman to the court with the design of revealing Guinevere's unfaithfulness" (*loc. cit.*).

The *Gawain* poet, I maintain, is presenting us, within a deliberately limited form, a microcosm, or better said, a semi-allegorical presentation of the whole history and meaning of the Round Table. Morgan attempts reform; Gawain fails in keeping faith with Bercilak; treacherous Guinevere remains alive. The form of the poem is thus quite consciously limited in time and in space in order to facilitate a unified and complete presentation of the progress of the Round Table; only in a single, complete adventure could the poet achieve any unified design which would reflect the whole of the tragedy. In this sense the poem is semi-allegorical in method in that we are not presented with a segment of the action, but with a miniature version of the whole action. The gay light tone, which reflects the ignorance and pride of Arthur's court, is maintained throughout the scenes which take place within the safe precincts of Camelot, but once the poem moves to the outside world, the tone changes radically. The journeys are always difficult and dangerous, the terrain rugged and foreboding. The scene of the final encounter, the Green Chapel, is, to Gawain, the "corsedest kirk" that he ever saw (l. 2195). Certainly, the prevailing tone is that of Christmas, but we must remember that the court is in "her first age" and that all the knights are ironically ignorant of Morgan's attempts to forestall the fate which will overtake them and ignorant also of the dangers outside the court which must be a part of any spiritual quest. Only the returned Gawain, who has himself made the initiatory journey, sees the imminent destruction which he expresses in his condemnation of women, and which he attempts to forestall by the institution of the green baldric.

Thus, the limited form of the poem, the gaiety of the court contrasted with the terrors of nature, the *rite de passage* and the prevailing contrast between the two courts all combine to give us the central theme. That some such purpose as this lies behind the romantic façade of the poem is further demonstrable by an examination of those features of the poem which the *Gawain* poet adds to his source materials. Professor Kittredge lists those elements which were "certainly added or greatly elaborated by the English author" as:

> the learned introductory stanza summarizing the fabulous settlements of Western Europe . . . ; the description of the Christmas festivities (i, 3) and that of the Green Knight (i, 7-9); the challenge (i, 12-13) and the speech of Gawain (i, 16); the highly poetical stanzas on the changing seasons (ii, 1-2); the very elaborate description of the process of arming a knight (ii, 4-6), with the allegorical account of the pentangle of virtues (ii, 7); Gawain's itinerary,—Logres, North Wales, Anglesea, Holyhead, the wilderness of Wirral (ii, 9); the winter piece (ii, 10); the justly celebrated account of the three hunts (iii, 1ff.).[42]

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[42] *Op. cit.*, pp. 129-30.

The first of these additions, the introductory stanza, serves to introduce (1) the theme of treachery in the allusion to Antenor and (2) more importantly, the theme of change, of the alternation of happiness and sorrow in the history of England:

> Where werre & wrake & wonder
> Bi syþeȝ hatȝ wont þer-inne
> & oft boþe blysee & blunder
> Ful skete hatȝ skyfted synne. (ll. 16-19)

This theme of the alternation of "blysse & blunder" is immediately reinforced:

> And quen þis Bretayn watȝ bigged bi þis burn rych,
> Bolde bredden þer-inne, baret þat lofden,
> In mony turned tyme tene þat wroȝten;
> Mo ferlyes on þis folde han fallen here oft
> Þen in any oþer þat I won, syn þat ilk tyme. (ll. 20-24)

In discussing Gawain's acceptance of the Green Knight's challenge, the poet says:

> Gawan watȝ glad to be-gynne þose gomneȝ in halle,
> Bot þaȝ þe ende be heuy, haf ȝe no wonder;
> For þaȝ men ben mery in mynde quen þay han mayn drynk,
> A ȝere ȝernes ful ȝerne, & ȝeldeȝ neuer lyke,
> Þe forme to þe fynisment foldeȝ ful sedlen. (ll. 459-99)

Thus, at the very beginning of the poem, we can see the English poet adding to his source materials passages which emphasize the theme of change, the alternation of "blysse & blunder" in the history of England. Moreover, when seen in the light of the whole history of Arthur's court, these remarks of the poet seen perfectly applicable to a poem which deals with the court in "her first age," ignorant of the treachery and civil war which will indeed change its "blysse" to "blunder."

The "description of the Christmas festivities [at both courts] (i, 3) and that of the Green Knight (i, 7-9); the challenge [including the failure of Authur] (i, 12-13) and the speech of Gawain" were necessary if the poet was to carry through his contrasting of the court of Arthur with that of Bercilak. For example, Christmas and New Year's Day, called by the poet a second Christmas (l. 65), would seem to be primarily social occasions at Arthur's court; while we have references to the singing of carols (l. 43) and to the "chauntre of þe chapel" (l. 63), there is no indication of the poem that the Christmas season has any special religious significance to Arthur's court; in fact, even Arthur's priests join in the general merriment (l. 64). On the other hand, we get a full description of the "hersum" Christmas Evensong at Bercilak's castle including the observation that the knights "seten sobrely samen þe servise quyle" (l. 940). Moreover, Bercilak tells Gawain that he will be better off "þat Gawayn hatȝ ben my gest at Goddeȝ awen fest" (l. 1036). In much the same way, the description of the Green Knight reinforces the contrast between the two courts by pointing out that Arthur immediately challenges the unarmed stranger to combat. Again, the challenge and Gawain's humble acceptance speech were added in order to point up Arthur's prideful attempt to deliver the blow and consequent failure and Gawain's humility in accepting and fulfilling the challenge.

The descriptions of the changing seasons may well have been added (1) as unifying and transitional devices and (2) as a means of supplying imagery of natural flux and change which would serve to remind the reader of the alternation of "blysse & blunder" which the poet had introduced at the beginning of the poem. The description of the arming of Gawain may serve to emphasize the contrast between the two courts by pointing up Bercilak's kindly welcoming of the armed Gawain. The description of Gawain's pentangle was almost certainly added in order to reinforce the spiritual quest theme of the poem. Finally, the descriptions of the journey and of winter emphasize the contrast between the warmth of the court and the wildness out of doors, and the hunting scenes furnish parallels and commentaries on the temptations of Gawain, who has remained home from the hunt.

Professor Kittredge states also that the *dénouement* of the poem, Gawain's return to Arthur's court, "shows plain traces of innovation."[43] Gawain's return to the court, "full of shame," is "contrary to custom, for the old French poets are loath to let Gawain come off from any adventure without the highest credit."[44] It would seem clear that the poet wished this obviously non-traditional conclusion to be regarded seriously. It is important to the poem as a whole that our final view of Gawain should be that of an initiated and matured penitent rather than of a stainless conqueror. The poet states that the king and the court laughed loudly at the king's decision that all the knights wear green baldrics (ll. 2513-14); we are not told that Gawain laughed with them. This ending also relates Gawain's adventure to the whole Arthurian court and so serves to reinforce the theory advanced here that the poet is writing not simply an isolated adventure of Gawain, but a highly compressed allegorical commentary on the entire Arthurian history.

What then is the relevancy of myth to *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight*? To begin with, whatever else it may be, the poem is not itself a vegetation or seasonal myth; it is first of all a highly sophisticated and skillfully wrought mediaeval poem. Thus it is of no critical value to say simply that *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight* is a record, or a manifestation, or a form of the *rite de passage* and let the matter rest with that identification. What the critic can say, I think, is that the myth of the hero's journey from innocence to knowledge underlies the poem and to a large extent determines its specific structure and theme. The critic can thus use myth both as a point of entrance and as a means of analysis; myth becomes (1) a means of coming directly and with dispatch to the structural and thematic core of a literary work and (2) a yard-stick by which the critic can measure the uses to which the poet puts the myth in terms of a specific metaphor and theme. In short, having discovered the myth core of a piece of literature, the critic must go on to examine in their own right the other literary aspects of the work, most of which he will find in turn to be determined by the central archetype. If I am right, the *Gawain* poet is using the myth of the hero's quest to develop a theme which lies at the core of mediaeval literature: that the tragedy of the Round Table, and of the secular society of which it is a symbol, was inevitable and that the seeds of that tragedy were present even in the "first age" of the youthful and joyous court at Christmas time.

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[43] *Ibid.*, p. 118.

[44] *Ibid.*

The *De Quidditatibus Entium* of Dietrich of Freiberg and its Criticism of Thomistic Metaphysics

ARMAND MAURER C.S.B.

RECENT research has shown that St. Thomas' innovations in metaphysics met widespread criticism from his contemporaries and immediate successors. Much still remains to be done before an adequate picture can be drawn of the impact of his novel notion of being upon the philosophy of the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Everything leads us to believe, however, that his metaphysics was widely misunderstood and criticized, even by his alleged followers.[1] Older metaphysical views, stemming on the one hand from Neoplatonists like St. Augustine, Boethius, and the author of the *Liber de causis,* and on the other from Aristotle, seem to have been too deeply rooted in the schools to be displaced by the daring novelties of the Angelic Doctor.

Among the most clear-sighted and resolute critics of St. Thomas at the end of the thirteenth century was the German Dominican Dietrich of Freiberg.[2] He seems to have studied and taught at the Dominican convent at Freiberg, in Saxony, and from there went to Paris in 1276 to complete his studies. He was too late to study under his compatriot and confrere, St. Albert. But he came under the influence of St. Albert's thought and of the Neoplatonism he had popularized in German Dominican circles. Combining that Neoplatonism with certain congenial elements in Aristotelianism, he turned it against the philosophy of St. Thomas. He died shortly after 1310, when another German Dominican, Master Eckhart, was also actively engaged in opposing the Angelic Doctor.

Dietrich of Freiberg wrote many metaphysical treatises, most of which are still unedited. One of the few that have been edited is the important *De Esse et essentia.*[3] A companion treatise, *De Quidditatibus entium* is edited in the present article. Together these two works treat of almost all the metaphysical problems raised by St. Thomas in his *De Ente et essentia,* and they constitute his reply to the positions of the Angelic Doctor in that treatise. They are important, therefore, not only for an understanding of Dietrich's metaphysics, but also for the light they throw upon the reaction to Thomism in the last quarter of the thirteenth century.

The main concern of Dietrich's *De Esse et essentia* is to establish, against St. Thomas, the identity of existence (*esse*) and essence both in reality and in meaning (*ratio*).[4] The theme running through it like a constant refrain is that essence does not differ from existence; rather, existence signifies the whole essence of any thing. The only distinction between them is their manner of signifying being: *esse* signifies being in the manner of an act, whereas "essence", like the term "entity", signifies the same being in the manner of a stable possession.[5] Thus *esse* signifies in a dynamic way exactly the same reality that essence signifies in a static way. This manner of distinguishing between existence and essence had already been proposed during the lifetime of St. Thomas by Siger of Brabant, who drew his inspiration for it from Averroes.[6] Dietrich is likely following an established school tradition of opposing the Thomistic distinction of *esse* and essence by a conception of being stemming from Aristotle by way of his commentator Averroes.

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[1] For the "correctives" of St. Thomas in the generation after his death, Cf. E. Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York, 1955), pp. 410-427, 730-750.

[2] For the life, works and thought of Dietrich of Freiberg, cf. E. Krebs, "Meister Dietrich (Theodoricus Teutonicus de Vriberg). Sein Leben, seine Werke, seine Wissenschaft", *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Phil. des Mittelalters* V, 5-6 (Münster, 1906); A. Birkenmajer, "Drei neue Handschriften des Werke Meister Dietrichs", *Beiträge* XX, 5 (Münster, 1922), 70-90; E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 433-437, Bibliography, p. 753, n. 9. For the spelling of Dietrich's name, cf. E. Krebs, article "Dietrich (Theodoricus) v. Freiberg", *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche* III (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1931), 318.

[3] Cf. E. Krebs, "Le Traité 'De Esse et Essentia' de Thierry de Fribourg", *Revue néoscolastique de philosophie*, XVIII (1911), 516-536.

[4] Cf. E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, p. 754, n. 19.

[5] Nunc de essentia et esse considerandum et circa ea notandum quod idem important in sua significatione et idem significant quod ens et entitas, videlicet totam rei essentiam. Nam in substantiis sive in accidentibus, sicut dictum est supra de

There is no doubt that Dietrich meant to criticize St. Thomas himself on this point. He cites and criticizes several arguments of St. Thomas establishing a real composition of *esse* and essence in creatures. Among them is the argument in the *De Ente et essentia*, in which St. Thomas reasons to the distinction of *esse* and essence from the fact that we can understand what a man or phoenix is without knowing whether they exist in reality. Since existence is not included in the understanding of their essence or quiddity—so runs the argument of St. Thomas—it must come from without and form a composition with the essence.[7]

This argument, according to Dietrich, is fundamentally erroneous, for it assumes that an essence can be understood without knowing anything of its actual existence. An analysis of the terms will reveal that this is false. As St. Augustine points out, the term *essentia* (essence) comes from the verb *esse* (to exist), as the term *sapientia* (wisdom) comes from the verb *sapere* (to be wise). Augustine was correct, then, in saying that an essence is an essence only because it exists. It follows that we cannot understand an essence like man unless we understand him as actually existing.[8] Actual existence belongs to the essential being of man—a point Siger of Brabant had already made against St. Thomas.[9] The fact that we can understand man without knowing whether he exists in reality does not militate against this. For we can know man through a simple concept without judging whether he exists or not. This shows that there are two ways of knowing man, not that there is in man a real composition of two principles: essence and existence.[10]

Not only does Dietrich oppose St. Thomas' distinction between essence and *esse*; he also criticizes the nobility and excellence the Angelic Doctor attributed to *esse* in comparison with essence.[11] Dietrich shows a deep appreciation of St. Thomas' position on this point, which has been so seldom understood even

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entitate et ente, quamvis differant in modis dicendi, ut videlicet esse significet per modum actus, idem autem significat ens et entitas per modum habitus et quietis, et sic etiam differunt esse et essentia. *De Esse et essentia* I, 5; ed. E. Krebs, p. 525.

[6] Cf. C. Graiff, *Siger de Brabant, Questions sur la métaphysique* (Louvain, 1948), pp. 16-19; A. Maurer, "*Esse* and *Essentia* in the Metaphysics of Siger of Brabant", *Mediaeval Studies*, VIII (1946), 68-86.

[7] Cf. St. Thomas, *De Ente et essentia*, 4; ed. M.-D. Roland-Gosselin (Paris, 1948), p. 34. Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, *De Esse et essentia* II, 1; ed. E. Krebs, p. 532.

[8] Sed ista ratio deficit in suo fundamento, quod assumit, scilicet quod omnis essentia potest intelligi sine hoc, quod aliquid intelligatur de esse suo actuali. . . . Quando enim intelligo hominem, intelligo hominem secundum actum suum essendi in rerum natura, secundum quod supra dictum est de sententia Augustini, scilicet quod omnis essentia non ob aliud essentia est, nisi quia est. *De Esse et essentia, ibid.* Cf. St. Augustine, *De Immortalitate animae* XII, 19; PL 32, 1031. Dietrich makes the same point in his *De Quidditatibus entium* I, 1.

[9] . . . ad esse essentiale hominis pertinet actualitas essendi. *Sigeri de Brabantia: Quaestio Utrum haec sit vera: Homo est animal nullo homine existente;* ed. P. Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant et l'Averroïsme latin au XIII^{e} siècle*, II^{me} partie, II (Louvain, 1908), p. 66.

[10] Sed quod coassumitur, quod ignoro utrum homo sit in rerum natura, hoc non est inconveniens, quia intelligendo essentiam hominis intelligam tanquam quoddam incomplexum, in quo non est veritas nec falsitas. Intelligendo autem ipsum hominem esse, iam intelligo illud idem, sed per modum complexi in quo attenditur veritas vel falsitas. *De Esse et essentia, ibid.*

[11] Dicendum quod ipsum esse est perfectissimum omnium; comparatur enim ad omnia ut actus. Nihil enim habet actualitatem, nisi inquantum est; unde ipsum esse est actualitas omnium rerum, et etiam ipsarum formarum. Unde non comparatur ad alia sicut recipiens ad receptum, sed magis sicut receptum ad recipiens. Cum enim dico esse hominis, vel equi, vel cuiuscumque alterius, ipsum esse consideratur ut formale et receptum, non autem ut illud cui competit esse. St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.* I, 4, 1, ad 3^{m}.

by Thomists.[12] He realizes that for the Angelic Doctor *esse* is a more noble and profound principle in being than essence, which is subject to *esse* and receptive of its influx. His own view of being, however, runs counter to this. Using an argument of St. Thomas (itself inspired by the *Liber de causis*), but drawing from it exactly the opposite conclusion, he asserts that the nobility of the created effect must be judged by the nobility of the action causing it. Now creation, which is the most excellent action of God, terminates at essence. Hence essence must be the most excellent of all effects. Indeed, nothing is more intimate to anything than its essence.[13] The student of St. Thomas will realize from these statements that Dietrich attributes to essence the primacy and nobility St. Thomas expressly reserved for *esse*. Nothing could show more conclusively his opposition to the Thomistic revolution in metaphysics which ascribes to *esse*, as distinct from essence, the actuality of all acts and the perfection of all perfections.[14]

Dietrich could not differ from St. Thomas on the relation of *esse* to essence without diverging from him on the meaning of all metaphysical terms. That is already apparent in his *De Esse et essentia* in which he defines, besides essence and *esse,* such notions as "quiddity", "what is", and "form". But the significance of his opposition to St. Thomas on the meaning of these terms becomes clearer when we read the companion treatise *De Quidditatibus entium.*

PLAN OF THE TREATISE

The central object of this little work is to set forth the precise meaning of the term "quiddity" and to show how quiddity is found in the various orders of being. Dietrich's conception of quiddity is expressed in the *De Esse et essentia,* but here it is made the dominant theme and it receives a much fuller treatment and development.

Dietrich was obviously inspired by St. Thomas' *De Ente et essentia* in the plan of the work. In his first chapter, St. Thomas explains the general meaning of the terms "being" and "essence". In the succeeding chapters he shows the meaning of essence in the various orders of being: in substances composed of matter and form (chapter 2); in logical intentions, such as genus, species and difference (chapter 3); in immaterial substances (chapter 4); and in accidents (chapter 6). Following a similar order, Dietrich begins in chapter one by giving his own descriptions of being and essence. Quiddity in the proper sense is then defined in distinction to essence, and the succeeding chapters make this key notion progressively more precise. He shows in what sense quiddity is found in general in all things (chapter 2); then how it is found in composite substances (chapters 3, 7, 8), in immaterial substances (chapters 3, 4, 7); in logical intentions (chapters 4-6); and in accidents (chapters 9-13). It will be noticed that whereas St. Thomas' treatise is chiefly concerned with *essence* and its relation to the various orders of being, Dietrich's takes up the same problems in terms of *quiddity*. This difference of terminology is not accidental. It points to the profound divergence between Dietrich's notions of essence and quiddity and those of St. Thomas. This will become clear if we examine the meaning of these terms in Dietrich's treatise.

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[12] The witness of Bañez in the sixteenth century is remarkable: Et hoc est quod saepissime D. Thomas clamat, et Thomistae nolunt audire: quod esse est actualitas omnis formae vel naturae. *Comm. in* I, q. 3, a. 4; ed. (Madrid, 1934), p. 141.

[13] Nihil enim intimius essentiae rei, quam ipsum esse. Sed inter omnia, quae sunt aliquid essentiae, nihil tam intimum, sicut ipsa essentia sibi ipsi est. Ergo esse idem est, quod essentia rei. Nec potest dici quod essentia est aliquid in se, cui influitur ipsum esse et intimatur ei. . . Unde et eius nobilissimae actionis, quae est creatio (ed. oratio), nobilissimus et primus est effectus, ut dicitur quarta propositione *libri de causis*: "prima rerum creatarum est esse", et alibi in eodem in commentario, quod "soli Deo competit creare". Sed nobilissima actio in quantum huiusmodi terminatur ad nobilissimum effectum. Nihil autem pertinens ad rei essentiam est nobilius ipso esse neque aeque nobile. Ergo actio Dei nobilissima, quae est creatio, non terminatur, nisi ad essentiam. Sed terminatur ad esse. Ergo esse est idem, quod essentia. *De Esse et essentia* I, 6; p. 526. Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.* I, 8, 1; O. Bardenhewer, *Das pseudoaristotelische Buch über das reine Gute, bekannt unter dem Namen Liber de causis* (Freiburg, 1882), 3, 4, p. 166.

[14] Unde patet quod hoc quod dico esse est actualitas omnium actuum, et propter hoc est perfectio omnium perfectionum. *Qu. disp. De Potentia* VII, 2, ad 9^{m}.

THE MEANING OF BEING, ESSENCE AND QUIDDITY

According to Dietrich, being (*ens*) is the first and most simple of all formal notions. It is that by which a thing primarily, through its essence, is outside nothingness. This does not mean that essence is really distinct from being. It is the very "beingness" or entity of the thing, or that in virtue of which the thing stands outside nothingness (I, 1).[15] In his *De Ente et essentia* St. Thomas defines essence in a similar way as "that through which and in which a thing has *esse*: *essentia dicitur secundum quod per eam et in ea res habet esse*."[16] In reality this definition of essence is entirely different in meaning from that of Dietrich. For St. Thomas, essence is a principle in created being other than *esse* and receptive of it. As potential to, and receptive of *esse*, essence is thus a principle through which and in which a thing exists.[17] Not so for Dietrich. Essence, in his view, is not subject to an influx of *esse*. It is the very beingness of the thing, and hence that through which it may be said to be outside of nothingness. Dietrich resorts to this description of being because he recognizes no terms simpler than being with which to define it; being is the simplest of all notions. This is not so for St. Thomas, who opens his *De Ente et essentia* by telling us that the meaning of essence is simpler than that of being, which indeed is a composite notion.[18] Being means that which in a way has *esse*: *ens dicitur quasi habens esse*.[19] This Thomistic quasi-definition of being is in terms simpler than being itself, namely essence and *esse*, but it is valid only in a metaphysics which sees in created being a real composition of essence and *esse*. It was bound to be rejected by Dietrich along with his rejection of the real composition.

In Dietrich's view, the terms "being", "entity", "essence", and "to be" are all existential, in that they express the fact that things exist. They are alike in that they reply to the question *whether* a thing exists. They must be carefully distinguished from another group of terms which answer the question *what* a thing is. These are quidditative terms: "what" and "whatness" or "quiddity".[20]

These latter terms signify more than the former, existential terms. A thing is said to be a being because it exists or stands outside nothingness. There can be no concept simpler than the one expressing this fact. After this, if we say that a being is a man or a horse, we add to what the concept of being expresses by itself. We signify a certain determination or specification of being which adds something to being, at least according to our way of understanding. These concepts express the "what" or "quiddity" of a thing, in the sense that they designate over and above being a certain determination not expressed by being itself (I, 2). It should be noted, however, that such quidditative terms imply being itself, or the fact of standing outside nothingness. That is why Dietrich denies that a quiddity has any meaning apart from existence. Man is not man if he does not exist.[21]

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[15] References will be given to the *De Quidditatibus entium*, edited, *infra*, in the Appendix, according to chapter and paragraph. (I, 1) refers to chapter I, paragraph 1. Ens, entitas, esse are all different terms expressing this primary concept: ens et entitas significant res sub prima entium intentionum, qua res prima distant a nihilo. . . . esse significat rem suam sub prima omnium intentionum, qua res distat a nihilo inquantum huiusmodi. *De Esse et essentia* I, 4; p. 524; 6; p. 525.

[16] *De Ente et essentia*, I; ed. M.-D. Roland-Gosselin, p. 4.

[17] Cf. St. Thomas, *De Potentia* VII, 2, ad 9^{m}; *Summa Theol.* 1, 3, 4.

[18] Quia vero ex compositis simplicium cognitionem accipere debemus et ex posterioribus in priora devenire. . . . ideo ex significatione entis ad significationem essentiae procedendum est. *De Ente et essentia*, 1; p. 2.

[19] St. Thomas, *In XII Metaph.*, 1; ed. Cathala (Turin, 1935), n. 2419.

[20] Cf. *De Quidditatibus entium* I, 1, 2. For the meaning of these terms, cf. also *De Esse et essentia* I, 1, 2; pp. 520-523.

These preliminary remarks clear the way for a precise definition of quiddity. A quiddity, Dietrich says, is the determination of a being which gives it its special character as a being and as an object of knowledge. Since it is an intrinsic determination or principle, it is not the efficient or final cause of a being, both of which are extrinsic to their effect. Neither is it the matter from which a thing is generated, for matter is a potential principle, whereas quiddity is an actual determination. Matter does not "quiddify" or make known the essence of a thing. Hence it is excluded from a thing's quiddity. In brief, quiddity is something formal and intrinsic to a thing, pertaining to its actuality: *Quidditas igitur aliquid est formale, intrinsecum rei quantum ad actum rerum* (II, 2-4).

In a wide sense anything actual may be said to have a quiddity. For example, simple beings, like the Intelligences, have a quiddity. For we distinguish the essence of an Intelligence, by which it is a being, from the act by which it is formally such and such a determined being. True, this distinction is not a real one; it is made by the mind. But it warrants our attributing a quiddity in some sense of the term to the Intelligences. So too, accidents may be said to have a quiddity in this wide sense, for in their own way (to be specified later) they are something actual (II, 5). Even potential being, like matter, may be said to have a quiddity in proportion to the mode of its essence. For possible being is by its nature possible being: that is what it is. Hence it has a quiddity and is a "what" in the mode of possibility (II, 6).

In short, anything which is in any way whatsoever has a quiddity in the wide sense, and this quiddity is proportionate to its being. But everything does not have a quiddity in the proper and true meaning of the term. In the strict sense only beings really composed of matter and substantial form have a quiddity, and this is precisely their substantial form (III, 1; VII, 5).

Why do composite beings alone possess a quiddity in the proper sense? The reason is that, as Aristotle says, quiddity answers the question "why" or "for what reason". We ask, for example, why stones and walls are a house. The answer, as Aristotle tells us, is that it has the form of a house.[22] The form, then, is the quiddity of the house. In everything possessing a quiddity, then, there must be a distinction between the quiddity and that which has the quiddity. The "what" or "that which" is not the quiddity; it is that which possesses it as its formal act, making it to be what it is. To use another example: a white thing is white by reason of whiteness. The white thing is what is white; whiteness is its quiddity. Whiteness itself—the quiddity—is not white, that is, it is not what is white (III, 1). So quiddity is not itself a "what is", but a quality by which something is a "what". It is clear from this that the quiddity is not the whole thing signified by the terms "what is" or "essence". Rather, it is the form of the thing: *quidditas non est ipsum quid, quia forma non est tota essentia rei* (VIII, 3).

QUIDDITY IN GOD AND THE INTELLIGENCES

It follows that a simple being, like an Intelligence, does not have a quiddity in the proper sense of the term, just as it cannot properly be defined. A quiddity, like a definition, implies a multiplicity in a being and a distinction between the quiddity itself and that which possesses it. Now a simple being lacks real multiplicity. It is only in accommodation to our way of thinking that we distinguish between the essence of a simple thing, by which it is a being, and the act by which it is formally such and such a determined being. Consequently, it cannot truly and properly have a quiddity (II, 5; III, 3, 4).

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[21] Cf. *De Esse et essentia* II, 1; pp. 532-533.

[22] Cf. Aristotle, *Metaph.* VII, 17, 1041a7-33.

This is basically the same argument Avicenna used to prove that God has no quiddity or definition. The Prime Being, he reasoned, must be one and simple, containing no multiplicity. If we speak of his having a quiddity, what we mean is precisely his unity or necessary being. There can be no quiddity in him over and above his necessary being for this would destroy his unity: *necessitas essendi non habet quidditatem sibi adiunctam nisi ipsam necessitatem essendi.*[23] In anything having a quiddity, like water, air or fire, there is a difference between the quiddity which happens to be and to be one, and the unity and being themselves. These are creatures, that is, beings which are possible in themselves, and which happen to exist because they have been caused. The First Being, who is necessary and uncaused, has no quiddity: *Primus igitur non habet quidditatem.*[24]

The Jewish theologian Maimonides was obviously inspired by Avicenna in similarly denying quiddity of God. Explaining in the Avicennian manner that God is necessary being to whom nothing is accidental, he asserts that God exists but not "in essence", for there is no multiplicity in his being.[25] For Maimonides, as for Avicenna, the absolute simplicity of God precludes his having an essence. Anything with a quiddity or essence is necessarily a composite being.[26]

This limitation of the notion of essence or quiddity found an early echo in Scholastic thought. In the first half of the thirteenth century William of Auvergne, who was deeply influenced by Avicenna's conception of being, agreed with him that owing to God's simplicity he has neither quiddity nor definition.[27] St. Thomas knew of this doctrine and referred to it several times in his writings. In his commentary on the *Sentences* he refers to some philosophers who say that God is a "being not in essence"—an obvious allusion to Maimonides.[28] In his *De Ente et essentia* he likewise reports that some philosophers hold that God has no quiddity or essence because his essence is not other than his existence. Here he seems to have Avicenna in mind.[29] As for St. Thomas himself, he never expressly rejected or criticized the Avicennian doctrine. On the other hand, he never adopted it as his own. When writing in his own name, he preferred to say, not that God has no essence or quiddity, but rather that his essence is his act of being (*esse*).[30]

At first sight this may seem a trifling difference, and yet it is not without significance. It indicates that St. Thomas conceived essence as a perfection which can be predicated of God in proportion to his being. It is not a term intrinsically involving an imperfection and consequently attributable in the strict sense only to creatures.[31] The notion of quiddity bequeathed by Avicenna to the Latin writers of the Middle Ages restricts it to composite being contained within the categories and hence definable in terms of genus and specific difference. Under these conditions essence and quiddity are bound to be refused to God. The denial of essence to him, like the denial of all limitation and imperfection, becomes a means of expressing his transcendence over creatures.

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[23] Avicenna, *Metaph.* VIII, 5 (Venice, 1508), fol. 90^{v}A.

[24] *Loc. cit.*, 4, fol. 99^{r}B.

[25] Nec est (*scil.* Deus) substantia cui acciderit esse, quia tunc sua inventio esset res addita super illam essentiam. Sed est necesse esse semper cui nihil accidit, et idcirco est non in essentia, et vivus non in vita, et potens non in potentia, et sapiens non in sapientia. Et haec omnia in idem redundant, quia non est in eo multitudo, sicut explanabitur. Maimonides, *Dux seu Director dubitantium aut perplexorum* I, 56 (Paris, 1520), fol. 21^{v}.

[26] Creator necesse est esse, in quo non est compositio, sicut probabimus, et non apprehendimus nisi essentiam ejus, non quidditatem ipsius. Et idcirco non convenit ei agnominatio attributiva, quia non habet essentiam quae exigat terminum quidditatis, nisi agnominatio significat illam. *Op. cit.*, I, 57; fol. 22^{r}.

[27] Item non habet (*scil.* Deus) quidditatem nec definitionem; omne namque definibile, et quocumque modo explicabile aliquo modo resolubile est, et vestitum. William of Auvergne, *De Trinitate*, 4 (Paris, 1674), fol. 6.

[28] Et ideo cum omnium quae dicuntur de Deo natura vel forma sit ipsum esse, quia suum esse est sua natura, propter quod dicitur a quibusdam philosophis quod est ens non in essentia, et sciens non per scientiam, et sic de aliis, ut intelligatur essentia non esse aliud ab esse, et sic de aliis: ideo nihil de Deo et creaturis univoce dici potest. St. Thomas, *In I Sent.* 35, 1, 4; ed. R. P. Mandonnet I (Paris, 1929), pp. 819-820.

[29] Aliquis enim est sicut Deus cuius essentia est ipsummet esse suum; et ideo inveniuntur aliqui philosophi dicentes quod Deus non habet quiditatem vel essentiam quia essentia sua non est aliud quam esse suum. St. Thomas, *De Ente et essentia*, 5; p. 37.

[30] Cf. *In I Sent.*, 8, 4, 2; p. 222; *Summa Theol.* I, 3, 4; *Contra Gentiles* I, 22.

Although Dietrich of Freiberg's notion of being has little in common with Avicenna's, he shares with him this restricted and limited notion of quiddity. He agrees with him that a simple being cannot have a quiddity, while parting company on what beings are truly simple. Avicenna conceived all beings except God as really composed of essence and existence. Besides this, material things are composed of matter and form.[32] Having denied the real composition of essence and existence in creatures, the only real composition Dietrich recognizes is that of matter and form. Now the Intelligences do not contain the latter composition; hence they are really simple beings. As a consequence Dietrich extends the Avicennian denial of essence to God to the Intelligences or angels as well. Material substances alone have a quiddity in the proper sense of the term (III). The full significance of this limitation will become apparent if we turn to his doctrine of the quiddity of material things.

Quiddity in Material Substances

We have seen that quiddity is not identical with "what is": it is only a part of the existing composite, namely the formal principle on which it depends for its being and its intelligibility. Now in a material substance this is the substantial form of the composite. Only material substances, then, have a quiddity in the proper sense, and this quiddity is their substantial form (III, 1; VIII, 3). Dietrich is convinced of this from his reading of Book VII of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and Averroes' commentary on it (III, 1-3). He is convinced, too, that this is the only view which makes it possible to distinguish between simple and composite beings. He knows that there are some philosophers who include the whole composite of matter and form in the quiddity of a material thing. But this, he says, is contrary to Aristotle and the truth. Even when the quiddity is signified in the abstract, for example by the concept "humanity", it signifies the form alone, not the composite of form and matter. Otherwise it would be indistinguishable from the quiddity of a simple immaterial being, and the whole difference between such beings and composite ones would be destroyed (III, 4).

In thus restricting the quiddity of a material substance to form, to the exclusion of matter, Dietrich is once again taking issue with St. Thomas. In his *De Ente et essentia* the Angelic Doctor sets out to disprove this thesis, which he recognizes as that of Averroes and some of his followers.[33] The essence of a material composite, he reasons, cannot be its form alone, for the essence of a thing is what is signified by its definition. Now, unlike the definition of mathematical entities, that of natural substances contains not only form but matter. So it is clear that the essence embraces both matter and form.[34]

Dietrich agrees with St. Thomas that what is defined by a definition of a material substance is the whole composite. He parts from him, however, in insisting that the form alone is signified by the definition. This, he assures us, is the teaching of Aristotle in Book VII of the *Metaphysics* and of Averroes' commentary (VIII, 4). It is a fact that both Aristotle and his great commentator exclude matter from the quiddity of a material thing, which they understand to be form alone.[35] Dietrich has tried to recapture the true meaning of the Aristotelian *to ti ēn einai* in his conception of quiddity. According to Aristotle, this is the form alone without matter. So that we will not be mistaken about the meaning of form in this context, he illustrates his thought by telling us that the souls of animals are the form and *to ti ēn einai* of animal bodies.[36] Dietrich uses the same example in explaining the restriction of quiddity to form. Quiddity, he says—alluding to St. Thomas—is not what some call the form of the whole (*forma totius*), embracing the whole substance in all its essential principles (*e.g.* humanity). For example, the quiddity of living things is the soul, not the whole animal (VIII, 3).

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[31] For the analogous character of essence according to St. Thomas, cf. J. Maritain, "Sur la doctrine de l'aséité divine", *Mediaeval Studies,* V (1934), 39-50.

[32] Cf. A. M. Goichon, *La Distinction de l'essence et de l'existence d'après Ibn Sina (Avicenne)* (Paris, 1937).

[33] Quidam enim dicunt quod tota essentia speciei est ipsa forma, sicut quod tota essentia hominis est anima. . . . Et haec opinio videtur Averrois et quorumdam sequentium eum. St. Thomas, *In VII Metaph.,* 9, n. 1467. On this point cf. A. Maurer, "Form and Essence in the Philosophy of St. Thomas", *Mediaeval Studies,* XIII (1951), 165-176.

[34] Neque etiam forma tantum essentia substantiae compositae dici potest, quamvis hoc quidam asserere conentur. Ex hiis enim quae dicta sunt patet quod essentia est id quod per diffinitionem rei significatur. Diffinitio autem substantiarum naturalium non tantum formam continet sed etiam materiam; aliter enim diffinitiones naturales et mathematicae non differrent. St. Thomas, *De Ente et essentia,* 2; p. 7.

Dietrich is here carefully distinguishing between the essence and quiddity of a material substance. Its essence is its very being, including both form and matter as its essential principles. Its quiddity is its formal actuality which gives it its special character as a being and object of knowledge. But this formal actuality is the substantial form of the thing. Quiddity is thus identical with substantial form, which is only one part of the whole being or essence of a material substance.

It should now be clear that Dietrich distinguishes between essence and quiddity in a way foreign to St. Thomas. In the first chapter of his *De Ente et essentia* the Angelic Doctor presents "essence" and "quiddity" as two names which designate the same thing. Essence is defined as that which constitutes a thing in its proper genus and species; again, as that through which and in which a thing has the act of being. But this is precisely the object of a definition expressing what a thing is. In short, it is the thing's quiddity. This is why, St. Thomas explains, philosophers changed the name "essence" to "quiddity".[37]

Dietrich of Freiberg's notion of quiddity does not permit him to make this identification. Patterned after the Aristotelian *to ti ēn einai* as seen through the eyes of Averroes, quiddity appears to him as the act and form of being, and hence exclusive of matter which is the potential and unintelligible element in reality. In his own interpretation of Aristotle, St. Thomas, following Avicenna, integrates matter in the quiddity of material substance.[38] It would be beyond our present scope to inquire fully into the significance and explanation of this difference in doctrine. It appears, however, that the real composition of essence and *esse* in created being is a decisive factor in the Avicennian-Thomistic interpretation of Aristotle on this point. St. Thomas himself furnishes us with a clue to this in his *De Ente et essentia.* As Dietrich well understood, St. Thomas envisages essence as a principle in created being really distinct from the act of being (*esse*) to which it is subject. Now what is subject to and receives the influx of *esse* is not the form or the matter alone but the composite of form and matter. Existence belongs to the composite, not to the form or matter taken by itself. The complete principle, then, according to which a thing exists and is called a being is not form or matter but the composite of the two. Now essence is precisely that according to which a thing is said to exist. Hence it necessarily embraces both form and matter in any material substance.[39]

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[35] Cf. Aristotle, *Metaph.* VII, 10, 1035a17-23, 1035b35, 1037a25-32; Averroes, *In VII Metaph.,* t. c. 34, 184D-F.

[36] Cf. Aristotle, *loc. cit.,* 1035b15. Cf. J. Owens, *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics* (Toronto, 1951), pp. 93-95.

[37] Cf. St. Thomas, *De Ente et essentia,* 1; p. 3.

[38] Cf. St. Thomas, *In VII Metaph.,* 9, n. 1469; Avicenna, *Metaph.* V, 5, 90F.

[39] Huic etiam concordat ratio, quia esse substantiae compositae non est tantum esse formae nec tantum esse materiae sed ipsius

This argument from St. Thomas' *De Ente et essentia* makes it clear that his notion of essence is thoroughly tied up with his conception of *esse* as the act of being. If he includes matter in the essence of a material thing, it is because of his notion of *esse* and the special relation of essence to *esse*. Having rejected the Thomistic doctrine of *esse*, Dietrich is logically bound to reject at the same time the Thomistic notion of essence or quiddity. His own follows the tradition of Greek and mediaeval formalism, rather than the newer existentialism of St. Thomas, which views being primarily not in terms of form but of existence.

Quiddity in the Order of Logic and Grammar

In Dietrich's own judgment St. Thomas' error regarding the quiddity of material things comes from a confusion of first and second intentions. This becomes clear from the chapters he devotes to quiddity and its relation to second intentions. In taking up this problem Dietrich is following the example of St. Thomas, who reserved chapter three of his *De Ente et essentia* to discussing the relation of essence to the logical notions of genus, species and difference. Like him, Dietrich realizes that an adequate explanation of quiddity must take into account not only its meaning in the real order of things, but also in the logical order of second intentions. Only then is the risk avoided of confusing quiddity as it is found in these two orders.

The primary division of being, according to Dietrich, is into real being and being of reason, or, to use another terminology, into being of first intention and being of second intention. Being of first intention, or real being, is divided in turn into the ten categories. Being of second intention, or being of reason, includes logical entities like the syllogism, definition, major and minor terms, genus, species and difference. It also includes the objects of grammar, like parts of speech and modes of signification (IV, 2).

In the order of second intentions—logical and grammatical entities—there are found the basic divisions of being into one and many, potency and act, as well as the subsequent divisions into matter and form, quiddity and "what is", although within this order the divisions have a meaning only proportionately similar to that which they have in the order of reality (IV, 3). Consider, for example, the division into form and matter. When a genus or species is predicated of a subject, it implies two things. First and directly it implies a quality after the manner of a form—the proper form of the genus or species taken precisely as such. Secondly, it implies an underlying subject or matter. In the case of a genus the underlying subject is a species; in the case of a species it is an individual. For instance, "white thing" signifies the species or form of whiteness, and it also implies in its notion a particular subject. A species, then, as a term of second intention, signifies a composite or aggregate of the species itself, understood as a form, and an individual whose species it is, understood as an underlying matter or subject. Similarly, a genus signifies a composite of the form of the genus and its underlying species. Difference, as a logical term, signifies a form alone in an absolute way. As a being of reason it is outside the substance of the genus, and hence the genus cannot be predicated of the difference. We cannot say that rational is animal (V, 2, 3).

In beings of second intention, then, as well as in beings of first intention, there is a composition of form and matter. But the meaning of the composition is not the same. Form and matter in the logical or grammatical order are not the same as in the real order; they are proportionate to their own orders. In the logical order the species, taken in abstraction from the individual of which it is predicated, is a form; *e.g.* humanity. This form expresses the whole nature of the species, and it is the quiddity of the composite of species and individual. So too the genus "animality" is a form in abstraction from the species of which it is predicated. It is the quiddity of the composite of genus and species, expressing the whole nature of the genus. It would be a mistake, however, to think that an abstract form like humanity, which signifies the whole nature of the species "man", is the quiddity of man understood as a being in reality or in the order of first intention. It is the quiddity of man simply in the logical order of second intention (VI, 1, 2). In the real order, as we have seen, man's quiddity is his substantial form or soul.

Dietrich ascribes this confusion of first and second intentions to certain persons whom he leaves unnamed. These persons, he says, intend to treat of the quiddities of natural things, which are beings of first intention, but they make the mistake of speaking of them as though they were dealing with second intentions. They call humanity, which in the abstract signifies the whole nature of the species, the quiddity of man as a natural being and a being of first intention, whereas in fact it is a logical notion and term of second intention (VI, 2).

There is little doubt but that this is a criticism of St. Thomas' treatment of the terms "man" and "humanity" in his *De Ente et essentia*. Both terms, according to this work, signify the essence of man, although in different ways. Humanity signifies all the essential parts of man: form and matter. It does this, moreover, as a form—a "form of the whole" (*forma totius*), prescinding from all the individual characteristics of men. In this it differs from the term "man" which, although abstracting from these individual characteristics, does not, like "humanity", positively exclude them, but contains them implicitly and indistinctly. That is why we can predicate "man" of any individual man but not "humanity". We can say "Socrates is a man", but not "Socrates is humanity". For humanity signifies only that whereby man is a man, and hence positively excludes from its meaning all individual conditions of the human essence.[40]

If this is true, "humanity" is not a logical concept nor a term of second intention. Like the concept "man" it signifies the essence of man absolutely, in abstraction from the particular conditions under which it exists in the real world and in the intellect. "Man" is a species, or concept of second intention, only when it includes the note of predicability of many individuals, and this condition attaches to man's essence only as it exists in the intellect. "Humanity" is not predicable of many individuals, and so it is not a species. An essence has the nature of a species or genus only when it is signified in the manner of a whole, like "man" or "animal", not when it is signified in the manner of a part, like "humanity" or "animality".[41]

Dietrich cannot agree with St. Thomas' explanation of these terms because he has refused to accept the notion of being on which it depends. Because in St. Thomas' view created being is really composed of essence and *esse*, an essence can be considered precisely as such, abstracting from the existential conditions it has either in reality or in the intellect. That is what in its own way "humanity" does. Despite its abstract character, then, it is not a logical notion, unless it is conceived as related by the mind to other notions.

This is completely foreign to Dietrich's metaphysics, in which one and the same quiddity does not admit of diverse modes of existence. From a metaphysical point of view, the quiddity of a material thing is its intrinsic formal principle or substantial form. In man, it is his soul. An abstract notion like "humanity" signifies all the essential elements of man's being, that is, both soul and body; but it does so as a logical concept and not as a concept of first intention. It is simply the species "humanity". The decisive factor in Dietrich's

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compositi; essentia autem est secundum quam res esse dicitur. Unde oportet ut essentia qua res denominatur ens non tantum sit forma nec tantum materia sed utrumque, quamvis huius esse suo modo forma sit causa. St. Thomas, *De Ente et essentia*, 2; p. 10. Cf. A. Maurer, *art. cit.*, 173-175.

[40] Cf. St. Thomas, *loc. cit.*, pp. 21-23.

[41] Cf. St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, 3; p. 23.

criticism of St. Thomas on this point is his rejection of the Thomistic notion of being with its real composition of essence and *esse*. We will find this also true of his criticism of St. Thomas' notion of an accident.

QUIDDITY IN ACCIDENTS

The final problem taken up by Dietrich is the one with which St. Thomas also concludes his *De Ente et essentia*: In what sense can we say accidents have a quiddity? The importance of the problem for Dietrich is indicated by the fact that he devotes five chapters of the present work to it (IX-XIII), besides having written a special treatise *De Accidentibus,* mentioned at the end of Chapter XIII.

We know already from the previous chapters that in the proper sense only substances composed of matter and form have a quiddity, and their quiddity is precisely their substantial form. Can accidents also be said to have a quiddity in the proper sense? Dietrich tells us that according to some, accidents have in themselves their own quiddity and essence, so that in their quiddity and essence they are unrelated to substance. They consider the definition of accidents to be formed from the intrinsic principles of their essence. For example, the definition of whiteness comprises its proper genus, colour, and some difference differentiating it from other colours within the genus, in much the same way that the definition of man is formed from the genus "animal" and the difference "rational" (IX, 1).

Several conclusions follow from this conception of accidents. Possessed of their own quiddities, it is not essential but accidental for them to exist in a substance as in a subject. It is also accidental for substance to enter into their definition. Finally, it is possible at least for a supernatural power to separate an accident from its subject so that it can remain in existence without that subject (IX, 2).

In the present work Dietrich gives no hint as to the identity of the persons teaching this doctrine of accident. From his *De Accidentibus,* however, it appears that this is his interpretation of St. Thomas'. In that treatise he presents the same conception of accident and then recounts three arguments used by its proponents to prove that an accident, possessing its own essence, can by God's power exist without substance. The first of these arguments is that, according to the *Liber de causis,* a primary cause exercises a greater influence on the effect of a secondary cause than the secondary cause itself. Consequently, when the secondary cause removes its influence from its effect, that of the primary cause still remains. Now God is the primary cause of accidents; their secondary cause is their subject. When their subject is removed, therefore, God can still hold accidents in existence. The second proof is the statement of St. Luke: "No word is impossible with God". The third is that God can do more than we can understand. Now some philosophers thought that the dimensions of bodies exist separately. Hence it is possible for God to make them exist separately.[42]

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[42] The arguments, with Dietrich's reply in part, run as follows: Ea autem quae objiciuntur in contrarium non est difficile dissolvere, quoniam in rationibus eorum multiplex invenitur defectus. Quandoque enim procedunt ex suppositione falsi, ut cum dicunt accidentia habere propriam essentiam suam secundum se et absolute, non concernendo substantiam; quam accidentis essentiam Deus posset facere non inesse subjecto alicui. Hoc autem quantum ad utramque partem hujus dicti supra latius improbatum est.

Inducunt enim ad assertionem suae intentionis, scilicet quod accidens possit esse sine subjecto, hoc quod in principio *Libri de causis* habetur, quod causa prima plus influit in effectum seu causatum causae secundae quam ipsa causa secunda. Unde quando a causato causae secundae removetur causalitas ipsius causae secundae, adhuc remanet causalitas ipsius causae primae. Unde cum accidentis causa secunda sit subjectum, Deus autem sit talis accidentis causa prima, remoto subjecto, adhuc Deus potest tenere accidens in suo esse. Haec ratio nimis deficit in proposito. Primo quia non est assumpta ab auctoritate secundum intentionem auctoris. Loquitur enim auctor *Libri de causis* in dicta auctoritate in eodem genere causae, puta efficientis vel formalis vel materialis. Unde ipse exemplificat in causis formalibus, scilicet in ente, vivo, rationali. Quantum autem pertinet ad propositum, non sic se habet, quoniam Deus est causa efficiens accidentis, subjectum autem est causa subjectiva seu materialis. . . .

Praeterea, illud quod adducitur in contrarium veritatis determinatae, scilicet quod

All three of these arguments are to be found in St. Thomas' article on the separability of accidents in the Eucharist in his commentary on the *Sentences.*[43] The second, which Dietrich calls an argument *in contrarium* in indeed the first of the two arguments *sed contra* of St. Thomas. It is likely, then, that Dietrich had this article in mind when he wrote the *De Accidentibus*, and that it is its doctrine of accident which he criticizes there and in his *De Quidditatibus entium.*

It is not surprising that once Dietrich refused to accept St. Thomas' doctrine of the real composition of essence and *esse* in created being, he would also reject his notions of substance and accident, which are in terms of that distinction. The definition, or quasi-definition, of substance, St. Thomas says, is "a thing having a quiddity which receives, or to which is due, being (*esse*) not in something else". An accident is defined as "a thing to which is due being (*esse*) in something else".[44] In defining substance and accident in this way St. Thomas is criticizing St. Bonaventure who, in the parallel place in his commentary on the *Sentences*, defines them respectively as "a *per se* existing thing", and "a being existing in something else".[45] St. Thomas saw clearly that he could not accept these definitions of substance and accident. The definition of substance, he says, cannot be "being *per se*", for this is to consider being as a genus and as the very essence of substance. But the essence of no creature is its very *esse.*[46] St. Thomas insists that a definition must point out the quiddity of the thing defined, not its being, which is distinct from that quiddity. This is precisely what his own definitions of substance and accident do. Each is defined as a certain "thing" or "quiddity" to which being is due, but in different ways. To substance it is due not to exist in something else; to accident it is due to exist in something else as in a subject. St. Thomas adds, in his charity, that when authors (cf. St. Bonaventure) sometimes define substance and accident improperly, it is for the sake of brevity.[47] In point of fact, a crucial philosophical issue is at stake, and St. Thomas shows his awareness of the fact by his careful reformulation of the current definitions of substance and accident.

Once St. Thomas has defined accident in this way, it is not difficult for him to show that an accident can exist supernaturally without a substance. By

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non est impossibile apud Deum omne verbum (*Lucae* i, 37), ergo potest Deus facere accidens sine subjecto, nihil valet. Si enim per omne verbum intelligatur omne quod per verbum vel vocem signatur, falsum est; nec hoc est intentio Evangelistae. Potest enim verbo seu voce signari contradictoria simul esse vera. Si vero per verbum intelligatur conceptus mentis . . . verum est quod non est impossibile apud Deum omne verbum. Quidquid enim vere concipi potest per intellectum totum Deo est possibile. Sed tunc auctoritas inducta non habet locum in proposito, quoniam accidens esse sine subjecto non potest capi per intellectum vere, quia importat contradictionem. . . .

Ex quorum positione etiam arguitur contra determinatam veritatem, scilicet quod Deus potest facere plus quam possumus intelligere. Philosophi autem quidam intellexerunt et posuerunt dimensiones esse separatas. Ad quod dicendum quod philosophi conceperunt quidem sic, sed non intellexerunt quia, sicut dictum est, intellectus semper est verorum. Dietrich of Freiberg, *De Accidentibus*, 23. *Ms* Maihingen II. 1, qu. 6, fol. 59^r, corrected with *Ms* Erfurt, Ampl. F 72, fol. 110^r.

[43] Cf. St. Thomas, *In IV Sent*. 12, 1, 1, 1, sed contra; ed. M. Moos (Paris, 1947), pp. 496-497; Responsio ad 1^m quaes., pp. 498-499.

[44] Sed definitio vel quasi definitio substantiae est res habens quidditatem, cui acquiritur esse vel debetur non in alio. Et similiter esse in subjecto non est definitio accidentis, sed e contrario res cui debetur esse in alio. St. Thomas, *loc. cit.*, ad 1^m quaest., ad 2^m; p. 499.

[45] Substantia dicitur res per se existens, ita quod nata est per se existere et nullo modo in alio. Accident, on the other hand, is: ens in alio. St. Bonaventure, *In IV Sent.* 12, 1, 1, 1; *Opera Omnia* IV (Quaracchi, 1939), p. 271, nn. 4, 5.

[46] Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut probat Avicenna in sua *Meta.*, per se existere non est definitio substantiae; quia per hoc non demonstratur quidditas ejus, sed esse ejus. Et sua quidditas non est suum esse; alias non posset esse genus, quia esse non potest esse commune per modum generis, cum singula contenta in genere differant secundum esse. St. Thomas, *ibid.* Cf. *Contra Gentiles,* I, 25; *Summa Theol.* III, 77, 1, ad 2^m; Avicenna, *Metaph.* II, 2; fol. 75^rC-76^r.

[47] Cf. St. Thomas, *In IV Sent., ibid.*

reason of its quiddity it belongs to an accident to exist in a substance, but it is possible for God to sustain it in existence without a substance. What belongs to something by reason of its quiddity may not belong to it by reason of the power of God. The objection may be raised that this is contrary to the very definition of an accident. But this is not the case. An accident is a "thing" to which it is due to exist in something else, and this remains true even when, by the divine power, it is conserved without a substance, as in the case of the accidents of bread and wine in the Eucharist.[48]

The objection may also be raised that a substance or subject enters into the very definition of an accident. Consequently, substance is of the very essence or quiddity of an accident. According to St. Thomas, however, substance does not enter into the definition of an accident as part of its very essence. It is added because of the natural dependence of the accident upon the substance. Strictly speaking, substance is outside of the essence of the defined accident: *extra essentiam definiti.*[49]

It is not impossible under these conditions for accidents to exist separately from substance through the power of God, although this would be impossible in virtue of their own nature. Moreover, when they are conserved by God without substance, as in the Eucharist, they have their own *esse* and their own essence, and their essence is not their *esse*. So they are composed of *esse* and essence just as the angels are. Ordinarily, however, accidents do not have their own *esse,* nor are they really composed of *esse* and essence.[50]

If it is indeed St. Thomas' doctrine of accident which is the object of Dietrich's criticism, his interpretation of it can hardly be said to be exact. St. Thomas himself never attributed to accidents their own essence or *esse*, except in the case of the Eucharist. Accidents have no existence of their own; only substances exist. The *esse* of accidents is *inesse*, for their being is to exist in a substance. What is more, because they do not have a being of their own, they lack a complete and absolute essence. Their essence is relative to the subject of which they are but the complementary determinations.[51]

Reading St. Thomas' tract on the Eucharist in his commentary on the *Sentences,* Dietrich seems to consider only one interpretation of its doctrine of accident possible. Accidents have a quiddity of their own or an absolute essence, in which they are unrelated to substance. This crude and intolerable error, he says, leads to the conclusions that substance is outside of their essence and definition, and that the divine power can conserve them in existence without substance (X, 1).

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[48] Et similiter esse in subjecto non est definitio accidentis, sed e contrario res cui debetur esse in alio. Et hoc nunquam separatur ab aliquo accidente, nec separari potest; quia illi rei quae est accidens, secundum rationem suae quidditatis, semper debetur esse in alio. Sed potest esse quod illud quod debetur alicui secundum rationem suae quidditatis, ei virtute divina agente non conveniat. Et sic patet quod facere accidens esse sine substantia, non est separare definitionem a definito. St. Thomas, *ibid.*

[49] . . . subjectum quod ponitur in definitione accidentium, non est de essentia accidentis. *Loc. cit.*, ad 3^{m} quaes., ad 6^{m}; p. 504. Dicendum quod cum dicitur accidentis esse est inesse, vel qualitercumque ponatur subjectum in definitione accidentis, intelligitur esse definitio per additionem, ut probatur in VII *Metaph.* (5, 1031a1-3). Et dicitur definitio per additionem quando in definitione ponitur aliquid quod est extra essentiam definiti, sicut nasus ponitur in definitione simi. Hoc autem est propter naturalem dependentiam accidentis a subjecto. Sed hoc non impediente, Deus potest accidentia sine subjecto conservare; nec tamen sequitur contradictoria simul esse vera; quia subjectum non est de substantia accidentis. St. Thomas, *Quodl.* IX, 5, ad 1^{m}.

[50] Dicendum quod cum ista accidentia habeant esse et essentias proprias, et eorum essentia non sit eorum esse, constat quod aliud est in eis esse et quod est. Et ita habent compositionem illam quae in angelis invenitur. St. Thomas, *In IV Sent.* 12, 1, 1, ad 3^{m} quaes., ad 5^{m}; p. 503. The metaphysical status of accidents in the Eucharist is an exception. Elsewhere St. Thomas explains that accidents do not have their own *esse*, nor do they have a real composition of essence and *esse*. Cf. *De Veritate* XXVII, 1, ad 8^{m}.

[51] Cf. St. Thomas, *De Ente et essentia*, 6; pp. 43-44; *Summa Theol.* I, 28, 2. For St. Thomas' notion of accident, cf. E. Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas* (New York, 1956), p. 31.

In Dietrich's opinion all these are errors stemming from the failure to distinguish correctly between substance and accident. The nature of a substance is to be *per se* and *secundum se,* or in other words to have an essence *per se* and *secundum se*: an essence so absolute that it is unrelated in itself to any extraneous thing. But if an accident is likewise defined as having an essence in itself, unrelated to substance, it becomes indistinguishable from substance. It too has an absolute essence, unrelated in itself to anything extrinsic.

It is not enough to point out that it is proper to substance to exist in itself and not in something else, whereas it belongs to an accident to exist in something else. These are properties or accidental modes of substance and accident; they do not constitute their very essences. Hence they do not enable us to distinguish between them essentially (X, 1).

To Dietrich's mind, the root of the difficulty is not so much to understand the nature of substance as it is to know that of an accident. The characteristic mark of substance is *per se* and essential being and unity, excluding all accidentality resulting from an essential relation to some other thing. There is an essential unity in its quiddity, in the quiddity and the substance possessing it, and in the total being of the substance (X, 2).

The case is just the opposite with accidents. Essentially they are dispositions of substance, as we learn from the commentator on Aristotle, Averroes. Hence they bear an essential relation to substance, and they are called beings only by reference to substance. Consequently, accidents are not *per se* beings, nor do they have an essential unity in themselves. As essentiality is the hall-mark of substance, so accidentality is the hall-mark of accidents (X, 3, 4, 5).

It should thus be clear that accidents do not have an absolute quiddity or essence; indeed, as Aristotle says, properly speaking they have no quiddity at all, nor can they be truly and properly defined. A true definition is formed from the intrinsic principles of a thing, without any extrinsic nature entering into the definition; for instance the definition of man, which is "rational animal". But definitions of accidents do include something else, for they are defined in reference to substance; for instance the definition of snub-nose, which is "curvature of the nose". At best, we can say that accidents have definitions in the broad sense of the term (X, 6).

When accidents are defined in the above way, in relation to substance, they are considered as they are in reality, or as beings of first intention. For in reality and in their essence they are dispositions of substance. But it is also possible to consider accidents logically, as beings of second intention, that is to say as genera, species, and the like. Then they can be defined autonomously and in themselves, without substance entering into their definitions (XII, 1).

Dietrich gives examples of these two ways of defining accidents in his *De Accidentibus.* If the question is asked: What is whiteness? the reply can be given: Whiteness is a colour which expands sight. This definition locates the object defined in its proper genus and assigns to it a specific difference as if it were a quiddity in itself like substance. But this is not a definition of whiteness as a reality, or as a being of first intention. It is a logical or dialectical definition, and as such it is "empty" (XII, 2).

Accidents, however, can also be given real definitions. If it is asked: What is colour? the reply can be given: Colour is the limit of the translucent in a determinately bounded body. This defines colour as it is in reality: a disposition of substance, and not as a quiddity in itself, in terms of its own genus and difference.[52]

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[52] Secundum hoc potest dici quod aliquo modo (accidentia) habent quidditatem, sed non simpliciter, sed ut quidam dixerunt modo logico. Modo, inquam, logico in quantum videlicet logice inquirendo per logicas seu dialecticas definitiones et interrogationem seu responsionem per quid est inquiritur de ipsis. Et hoc dupliciter: uno modo quoad coordinationem eorum in linea seu genere praedicamentali; ut si quaeratur

We have already seen Dietrich accuse St. Thomas of confusing first and second intentions. Had St. Thomas distinguished properly between them, he would never have called an abstract logical notion like "humanity" the quiddity of man. It now appears that Dietrich considers the same confusion responsible for St. Thomas' doctrine of accidents. We can ask the question "What is it?" of an accident as well as of a substance, and a reply can be given stating the "whatness" of the accident. But it will signify the real quiddity only if it defines the accident as it is in reality, that is, as a disposition of substance. If it defines the accident like a substance, in terms of a genus and specific difference, the definition will be only dialectical. It will not point out what the accident is in reality. That is why Dietrich considers St. Thomas' definition of whiteness as "a colour which expands sight" purely logical.[53] Such a definition gives the illusion that an accident has its own quiddity. It also leads one to imagine that an accident can be made to exist without a substance, if not by a natural power, at least by a supernatural one. In fact, the quiddity of an accident is to be a disposition of a substance. Existence in a substance is thus a necessary property of an accident, as equality or inequality is a necessary property of a number. Hence it is impossible for any power, natural or supernatural, to separate an accident from its substance.[54] (XII, 3).

We now know that the quiddity of an accident is to be the disposition of substance. But it is possible to be even more precise. Dietrich has told us that, in general, quiddity is the formal principle of a thing, giving it its special character as a being and as an object of knowledge. In composite substances the substantial form answers this description, and so it is their quiddity. In accidents the most formal principle of their being and intelligibility is substance. This is clear from the fact that substance is placed in the definition of accidents as their formal difference. For instance, when we define snubness, we say it is curvature *of the nose*. Substance is thus the formal, specifying principle in the definition of accidents and plays the role of their quiddity, as substantial form does in substances (XIII, 1, 2).

This conclusion of the final chapter of the *De Quidditatibus entium* completes Dietrich's description of quiddity and at the same time demonstrates its thorough consistency. Quiddity in general is the intrinsic formal principle of a being, specifying it as a being and as an object of knowledge. In this general sense, quiddity is to be found in every order of being. Every being, besides standing outside of nothingness, has a determinate or specified character and offers itself to the intellect as a determinate object of knowledge. In this broad sense everything can be said to have a "whatness" or quiddity. Even possible being is precisely "possible" being.

In most orders of being, however, there is no real distinction between being and the quiddity which determines it to be such and such a being. We think of

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quid est albedo, et respondeatur color; vel si definiatur color, quod albedo est color disgregativus visus; quae definitio constat ex proprio genere et differentia utriusque illorum. . . . Est etiam alius modus, videlicet considerando ea in ordine ad substantiam, in quantum scilicet sunt dispositiones substantiae. Et iste modus considerationis pertinet ad considerationem essentiae et naturae eorum in quantum sunt entia et res primae intentionis, circumscriptis ab eis rebus secundae intentionis, ut si quaereretur quid est color, et respondeatur quod color est extremitas perspicui corporis in corpore terminato. *De Accidentibus*, 12, 13. *Ms* Maihingen II, 1, qu. 6, fol. 56^{rab}, corrected with *Ms* Erfurt, Ampl. F 72, fol. 108^{rab}.

[53] Cf. St. Thomas, *De Ente et essentia*, 6; p. 47; *In X Metaph.*, 9, nn. 2106, 2107. St. Thomas explains, however, that he does not consider the difference 'expansive of sight' a true constitutive difference of whiteness, but rather its effect.

[54] XII, 3. In his *De Accidentibus* Dietrich also forcefully denies this possibility: Si autem juxta praedicta quaeratur utrum accidens quacumque virtute hoc agente possit esse sine subjecto, et in sua essentia per se stare absque omni fulcimento alterius naturae, respondendum simpliciter absque omni distinctione quod non. *Ms* Maihingen, fol. 58^{ra}; *Ms* Erfurt, fol. 109^{va}. Unfortunately; he does not give his own theology of the Eucharist.

simple beings, like God and the Intelligences, as though they were distinct in their being and quiddity, but we know that their very simplicity precludes this. In the logical and grammatical orders (the order of second intention), there is indeed a distinction between an underlying subject and determining quiddity. In these orders quiddity is found in the special sense of a principle distinct from the being which it determines and specifies to be of such and such a kind. But these beings are products of the mind, and consequently the distinction between their being and quiddity is not real. As for accidents, they do not have a being or quiddity of their own. As dispositions of substance, they are called beings only in reference to substance. Substance indeed is their very quiddity, for it is that which most formally determines and specifies them.

Only in material substances, which are really composed of matter and form, do we find all the conditions required for quiddity in the full and proper sense. Possessed of their own essence and being, they contain within themselves a real multiplicity of underlying subject and determining form. In this order of being alone, "what is" is really distinct from the intrinsic principle by which it is what it is, namely substantial form. Substantial form, then, is quiddity in the perfect and proper sense of the term. Formal principles in other orders of being may be proportionately called quiddities, but on the analogy of substantial form, which alone is quiddity in the proper sense.

Dietrich is fully aware of the gulf between this notion of quiddity and that of St. Thomas. He is also conscious that his divergence from St. Thomas on this point stems from a more fundamental opposition on the meaning of being itself. Two metaphysical views of reality are here at stake: one which sees reality primarily as existential act, and the other which sees it primarily as essence and quiddity. Dietrich recognizes the new direction of St. Thomas' metaphysics and its un-Aristotelian character. But he himself prefers the second type of metaphysics, which he found in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* as interpreted by Averroes. Dietrich's merit as a metaphysician lies in the fact that, having made this choice, he consistently drew from it its manifold implications.

APPENDIX

The edition of Dietrich of Freiberg's *De Quidditatibus entium* has been made with the following manuscripts which, to my knowledge, are the only ones extant.

E=Erfurt, Stadtbücherei, *Cod.* Amplon. *lat.* F 72, fols. 110^{vb}-113^{ra}.
M=Maihingen, Oettingen-Wallensteinsche Bibliothek, *Cod.* II, 1, qu. 6, fols. 73^{va}-75^{rb}, 78^{rv}.

E has been used as the basic manuscript and it has been corrected with *M*. It contains several marginal corrections and additions. Described by E. Krebs, "Meister Dietrich (Theodoricus Teutonicus de Vriberg). Sein Leben, seine Werke, seine Wissenschaft", *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters* V, 5-6 (Münster, 1906), 9*, 15*-18*.

M omits the title of the work and the numbers and titles of the chapters. Folio 78 has been misplaced in the codex. It belongs to the *De Quidditatibus entium*, and should be placed after fol. 74. It has been erroneously inserted in the *De Tempore* and edited as a part of that work by F. Stegmüller, "Meister Dietrich von Freiberg über die Zeit und das Sein", *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, XIII (1940-42), 178-186. Since a microfilm copy of fol. 78 was not available, I have recorded the variants of this folio from F. Stegmüller's edition. *M* is described by A. Birkenmajer, "Drei neue Handschriften des Werke Meister Dietrichs." *Beiträge*, XX, 5 (Münster, 1922), 72-75.

ARMAND MAURER

TRACTATUS DE QUIDDITATIBUS ENTIUM

DIETRICH OF FREIBERG

PRIMUM CAPITULUM

Differentia entis et ejus quod est quid secundum suas proprias rationes.

<1> De quidditatibus entium, cujusmodi sint, et quae propria ratio quidditatis in eo quod quidditas, et in quibus entibus, et quomodo inveniantur,[1] secundum communem[2] vel propriam quidditatis rationem, ad praesens intendamus.[3] Ubi primo[4] considerationi occurrit quod ens et quid, quamvis secundum utriusque eorum latitudinem et continentiam secundum supposita convertantur ad invicem, (nihil enim est ens quod non sit aliquid, et nihil est aliquid quod non sit ens), differunt tamen secundum suas proprias rationes, secundum quod etiam Philosophus distinguit in demonstrativis in[5] libro *Posteriorum*,[6] quaestionem 'si est' a quaestione 'quid est'. Ens enim, in eo quod ens, prima et simplicissima omnium intentionum formalium est, qua res primo per essentiam, secundum quod essentia,[7] distat a nihilo. Dico autem 'essentia in eo quod essentia' quia, sicut dicit Augustinus libro *De Immortalitate animae*,[8] essentia non dicitur nisi[9] quia est. Et dicitur in VII *De Trinitate*, capitulo 1:[10] "Quod enim est sapientiae sapere, et potentiae posse, et aeternitati aeternam esse, et justitiae justam esse, et magnitudini[11] magnam esse, hoc est essentiae ipsum esse." Essentia igitur in eo quod essentia[12] et non per aliquid extraneum essentiae vel accidentale distat a nihilo. Haec est igitur propria ratio essentiae et entis in quantum hujusmodi.

<2> Ipsum autem quid in eo quod quid, seu quidditas in eo quod quidditas, super rationem entis importat quamdam rei informationem, saltem quoad modum intelligendi, qua res seu ens determinatur ad talem vel talem essentiam seu[13] naturam, ut talis res non solum sit ens per distantiam ejus a nihilo sed etiam sit hoc vel hoc secundum aliquam informationem, sicut de primo causato, quod est intelligentia secundum philosophos.[14] Dicitur in libro *De Causis*[15] quod ipsa est hyliatim, id est ens et forma, saltem quantum ad modum intelligendi. Et caelum et terra, homo et equus, non solum sunt entia per distantiam a nihilo, sed per aliquam sui informationem determinantur ad hoc vel hoc ens secundum uniuscujusque propriam naturam et essentiam.

SECUNDUM CAPITULUM

De quidditate secundum suam generalem rationem, secundum quod communiter[1] in omnibus entibus <quocumque> modo existentibus invenitur.

<1> His visis, sumendum est[2] ex dictis generalem rationem quidditatis. Dico autem generalem, quia magis in speciali considerando diversa in diversis generibus entium invenitur ratio et modus diversus quidditatis, ut infra dicetur.[3]

<2> Quidditas igitur entis cujuscumque, secundum praedicta, vult esse aliquod principium intrinsecum rei secundum actum, a quo sumitur ratio rei et secundum rationem essendi et secundum rationem notificandi seu innotescendi. Dico autem rationem rei quam significat nomen, et est definitio secundum Philo-

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[1] inveniatur *E.*

[2] *Corrected in margin to* convenientiam *E.*

[3] intendendum *M.*

[4] primae *E.*

[5] *Om. E.*

[6] Aristotle, *Post. Anal.* II, 1, 89b21ff.

[7] esse *E.*

[8] St. Augustine, *De Immortalitate animae* XII, 19; PL 32, 1031.

[9] *Om. E.*

[10] St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* VII, 1; PL 42, 936; decimo *EM.*

[11] magnitudine *E.*

[12] in eo quod essentia; quod essentia in eo *E.*

[13] vel *M.*

[14] Cf. Avicenna, *Metaph.* IX, 4; ed. (Venice, 1508), 104^{v}A; *Liber de causis*, 4; ed. O. Bardenhewer (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1882), p. 167.

[15] *Op. cit.*, 8; p. 173.

[1] convenit *or* contingit *E.*

[2] *Om. M.*

[3] Cf. *infra*, III-XIII.

sophum in[4] IV (111ra) *Metaph.*[5] Nomen enim semper imponitur rei quantum ad actum suum, ut[6] dicit Commentator super VII.[7]

<3> Quod autem hic dicitur quod quidditas est principium intrinsecum, excluduntur causae extrinsecae, scilicet efficiens[8] et finis et materia, ex qua fit generatio in rebus quae exeunt in esse per generationem ex determinato aliquo principio materiali generationis, cujusmodi est menstruum in generatione aliquorum animalium, ut hominis et equi. Hujusmodi enim principia seu causae, scilicet efficiens,[8] finis et materia ex qua, non sunt[9] quidditas rei. Quidditas enim vult esse[10] aliquod principium rei intrinsecum secundum suam essentiam absolutam[11] secundum se in quantum est ens, a quo circumscribuntur omnes causae extrinsecae quibus constituitur res non in quantum ens, sed in quantum ens naturae.

<4> Quod autem assumitur quod quidditas est principium secundum actum, removetur materia, quae est altera pars compositi, vel quod modum materiae habet in composito. Ex hoc enim quod hujusmodi materiale principium est principium secundum potentiam, quantum ad proprietatem suae naturae, nec quiddificativum nec notificativum est ejus rei, cujus est[12] principium. Quidditas igitur aliquid est formale, intrinsecum rei quantum ad actum rei. Et ideo additur quod ab ipso sumitur ratio rei, et quantum ad rationem essendi et quantum ad rationem notificandi seu innotescendi ipsam talem rem.

<5> Attendendo igitur dictam generalem rationem quidditatis, possumus dicere quod in omni eo quod est aliquod ens secundum actum est quidditas, qua est id quod est secundum actum. Unde et in simplicibus etiam habet locum ratio quidditatis, extenso nomine quidditatis secundum dictam generalem rationem quidditatis.[13] Secundum hoc enim dicit Avicenna[14] quod quidditas simplicis est ipsum simplex. Distinguimus enim et ponimus in ipso simplici, saltem quantum ad modum intelligendi et significandi, essentiam suam qua est ens, et actum quo formaliter est tale vel tale ens[15] determinatum,[16] ut de intelligentia supra dictum est.[17] Eadem autem ratione,[18] secundum generalem suprapositam quidditatis descriptionem possumus dicere quod non solum in substantiis sed etiam in accidentibus est quidditas et habent[19] quidditatem. Sunt enim non solum substantiae sed etiam accidentia suo modo aliquid secundum actum, quamvis differant[20] a modo substantiarum, ut infra dicetur.[21]

<6> Posset etiam, juxta dictam quidditatis rationem, rationabiliter concedi quod etiam id quod est ens in potentia, ut materia et similia,[22] habeant quidditatem[23] secundum proportionem et modum suae essentiae, videlicet ut sicut per suam essentiam proprietate naturae suae est ens possibile, sic et quidditatem habeat et sit quid modo possibili. Sed haec hactenus de quidditate secundum sui generalem rationem, qua extenso nomine quidditatis invenitur quidditas in omnibus entibus quocumque modo habeat res rationem entis.

TERTIUM CAPITULUM

De quidditate secundum suam rationem magis specificam, secundum quam magis proprie et vere invenitur, et solum in rebus compositis.

<1> Si autem discedamus[1] magis in speciali ad veritatem entis[2] et proprietatem

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[4] *Om. M.*

[5] Aristotle, *Metaph.* IV, 7, 1012a24.

[6] et *M.*

[7] Averroes, *In VII Metaph.* t. c. 11; ed. (Venice, 1574), 161LM.

[8] effectus *E.*

[9] *Om. E.*

[10] *Om. M.*

[11] absolute *M.*

[12] *Om. E.*

[13] *Om. M.*

[14] Avicenna, *Metaph.* V, 5; 90^{r}F.

[15] *Om. M.*

[16] *Add.* est *M.*

[17] Cf. *supra*, I, 2.

[18] *Add.* ens determinatum *E.*

[19] habens *M.*

[20] differenter *M.*

[21] Cf. *infra*, X-XIII.

[22] *Lac. M.*

[23] *Add.* tamen *M.*

[1] descendamus *M.*

[2] *Om. M.*

rei, considerandum quod in omni quod habet quidditatem et est quid, necessarium est inveniri aliquam realem multitudinem, secundum Philosophum versus finem VII,[3] in qua aliquid substernitur quasi subjective et materialiter, in quo originatur substantia rei. Perficitur autem et completur ut sit ens, in eo quod quid, per aliquem actum formalem, qui ex hoc ipso quidditas est talis entis, et istud judicat[4] quaestio 'per quare' seu 'propter quid', secundum Philosophum in VII.[5] In his enim quaestionibus, si proprie eis quis utatur, ex proprietate significationis et locutionis semper aliquid ponitur[6] et quaeritur de alio. Omne enim quid importat, secundum suam propriam rationem, aliquid quod aliqua quidditate est quid; sicut album, quo designatur aliquid esse[7] albedine album; ipsa autem albedo non est alba. Sed, ut dictum est, aliquid est albedine album.

<2> Cujus ulterius ex parte quidditatis ratio est quod[8] quidditas, non solum quantum ad modum significandi, in quantum videlicet abstractive significatur, (111^{rb}) sed magis et[9] verius secundum rem[10] dicit quamdam qualitativam rem[11] seu qualitatem, qua res in sua substantia est quid. Unde etiam secundum hoc, quidditas non est quid, sed aliquid est quid ipsa quidditate. Et quidditas igitur, et id quod est quid, per se important respectum mutuum ad invicem tamquam distincta in eadem rei substantia large, ut nunc sumendo substantiam rei. Secundum hoc ergo in omni habente quidditatem, et[12] in eo quod est quid, invenitur aliqua multitudo, ut praemissum est. Unde Philosophus, versus finem VII,[13] dicit: Secundum hanc enim dispositionem semper quaeritur aliud, et est alterius. Et infra dicit[14] quod quaerere de una re, ut quaerere quare homo est homo, nihil est quaerere.[15] Manifestum est igitur quod in simplicibus non quaeritur nec consideratur. Compositum est igitur aliquid quod est secundum hunc modum.

<3> Haec autem omnia quae hic dicta sunt indicant etiam exempla Philosophi quae ad dictorum evidentiam inducit Philosophus[16] in VII,[17] insinuans hoc quod ponit in libro *Posteriorum*,[18] scilicet[19] quod quaestio 'propter quid' seu[20] 'quare' reducitur ad quaestionem 'quid est', maxime secundum considerationem primi philosophi, qui proprie de quidditatibus et essentiis rerum considerare habet in quantum hujusmodi. Ponit igitur Philosophus[21] exemplum in artificialibus et naturalibus: in artificialibus quidem,[22] ut quare lapides et lateres sunt domus, ubi quaeritur de forma, quae est quasi quidditas domus, scilicet cooperimentum;[23] in naturalibus,[24] ut quare generatus ex hoc, scilicet ex rebus ex quibus constituitur corpus proprium hominis, est homo. Et subdit:[25] "Manifestum est igitur quod quaeritur causa materiae, et ista est forma ejus quod habet aliquid, et est substantia." Commentum:[26] "Manifestum est igitur quod in istis rebus[27] quaeritur causa quae est materiae per quare, et est forma, propter quam est materia." Manifestum est igitur quod in simplicibus non est quidditas. Et per consequens ipsorum non est definitio, eo quod in essentia simplicis[28] non est distinctio[29] alicujus multitudinis, nec de eis habet locum quaestio[30] 'propter quid' vel 'per quare' secundum praedicta. Unde Commentator super VII, in fine penultimi

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[3] Aristotle, *Metaph.* VII, 17, 1041b3-9.

[4] istud judicat: ista *E.*

[5] Aristotle, *loc. cit.*, 1041a7-33.

[6] supponitur *M.*

[7] *Add.* de *E.*

[8] quia *M.*

[9] *Om. E.*

[10] *Om.* secundum rem *M.*

[11] *Om. M.*

[12] *Om. M.*

[13] Aristotle, *loc. cit.*, 1041a11. Not a literal quotation.

[14] *Loc. cit.*, 1041a15.

[15] *Add.* et infra *M.*

[16] *Om.* quae . . . Philosophus *E.*

[17] *Loc. cit.*, 1041a10-32.

[18] Aristotle, *Post. Anal.* II, 2, 90a15, 32.

[19] si *M.*

[20] vel *M.*

[21] Aristotle, *Metaph.* VII, 17, 1041a26, 1041b4-5.

[22] qualis *M.*

[23] coopertorium *M.*

[24] *Add.* autem *M.*

[25] *Loc. cit.*, 1041b8.

[26] Averroes, *In VII Metaph.*, t. c. 60; 208EF: Manifestum est quod quaeritur in istis rebus per quare causa, quae est secundum materiam.

[27] istis rebus: simplicibus *E, om. M.*

[28] simplicitatis *E.*

[29] definitio *M.*

[30] *Add.* per *M.*

capituli, dicit sic:[31] "Ideo id quod est simplex[32] in rei veritate[33] non habet definitionem neque quaeritur per quare."

<4> Ex dictis etiam manifestum est quod hi qui dicunt quidditatem comprehendere totum compositum in[34] rebus compositis ex materia et forma, quod etiam in abstracto significatur, ut humanitas, ut dicunt;[35] hi, inquam, sentiunt contra Philosophum et contra veritatem. Nulla enim secundum hoc esset differentia inter simplicia et composita. Sicut enim in rebus compositis[36] totum significatur in abstracto, sic in simplicibus; nec est aliqua ratio quare in compositis quidditas rei importat[37] totum compositum et non in simplicibus. Compositio enim in rebus compositis nihil facit ad propositum, in eo videlicet quod potius[38] ipsa composita dicantur habere quidditatem quam simplicia, ex quo in utroque illorum[39] tota essentia potest significari et[40] in abstracto et in concreto. Considerando igitur magis in speciali, ut praemissum est, proprietatem et modum et rationem quidditatis, removetur quidditas, et per consequens definitio, a simplicibus; sed solum in compositis invenitur, non sic quod quidditas in eis sit[41] totum compositum, sed aliquid ejus quasi[42] intrinsecum principium secundum actum formalem.

QUARTUM CAPITULUM

Quod in rebus secundae intentionis, quae sunt res rationis, invenitur et quidditas.

<1> Exclusis igitur simplicibus ab eo quod est habere proprie quidditatem, agendum de compositis, in quibus et quomodo et cujusmodi quidditas in eis inveniatur secundum diversa entium genera, quorum distinctio descendit ex divisione entis. Unde per consequens ea quae conveniunt enti secundum communem entis rationem, in eo quod ens, conveniunt etiam partibus entis in quas descendit ens per sui divisionem, quamvis secundum quamdam[1] analogiam, sicut[2] et ipsum ens est analogum. Sunt autem hujusmodi, ut unum et multa, et eorum species, puta[3] simile,[4] dissimile, aequale, inaequale, idem, differens, diversum et similia. Item, entis in quantum est ens sunt potentia et actus,[5] supra quae, id est[6] in (111va) speciebus entis, fundantur materia et forma, et quidditas et id quod est quid, quantum ad essentias eorum; similiter activum et passivum, in quantum hoc quidem est actu, hoc vero potentia. Haec igitur in diversis entium generibus inveniuntur secundum quamdam similitudinem proportionis secundum exigentiam uniuscujusque generis entium.

<2> Dividitur autem prima divisione ens in ens secundum rem, secundum quod est res primae intentionis cum suis proprietatibus distinctum in decem genera praedicamentorum, et in ens quod est res secundae intentionis et res[7] rationis, quod similiter praedictis in diversos modos distinguitur. Sunt enim in hujusmodi rerum maneriae quae sunt logicae considerationis, puta syllogismus, definitio,[8] major et minor extremitas, locales habitudines, genus et[9] species, et hujusmodi. Sunt etiam aliqua hujus generis quae cadunt sub consideratione facultatis grammaticae, puta[10] modi significandi et consignificandi partium orationis, et hujusmodi.

<3> In his igitur rebus secundae intentionis, ea quae descendunt ex ente per

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[31] Averroes, *loc. cit.*, t. c. 39; 207I.

[32] simpliciter *E.*

[33] veritatem *E.*

[34] ex *M.*

[35] Cf. Avicenna, *Metaph.* V, 5; 90F; St. Thomas, *In VII Metaph.*, 9, n. 1469; *De Ente et essentia*, 2; ed. Roland-Gosselin (Paris, 1948), pp. 19-20.

[36] in rebus compositis: inter res compositas *E.*

[37] importet *M.*

[38] post *M.*

[39] istorum *M.*

[40] *Om. M.*

[41] *Om. E.*

[42] ejus quasi: eis tamquam *E.*

[1] *Om. M.*

[2] sicut: si tamen *M.*

[3] scilicet *M.*

[4] *Add.* et *M.*

[5] *Om.* Item . . . actus *E.*

[6] *Om.* id est *M.*

[7] ens *M.*

[8] *Add.* et *M.*

[9] *Om. M.*

[10] scilicet *M.*

suam divisionem, puta unum et multa et[11] eorum species, item potentiam et actum et quae in eis fundantur, scilicet materiam et formam, et quidditatem et id quod quid est, proportionaliter sumendum ad similitudinem entium realium primae intentionis.

Quintum Capitulum

Ponitur quoddam praeambulum ad sumendum quidditatem in rebus secundae intentionis, quae sunt res rationis.

<1> Quamvis autem hujusmodi res secundae intentionis circueant omnia genera praedicamentorum, per prius tamen inveniuntur in genere substantiae et ex hoc proportionaliter descendunt in alia genera, sicut et ipsum ens derivatur a substantia ad alia genera vel entia[1] quae sunt in aliis generibus. Separetur igitur secundum considerationem in genere substantiae, id quod est substantia et res primae intentionis ab eo quod est genus substantiae secundum coordinationem in linea praedicamentali quantum ad genera et species et differentias et[2] hujusmodi, quae in quantum talia sunt res secundae intentionis et res rationis. Et accipiuntur secundum praedicari in quid vel[3] quale vel de pluribus vel de uno solo, ut particularia; sic enim vel sic praedicari est res rationis et res secundae intentionis.

<2> Si ergo consideremus in genere substantiae, quoad coordinationem in linea praedicamentali, genera et[4] species et differentias et particularia, in quantum sunt res secundae intentionis, secundum hoc cadit distinctio substantiae in primas et[5] secundas substantias, secundum Philosophum in *Praedicamentis*.[6] Proprium autem est primae substantiae, ut ibidem dicit, significare hoc aliquid in quantum est particulare; secundae autem substantiae, scilicet genera et species, significant quale quid. In eo autem quod significant quale quid, duo importantur in significato suo: unum, videlicet, quod principaliter et qualitative et per modum formae significatur et in recto, et hoc est propria forma generis vel speciei in se, in quantum genus vel species; aliud quod quasi materialiter et subjective[7] in suo significato important, id, videlicet, quod eis in linea praedicamentali supponitur, ut[8] species generi, et speciei individuum vel[9] particulare. Sicut si ageretur de significatione albi, diceretur quod significat[10] speciem seu[11] formam albedinis, et in intellectu suo importat subjectum particulare aut[12] individuum, quantum ad coordinationem in linea praedicamentali, quasi materialiter et subjective significatur; et ideo dicuntur significare hoc aliquid. Hinc est quod superiora de[13] inferioribus sibi subjectis praedicantur, ut genus de specie, et species de individuo. Sunt enim superiora formae quaedam[14] inferiorum, importantes in significatione sua quoddam aggregatum, naturam videlicet propriam sui ipsius generis et speciei subjectae. Similiter et ipsa species cum sua propria specifica forma concernit sibi subjectum individuum. Et sic, secundum quod dicit Philosophus,[15] Plato aggregatum ex specie et individuo vocat[16] quoddam simul totum, in quo species formaliter se habet, individuum in eo quod individuum materialiter et subjective. Sed haec hactenus de significatione generum, specierum et individuorum.

<3> Differentia autem, quae etiam[17] pertinet ad coordinationem lineae praedicamentalis, sed a latere et quasi indirecte in quantum differentia et res rationis,

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[11] in *M.*

[1] *Om.* vel entia *M.*

[2] *Om. E.*

[3] *Add.* in *M.*

[4] *Om. M.*

[5] *Add.* in *M.*

[6] Aristotle, *Categories,* 5, 2a11-18.

[7] *Add.* materialiter *E.*

[8] vel *E.*

[9] sive *M.*

[10] *Om. E.*

[11] vel *M.*

[12] *Add.* seu *EM.*

[13] superiora de: superioritate *M.*

[14] quoddam *M.*

[15] Aristotle, *Metaph.* VII, 8, 1033b19-1034a7. Aristotle does not attribute this doctrine to Plato.

[16] vocavit *M.*

[17] autem quae etiam: etiam quae *E.*

solam formam significat absolute. Et ideo secundum Philosophum in suis *Topicis*,[18] genus non praedicatur de differentia, quia differentia est extra substantiam generis in quantum sunt res rationis. Si enim praedicaretur animal, in quantum genus, de rationali, in quantum differentia, ut (111$^{\text{vb}}$) ibi dicit Philosophus,[19] homo esset duo animalia propter duo disparata ab[20] invicem, scilicet[21] genus et differentia; quorum utrumque esset animal, et unum esset aliud animal quam aliud.

<4> Ei autem quod dictum est, videlicet[22] quod superiora sunt[23] formae inferiorum sibi in linea praedicamentali suppositorum, puta genera specierum, et species individuorum, videtur contrarium, quoniam inferiora magis formalia[24] sunt superioribus et magis in actu. Superiora enim in linea praedicamentali per inferiora dividuntur vel[25] determinantur, sicut potentialia per magis actualia.

<5> Ad quod dicendum quod ea quae ordinantur in linea praedicamentali dupliciter accipi possunt. Uno modo ut sumuntur[26] res ipsae quae sunt[27] talis generis, et sunt[28] res primae intentionis, puta substantia, corpus, animal, homo. In hujusmodi, id quod significatur nomine alicujus generis, et id quod significatur nomine differentiae determinantis tale genus in speciem, sunt partes formae ejus rei quae subjicitur generi; ut si dicatur homo est animal rationale. Hujusmodi enim definitio significat formam, cujus formae partes explicantur[29] per partes dictae definitionis. Alio modo possunt considerari ea quae sunt in tali genere secundum quod ordinantur in genere in quantum genera, species et hujusmodi, quae sunt res secundae intentionis, in quibus similiter superiora, id est genera, cum adjunctis differentiis determinantibus ea in species, sunt partes formae ejus quod subjicitur superiori, ut animal rationale, quae sunt partes formae ejus quae est humanitas in quantum homo est species, et species est res secundae intentionis. Utroque autem istorum modorum sumendi genera et differentias, quae significant partes formae, ipsa, inquam, simul juncta, sunt quid formalius quam id cujus est talis forma, sicut et ipsa forma formalior est eo cujus est forma. Et secundum hoc non obstat dicta objectio.

SEXTUM CAPITULUM

Quomodo sumitur quidditas in rebus secundae intentionis, quae sunt res rationis.

<1> Praehabitis igitur consideratis, patet quomodo sumenda seu[1] intelligenda sit quidditas in rebus secundae intentionis, quae sunt res[2] rationis. Et primo, gratia majoris evidentiae, in genere substantiae. Si enim accipiamus simul totum secundum Platonem,[3] id est aggregatum ex specie et individuo, natura speciei,[4] in eo quod species, in hujusmodi aggregato habet rationem formae et individuum speciei suppositum stat in ratione materiae. Unde ipsa species, si formaliter sumatur, id est circumscripto individuo,—et hoc designatur si ipsa species significetur in abstracto, ut humanitas—species, inquam, sic sumpta, est quidditas dicti aggregati quod est homo, et quoddam simul totum secundum Platonem, ut recitat Aristoteles.[5] Humanitas autem secundum hoc dicit totam naturam speciei, cujus formae, scilicet humanitatis, partes sunt animal et rationale, si dicta forma exponatur et explicetur[6] per suas partes. Et secundum hoc, animal rationale non est definitio humanitatis sed partes ejus. Est autem

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[18] Aristotle, *Topics* VI, 6, 144a28-34.
[19] *Loc. cit.*, 144a34-144bl.
[20] ad *E.*
[21] Om. *E.*
[22] scilicet *M.*
[23] sint *M.*
[24] formaliter *E.*
[25] *Om.* dividuntur vel *M.*
[26] sumantur *M.*
[27] *Add.* res *M.*
[28] sint *M.*
[29] exemplificantur *M.*

[1] vel *M.*
[2] *Om. E.*
[3] Cf. *infra*, note 5.
[4] natura speciei: nam species *M.*
[5] Aristotle, *Metaph.* VII, 8, 1033b19-1034a7. Aristotle does not attribute this doctrine to Plato.
[6] implicetur *M.*

hujusmodi, scilicet animal rationale, definitio hominis secundum dictum modum, solam formam significans sed definiens hominem totum.

<2> Et hinc[7] est quod quidam,[8] minus considerate loquentes, et volentes agere de quidditatibus rerum naturalium, quae sunt res primae intentionis, dixerunt humanitatem, quae in abstracto importat totam naturam speciei, esse quidditatem hominis, in quantum utrumque istorum, scilicet et humanitas et homo, est res naturae et res primae intentionis. Aestimantes se agere de rebus naturae seu primae intentionis, inciderunt in modum et proprietatem rerum secundae intentionis, quae sunt res rationis. Sicut autem dictum est, gratia exempli, de specie quae est homo et sua quidditate quae est humanitas, in quantum utrumque est res rationis et res secundae intentionis, sic dicendum est de genere, verbi gratia, de animali, quod secundum praemissum modum est etiam quoddam simul totum, id est aggregatum ex genere et supposita sibi specie, in quantum utrumque est res rationis; cujus aggregati forma, et per consequens quidditas, est animalitas, designans totalitatem generis in quantum tale genus. Partes autem hujus formae sunt corpus, animatum, sensibile; quae partes formae, ad invicem aggregatae, sunt definitio animalis. Secundum eundem modum de aliis generibus et speciebus negotiandum, et quidditatibus eorum in genere substantiae.

<3> Sed et in aliis generibus praedicamentorum eodem modo procedendum est (112^{ra}) in sumendis quidditatibus generum et specierum uniuscujusque praedicamenti, in quantum sunt res rationis et res primae intentionis. Similiter autem et in aliis quae cadunt sub logica consideratione, si alicujus curiositati placuerit, poterit eorum quidditates[9] investigare, puta syllogismi,[10] in quo attenditur debitus modus et figura quantum ad formam ejus. Sic de propositione, sic de termino agendum. Sed non est hic circa hoc immorandum.

<4> Similiter autem, quantum ad considerationes grammaticales secundum modum et proportionem dictorum, apparent quidditates eorum[11] in suo genere; quantum enim ad modum significandi, patet in partibus. In nomine enim, quod significat substantiam cum qualitate, qualitas locum formae, et per consequens quidditatis, tenet. Pronomen etiam, quamvis significet meram substantiam, qualificatur tamen demonstratione et relatione; verbum etiam et participium, quae significant actum, ut in verbo distantem vel[12] in participio conjunctum substantiae. Secundum modum significandi patet quomodo id quod magis formale est in significato locum quidditatis habet. De aliis autem partibus, puta adverbio, conjunctione, praepositione,[13] interjectione, quae[14] syncategorematicae[15] sunt quoad sua significata, non est necesse multum curiose agere et superfluum est immorari. Sed ista quae dicta sunt ratione exempli sufficiat tetigisse.

<5> In omnibus igitur quae praemissa sunt ad sumendum quidditatem rerum secundae intentionis, manifestum est quod salvatur ratio quidditatis et ejus quod quid est, in quantum hujusmodi, non solum secundum communem rationem quidditatis positam in principio hujus tractatus, sed etiam magis in speciali considerando rationem quidditatis, in quantum, videlicet, in eo quod quid est et quod quidditatem habet, necessarium est inveniri aliquam multitudinem qua distinguitur[16] inter quidditatem et id quod quidditate informatur tamquam aliquod subjectum per suam formam. Sed hic hactenus de quidditatibus rerum secundae intentionis, quae[17] sunt res rationis.

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[7] *E* ?, hoc *M.*

[8] Cf. Avicenna, *Metaph.* V, 5; 90F; St. Thomas, *In VII Metaph.* 9, 1467-1469; *De Ente et essentia*, 2, p. 22.

[9] quidditatem *M.*

[10] syllogismum *M.*

[11] ipsorum *M.*

[12] *Add.* ut *M.*

[13] *Add.* et *M.*

[14] quia *M.*

[15] sinchache grammaticae *E.*

[16] distinguatur *M.*

[17] *Add.* etiam *M.*

Septimum Capitulum

De completa et perfecta ratione quidditatis quae proprie est quidditas.

<1> De quidditatibus autem rerum naturalium, quantum ad essentias suas, nunc considerandum. Sunt autem res naturae substantiae et accidentia naturalia, scilicet quantitas, qualitas et cetera talia. Et primo agendum de quidditatibus substantiarum quoniam de prioribus prior est speculatio. Substantia autem prior est aliis definitione et cognitione et tempore, sicut[1] dicit Philosophus in[2] VII *Metaph.*[3]

<2> Ad sumendum igitur[4] quidditatem substantiae secundum differentiam ad accidentia, considerandum quod ea quae dicta sunt de quidditate, quantum ad generalem ejus rationem positam in principio hujus tractatus, item illud[5] quod postea additum est, scilicet quod in omni eo quod est quid et quod habet quidditatem oportet inveniri quamdam multitudinem in qua aliquid tamquam forma sit alicujus tamquam materiae, ut supra ostensum est[6]—haec, inquam, ad perfectam et veram rationem quidditatis non sufficiunt, quae solum invenitur in substantiis[7] compositis. Necessarium est igitur dictam in principio generalem rationem quidditatis, cum eo quod additum fuit postea, salvam esse in quidditatibus substantiarum compositarum; sed oportet magis ipsam specificare, ut inveniatur quidditas quae proprie quidditas est, quae solum invenitur in substantiis secundum Philosophum.[8]

<3> Hoc autem, quod cum[9] praedictis de ratione quidditatis complet rationem quidditatis quae vere et proprie quidditas est, colligimus manifeste a Philosopho et a Commentatore VII *Metaph.*[10] Ad cujus intelligentiam, considerandum quod illud quod est quid et habet quidditatem, habet se sic, id est, quod est quid et habet quidditatem secundum eam rationem qua est ens et habet entitatem, quamvis ens et entitas abstractioris sint quam quid et quidditas. Sunt tamen unius ordinis, quantum ad hoc quod modus et proprietas entis descendit in ipsum quid in quantum hujusmodi; qui ordo est essentialis et per se. Sunt enim per se convertibilia, ens et quid, secundum supposita,[11] quia quidquid est ens est quid et e converso. Et ideo modus et proprietas essentialis et quae est per se in uno salvatur in alio. Importat autem ens sive entitas perfectam[12] quamdam essentialitatem in se quae, in quantum est ens, omnem accidentalitatem excludit in sua essentia, quae accidentalitas consistit in eo, vel quod aliquid (112^{rb}) accidat alteri et in eo seu ex hoc sit ens, vel quod aliquid sit ens ex aliquibus accidentaliter sibi unitis invicem. Talia enim non sunt vere et simpliciter entia, sed accidit ut talia sint, et per consequens accidit ut sint entia. Ens igitur in eo quod ens, quod vere et per se est ens, habet in sua essentia talem essentialitatem qua essentialiter et per se est ens et unum.

<4> Et quoniam ens et[13] quid et[14] verum et unum et similia sunt transcendentia,[15] circueunt etiam omnia entia et secundum supposita convertuntur, quamvis propriis rationibus differant; est tamen in eis aliquis ordo. Ens enim secundum suam propriam rationem omnium est primum, deinde quid est, deinde alia, ut patet, ordine essentiali ad invicem disposita. In omni autem essentiali ordine rationem primi, et ea quae sunt primi per se, oportet salvari in secundis. Igitur necessarium est eam essentialitatem, quae est entis in eo quod[16] vere ens[17] et simpliciter ens, salvam esse in eo quod est quid, ut videlicet in eo quod est vere

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[1] ut *M.*
[2] *Om. M.*
[3] Aristotle, *Metaph.* VII, 1, 1028a31-34.
[4] autem *M.*
[5] id *M.*
[6] Cf. *supra*, III, 1-3; VI, 5.
[7] his *M.*
[8] Aristotle, *Metaph.* VII, 4, 1030b5, 1031a14.
[9] quod cum: quantum *E.*
[10] Aristotle, *ibid.*; Averroes, *In VII Metaph.*, t. c. 16; 165M, t. c. 19; 168F.
[11] suppositum *M.*
[12] perfecta *M.*
[13] *Om. M.*
[14] *Om. M.*
[15] *Add.* et *M.*
[16] *Add.* est *M.*; est *deleted E.*
[17] *Om. M.*

et simpliciter quid omnis accidentalitas sit exclusa. Sicut igitur ens, quod vere et simpliciter est ens, essentialiter est per se ens et unum, ita ipsum quid, quod[18] vere et simpliciter est quid, omnem accidentalitatem et diversitatem excludit quantum ad id quod quid est.

<5> Attenditur igitur in eo quod vere et simpliciter et essentialiter est quid quaedam per se et essentialis identitas seu unitas inter quidditatem et ipsum quod quid est. Et hoc ostendit Philosophus versus principium VII[19] *Metaph.*,[20] scilicet quod quidditas substantiae est eadem cum substantia cujus est quidditas. Non autem, ut ibi ipse pertractat,[21] convenit hoc accidentibus, quia ipsorum quidditates non sunt eaedem cum ipsis accidentibus, ut infra patebit cum fuerit sermo de accidentibus.[22] Est autem haec quidditas substantiae, quam etiam significat definitio, forma substantialis, quae essentialiter et per se est unum et idem cum substantia cujus est forma.

<6> Attenditur etiam alia unitas per se et essentialis in eo quod quid est, videlicet quoad partes quidditatis in seipsis ad invicem, quae sunt partes formae et sunt ante totum, et propter hoc ingrediuntur definitionem substantiae, ut Philosophus ostendit in VII *Metaph.*[23], puta animal rationale quantum ad hominem. Sunt enim essentialiter unum et idem animal[24] rationale, ut dicitur super VII,[25] quamvis nomine seu intentione differant, ut illud quod nomine animalis importatur, significetur tamquam minus determinate, rationale autem significet idem illud magis determinate. Isti autem duo modi unitatis seu identitatis qui sunt essentialiter et per se quidditatis, inquam, et ejus quod quid est, et partium quidditatis inter[26] se et definitionis et definiti, et partium definitionis inter se, pertinent ad primum modorum per se[27] quos enumerat Philosophus in I *Posteriorum.*[28]

<7> Tertius etiam modus unitatis attenditur in eo quod vere et simpliciter quid est, videlicet ut non solum partes quidditatis sint sibi[29] unum invicem essentialiter, quod pertinet ad secundum modum praemissum, nec solum ipsa quidditas sit essentialiter et per se unum cum eo quod quid est, quod pertinet ad primum modum, sed necessarium est id quod est vere et simpliciter quid esse unum per se et essentialiter in sua substantia, quantum ad omnes partes et principia substantiae intrinseca. Et iste modus pertinet ad tertium modum per se, eorum quos enumerat Philosophus in libro *Posteriorum.*[30] Essentia enim et essentialitas, qua res est per se secundum hunc tertium modum per se,[31] excludit omnem accidentalitatem et accidentalem unionem seu unitatem eorum ad invicem, ex quibus constat substantia rei. Hunc modum unitatis ipsius quod vere et simpliciter est quid insinuat Philosophus in VII, ubi inquirens de definitionibus accidentium, capitulo 12, dicit:[32] "Et definitio rei est illud quod significat quid est esse[33] rei". Et subdit[34] quod in accidentibus non est illa unitas essentialis quae requiritur in eo quod[35] vere et simpliciter est quid, quia quamvis in accidentibus unum praedicetur de alio, non tamen unum eorum, scilicet quod praedicatur, est illud de quo praedicatur. Et exemplificat de homine albo, et subdit[36] quod inveniri[37] talem unitatem essentialem in substantia ejus quod vere est quid non est nisi substantiarum tantum.

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[18] *Om. E.*

[19] *Om. E.*

[20] Aristotle, *Metaph.* VII, 6, 1031b18, 1032a5.

[21] *Loc. cit.*, 1031b23-27.

[22] Cf. *infra*, X, 6; XIII, 2.

[23] Aristotle, *Metaph.* VII, 10, 1035b3-35.

[24] *Add.* et *M.*

[25] Averroes, *In VII Metaph.*, t. c. 21; 171A-C.

[26] in *E.*

[27] *Add.* eorum *M.*

[28] Aristotle, *Post. Anal.* I, 4, 73a34-37.

[29] ibi *E.*

[30] *Loc. cit.*, 73b5-9.

[31] *Om.* secundum . . . se *M.*

[32] Aristotle, *Metaph.* VII, 12, 1037b26-28; cf. 5, 1031a12.

[33] essentia *M.*

[34] *Loc. cit.*, 1031b19.

[35] et *E.*

[36] substantia *E. Loc. cit.*, 1031a28.

[37] invenire *E.*

Octavum Capitulum

Quod quidditas, secundum completam et perfectam rationem quidditatis, invenitur solum in substantiis compositis, et quae sit ipsa quidditas eorum (112va).

<1> Ex his igitur quae dicta sunt colligimus id quod complet[1] et determinat et specificat superius positam generalem quidditatis rationem ad eam quae vere et perfecte et simpliciter quidditas est. Et est quod, quantum ad[2] id quod vere et simpliciter et essentialiter est quid,[3] attenditur[4] per se et essentialis[5] unitas quidditatis ad ipsum quod quid est. Item, quod partes quidditatis per se et essentialiter sint unum. Item tertio, quod ipsum quod quid est in sua substantia per se et essentialiter sit unum.

<2> Congregando igitur ea quae dicta sunt de ratione quidditatis secundum Philosophum, habemus quod quidditas, quae vere et simpliciter quidditas est, est aliquod principium intrinsecum secundum actum, a[6] quo sumitur ratio rei et secundum rationem essendi et secundum rationem innotescendi;[7] ratio, inquam, rei importantis in sua substantia aliquam multitudinem cum unitate eorundem multorum ad invicem essentiali.

<3> Constat autem quod hoc principium intrinsecum secundum actum, cum jam dictis conditionibus, non est nisi forma substantialis. Igitur quidditas, quae vere et simpliciter quidditas est, non est nisi in substantiis compositis et est forma substantialis: non ea[8] quam dicunt formam totius, quae complectitur totam rei substantiam quantum ad omnia sua principia essentialia, ut aiunt[9] de humanitate, sed forma quae est altera pars compositi, ut anima in animatis, quae est quidditas animati, non totum animatum. Quidditas enim non importat totum quod importat ipsum quod quid est. Et ideo quidditas non est omnibus modis idem quod ipsum quod[10] quid. Et etiam in hujusmodi, ipsa quidditas non est ipsum quid, quia forma non est tota essentia rei. Et hoc est quod dicit Philosophus,[11] quod si animal esset ipsa anima, non differret in animali quid ab ipsa quidditate, quod est inconveniens apud ipsum in substantiis compositis.

<4> Hoc principium intrinsecum secundum actum, quod est forma rei et quidditas substantiae compositae, ex cujus formali actualitate et essentiali unitate tota entitas et essentialis unitas substantiae compositae dependet, et secundum rationem essendi et secundum rationem notificandi, investigat Philosophus in VII *Metaph.*[12] ex proprietate et modo[13] definitionis et quaestionis per quid est vel quare est, ostendens quod quidditas quae vere et simpliciter est quidditas in solis substantiis invenitur, et quod solum substantiae simpliciter et proprie habent definitionem, quae secundum Philosophum et Commentatorem[14] solam formam significat, quamvis definiat totum compositum. Sola enim substantia vere et simpliciter est ens et unum per suam essentiam. Et secundum hoc, vere et simpliciter est ens et[15] quid quod designatur per definitionem, quae est vere et simpliciter definitio sumpta solum ex essentialibus et essentialiter intrinsecis rei.[16] Sed hic hactenus de quidditatibus substantiarum.

Nonum Capitulum

Falsa positio aliquorum circa quidditates accidentium.

<1> Ceterum,[1] qualiter sit quidditas in accidentibus nunc considerandum.[2]

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[1] Corrupt *E.*

[2] quantum ad: quemadmodum *M.*

[3] *Om. E.*

[4] intenditur *M.*

[5] essentialiter *E.*

[6] in *M.*

[7] notificandi *M.*

[8] eam *E.*

[9] Cf. St. Thomas, *In VII Metaph.* 9, n. 1469.

[10] *Om. M.*

[11] Aristotle, *Metaph.* VII, 10, 1036a17-25.

[12] *Loc. cit.*, 1-17, 1028a10-1041b33.

[13] et modo: essentiae *M.*

[14] *Loc. cit.*, 10, 1035a17-23, 1035b35, 1037a25-32. Averroes *In VII Metaph.*, t. c. 34; 184D-F.

[15] *Om.* ens et *M.*

[16] re *E.*

[1] Attamen *M;* ceterim *E.*

[2] nunc considerandum: sic videndum *M.*

Circa quod sunt qui dicunt[3] quod accidentia quidditatem propriam habent secundum se, secundum rationem suae essentiae absolute, id est non concernendo nec in sua quidditate nec in sua essentia substantiam. Secundum hoc, et ipsorum accidentium definitio, secundum eos,[4] ex propriis sui generis seu suae essentiae intrinsecis principiis constat. Definio enim albedinem ex suo proprio genere, quod est color, aggregando tali generi aliquam propriam differentiam qua species albedinis sub tali genere constituitur, sicut definio hominem ex animali et rationali.

<2> Secundum hoc ergo non est essentiale sed accidit accidenti inesse subjecto quod est substantia, et accidit in definiendo accidens ut substantia ingrediatur definitionem accidentis. Secundum hoc etiam possibile[5] est, virtute saltem supernaturali, accidens separari a subjecto et in se sic separatum permanere sine subjecto.

DECIMUM CAPITULUM

Destructio positionis falsae eo quod est contra Philosophum.

<1> Sed ista positio, cum hoc quod intolerabilem falsitatem continet, destruit et annihilat totam doctrinam Philosophi quam circa materiam[1] istam tradit in VII *Metaph.*[2] Patet autem istius rudis positionis falsitas primo (112^{vb}) ex eo quia[3] nulla differentia esset inter esse accidens et esse substantiam. Et universaliter inter substantias et accidentia, in quantum hujusmodi, nulla esset diversitas secundum[4] propriam rationem suarum essentiarum. Stare enim per se et non esse in alio, quod dicunt[5] proprium esse substantiae, et esse in alio, quod per se convenit accidenti, sunt quaedam proprietates et modi accidentales: illud[6] substantiae, istud[7] accidenti. Proprietates autem rerum et accidentalia non constituunt rerum essentias, et per consequens nec essentiales eorum[8] differentias. Et ideo ad habendam diversitatem essentialem[9] substantiarum et accidentium, in quantum substantiae et accidentia, attendendum est ad[10] ea quae pertinent ad essentias earum.[11]

<2> Pertinet autem ad generalem rationem substantiae, in quantum substantia, per se et secundum se esse secundum rationem suae essentiae; quod non est aliud nisi habere essentiam per se et secundum se sic absolutam ut non concernat, nec secundum rationem suae quidditatis, nec secundum rationem suae essentiae, aliquam extraneam naturam. Alias enim non esset in substantia essentialis unitas, nec in ipsa quidditate substantiae, nec inter quidditatem et ipsum quid, quod est substantia, nec in essentia totali[12] substantiae. Et per consequens ipsa substantia non esset essentialiter et per se ens sicut nec unum, faciente hoc accidentalitate quadam[13] tali, quae attenditur in hoc quod essentia substantiae concerneret rem alterius naturae et eam in sua quidditate vel essentia reciperet.

<3> E converso autem se habet in accidentibus in quantum accidentia, id est secundum generalem rationem accidentium in quantum accidentia, quae generaliter per essentiam et per se competit omni accidenti in quantum accidens. Accidentalitas enim, quae per se et essentialiter est accidentis in eo quod accidens, excludit ab esse[14] accidentis eam essentialitatem qua ens est per se et essentialiter

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[3] Cf. St. Thomas, *In IV Sent.*, d. 12, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3^{m} quae., ad 5^{m}; ed. M. Moos (Paris, 1947), p. 503.

[4] Cf. St. Thomas, *De Ente et essentia*, 6; ed. Roland-Gosselin (Paris, 1948), p. 46; *In X Metaph.*, 9, nn. 2106-2107.

[5] impossibile *M.*

[1] naturam *E.*

[2] Aristotle, *Metaph.* VII, 1, 1028a10-bl.

[3] quoniam *M.*

[4] suam *E.*

[5] Cf. St. Thomas, *In IV Sent.*, d. 12, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1^{m} quae., ad 2^{m}; p. 499.

[6] istud *M.*

[7] illud *M.*

[8] ipsarum *M.*

[9] *Om. M.*

[10] *Om. E.*

[11] eorum *M.*

[12] essentia totali: esse rationali *E.*

[13] *Om. M.*

[14] essentia *M.*

ens et unum; quod non convenit accidentibus quia per suam essentiam non sunt per se et simpliciter entia. Secundum Philosophum enim in VII *Metaph.*,[15] accidentia sunt entia in eo quod sunt entis veri[16] quod est substantia. Esse autem ens in eo quod est entis, non est per se et simpliciter ens, et per consequens nec unum simpliciter et per se. Manifestum est igitur quod proprium est substantiae habere talem quidditatem et essentiam secundum se et absolute,[17] id est non concernendo aliquid extraneum essentiae, et hoc in quantum substantia.

<4> Si ergo accidentia tales quidditates et essentias haberent, non esset differentia inter substantias et accidentia.[18] Ipsa[19] essent vere et simpliciter substantiae, sive secundum tales essentias suas[20] essent in subjectis sive essent a subjectis separata.[21] Esse enim in subjecto vel non inesse nihil facit ad differentiam essentiae quam dicunt habere accidens.[22] Praeterea, secundum Philosophum in principio IV *Metaph.*,[23] ens praedicatum de unoquoque decem generum[24] praedicatur per essentiam, et dicit essentiam uniuscujusque eorum. Praedicatur autem de substantia in quantum est per se et simpliciter ens, de accidentibus autem per attributionem eorum ad substantiam, quia sunt entia in eo quod sunt entis veri quod est substantia. Igitur per essentiam convenit accidentibus dici entia per attributionem ad substantiam. Sunt autem[25] per[26] essentiam formae quaedam et dispositiones. Ergo per suam essentiam[27] dicuntur entia per attributionem ad substantiam, in quantum non sunt nisi substantiae dispositiones.

<5> Haec est igitur essentia accidentis cujuscumque: esse dispositionem substantiae, sicut etiam dicit in commento[28] expresse et ratio concludit. Analogia igitur quae attenditur inter accidentia et substantiam,[29] convenit per attributionem accidentium ad substantiam in quantum non sunt nisi substantiae dispositiones. Haec est igitur essentia accidentis cujuscumque: esse dispositionem substantiae, sicut etiam dicit ibi Commentator.[30] Item, in eo quod ens praedicatur,[31] secundum hoc, per prius et posterius de substantia et accidente, necessario, secundum jam dicta, attenditur in accidente et substantia per suas essentias, non in his proprietatibus sive modis accidentalibus qui[32] sunt inesse subjecto, quod convenit accidentibus, vel non inesse, quod substantiarum est.

<6> Manifestum est igitur ex his quod accidentia absolutam quidditatem et essentiam secundum se non habent, ita quod non concernant in sua quidditate et essentia substantiam. Et hoc est quod Philosophus determinat in VII *Metaph.*,[33] videlicet quod accidentia vere et proprie quidditatem non habent, et per consequens definitionem vere et proprie non habent simpliciter.[34] Talis (113ra) enim[35] definitio constat ex intrinsecis rei principiis secundum se et absolute, non concernendo aliquam aliam naturam quae ingrediatur definitionem ejus, ut definitio hominis, quae[36] est animal rationale. Definitiones autem accidentium, quae[37] tamen extenso nomine possunt dici definitiones, sunt ex additione alterius naturae, scilicet substantiae, ut definitio simi, quae est concavitas nasi. Determinat etiam Philosophus in eodem,[38] quod quidditas substantiae est essentialiter indifferens[39] et eadem substantiae cujus est quidditas, in accidentibus autem non. Quod igitur dicunt de quidditate et essentia accidentium, ut praemissum est, manifeste est contra Philosophum; et secundum positionem ipsorum[40] impossibile

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[15] Aristotle, *loc. cit.*, 1028a10-30.

[16] *Om. M.*

[17] et absolute: absolutam *M.*

[18] *Add.* et *M.*

[19] *Add.* accidentia *M.*

[20] *Om. M.*

[21] secreta *M.*

[22] habere accidens: *lac. E.*

[23] Aristotle, *Metaph.* IV, 2, 1003a33-1003b11.

[24] *Add.* praedicamentorum *M.*

[25] *Om.* autem *E.*

[26] *Add.* suam *M.*

[27] dispositionem *E.*

[28] Averroes, *In VII Metaph.*, t. c. 4; 155B.

[29] *Add.* quae *E.*

[30] *Om.* quae convenit . . . Commentator *M.* Averroes, *ibid.*

[31] ponitur *M.*

[32] quae *M.*

[33] Aristotle, *Metaph.* VII, 4, 1030a28-1030b6.

[34] definitionem . . . simpliciter: nec definitionem vere et simpliciter habent *M.*

[35] nisi *E.*

[36] quod *E.*

[37] si *M.*

[38] *Loc. cit.*, 6. 1031b18-1032a11.

[39] differens *E.*

[40] eorum *M.*

est verificari ea quae circa materiam[41] istam determinat Philosophus in dictis locis.

Undecimum Capitulum

Destructio positionis falsae ex rationibus propriis.

<1> Cujus positionis falsitas etiam patet ex hoc. Si enim accidens propriam[1] quidditatem habet et essentiam, ut dicunt,[2] ergo habet[3] quidditatem simpliciter, et est ens quid simpliciter si est compositum vel est quidditas simpliciter si est solum forma. Si autem est ens quod vere et simpliciter, est vere substantia, ut supra dictum est.[4] Si autem accidens est forma et quidditas secundum perfectam rationem[5] quidditatis, quod necessarium est dicere secundum eorum positionem, ergo quod recipit talem formam et quidditatem in se, tale, inquam, est vere et simpliciter ens et quid secundum hujusmodi quidditatem. Ergo transmutatione facta secundum hujusmodi formam, ens transmutatum mutatur substantialiter et[6] secundum esse et definitionem, quia transmutatur secundum veram sui quidditatem, dicta eorum positione retenta. Praeterea, ens simpliciter, quod est substantia, existens in actu per suam essentiam et sic manens, non est in potentia nisi ad aliquem sui modum vel dispositionem accidentalem. Talis autem dispositio, sicut et ipsum nomen importat, non est nisi substantiae diversa positio in suis partibus, et hoc vel quantitative vel qualitative vel secundum aliquem alium talem modum, secundum quem talem vel talem habitudinem ad invicem se habeant partes talis substantiae dispositae. Dispositio enim est habentis partes, secundum Philosophum in[7] V *Metaph.*[8] Circumscriptis igitur talibus partibus, dispositio nihil est. Confirmatur[9] hoc in grosso exemplo, videlicet si plures candelae situentur et disponantur ad invicem vel secundum circulum vel secundum rectum; circumscripta autem tali multitudine candelarum, quae sunt quasi quaedam partes hujus multitudinis,[10] dispositio dicta nihil est.

<2> Potentia igitur substantiae seu habitudo ejus ad suam accidentalem dispositionem, quae est ipsum accidens, non nisi entis simpliciter secundum actum suum substantialem[11] subsistentis ad actum seu[12] formam qua substantia, non est nisi ens secundum quid, idest secundum aliquam sui dispositionem; nec est alius modus potentiae seu habitudinis substantiae ad accidens nisi iste qui dictus est. Ergo per quamdam correspondentiam mutui respectus actus et potentiae, actus seu forma accidentalis, quae est ipsum accidens, non est vel[13] non habet se ad substantiam nisi sicut ipsiusmet[14] substantiae dispositio. Nec est alia habitudo accidentis ad substantiam nisi ista quae dicta est, sicut nec alia est habitudo substantiae ad accidens nisi sicut ipsius substantiae ad accidens, nisi sicut[15] ad dictam[16] dispositionem, ut dictum est.

<3> Secundum autem talem habitudinem accidentis ad substantiam, in quantum est dispositio substantiae, accidens per[17] attributionem ejus ad substantiam dicitur ens. Ergo accidens non dicitur ens nisi in quantum est dispositio substantiae. Ens autem praedicat essentiam uniuscujusque generis praedicamentorum. Ergo accidens per essentiam suam non est nisi dispositio substantiae,[18] et non aliqua natura seu essentia absolutae quidditatis secundum se. Praeterea, omnis forma et actus absolutae essentiae et quidditatis in se non respicit subjectum, cujus est forma et actus, nisi in quantum tale subjectum est simpliciter ens in potentia. Actus enim, qui est simpliciter actus, et est qui se ipso intranee per

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[41] naturam *E.*

[1] absolutam *M.*

[2] Cf. *supra*, IX, note 3.

[3] habent *M.*

[4] Cf. *supra*, X, 4.

[5] rem *M.*

[6] *Om.* *M.*

[7] *Om.* *M.*

[8] Aristotle, *Metaph.* V, 19, 1022b1.

[9] consideratur *E.*

[10] *Add.* hujusmodi *M.*

[11] substantiale *M.*

[12] vel *M.*

[13] *Om.* non est vel *M.*

[14] ipse *M.*

[15] *Om.* ipsius . . . sicut *M.*

[16] suam *M.*

[17] secundum *M.*

[18] *Om.* Ens . . . substantiae *E.*

suam essentiam est actus, non respicit potentiam nisi quae est simpliciter potentia et quae intranee per suam essentiam est ens potentia. Et haec est ratio quare forma substantialis non habet subjectum nisi ens simpliciter in[19] potentia, quod est materia, quoniam ex duobus actu entibus, secundum Boethium,[20] non constituitur aliquid tertium. Si ergo accidens habet talem essentiam et est actus absolutae quidditatis secundum se, ut dicunt,[21] ergo nunquam (113^{rb}) posset inesse substantiae completae et perfectae inesse substantiali, sed solum substantiae quae[22] est ens per suam essentiam in potentia; et sic non erit differentia inter[23] accidens et formam substantialem; quod est absurdum.

Duodecimum Capitulum

Solutio eorum quae[1] per se inducunt pro dicta opinione falsa.

<1> Ad hoc autem quod supra inductum est,[2] quod his quae hic dicta sunt[3] videtur contrarium, respondendum. Quod enim ibi dictum est quod res uniuscujusque generis accidentium definiuntur ex propriis sui generis, et ita non concernunt substantiam in sua[4] essentia,[5] quidditate et definitione, dicendum quod res novem generum accidentium dupliciter accipi possunt. Uno modo in quantum sunt res naturae et primae intentionis. Et secundum hoc, per suam essentiam et secundum rem non sunt nisi dispositiones substantiae, et in suo intellectu important substantiam et ex ea definiuntur, secundum quod[6] dicit Philosophus in VII,[7] versus principium, scilicet quod definitio substantiae accipitur in definitione cujuslibet rei. Alio modo possunt accipi res novem generum[8] accidentium secundum coordinationem cujuscumque eorum in linea praedicamentali, in quantum videlicet genera et species et hujusmodi. Et secundum haec[9] cadunt in logicam considerationem quoad hujusmodi[10] res secundae intentionis. Et sic unumquodque ipsorum generum praedicamentalium ab intellectu suo excludit genus substantiae, et secundum se ipsum consideratur, et modo logico definitur, et habet in eo locum quaestio 'quid est'. Et per consequens quidditas invenitur in eo, ut quidam dixerunt, modo[11] logico. Haec sunt verba Philosophi in VII.[12]

<2> Tales autem definitiones, constantes ex hujusmodi logicis intentionibus quae sunt genera et differentiae, in suis propriis generibus, sunt logicae et vanae omnes, ut dicitur in libro *De Anima*,[13] nec indicant id quod sunt hujusmodi secundum rem naturae. Et ideo ex hujusmodi quaestionibus et definitionibus per quid est, non potest argui quod accidentia habeant secundum se absolutas essentias secundum rationem absolutae et propriae quidditatis, circumscripta substantia.

<3> De eo autem quod inducunt, quod accidenti accidit inesse substantiae, et secundum hoc saltem[14] aliqua virtute supernaturali potest fieri quod non insit, dicendum quod inesse subjecto est accidentale accidenti secundum eum modum quo proprietas et per se passio potest dici accidere suo proprio subjecto, ut paritas vel imparitas numero. In talibus autem eadem est definitio dicens quid est subjecti et propter quid passionis.[15] Stante igitur subjecto in esse, stabit ejus definitio[16] et e converso; alioquin definitio separaretur a definito, quod est

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[19] *Om.* *E.*

[20] Boethius, *Contra Eytychen et Nestorium* IV, *Opuscula Sacra:* ed. R. Peiper (Leipzig, 1871), p. 198, ll. 26-34.

[21] Cf. *supra*, IX, note 3.

[22] qua *M.*

[23] *Add.* ipsum *M.*

[1] *Add.* est *E.*

[2] Cf. *supra*, IX.

[3] *Om.* *E.*

[4] sui *M.*

[5] *Om.* *M.*

[6] secundum quod: ut *M.*

[7] Aristotle, *Metaph.* VII, 1, 1028a31-37.

[8] *Add.* scilicet *M.*

[9] hoc *M.*

[10] ejusmodi *M.*

[11] verbo *E.*

[12] Aristotle, *loc. cit.*, 4, 1030a24-28.

[13] Aristotle, *De Anima* I, 1, 402b26-403a2.

[14] autem *M.*

[15] *Add.* est *E.*

[16] dispositio *E.*

impossibile. Ergo eadem ratione, cum eadem sit definitio passionis, stante subjecto et tali definitione impossibile est talem passionem non inesse,[17] sicut stante quarternario impossibile est non inesse paritatem. Eodem modo est in proposito. Si[18] ratio accidentis est esse dispositionem substantiae, impossibile est non inesse substantiae; esse enim dispositionem substantiae et dicens propter quid inest, ut patet. Ergo stante accidente in esse suo et sua essentia, impossibile est, quacumque virtute posita, fieri ut non insit; alias separaretur definitio a definito.

TERTIUMDECIMUM CAPITULUM

Quomodo sumatur quidditas in accidentibus, et quae sit quidditas eorum, secundum quod possunt habere quidditatem.

<1> Ad sumendum igitur quidditatem eam quam possunt habere accidentia, aliter oportet considerationem intendere. Est autem communis ratio quidditatis in habentibus quidditatem, videlicet quod quidditas est aliquod formale principium rei, secundum quod sumitur ratio rei, et secundum rationem essendi et secundum rationem notificandi. Unde in his[1] compositis substantiis quidditas est forma substantialis, ut dictum est supra.[2] In constitutione autem accidentium in suo esse naturali reali, et secundum rationem essendi et secundum rationem notificandi seu innotescendi, formalissimum principium est substantia. Essentia enim accidentis est ut sit dispositio substantiae, ut dictum est.[3] Unde in definitione accidentis ponitur definitio substantiae vel ipsa substantia loco differentiae; ut si definiatur simitas, dicetur quod est concavitas nasi. (113va)

<2> Igitur substantia locum quidditatis tenet in accidentibus, sicut forma substantialis in substantiis. Et hoc est quod ostendit Philosophus in VII *Metaph.*,[4] scilicet quod quidditas accidentis non est unum essentialiter[5] cum accidente, et quia in accidentibus deficit identitas seu unitas quidditatis cum ipsis accidentibus. Ideo proprie et simpliciter quidditatem non habent, et per consequens nec definitionem nisi modo communi et extenso nomine et,[6] ut ibi dicit,[7] modo logico. Modo, inquam, logico dupliciter:[8] uno modo,[9] videlicet secundum considerationem logicam, quoad considerationem eorum in proprio genere praedicamentali, ut praemissum est.[10] Alio modo secundum quod[11] sunt res naturae, et habent essentiam, et recipiunt praedicationem entis per attributionem et analogiam ad substantiam. Et sic substantia tenet locum quidditatis in eis.

<3> De quidditatibus igitur entium tantum dictum sit. Ea autem quae hic quaesita sunt diffusius pertractata sunt[12] in nostro tractatu de inseparabilitate[13] accidentium a substantia.[14] Explicit. Deo gratias. Amen.[15]

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[17] esse *E.*

[18] *Add.* enim *M.*

[1] *Om.* *M.*

[2] Cf. *supra,* VII, 5.

[3] Cf. *supra,* X, 5.

[4] Aristotle, *Metaph.* VII, 6, 1031b18-28.

[5] accidentaliter *E.*

[6] *Om.* *M.*

[7] Cf. Aristotle, *Metaph.* VII, 4, 1030a24-28.

[8] dicitur *E.*

[9] *Om.* *E.*

[10] Cf. *supra,* XII, 1.

[11] secundum quod: ut *M.*

[12] *Om.* diffusius . . . sunt *E.*

[13] separabilitate *M.*

[14] For the manuscripts and a summary of the *De Accidentibus* cf. E. Krebs, "Meister Dietrich (Theodoricus Teutonicus de Vriberg). Sein Leben, seine Werke, seine Wissenschaft", *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Phil. des Mittelalters* V, 5-6 (Münster, 1906), 83*-86*; A. Birkenmajer, "Drei neue Handschriften des Werke Meister Dietrichs", *Beiträge* XX, 5 (Münster, 1922), 74-81.

[15] *Om.* Explicit . . . Amen *M.*

Mediaevalia

I. Chaucer's Double Consonants and the Final *E*.

THE evidence showing that Chaucer pronounced final unstrest *e* has long been familiar and is not a matter of controversy, so far as the interior of the line of verse is concerned. That is to say, we have thousands of lines that will not scan unless one pronounces the final *e*'s, and nobody, so far as I know, disputes this fact. Many lines occur, however, the scansion of which requires that the final *e* of some word or words be left unpronounced. Such an *e* makes no problem, of course, if it is merely scribal, and in the following discussion the *e*'s that are mere spellings or misspellings will be ignored. But an *e* that is silent although it represents a sound of speech obviously needs explaining. More precisely, one needs to know why the sound it represents is not uttered.

A silent *e* of this kind may be a case of elision before a word beginning with a vowel; examples of this elision occur in English poetry as early as *Beowulf*. Or the silent *e* may be a case of early loss in a weak word (that is, a word normally unstrest in the rhythm of an utterance); the beginnings of this kind of apocope likewise go back to OE times. Thirdly, the final *e* may be silent in words strest on the antepenult. The loss of the final *e* in such words is a ME phenomenon, beginning in the twelfth century and carried through in the fourteenth.

By far the greatest number of Chaucer's silent final *e*'s are to be explained as elisions or as cases of early loss in weak words and in words that took the stress on the antepenult. But now and then the rhythm of the line of verse shows that the final *e* of a word is not pronounced even though the word is not weak, takes the stress on the penult, and is followed by a word beginning with a consonant. I will give only one example: line 77 of the General Prologue, where we are told that the knight's 'gipoun' was besmuttered,

For he was late ycome from his viage.

Here we must say *ycom*, not *ycome*, although this past participle is entitled, etymologically, to an *e* that became final after the loss of the *n*. One may plausibly explain such cases on the theory that Chaucer felt free to depart from his own kind of English in favor of that of others when it suited his metrical convenience to do so. He learned to speak English, of course, as a small child, and his English is therefore that of the London of the mid-fourteenth century. But he was no recluse, in spite of the well-known passage in the *House of Fame*, and he was familiar with kinds of English other than his own. In his day all northerners and many midlanders habitually dropped the final unstrest *e* wherever it had occurred in earlier English and when Chaucer found this way of speaking metrically convenient he used it.

But what about the end of a Chaucerian line of verse? Here the meter gives us no help: whether we pronounce the final *e* at the end of the line or not, the line scans well enough. The only evidence we have, apart from etymology, analogy, and spelling, lies in Chaucer's rimes. Some of the rimes that require pronunciation of the final *e* were pointed out long ago and are familiar to all Chaucerians. A good example occurs in the opening stanza of *Troilus*:

The double sorwe of Troilus to tellen,
That was the king Priamus sone of Troye,
In lovinge, how his aventures fellen
Fro wo to wele, and after out of joye,
My purpos is, er that I parte fro ye.

Here *fro ye* 'from you' rimes with *Troye* and *joye* and the rime makes us certain that these words were disyllabic in pronunciation. Another familiar example occurs in the Miller's Tale, lines 513 f. (A 3699-3700):

> My faire brid, my swete cinamome,
> Awaketh, lemman myn, and speketh to me.

Here *-mome* rimes with *to me* and we may therefore be sure that *cinamome* 'cinnamon' is a word of four syllables, like its French original. Other cases of this kind occur but these two will be enough for our present purposes.

Chaucer's treatment of double consonants in rime gives us a great deal of further information on this matter, information that has not been used, so far as I know, to throw light on Chaucer's final *e* at the end of a line of verse. I have gone through the concordance and have collected, I think, all the relevant material. Before presenting any cases, however, it may be well to examine very briefly the system of phonemes that Chaucer used in speaking English, disregarding the phonemes that have no bearing on our present problem. First of all, double consonants occur only between vowels. The usual pattern is the one found in words like *sinne* 'sin.' Here the vowel before the double consonant is strest; the vowel after the double consonant is unstrest. Again, the strest vowel that precedes the double consonant is always short. In OE a long vowel might be followed by a double consonant but by the year 1000 all such long vowels had undergone shortening. A double consonant is a special kind of long consonant: one that falls into two parts, the first part belonging to one syllable, the second part to another. Thus, in the word *sinne* the first syllable is *sin*, the second is *ne*; the two syllables divide the long *n* between them. If the consonant is short, like the *n* of Old and Middle English *c(h)ine* 'chink,' no such division takes place: the whole consonant goes with the following vowel and the preceding vowel ends its syllable. Such a syllable is said to be open. In Chaucer's English the two high short vowels of earlier times, *i* and *u*, had remained short in open syllables. The two mid short vowels, *e* and *o*, and the low short vowel, *a*, had become long in this position, subject to certain conditions that I need not go into here. In consequence, such an opposition as *ale / alle* 'ale / all' has long vowel plus short consonant as against short vowel plus long consonant, whereas in such an opposition as *spite / spitte* 'tool used in cooking meat' / 'eject saliva from the mouth' the vowels are identical and the two members of the opposition are distinguished simply and solely by the contrast between short consonant and long consonant.

One more point and I shall be ready to present my evidence. As early as OE times an etymologically long consonant seems to have undergone a certain amount of shortening at the end of a word. Thus, the word *bliss* had long *s* in OE but, if we may go by the variant spelling *blis*, the consonant was not fully long here, though in the oblique case-form *blisse*, where the *ss* was not final, it remained fully long. When we come to Chaucer's English we can prove by rimes that the old long consonants and the old short consonants were no longer distinguished in final position. Thus, Chaucer rimes the uninflected form *blis* with *this* and *is*. The spelling with single *s* indicates a more or less short pronunciation, irrespective of etymology, but for us the important point is not so much the exact length of the consonant as the fact that Chaucer freely rimes long-consonant words with short-consonant words if the consonant comes at the end of the word. As we shall see, double consonants are not subject to this leveling.

We come now to the rimes themselves. I begin with the familiar ME opposition *sone / sonne* (OE *sunu / sunne*). In modern English these words are identical in pronunciation, though we distinguish them in spelling, *son* representing the word for *filius* whereas *sun* represents the word for *sol.* The word *sone* 'filius' occurs nine times in rime in Chaucer. In all cases it rimes with *wone*, a word which, like *sone*, has an *n* etymologically single. In two of these rimes *wone* continues the OE verb *wunian* 'dwell.' In the other seven it continues the OE noun *wuna* 'custom, habit, practice.' The plural *sones* occurs once in rime; it rimes with the phrase *wone is* 'custom is.' The other member of the opposition, *sonne* 'sol,' occurs in rime with ten other words. It rimes once with each of the following: *ronne*, *upronne*, *tonne*, *gonne*; twice with *wonne* and *donne*; three times with *ywonne*; six times with *yronne* and *conne*; and seven times with *bigonne*. This makes a total of 30 occurrences in rime. In 29 of these occurrences it rimes with words that have an *n* etymologically double. In one case it rimes with *gonne* 'gun,' a word the etymology of which is in dispute. This word is spelt with *nn* and Chaucer rimes it not only with *sonne* but also with *ronne*; that is, he rimes it only with words that have *nn*. If Skeat's etymology of *gun* is right, the Chaucerian form *gonne* with *nn* is etymologically correct.

But what has this to do with the final *e*? If Chaucer did not pronounce the final *e* of *sone* and *sonne* at the end of a line of verse, then he presumably said simply *son* in this position; that is, he pronounced the two words exactly alike, the *nn* of *sonne* undergoing shortening when by loss of the final *e* it took end-position. If so, how is it that Chaucer keeps these two words so rigorously apart in his riming? He was particularly fond of rich rime; that is to say, of riming words identical in sound but different in meaning.[1] If he did not pronounce the final *e* at the end of a line of verse, the rime *son(e)* 'filius' / *son(ne)* 'sol' would be a perfect one for him. But not only does he fail to rime these two words; he never once rimes *sone* 'filius' with any word that has *nn* by etymological right and he never once rimes *sonne* 'sol' with any word that has single *n* by etymological right. We are justified, I think, in concluding that in all these cases the final *e* was pronounced.

My investigation included not only these two words but also the other high-vowel riming words in which the contrast between single and double consonant is to be found. So far as these words occur in rime, Chaucer is habitually etymological. One might expect him to depart from the etymologically correct form as freely at the end of a line as he does inside the line, but this is not the case. I have found only one example of this freedom in rime. I quote the passage (lines 44 ff. of A Complaint to his Lady):

> In my trewe careful herte ther is
> So muche wo, and so litel blis
>   That wo is me that ever I was bore;
> For al that thing which I desyre I mis,
> And al that ever I wolde nat, iwis,
>   That finde I redy to me evermore.

Here we have the apocopated form *mis* instead of the full form *misse*. Obviously Chaucer used the monosyllabic form for the sake of the rime with *is*, *blis*, and *iwis.* Apart from this one instance, Chaucer kept the final *e* consistently at the end of the line in all the words of the group that I am now dealing with; that is, the high-vowel riming words.

Long ago ten Brink pointed out a case of apocope in which the riming words have a mid vowel, but this case is doubtful. It occurs in the poem from which I have just quoted. The passage reads (lines 94 ff.):

> For ye be oon the worthiest on-lyve

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[1] Thus, in the third stanza of the fifth book of *Troilus*, we find the noun *rede* 'counsel' riming with the verb *rede* 'read.'

And I the most unlykly for to thryve;
  Yit, for al this, witeth ye right wele
That ye ne shul me from your service dryve,
That I nil ay, with alle my wittes fyve,
  Serve yow trewly, what wo so that I fele.

Here the rime *wele / fele* makes difficulties, since the adverb *wel* 'well' was monosyllabic in Old English, and ten Brink took the final *e* of *wele* to be scribal, explaining the rime on the theory that *fele* was monosyllabic (i.e. apocopated) in pronunciation in spite of the spelling.[2] But the final *e* of Chaucer's *wele* may be the adverbial suffix. Certainly this suffix was often attached to ME *eek* 'also' (OE *ēac, ēc*). For examples see the MED and note Chaucerian rimes like *eke / seke* (B 59-60) and *eke / speke* (H 323-324). If the final *e* of *wele* here is indeed the adverbial suffix we need not take *fele* for a monosyllabic form and may give it its usual disyllabic pronunciation. I have found no cases of apocope with a low vowel in the riming words.

In view of the evidence afforded by the double-consonant words in rime, one is justified, I think, in concluding that Chaucer habitually pronounced the final unstrest *e* at the end of a line.

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II. The Owl as Religious Altruist in *The Owl and the Nightingale.*

THERE seems to be no adequate explanation of how the Owl in *The Owl and the Nightingale* becomes, in G. G. Coulton's phrase, a "religious altruist," whose mission it is to rescue back-sliding Christians.[1] Although Hinckley, for one, was sure that he saw throughout the poem the species *Strix flammea*, Atkins and Huganir were satisfied to stay clear of a scientific classification and to view the Owl simply as a composite which recalls three separate traditions: the owl (1) as a bird of filthy habits; (2) as a bird that avoids the light of day; and (3) as a prophet of evil.[2] Recently, Professor Lumiansky continued the discussion of traditions when he found that the two "views of life" expressed in *The Owl and the Nightingale* are "fittingly symbolized by the *traditionally* suitable bird."[3] Yet, we may ask, is there a tradition that explains the puzzling note of altruism in the Owl? In a further analysis of the above-mentioned "composite" I hope to develop as a fourth element the note of altruism and to trace its source to an important, yet so far unmentioned, Biblical tradition.

To date surprisingly few indications of Biblical influence have been found in the poem. Gadow early in this century listed some scattered references, but none of these might be called vital to an understanding of the whole work.[4] More recently, however, when struck by the diversity of roles assigned the Owl, Miss Huganir was prompted to remark in a footnote (p. 19): "It is curious that the references in the Bible have not been recalled in this connection." She then proceeded to list all the passages from the *English* Bible which render merely as "owl" not only the Vulgate *nycticorax, noctua, bubo* and *ulula,* but even *struthio* and *ericius,* which have become "owls" only with modern translation of the Bible into the vernacular. Her reflections, surely, stopped far short. For had she continued her study of Biblical owls as far as the Vulgate, she would certainly have discovered more than one kind, and the owl known as *nycticorax* might have appeared to her as suspiciously similar to the religious altruist in the poem. Two passages in the Vulgate mention *nycticorax,* or "night-raven." In *Deuteronomy* xiv, 12-16, it is simply listed with various other unclean animals; in *Psalm* ci, 7-8, it is highly dignified as David compares himself to this bird in a simile which will remain unforgettable:

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[2] *Chaucers Sprache und Verskunst* (1884) p. 193.

[1] "The Owl and the Nightingale," *MLR*, XVII (1922), 71. The lines in which the Owl might be seen as altruist include: vs. 329-330; 385-396; 481-486; 610-612; 837-932; 1615-18; 1645-48. The edition used in this study is J. H. G. Grattan and G. F. H. Sykes, edd. *The Owl and the Nightingale*, EETS, E. S., CXIX (London, 1935), but punctuation and capitalization are added.

[2] Henry Barrett Hinckley, "Science and Folk-lore in *The Owl and the Nightingale*," *PMLA*, XLVII (1932), 304; J. W. H. Atkins, *The Owl and the Nightingale*, (Cambridge, 1922), pp. lxviii-lxix; Kathryn Huganir, *The Owl and the Nightingale, Sources, Date, Author*, U. of Pennsylvania diss. (Philadelphia, 1931), p. 19.

[3] R. M. Lumiansky, "Concerning *The Owl and the Nightingale*," PQ, XXXII (1953), 414. Included in this study is a most helpful review of modern scholarship on the poem.

[4] Wilhelm Gadow, *Das Mittelenglische Streitgedicht Eule und Nachtigall* (Palaestra LXV, Berlin, 1909), p. 219. D. W. Robertson, Jr., "Historical Criticism," *English Institute Essays, 1950* (New York, 1951), p. 23, dismisses the possibility that the Owl "is a Scriptural sign."

> Similis factus sum pellicano solitudinis,
> *factus sum sicut nycticorax in domicilio,*
> vigilavi et factus sum sicut passer solitarius in tecto.

Yet the very bird which in *Deuteronomy* is called unclean and in the Psalms is thus dignified was to experience another figurative life. This came as the Psalms, perhaps more than any other book of the Old Testament, received from patristic and later commentators a specifically Christian interpretation.

In his fourth-century commentary on the Psalms St. Hilary opens with the axiom which underlies this change: *Psalmorum clavis, Christi fides* (PL 9, 236): The key which opens the Psalms as the word of God for Christian readers is faith in Christ and all that it means. Thus, when read for its Christian meaning, *nycticorax* became a figure with two quite separate, yet related, significations, and these St. Augustine elaborates in his *Enarrationes in Psalmos. Nycticorax,* he says, is characterized by its love of the night, when it is commonly found in the roofless ruins of old buildings. Figuratively, it would not abandon those who live in the night, yet who can still be saved, the backsliders, *tepide ambulantes: non enim deserit et tenebras eorum qui habitant in nocte, et ipsos lucrari vult: venerit ad eos qui christiani sunt quidem habitantes in domo, non quasi qui non crediderint, aut quod crediderant demiserint, sed in eo quod credunt tepide ambulantes* (PL 37, 1298-99). Secondly, just as St. Augustine finds in *nycticorax* the righteous Christian who like Christ seeks out moral darkness in order to live among the *tepide ambulantes* in the hope of improving them, so too, he says, the same bird, like the pelican and the sparrow, is much more. "Let us see God in it," he says: *Ipsum Dominum videamus, ne forte ipse sit, et melius ipse agnoscatur, et pelicanus in solitudine, et nycticorax in parietinis, et passer singularis in tecto.* For, like this owl, Christ loves the darkness:

> Nam nisi amaret, unde diceret, Pater, *ignosce illis quia nesciunt quid faciunt* (*Luc.* xxiii, 34)? Deinde natus in solitudine, quia solus ita natus; passus in tenebris Judaeorum tanquam in nocte, in praevaricatione tanquam in ruinis: quid postea? *Vigilavi.* Ergo dormieras in parietinis, et dixeras: *Ego dormivi.* Quid est, *Ego dormivi?* Quia volui, dormivi; noctem amando dormivi: sed ibi sequitur, *Et exsurrexi* (*Psal.* iii, 6). (*Ibid.,* 1299-1300).

In the centuries following, over two dozen commentators on the Psalms wrote interpretations which generally appear close to St. Augustine's reading of this text. Among these might be mentioned Cassiodorus (PL 70, 710) and the Pseudo-Bede, (PL 93, 994-995), who see *nycticorax* as the sensitive Christian giving example to his fellows; Honorius of Autun (PL 172, 300) and Peter Lombard (PL 191, 908-909), on the other hand, continue St. Augustine's twofold interpretation. It is noteworthy that the mention of Peter Lombard and the Pseudo-Bede brings the commentaries of the Psalms close to the second half of the twelfth century, when *The Owl and the Nightingale* is now believed to have been written.[5] For the most convenient summary of commentaries on the Psalms, however, we must turn to the encyclopedias. Although St. Isidore says surprisingly little in the *Etymologies* (PL 82, 464-465), Rabanus Maurus (PL 111, 251) and Hugh of St. Victor are not disappointing. The text of the latter is quoted because of its full detail:

> Nycticorax est avis, quae amat tenebras noctis. In parietinis habitat, quia in ruinis maceriarum, quae sunt sine tecto, domicilium servat. Lucem refugit. In nocte volitans cibos quaerit. Mystice nycticorax Christum significat, qui noctis tenebras amat quia *non vult mortem peccatoris, sed ut convertatur et vivat* (*Ezech.* xviii). Ita enim Deus dilexit mundum, ut pro redemptione mundi morti traderet Filium suum (*Joan.* iii). Quod autem peccatores tenebrae vocentur, Apostolus testatur, dicens: *Fuistis aliquando tenebrae, nunc autem lux in Domino* (*Ephes.* v). Habitat nycticorax in ruinis parietum, quia Christus nasci voluit de populo Judaeorum. . . . Sed Christus opprimatur a ruinis, quia occiditur a Judaeis. Lucem refugit, quia vanam gloriam detestatur et odit. Cum enim leprosum curaret, ut nobis exemplum humilitatis daret, dixit leproso: *Vide, nemini, dixeris* (*Matth.* viii). De hac luce dicitur: *Auferetur ab impiis lux sua* (*Job* xxxviii), id est, praesentis vitae gaudia. Ipse autem est lux inaccessibilis, *quae illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum* (*Joan.* i). Lux igitur refugit lucem, id est, veritas refugit mundanae gloriae vanitatem. In nocte volitans escas quaerit, quia peccatores in corpus Ecclesiae praedicando convertit (PL 177, 30).[6]

Wheras "mystically" *nycticorax* is Christ, Hugh of St. Victor completes the distinction by saying that "morally" (*moraliter*) it signifies a type of just man:

> Moraliter autem nycticorax non quemlibet justum innuit nobis, sed eum qui, inter homines degens, ab intuitu hominum se, in quantum potest, abscondit. Lucem refugit, quia humanae laudis gloriam non attendit; de qua luce dicitur: *Nonne lux impii exstinguetur, nec splendebit flamma ignis ejus?* (*Job* xviii). Lucem dicit praesentis vitae prosperitatem. Sed lux impii exstinguitur, quia futurae vitae prosperitas cum ipsa terminatur. . . . In nocte vigilat, dum peccatorum tenebras attendens, eorum errores vitat. Habitat in ruinas parietum, dum mundi defectum considerat, et exspectat occasum. Escam in nocte quaerit, quia peccantium vitam recogitans, de exemplis justorum mentem, et vitam pascit (PL 177, 30-31).

Before we examine the text of *The Owl and the Nightingale,* we might well determine whether *nycticorax* as elaborated so fully by St. Augustine and later commentators was known in vernacular literature simply as an owl. In Latin writings, we know, *nycticorax* from earliest times was loosely associated with *bubo* and *noctua*, both true owls.[7] Yet, in English, two translations of the word were possible. Typically, the Vespasian Psalter and later ones give a very literal *næhtrefn*;[8] as late as the fourteenth century the same literal rendering was possible, for Richard Rolle refers to a *nyghtrauen* in his commentary on *Psalm* ci, 7.[9] At the same time, some of the earliest English texts reflect a doubt that *nycticorax* should be so translated. A gloss appearing with Aldhelm's enigmatical *De Nycticorace* reads: *Nycticorax, i. noctua. Multi bubonem esse contendunt. Sunt etiam qui asserunt esse orientalem avem quae nocturnus corvus appellatur.*[10] That this bird, finally, came to be associated with English *owl* is the conclusion expressed in the *Oxford English Dictionary,* which describes *nightraven* as no separate species, even as, in medieval French, *nycticorax* becomes merely *huhans/hurans.*[11] We should hardly be surprised, therefore, if the twelfth-century author of *The Owl and the Nightingale,* despite any historic doubts, was strongly tempted to translate the word consistently as ME *ule.*

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[5] Lumiansky, 417; Damian Van den Eynde, "Literary Note on the Earliest Scholastic Commentarii in Psalmos," *Franciscan Studies*, XIV (1954), 147, includes the text ascribed to Bede in his treatment of twelfth-century commentators.

[6] On the authorship of Book I of the *De Bestiis et aliis rebus,* from which this quotation is taken, see H. Peltier, "Hugues de Fouilloy, Chanoine Regulier, Prieur de Sainte-Laurent-au-Bois," *Revue du moyen âge latin,* II (1946), 41-42.

[7] See, for example, the commentary of Cassiodorus, P L 70, 710.

[8] Henry Sweet, ed. *The Oldest English Texts,* EETS, O. S., LXXXIII (London, 1885), p. 331.

[9] H. R. Bramley, ed. *The Psalter or Psalms of David and Certain Canticles with a Translation in English by Richard Rolle of Hampole* (Oxford, 1884), p. 353.

The extent to which he knew the traditional *nycticorax* and, further, represented it in his debate remains to be shown. We are, in fact, clearly told of his familiarity with Biblical exegesis. At an advanced point in the argument he causes the Owl to make this telling claim:

> Ic con ynouh in bokes lore,
> & ek ic can of þe Godespelle
> More þan ic wile þe telle:
> Vor ic at chireche cume ilome,
> & muchel leorny of wisdome;
> Ic wot al of þe toknynge,
> & of oþer vale þinge. (Vs. 1208-14)

Not only does the Owl assert a knowledge of the Gospel, but she goes on to say: *Ic wot al of þe toknynge,* or, according to Atkins' translation (p. 172), "I know all the symbolic meanings." For present purposes *toknynge* should be viewed, not as "symbolic meanings," but as the common translation of the Latin *significationes;* similarly, we know ME *bitocnen* is the translation of the Latin *significare,* "to indicate according to the various senses which the Bible allows." Thus a contemporary sermon of the twelfth century states: [*Adventus*] *significat tria tempora. ante legem. sub lege. sub gratia. and bitoknep þre time.*[12] If, then, the Owl's apology, vs. 1208-14, is important at this point, it is so only because it emphasizes the poet's familiarity with the system which at the time made of the Owl a figure with more than one Christian signification.

To determine whether these significations are supported by the text of *The Owl and the Nightingale,* we ought first to look at the Owl's own lines about herself, rather than the derogatory ones about her which the Nightingale utters. The Owl, in fact, early identifies herself as the just Christian of Scriptural commentary—Coulton's "religious altruist"—helping to salvation those around her. A few suggestive passages should be quoted first. *Ic do god myd myne þrote,* the Owl says, *And warny men to heore note* (vs. 329-330); in contrast, that is, the Nightingale's song is alleged to be profitless. Then, the Owl says, wherever men gather, even in war, she stands by in her familiar role as helper (vs. 385-390). Significantly, the Nightingale is temporarily silenced by the directness of this defense (vs. 391-396). At Christmas, the Owl urges men to do other things than play, sing, or turn their attention from the occasion at hand:

> & hure & hure to Cristes-messe,
> Hwenne riche & poure, more & lasse,
> Singeþ cundut nyht & day,

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[10] Thomas Wright, ed. *The Anglo-Latin Satirical Poets and Epigrammatists of the Twelfth Century* II, (Rolls Series, London, 1872), p. 550.

[11] Francisque Michel, ed. *Le Livre de Psaumes* (Paris, 1876), p. 183; Friedrich Apfelstedt, ed. *Lothringischer Psalter* (Altfranzösische Bibliothek, Heilbronn, 1881), p. 101.

[12] R. Morris, ed. *Old English Homilies of the Twelfth Century*, EETS, O. S., LIII (London, 1873), p. 3. For further exemplification of *bitoknen* in this technical sense, see R. H. Bowers, "A Middle English Treatise on Hermeneutics: Harley MS. 2276, 32^{v}-35^{v}," *PMLA*, LXV (1950), 594, 595, 597, 599, where the verb becomes formula-like.

Ic heom *helpe* hwat ic may.
& ek ich þenche of oþer þinge,
Þane to pleye oþer to singe. (Vs. 481-486)

Later, we read, so dear to the Owl is *Cristes huse* that she cleanses it of *fule muse,/Ne schal þar neuer cume to/Ful wiht, if ich hit may i-vo* (vs. 610-612).

But these preliminary attempts by the Owl to identify herself and her function in a Christian milieu are less conclusive than vs. 837-932, where the issue of the debate shifts slightly. The issue is now: How can one bring his fellow man to better ways—by singing like the Nightingale, or by urging repentance like the sober, high-minded Owl? Only the latter course, says the Owl, is desirable:

Wenestu hi bringe so lyhtliche
To Godes riche al singinde?
Nay, nay, hi schule wel avynde
Þat hi myd longe wope mote
Of heore sunnen bidde bote,
Ar hi mote euer come þare.
Ich rede þi þat men beo ware,
& more wepe þane singe,
Þat fundeþ to þan heuene-kyng:
For nys no mon wiþvten sunne. (Vs. 854-863)

As she reminds men that *nys no mon wiþvten sunne,* she can say only, *Betere is my wop þan þi song* (v. 878). But her help can reach the just as well as sinners:

Ich helpe monne on eyþer halve,
Mi muþ haueþ tweire kunne salue:
Þan gode ich fulste to longinge,
Vor hwene him longeþ ich hem singe;
& þan sunfulle ich helpe al-so,
Vor ic him teche hwar is wo. (Vs. 887-892)

At the end of the Owl's prolonged speech (vs. 837-932), the Nightingale once more has little to say, for she is *sumdel of-schomed* (v. 934) and apparently has at hand no fit answer.

If these passages which have been quoted show the Owl only in the first of the two roles developed in the commentaries already mentioned, other passages in the poem develop the second role: here the phrasing suggests that the poet envisions Christ Himself. After the Nightingale says that her opponent's usefulness is limited to but one function—her appearance as a scarecrow in the fields (v. 1128)—the Owl remembers this charge and, when the opportunity comes, hurls it back advantageously altered. First she admits that she is attacked by stone and stick and hanged as a sign to frighten pies and crows. But, even in death, she emphasizes, she does her fellow-man good:

Þah hit beo soþ, ic do heom god,
& for heom ic schedde my blod:
Ic do heom god myd myne deþe,
Þar-fore þe is wel unmeþe. (Vs. 1615-18)

The wording here—especially, *ic schedde my blod*—recalls, of course, Christ and the Crucifixion. If this image were not continued later in the poem, it might be a coincidence that we are reminded of Christ. But it appears again, when the Nightingale unwittingly continues to remind the Owl of her familiar pose, mounted on an upright:

Þu seyst þat gromes þi i-voþ,
& heye *on rode þe an-hoþ*

& þe to-twiccheþ & to-schakeþ,
& summe of þe scheules makeþ. (Vs. 1645-48)

Again the phrasing is significant: *heye on rode.* In the twelfth century, ME *rod* in the sense of a cross-shaped object meant either (1) a "cross as an instrument of execution" simply (*OED*, sb. I. 1), or "the cross upon which Christ suffered" (sb. I. 2). In the latter sense, that is, when referring to Christ's Cross, it was ordinarily used, as here, without the definite article.

If the Owl in the poem is intended to be a figure not only of the just Christian urging repentance, but also of Christ, two questions seem to remain. The first might be stated: Does Biblical literature account for the antagonism between this bird and the Nightingale? As Atkins, Huganir, and others remind us, the Nightingale has a special figurative meaning in Christian learning as "chorister of divine love."[13] Just as the Owl confuses the "chorister of divine love" with the inciter of illicit love (vs. 1331 ff.), so the Nightingale in the poem is made at times to confuse her opponent with two other Vulgate owls, *noctua* and *bubo,* in a mistaken identity which has striking effects. Among the Nightingale's lines are definite indications that she is thinking of *noctua* and *bubo* while addressing *nycticorax.*

In Biblical commentary the Vulgate owl known as *noctua* has no wholesome reputation. Condemned as food in *Leviticus* xi, 16 and *Deuteronomy* xiv, 15, *noctua* becomes in Christian interpretation a figure of the Christian fleeing the light of truth into the darkness of error and sin. Thus Rabanus Maurus sums up earlier commentary: *Noctua homines, veritatis lucem fugientes, tenebris obligatos significat* (PL lll, 247). That there is, further, a learned, as opposed to Hinckley's folkloristic,[14] antagonism between this bird and the nightingale is evident from a text much older than St. Isidore, whose *Etymologies* Miss Huganir cites as "perhaps the earliest example of the two birds in their emblematic function . . . and the most probable direct source of the tradition" (p. 22). In his commentary on the Hexaemeron, St. Ambrose describes birds of the night with their signification—first the nightingale with its inimitable song and then, immediately after, *noctua,* which has eyes but does not see: *De cordis oculis loquor, quos habent sapientes mundi, et non vident, in luce nihil cernunt, in tenebris ambulant, dum daemoniorum tenebrosa rimantur, et coeli alta se videre credunt, describentes radio mundum, mensuram aeris ipsius colligentes* (PL 14, 239-240). This owl, avoiding the light of truth, seems to be the bird which the Nightingale fancies her opponent to be at an early point in the debate:

Þu flyst a-nyht and noht a-day:
Þar-of ic wundri, & wel may,
For vych þing þat shonyeþ riht,
Hit luuyeþ þuster & hateþ lyht;
& evych þing þat luueþ misded
Hit luueþ þuster to his dede. (Vs. 227-232)

Yet the Nightingale mistakes her opponent for another Vulgate owl which like *noctua* is found to be repulsive and, in Scriptural commentary, even so repulsive as to deserve attack from whatever quarter.[15] This bird, *bubo,* resembles *noctua* in two ways. It is condemned by Leviticus xi, 16, and also serves as the same reminder of the sinner fleeing the light of truth into the darkness of error and sin. Still other characteristics, however, are assigned *bubo*. St. Isidore and Rabanus Maurus provide lengthy, rather similar descriptions of this bird, but perhaps the most detailed account is provided by Hugh of St. Victor:

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[13] See also J. M. Telfer, "The Evolution of a Mediaeval Theme," *The Durham University Journal,* XIV, N. S. (1952), 29-31.

[14] Henry Barrett Hinckley, "The Date, Author, and Sources of *The Owl and the Nightingale*", *PMLA,* XLIV (1929), 343-344.

[15] The inevitability of an association of *bubo* with the other Vulgate owls, even with *nycticorax,* appears in the commentary of St. Gregory the Great (PL 79, 608), whose reading of the Psalm under study accordingly differs from what might be regarded as the Augustinian: "Nycticorax, qui alio nomine bubo dicitur, in dirutarum domuum aedibus moratur." *Nycticorax,* he adds, "solet autem nocte cantum cantare, per quod notantur hi, qui in tenebroso tripudiant opere, et in mentium suarum exsultant destructione."

> 1) Avis foeda esse dicitur, quia stercore ejus locus in quo habitat commaculatur, quia peccator illos, cum quibus habitat, exemplo perversi operis dehonestat. . . . 2) Ab aliis avibus visus, magnis earum clamoribus proditur, magnis etiam incursionibus vexatur. Si etiam peccator ad lucem cognitionis, ubi peccata sua cognoscantur, veniat, magnam bene agentibus derisionem praestat, et cum in peccato deprehensus fuerit, ab aliis verba reprehensionis audit, plumas enim ejus evellunt, et rostro lacerant, quia et carnales actus peccatoris bene agentes reprehendunt, et superfluitatem levitatis ejus damnant. 3) Infelix ergo bubo dicitur, quia infelix est qui ea quae praediximus operantur (PL 177, 45).

Although the Nightingale waits until later to call her opponent a sinner *þat shonyeþ riht* (vs. 227-232), she early ascribes to the Owl such admittedly general characteristics of *bubo* as have been enumerated. 1) She says the Owl is *lodlich and vnclene* (v. 91) and, like the Latin owl, soils both her nest and her offspring (vs. 92-93). 2) The Owl, she says, is hated by all other birds, which drive her off amid screeching and outcries (vs. 65-70). 3) Still later, the Nightingale says that the Owl is the harbinger of misfortune because she announces the burning down of houses, impending military service, the death of cattle, loss of spouse, quarreling—never anything good (vs. 1151 ff.); but this charge the Owl answers by saying that her foreknowledge tells what will happen without actually causing it (vs. 1185-1206). Like the omniscient Christ she is indeed saddened by such knowledge (vs. 1217-22); but, simply, foreknowledge and predestination are not the same thing (vs. 1235-64). Thus, though these parallels between the Vulgate *bubo* and the disreputable opponent which the Nightingale envisions could be extended, these three may be sufficient to show that the author of *The Owl and the Nightingale* is close to representing two "false" owls, *bubo* and *noctua,* both supported in Scriptural learning, which serve to explain but do not excuse the Nightingale's well-meant but unjust antagonism toward so righteous a bird as the Owl-altruist.

A further question remains. How can the very bird which with *noctua* and *bubo* is declared unclean become figuratively a reminder of both altruist and Christ? Again Scriptural learning helps, for Rabanus Maurus, in his commentary on *Leviticus* xi, states and answers this question:

> Sed, inquies, Quomodo horum animalium non cibus sed imitatio prohibetur; cur pelicano et nycticoraci David propheta semetipsum comparaverit, dicens: *Similis factus sum pelicano in solitudine, factus sum sicut nycticorax in domicilio* (*Psal.* ci); per aquilam autem Moyses ipsum significet Deum dicentem ad Israel, *Quomodo portaverim vos super alas aquilarum* (*Exod.* xix)?

He then states the basis on which this figurative representation—and countless others—rests:

> Nam et prophetae leonem Christum apellant; leonem autem a diverso Petrus esse diabolum dicit: nec tamen secundum hoc leo Christus secundum quod diabolus dicitur, absit a nobis, absit ista impietas; sed quia simul regium, nec non rapax atque immite est animal, cumque dignitatem laudabilem, vituperabilem tamen operationem gerat, quod quidem laudabile habet, hoc in Christo regno accipitur, quod autem vituperabile in diabolo, id est, rapacitas, immansuetudo. Quod et aquila considerantes, sine aliqua dubietate

> reperimus: propter altitudinem enim volatus ejus, figuram ejus in Deum Moyses sumpsit; quia vero rapax, a cibo ejus abstinendum dixit. Propheta autem David, lugens hominem in peccato constitutum, nycticoraci hunc sicut in nocte viventem comparavit . . . (PL 108, 357-358).

Although Rabanus Maurus admits that the prophets called the Saviour a lion and later Peter called the devil one, still, he says, the two comparisons rest on different characteristics of the same animal: the lion is royal as king of beasts and so stands for Christ—*leo Christus*—but his ferocity can suggest only the devil. In the same way, though the owl known as *nycticorax* is unclean, it shows another characteristic which recommends itself to David, who, lamenting man's sinfulness, thinks of himself as living like the owl in complete darkness. Christian commentators, accepting the exaltation of *nycticorax* which the Psalmist sings and reading the same text for its specially Christian signification, discovered in *nycticorax* a poetic suitableness as they envisioned altruism in the righteous man and, preeminently, in Christ Himself.

As the debate in *The Owl and the Nightingale* proceeds, we might say, in summary, that the Owl-altruist strategically delays the assertion of her highest role. First, she allows the Nightingale to mistake her for the despicable *bubo* and then for *noctua*, hardly any better, and holds off revealing her true self until verses 329-330, where for the first time she insists on her native goodness: *Ic do god myd myne þrote*. Thereafter her altruism is presented more explicitly. In verses 854-863 she urges repentance—*more wepe þan singe*—clearly as human and divine protector of backsliders, the *tepide ambulantes*. Before the image of Christ ever appears in the text, however, she reminds her reader that she knows the sometimes "daring" procedure of Biblical exegesis, as though to prepare that reader for the figuration of Christ, not as bridegroom, but as owl. As a traditional reminder of Christ, she simply says that it is true that she sheds blood for mankind and is herself fixed to a Cross, just as Christ was. The very order, in other words, of those passages which introduce and develop the traditional Owl-altruist is the order of knowing—first false and then true recognition, and, when the reader knows the lower or "human" altruist, the Owl as divine appears.

Certain proposals can now be offered if the comparison of the Owl-altruist in the poem with her counterpart in the Bible and its commentaries does not rest on purely accidental similarities. To judge from the really marked similarities in the two writings, the poet, even apart from his stated interest in exegesis, was from the evidence of his work far more familiar with the figurative style than has heretofore been claimed by Atkins and Huganir. Secondly, in an analysis of style or type of writing in *The Owl and the Nightingale*, we must turn to the Owl's own lines, rather than to the Nightingale's maligning her, to see what the Owl, in the poet's probable intention, stands for. Thirdly, since the Owl claims to be an altruist or altruist-penitent among sinners and even to be like Christ Himself, we should not hesitate to conclude that the Owl's "divine" nature suggested here equates her with the Nightingale, which as harbinger of divine love only shares an already common divinity. And, lastly, because of this divinity shared alike by Owl and Nightingale, neither bird, or figure, is superior—that is, neither can have a prior claim, because of her traditional reputation, to an advantage in the debate.

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III. A Third Manuscript of Peter Abelard's *Theologia 'Summi Boni'* (*Ms* Oxford, Bodl. *Lyell* 49, fols. 101-128^v).

THE first publication of this Abelardian work dates back to the year 1891 when it was published by Remigius Stölzle, who discovered it, under the title *Abelards 1121 zu Soisson verurtheilter Tractatus de unitate et trinitate divina* (Freiburg i. B.). He found it in the University Library of Erlangen (*Ms* 182, Irmischer 229), though its former owner had been the Cistercian abbey of Heilsbronn. There was no doubt at any time that the tractate was incomplete but it was impossible to say how incomplete it was.

In 1924, H. Ostlender announced that he had discovered the entire work in the Staatsbibliothek of Berlin (*Cod.* theol. *lat.* oct. 95). Fifteen years later he edited it under a new title: *Peter Abaelards Theologia 'Summi Boni'*[1]. Both manuscripts designate Abelard as the author, and the explicit of the complete tractate (*Petri Abaelardi Palatini Peripatetici Theologia explicit*) accounts for Ostlender's change of the title.

In 1950, R. W. Hunt published a description of the mediaeval manuscripts bequeathed to the Bodleian Library by James P. R. Lyell.[2] The entry listed under no. 49 reads as follows:

> Boethius, De Trinitate, with the commentaries of Remigius of Auxerre (59) and Thierry of Chartres (81); P. Abailardus, Tractatus de unitate et trinitate divina (101). Admont, no. 382. Sheepskin binding, 15th cent. 12th cent. i+129 leaves: 235×150 mm.

The manuscript contains *three* distinct commentaries on the *opuscula sacra* of Boethius. The first of these is in the nature of a gloss with interlinear and marginal elucidations in different hands of different periods. Some of the comments date back to the commentary published by E. K. Rand as a work of *Johannes Scottus* (Munich, 1906). The gloss includes the text of the fourth *opusculum* (fols. 20^v-30) with ample space for marginal notes, but there are no explanations of any kind added to it. The explicit is found on fol. 57.

On fols. 59-79^v we find the commentary attributed by Rand to John the Scot, now considered to be a work of Remigius of Auxerre. Since there are some marginal and interlinear notes (with the exception of the last *opusculum*) added to it, it may be classified as a gloss on top of the Carolingian gloss. The fourth *opusculum* is not represented. As it happens so frequently, the entire commentary concludes with the misleading remark: *Explicit commentum super Boethium de s. trinitate* (fol. 79^v).

It is followed, on fols. 81-99^v, by the commentary known as *Librum hunc* attributed in the manuscript to "a certain French master Peter Helias" (fol. 81). W. Jansen,[3] who edited about half of this commentary, neither mentioned nor used the manuscript. We may note here that the Erlangen manuscript which contains Abelard's *Theologia 'Summi Boni'* also contains *Librum hunc* (fols. 66-103^v), though in reversed order.

On fols. 99^v-100^v of the Oxford manuscript we find the fragment of a commentary on Boethius *De Hebdomadibus*, written by the author of *Librum hunc*. For some unknown reason it breaks off on fol. 100^v after the first word in the fifteenth line. The rest (seventeen lines) of the folio is blank.

The same scribe wrote the *Theologia 'Summi Boni'*, beginning on fol. 101 without indication of its author. At a recent date a librarian wrote the name *Abälard* on the margin. In point of length, the Oxford copy agrees exactly with the Erlangen copy of this work. We shall now use *L* (Lyell) to designate the former, and shall follow both Stölzle and Ostlender in designating the latter by *E*. *B* designates the Berlin manuscript mentioned above.

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[1] *Beiträge*, XXXV (1939), 2-108.

[2] R. W. Hunt, "The Lyell Bequest", *Bodl. Libr. Record*, III (1950), 68-100.

[3] *Der Kommentar des Clarenbaldus von Arras zu Boethius De Trinitate* (Breslau, 1926), pp. 3*-25*.

Ostlender has pointed out that, despite a number of errors, both *E* and *B* were written with great care. The same must be said of *L* whose scribe or corrector carefully noted even transpositions of words. The fact that *E* and *L* contain *Librum hunc* suggests that they are interrelated. A comparison of variants makes it undeniable that they belong to the same family, though the text of *L* appears to be superior to that of *E*. This is, no doubt, important in an attempt to reconstruct the original Abelardian text.

Abelard, as Ostlender remarks, quotes the text of his sources meticulously. This led Ostlender to the justifiable conclusion that Abelard treated his own text with similar punctiliousness. For that reason Ostlender indicates in his critical apparatus not only the variants of *BE*, but also those found in (the manuscripts of) Abelard's *Theologia christiana* whenever it contains a passage taken from the earlier *Theologia 'Summi Boni'*. Stölzle had already shown that the *Theologia christiana* is what he calls *eine spätere Bearbeitung* of the *Theologia 'Summi Boni'*.

In claiming that the text of *L* appears to be superior to that of *E* (and of *B*), we base this view on the increased evidence of textual agreement between *L* and *T* (=*Theologia christiana*). When Ostlender prepared his edition, he decided to make *B* his basic text and follow it unless "serious reasons", including Abelard's style, called for modification. Under the circumstances, Ostlender could hardly adopt a different policy, if he wished to preserve the *Einheitlichkeit des Textes*. However, a study of our variants (*L*) not only in individual words, but also in word position, suggests strongly that Abelard remained much more faithful to his *Theologia 'Summi Boni'* in his *Theologia christiana* than the text of *B* would have us assume.

This leads us to the question whether Abelard wrote an enlarged and revised edition of his *Theologia 'Summi Boni'*. Ostlender maintains that he did and that both editions went into circulation. Though this may have been the case, there is no reason why Abelard should have abandoned his punctiliousness in making his revision. In other words, the value of *L* in an attempt to reach the original Abelard remains considerable.

We have stated that, in point of length, *L* agrees with *E*. The textual agreement is also so remarkably close that one may even be inclined to assume that *E* was directly copied from *L*. But such, it seems, was not the case, although *L* (Admont, diocese of Salzburg) was also geographically close to *E* (Heilsbronn, diocese of Eichstätt). A textual comparison of *Librum hunc*, as preserved in *EL*, strengthens the view that *E* was not directly copied from *L*. Hence there must have been at least one other copy of the Abelardian work, presumably in Southern Germany where such men as Otto of Freising and Gerhoh of Reichersberg manifested a keen, though not equally friendly, interest in Abelard's teaching.

While *EL* agree in length, they also agree in the number of *lacunae* in comparison with the full text of B. These are listed on pp. XV-XVI of Ostlender's edition. Some modifications are worth recording. *L* opens with the heading: *Librorum de trinitate capitula,* and continues: *Primus liber continet* . . . Hence it varies from the long opening in *E* and does not contain the sentence on p. 2, 2: *Quid continet* . . . *operis*. The division indicated by *Quid secundus* (p. 2, 10) and *Quid tertius* (p. 2, 14) does not occur in *L*. Where the edition (p. 2, 21-23) reads *Liber I* . . . *personarum, L* reads: *Capitulum II. Quid sonent nomina personarum. Incipit Liber I* (fol. 101). In Ostlender's edition this reading appears on p. 3, 1-2, with the exception of *Incipit Liber I*. According to a marginal number in *L*, the second chapter begins on p. 3, 30: *Nec solum . . .*

The division and heading: *Capitulum III. Testimonia prophetarum* (p. 6, 1-2) do not occur in *L*. But a marginal note identifies the next chapter as the fourth (which agrees with Ostlender's edition). Incidentally, the marginal Roman numerals in *L* are no longer complete, because some were at least partly cut off in the process of binding. Also missing is the heading of chapter four: *Quare sapientia vocetur verbum* (p. 6, 27).

There is no break in the text of *L* from the fourth to the fifth chapters but the Roman numeral (V) on fol. 102 indicates a new chapter. For lack of space the scribe wrote the chapter heading on the upper margin of fol. 102^v. The average folio has 32 lines. In the last line of fol. 102^v we read: . . . *Isaias admirans ait: Generatio* [*nem eius quis ennarrabit?*] About a quarter of the line is left blank. The next folio begins in the middle of a sentence: *secundum septiformis gratiae dona* (Ostlender, p. 19, 21). According to both Stölzle and Ostlender, *E* ends here with the words: *Isaias admirans ait*. The scribe of *E* then left what Ostlender describes as *spatium trium fere versuum* or about two and a half lines according to Stölzle. A note on the margin of *E* states: *deest.*

The scribe of *L*, as we have seen, stopped in the middle of a word and left a blank space of about a quarter of a line, the last line on the folio. There is no marginal note to warn the reader of an omission. One may therefore be tempted to assume that some folios of *L* have disappeared. The blank, however short, weakens this explanation. And the fact that the scribe stopped in the middle of the first word of a quotation from Isaias, with which he must have been quite familiar, makes it morally certain that he stopped precisely where his exemplar stopped. Hence we can conclude that some folios disappeared not from *L* but from the exemplar used by the scribe of *L*. He performed his task faithfully and simply copied what he found and as he found it.

Realizing that there was something out of order, the scribe of *E* ended with: *admirans ait* and left some blank space, presumably with the assumption that the omission was short. He probably dropped the meaningless *generatio*, provided it occurred in his exemplar. For the same reason he must have omitted the incomplete sentence: *secundum septiformis gratiae dona* which is found on fol. 103 of *L*, provided, also, that his exemplar contained it. Ostlender suspects that an entire gathering or quire (*eine ganze Lage*) was missing. The text of *L* confirms this suspicion.

On p. 6, 30, both *E* and *L* omit the phrase: *ut supra meminimus*. Ostlender has rightly noted that it refers to the missing section. According to *L*, the paragraph on p. 37, 1-7, belongs to the previous part of the second book. The same modification applies to p. 42, 15-19. Hence, according to *L*, the second *capitulum* would begin: *Quo in loco . . .* The sentence (p. 45, 20): *Numquid et pater est filius?* is missing in *EL* because of a *homoioteleuton* which probably goes back to the exemplar. Also missing in *EL* is the sentence: *Constat . . . sermones* (p. 51, 4-5). It contains an allusion to Boethius, *De Phil. consol.* III, 12, 104.[4] The paragraph from p. 51, 17, to p. 52, 8, is not contained in *EL*.

In *L*, the Roman numeral II on p. 57, 27, of the edition precedes the sentence on p. 58, 32: *Loca etiam . . . L* reads *Cap. IV* where the edition reads *Capitulum V* (p. 63, 10). The sentence: *Idem . . . laborandum* (p. 80, 10-14) is missing in *EL*. On the same page (p. 80, 24-27) both manuscripts omit the sentence: *Ne dicas . . . esse*. Because of a (previous?) *homoioteleuton*, *EL* omit the passage: *quae ad . . . quidem essentiae* on p. 82, 16-17. Both manuscripts end abruptly in the middle of a sentence (p. 83, 31): *. . . est materia huius hominis.*

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[4] *De Phil. cons.* III, 12, 104; ed. R. Peiper (Leipzig, 1871), p. 85. Ostlender does not cite the proper reference (p. 51, note 100) and wrongly assumes that Abelard misread the text. Ostlender's note 94 on p. 49 ought to be corrected by reference to Plato, *Timaeus* (*Chalcidio interpr.*), 24; ed. Mullach, p. 179 (Wrobel, p. 64): inter nullam et aliquam substantiam. These are the exact words used by Abelard.

The scribe of *L* had written eleven lines on fol. 128^v. At a considerably later date another writer used the blank space to pen down some thoughts on the mystery of the Trinity as presented by Boethius. The reason why both *E* and *L* break off at the same point in the middle of a sentence must be sought in a copy common to both. And the question why this copy failed to provide the rest of Abelard's work may be answered in the same way as was suggested for the previous major *lacuna*: the exemplar used by those scribes had suffered the fate of partial disappearance. Since *EL* are textually so closely related to each other it would seem unnecessary to posit several previous copies in the same state of partial disappearance. It would, finally, seem useless to speculate on the reasons why the folios disappeared, although one might venture the suggestion that Abelard's teaching on the world soul which is found in both sections had something to do with it.

In the following list of variants, Ostlender's *sigla* have been adopted. However, no differentiation is made between the various readings of *T*, since they can be easily checked in Ostlender's exemplary edition. Moreover, they are based on manuscripts rather than on the published text of the *Theologia christiana.* Word positions have been included in the list not only because Ostlender chose to do so, but also because Abelard himself was not indifferent in this regard. We are too readily inclined to underestimate Latin word positions as immaterial peculiarities of an author's prose and as of less importance for the understanding of his thought. Yet we know that that scholars especially of the first half of the twelfth century underwent a rigorous training in grammar and syntax. For that reason they developed an almost passionate interest in grammatical questions as can be gathered from the following story transcribed by R. W. Hunt.

A commentator on Priscian relates that Gilbert of Poitiers once propounded the thesis that, according to Priscian, adjectives are to be placed before the noun they qualify. Several masters attended the lecture. Master Guarnerus requested an elucidation of this controversial point and ended by saying: *Magister Gilleberte Porrete, responde.* Gilbert was indignant: *Garcio, nescis adiectiva debent fixis preponi? Debuisses ergo dixisse "Porrete Gilleberte". Quia male dixisti, lues.* With an obvious air of satisfaction, the commentator adds: *Fecitque eum optime verberari.* The commentator's own master maintained, however, that the noun must precede the adjective just as matter must precede form.[5]

In view of such lively debates and rigorous demands, Ostlender was well advised to pay more than usual attention even to the position of words, but above all because of the close textual relationship between the *Theologia 'Summi Boni'* and the later *Theologia christiana.* Our list of variants sometimes confirms and sometimes weakens Abelard's text as it is published. It shows that in numerous instances *EL* are closer to *T* than *B* which is Ostlender's basic manuscript. Hence there is new evidence that the text as published is not final. Of course, under the circumstances it was not meant to be final. The day, we hope, will come when the discovery of yet another manuscript will bring us another step closer to the original Abelard.

p. 2
1: Librorum de trinitate capitula *L.*
2: Quid . . . operis *om. ELT.*
8: a philosophis dicta sunt *ELT.*
10: Quid secundus *om. ELT.*
12: quot *LT.*

p. 3
2-3: Capitulum . . . nomina *om. L* (Cf. p. 2, 20).
2: nomina personarum *EL.*
8: quo *ELT.*
10-11: cunctos salvare *EL.*
13: ergo est *L.*
15: immo ipsam esse *EL.*
13: quot *LT.*
14: Quid tertius *om ELT.*
19: intellexit *ELT.*
19: creatam *ELT.*
20-23: Capitulum II. Quid sonent nomina personarum. Incipit liber I. *L* (Cap. I. Quid . . . personarum *om. L*).
15: etiam *om. EL.*

[5] R. W. Hunt, "Studies on Priscian", *Med. and Ren. Studies,* II (1950), 42.

17: in *om. EL.*
17: scilicet/fol. 101^{v}/ac benignitate *L.*
22: quod si et *BLT.*
26: haec tria *ELT.*
27: (videlicet) videlicet et *ELT.*
29: vere bonum *BLT.*
30: II *marg. L.*
31: et *BEL* (etiam *T*).
34: esse *om. ELT.*
35: atque *BLT.*
35: quidem *ELT.*
p. 4
7: patris ut diximus *ELT.*
8: erga *BLT.*
19: a doctoribus quoque antiquis *BLT.*
p. 4, 20—p. 5, 36: Primum . . . transeamus *om. EL.*
p. 6
1-2: *om. L.*
3: III *marg. L.*
3: maximus/fol. 102/ille.
19: Ysaias *marg. L.*
23: hoc nomine deus *ELT.*
24: videlicet *om. EL.*
26: IV *marg. L* (capitulum *om. EL*).
27: quare . . . verbum *om. L.*
30: (etiam) et *ELT.*
30: Moyses *marg. L.*
30: ut supra meminimus *om. EL.*
p. 7
1: David *marg. L.*
6: aeternam *BLT.*
7: locutio est *ELT.*
9: (XV) VIII *L* (VIII libro *E*).
12: V *marg. L* (capit. *om. L*).
13: quare . . . sanctus *marg. L* (fol. 102^{v}).
14: benignitatis/fol. 102^{v}/ et caritatis.
17: aut prae doloris vel laboris *L.*
18: ex libro sapientiae *marg. L.*
19: maledictum *BELT.*
22: spiritualis *BLT.*
23: et *ELT.*
26: (haec) hoc *EL.*
29: tamen et *ELT.*
p. 8
1: sint *BL.*
4: generationem quidem filii ex patre *L.*
5: aeternam *om. L.*
5: David *marg. L.*
11: temporis praesentis *ELT.*
13: ipsam generationem *BLT.*
17: ex patre *ELT.*
22: etc. *om. ELT.*
24: Ysayas *marg. L.*
24: (generationem) generatio *L.*
p. 8, 24—p. 19, 21: eius . . . appellatur *om. L.*
p. 19
21: fol. 103 secundum septiformis . . .
22: dictum est Est in *L.*
26: cui *L* (cum *E*).
p. 20
1: qui *BEL.*
2: philosophiae *BLT.*
3: etiam *BLT.*
5: quod *ELT.*
16: haec est *EL* (est *om. E*).
20: sit vel *EL.*
22: rem *EL.*
24: aut *EL.*
29: attendatur *ELT.*
p. 21
1: hic *ELT.*
2: peritis /fol. 103^{v}/ saecul.
3: pater *BLT.*
4: civitate *ELT.*
4: in gratia Christi *EL.*
7: agnoscunt *BEL.*
9: legisse *BLT.*
18: in graecum *ELT.*
19: studii *ELT.*
24: scripturis *BL.*
24: quidem . . . summa *ELT.*
27: Paulo *ELT.*
p. 22
1: ex Platonicis *marg. EL.*
1: deum *L* (domini *E*).
2: typo *BELT.*
8: nihil *om. L.*
10: hominis *BLT.*
12: est *ELT.*
14: (eum factus) ipsum factus *EL.*
15: autem *BLT.*
16: credentibus *ELT.*
16: credentibus/fol. 104/ in.
18: non ex *ELT.*
19: sed quia *ELT.*
22: sed *ELT.*
26: eum *ELT.*
26: a mortuis *ELT.*
27: ei *ELT.*
29: Christus *om. EL.*
30: quod *ELT.*
31: unigenitus filius tuus *BLT.*
p. 23
1: est ibi *BLT.*
2: pro impiis *ELT.*
3: Sibilla *marg. L.*
4: etiam *ELT.*
7: iniuste iudicatus est *ELT.*
9: qua *ELT.*
10: quid etiam *ELT.*
11: fidelibus *ELT.*
12: symbolon *L.*
16: erictream *EL.*
17: quidam *ELT.*
18: VIII *EL.*
18: latinus *BEL.*
19: est interpretatus *BLT.*
21: e caelo *ELT.*
24: dei filius *ELT.*
25: Lactentius *BEL.*
25: Sibylla/fol. 104^{v}/in.
26: infidelium postea *ELT.*
31: (suppliciter *ET*) simpliciter *L.*
p. 24
3: corona spinea *L.*
5: hospitalitate *L.*
10: (tribus horis) tenebrosa *L.*
14: Nabuchodonosor *marg. L.*
17: praestantes *BLT.*
27: (vera) verae *L.*
33: impudentiam *BL.*
36: animae tradunt *ELT.*
37: Iob *marg. L.*
p. 25
2: (sim) sum *L.*
2: sim/fol. 105/et.
4: (scripturis) scriptis *EL.*
6: (scribendo) scriptis *EL.*
6: ac *BL.*
11: De Socrate *marg. L.*
16: extendere *om. L.*
16: quandoquidem causas rerum ab eis *L.*
19: eas *ELT.*
21: naturali vigore in aeterna se attolleret *ELT.*
22: naturamque *ELT.*
22: incorporei *EL.*
24: eum *LT.*
25: opinantium *BLT.*
26: (unde et) unde L.
27: inimicitiis *ELT.*
27: morte multatus est *BLT.*
28: (quae) quem *EL.*
p. 26
1: ipsius *BELT.*
5: disceptatione *ELT.*
5: versari/fol. 105^{v}/ubi.
8: ceterorum gentilium *EL.*
9: de Iob *marg. EL.*
10: Iob perhibuit *EL.*
15: de Diogene *marg. BEL.*
23: (doctor) doctorum *EL.*
25: de Tyto *marg. BEL.*
26: tantae dicitur fuisse bonitatis *BLT.*
28: die illa *BLT.*
29: nobis non perire *BEL.*
p. 27
2: (naturaliter . . . fecit) naturaliter sic et dixit et fecit *L.*
p. 28
1: Liber II *om. L.*
7: praecellentium *ELT.*
8: auctoritates *ELT.*
8: ipsas/fol. 106/auctoritates.
12: summae id sibi gloriae *ELT.*
13: namque *BLT.*
15: labefactare *ELT.*
18: atque unum *ELT.*
21: dabo *BLT.*
22: poterunt *BLT.*
p. 29
1: invectio in dialecticos *marg. L.*
2: universos autem *ELT.*
9: liberalis *ELT.*
11: commendetur *ELT.*
12: laus dialecticae *om.* (*eras.?*) *L.*
15: (disciplinam) disciplina *EL.*

16: haec docet discere *om. EL.*
17: quid sit *BELT.*
22: disputationis disciplina regnat *EL.*
22: disci/fol. 106^{v}/plina.
23: genera *ELT.*
24: (sanctis) sacris *BEL.*
24: sunt *ELT.*
25: cavenda *ELT.*
27: (appellantur) vocantur *BEL.*
27: conclusiones) conclavationes *EL.*
28: veras *ELT.*
p. 30
1: ingeniosos etiam *ELT.*
1: minus attentos *om. EL.*
2: quantum existimo *om. BEL.*
2: (illo) eo *BEL.*
3: (dictum est) dicitur *BEL.*
5: utitur *BLT.*
7: quidem *ELT.*
8: et *ELT.*
10: de *om. BEL.*
21: est enim malum *ELT.*
24: committendo *ELT.*
25: quaedam cognoscere *ELT.*
25: absolvi a malitia deus *ELT.*
26: qui *BLT.*
27: est/fol. 107/scientiarum.
27: donum *ELT.*
29: is *BL.*
29: cuncta veraciter *BLT.*
29: cui *ELT.*
p. 31
1: assistunt *BLT.*
3: mali quoque scientia *ELT.*
4: promerendum *ELT.*
6: liberum non habet *BLT.*
7: e contra *om. L.*
11: mala sint *ELT.*
12: omnem tribuat *ELT.*
14: esset desuper *LT.*
17: autem *EL.*
18: vicium *EL.*
18: naturaliter adhaerens *EL.*
19: haec *ELT.*
21: quae *ELT.*
p. 32
1: esse *BLT.*
1: quidlibet aut *ELT.*
7: quod *ELT.*
7: est/fol. 107^{v}/ ex.
9: donum maximum *ELT.*
17: est *ELT.*
18: quod *ELT.*
18: illos deus *ELT.*
21: (ipsum) ipsum etiam *ELT.*
26: (quibus) quibus et *ELT.*
26: (summo opere) summopere *ELT.*
28: decipiat *ELT.*
p. 33
7: domini est *BLT.*
9: tibi pater domine *L.*
10: (qui) quia *EL.*
11: mundi et infirma *BL.*
13: stultitia *ELT.*
14: qui /fol. 108/ docet.
16: aequaliter ab eis *ELT.*
17: magister *ELT.*
18: etiam sine verbo docet *EL.*
18: de *ELT.*
20: sapientia *BLT.*
23: (intendendum) nitendum *ELT.*
24: immundos *ELT.*
26: instandum *BLT.*
27: se philosophos *BLT.*
29: vivendo *ELT.*
p. 34
2: acceditur *ELT.*
3: enim *BLT.*
4: (deus) dominus *ELT.*
5: eius *ELT.*
5: enim *om. ELT.*
7: dicit apostolus *BLT.*
11: tanta enim est *L.*
12: et *BLT.*
13: cum *ELT.*
14: dei sapientia *L.*
15: ei me ipsum *BLT.*
16 ipse *BLT.*
18: comprehendere /fol. 108^{v}/ incomp.
19: quantulaecumque *ELT.*
21: eum *om. L.*
22: (posset) possit *ELT.*
23: Plato *marg. L.*
24: Plato *om. L.*
26: assereret *ELT.*
p. 35
1: voluntas divina *ELT.*
3: qualis sit ab hominibus *ELT.*
4: non *ELT.*
5: plene *om. EL.*
6: (et) ac *L.*
7: deus sit *LT.*
10: merito deum *LT.*
14: (hoc) haec *L.*
17: (potest) valet *ELT.*
18: praebet *ELT.*
23: sit *om. L.*
23: non licet discutere *ELT.*
24: iussum *ELT.*
25: mysterium/fol. 109/ patris.
p. 36
2: rationibus eis *BLT.*
3: qui *ELT.*
4: stultitiam suam *BLT.*
10: ut *ELT.*
12: videtur *BLT.*
16: (nos neque) nos nec *EL.*
19: humanas curant rationes *ELT.*
21: animales sint homines *ELT.*
21: (vero) autem *ELT.*
26: autem *om. ELT.*
27: dominus *BLT.*
27: verisimile sit *EL.*
27: ac *BLT.*
p. 37
1-2: Capitulum . . . trinitatem *om. L* (Cf. p. 37, 8).
6: adversus /fol. 109^{v}/ positionem.
8: Cap. I (*in text L*) Summa fidei circa unitatem ac trinitatem *marg. L.*
9: esse deos *EL.*
9: dominum *BL.*
11: solam *ELT.*
13: (pertinet) attinet *ELT.*
16: substantia est *EL.*
17: ac *om. EL.*
17: omnino simplex *EL.*
20: hae *L.*
20: quarum tantum est penitus *EL.* (eadem *om. EL*).
p. 38
1: haec *LT.*
2: est trium personarum *BLT.*
9: aliud in natura *BLT.*
17: discretus/fol. 110/ ut.
18: substantialiter *ELT.*
21: (diversi) disiuncti *ELT.*
21: aliud *ELT.*
24: dicenda *ELT.*
25: (singularis) singulis *EL.*
28: quid sit simplex divina substantia *marg. L* (sive informis *om. L*).
p. 39
4: (hoc) haec *L.*
4: quia *ELT.*
5: ista est *L.*
6: subsistentia *LT.*
7: ideo *ELT.*
10: ad *ELT.*
13: dicitur simplex *BLT.*
15: liquor est *ELT.*
21: dei *BLT.*
24: im/fol. 110^{v}/munem.
26: summo principio *BLT.*
26: deus *om. L.*
p. 40
3: extitit *ELT.*
4: (donec) donec scilicet *ELT.*
13: esse conferunt *ELT.*
13: homine *BLT* (*corr. ex* hominem *L*).
p. 41
3: qui *EL.*
4: specie *om. EL.*
6: id est spec. differentiae *ELT.*
7: postea *ELT.*
15: individuam/fol. 111/ omnino.
15: informem *BLT.*
15: eam recte *LT.*
16: perfectum *ELT.*
18: quantumlibet *ELT.*
21: fundamentum in quo sit *ELT.*
27: illa *ELT.*
p. 42
4: est penitus *EL.*
4: est spiritus *BLT.*
7: (sit illud) illud *EL.*
8: hic est adhibenda *L.*
10: singularitati *ELT.*
11: simul *ELT.*
12-13: *om. L* (Cf. p. 42, 20).
19: primum *BLT.*

20: Cap. II. Prima obiectio contra trinitatem *marg. L.*
21: vocabula tantum diversa sint *ELT.*
21: tantum / fol. 111^{v} / diversa.
26: ab hominibus facta sit *BLT.*
27: II *om. L.*
32: III *om. L.*
p. 43
3: sit in substantia *LT.*
4: substantia sit *ELT.*
4: personae *BLT.*
4: IV *om. L.*
7: trinus est et *ELT.*
9: V *om. L.*
11: nulla sit *ELT.*
16: VI *marg. L.*
18: dissimile est *BLT.*
21: discreti/fol. 112/amplius.
22: VII *marg. L.*
23: (sicut) sicut est *ELT.*
23: (et) vel *ELT.*
27: VIII *marg. L.*
31: una tantum substantia. *L.*
31-32: sicut . . . plures *ELT.*
33: IX *marg. L.*
p. 44
3: X *marg. L.*
3: personae *BLT.*
4: haec *BLT.*
5: non sint ideo *BLT.*
7: est substantia *BLT.*
9: Plurale *BLT.*
11: XI *marg. L.*
13: sive *BLT.*
14: XII *marg. L.*
19: hic *ELT.*
21: XIII *marg. L.*
22: entia *ELT.*
24: dicimus *ELT.*
25: dicimus/fol. 112^{v}/ambulant.
28: oportet *BLT.*
28: entia *LT.*
29: XIV *marg. L.*
p. 45
4: XV *marg. L.*
4: rerum differentia *ELT.*
5: est singularis *ELT.*
7: (sit) est *ELT.*
7: aliquam mutationem *ELT.*
10: in deo *LT.*
12: ille *ELT.*
14: das *BLT.*
18: prima . . . unitatem *marg. L.*
19: haec essentia *ELT.*
20: numquid . . . filius *om. EL.*
21: pater est deus *ELT.*
21: ostenditur pater esse *LT.*
22: pater est deus *L.*
28: II *marg. L.*
28: sedens sit *ELT.*
29: esse *om. EL.*
30: (dicantur) dicuntur *BEL.*
30: dicantur/fol. 113/hic.
31: sit essentia *ELT.*
p. 46
1: aut *om L.*
1: multae *ELT.*
3: de *om. ELT.*
4: numero *ELT.*
5: III *LT.*
5: (nulla) nec ulla *ELT.*
8: est saltem *BLT.*
8: substantiae instabilitas *ELT.*
9: assiduaque *ELT.*
10: IV *LT.*
12: (ut videlicet) ut is videlicet *LT.*
13: sit filius *EL.*
18: V *LT.*
21: (prorsus sit) sit penitus *ELT.*
23: res se ipsam *ELT.*
23: (verum) sed *L.*
p. 47
2: generatione divina *ELT.*
2: primo de *ELT.*
4: quod *ELT.*
4: deus ita *ELT.*
5: spiritualis *LT.*
5: omnino res *ELT.*
12: hic/fol. 113^{v}/posse.
14: Cap. III *marg. L.*
17: est *om. EL.*
17: loquendi modum *L.*
19: loquendi genere *L.*
25: summum illud *ELT.*
p. 48
1: dicere ausus sit *ELT.*
3: qualis sit *om. ELT.*
3: docere recte *ELT.*
6: manifeste aperuit *ELT.*
8: corporalis *ELT.*
11: divinitas *ELT.*
13: dicendi *ELT.*
13: sint *LT.*
13: (quid) quid forte *ELT.*
15: ne de *EL.*
17: ipso *BEL.*
17: investigabant *corr. ex* vestigabant *L.*
19: ignotum / fol. 114/ deum.
20: sunt *BEL.*
27: scilicet *ELT.*
27: subiectis substantiis *EL.*
p. 49
1: nisi *ELT.*
5: etiam *BEL.*
6: quae *ELT.*
8: (ac) et *ELT.*
11: verum et *ELT.*
13: quae *BEL.*
14: (scilicet et) scilicet *ELT.*
19: inquit *BLT.*
20: (idem) ideo *L.*
21: susceptibile *ELT.*
22: cum unum et idem numero sit *EL.*
23: susceptibile *ELT.*
23: deo ista *ELT.*
25: omnino formis *ELT.*
26: ratione/fol. 114^{v}/ qua.
p. 50
4: appell. sequamur *ELT.*
5: argumento *ELT.*
8: (quae) quod *EL.*
12: eorum *BLT.*
14: contentos *ELT.*
14: ac *EL.*
17: praecipue *BL.*
19: quae *ELT.*
20: designativa *BLT.*
20: quod *LT.*
20: incepit *ELT.*
23: res *ELT.*
24: subsistere *BLT.*
27: hominum institutionem *ELT.*
30: aliquod *ELT.*
p. 51
1: inde *BEL.*
3: hoc *BLT.*
4-5: Constat . . . sermones *om. EL.*
6: ait/fol. 115/indignum.
7: existimo *ELT.*
10: nedum *BEL.*
11: arte *BEL.*
17—p. 52, 8: Quid . . . oportet *om. EL.*
p. 52
9: invectio in dialecticos *marg. L.*
10: astute *BEL.*
14: aliud *ELT.*
15: ausi non sunt attingere *EL.*
19: (ac) et *EL.*
25: (igitur) ergo *ELT.*
p. 53
3: manifest / fol. 115^{v}/ andos.
13: pseudodialecticorum *ELT.*
14: attigimus *BELT.*
15: adeo in studiis ipsorum *EL.*
17: (nos) non *EL.*
p. 54
1: differentia personarum *marg. L* (de *om. EL*).
7: eadem res . . . permutatur *ELT.*
11: alios *LT.*
12: (prosequamur) assequamur *EL.*
13: quot *ELT.*
14: controversia/fol. 116/ summa.
17: esse *ELT.*
18: quot *ELT.*
19: quot *ELT.*
20-21: IV cap. De eodem et diverso *marg. L.*
27: primus . . . idem *marg. L.*
p. 55
6: secundus modus *marg. L.*
7: (omnem) omne *L.*
11: idem *EL.*
14: ab invicem sunt *EL.*
15: neque *EL.*
15: (isto) illo *EL.*
16: itaque *om. L.*
25: illud/fol. 116^{v}/vel.
26: III *marg. L.*
26: quoque *BLT.*
27: (sicut album) vel album *EL.*
28: penitus est diffinitio *ELT.*
32: quaeritur *ELT.*

p. 56
6: haec diffinitio *ELT.*
7: substantia colorata *ELT.*
14: (est) esse *ELT.*
16: sit ensis *ELT.*
17: etiam *BEL.*
17: ensem *ELT.*
18: (namque) itaque *ELT.*
20: exigat *ELT.*
26: IV *marg. L.*
28: vel quaelibet *BLT.*
28: unum/fol. 117/vel.
29: (aliqua propr.) aliquo genere *L.*
33: hoc est *ELT.*
34: unquam *LT.*
p. 57
3: eundem *om. EL.*
3: manifestandum intellectum *EL.*
5: (sex) quinque *BEL.*
5: modis dicitur *ELT.*
5: Saepe eadem res *ELT.*
9: primus . . . diversum *marg. L.*
10: diversa aliqua *BEL.*
13: paries id *EL.*
14: aliquam simplicem aliam compositam aliam id est *L.*
15: (cum) ut *L.*
16: ipsum compositum *BLT.*
17: diversa dicimus *ELT.*
19: sive diversa praedicatione *EL.*
21 - 23: specialissimum *ELT.*
22: fiet *ELT.*
23: (unquam) fiet unquam *EL.*
28: non *ELT.*
p. 58
1: suae essentiae *BLT.*
2: specie *ELT.*
2-3: hic *ELT.*
4: communis/fol. 117^{v}/differentia.
9: aliud *ELT.*
9: (haec) hoc *EL.*
12: diversa *ELT.*
15: differens dicitur a creaturis *ELT.*
19: unaquaque *LT.*
20: hic *ELT.*
23: aliquem *ELT.*
26: qui *BLT.*
31: cum etiam *EL.*
32: (loca) II *marg. L.*
p. 59
1: (simul) similiter *EL.*
2: in archa et in domo *EL.*
3: tamen diversas res *EL.*
4: diversa loca *EL.*
6: III *marg. L.*
7: terminari/fol. 118/non.
8: res *ELT.*
11: (nec) neque *ELT.*
11. illud exigat *ELT.*
13: esse *om. L.*
18: disiungantur *ELT.*
23: (affirmatione) assuntione *L.*
25: animal et *ELT.*
26: concedi *ELT.*
29: (affirmatione) assumptione *L.*
p. 60
1: animal quippe potest esse *L.*
2: sit animae *BL.*
2: (hoc tantum) hoc tamen *L.*
4: (et) ac *L.*
5: et hic . . . sive hic *ELT.*
8: (differentias) differentiarum *ELT.*
10: sint penitus divisivae sint et constitutivae *L.*
14: sic *BEL.*
16: diffinitione/fol. 188^{v}/accipimus.
22: quae vel diversa *EL.*
24: urbe *EL.*
28: distributionem *EL.*
29: et illud *ELT.*
31: ad *om. EL.*
p. 61
2: pistor *BEL.*
4: (sed cum) sed et cum *L.*
4: primo *ELT.*
5: voces *BEL.*
8: (tenetur) tenent *EL.*
9: impositionem *EL.*
10: vocem *ELT.*
11: affectiones *ELT.*
13: diversos *BLT.*
14: (quot) quod *BL.*
14: (seu) sive *ELT.*
16: est penitus substantia *L.*
17: eadem est *ELT.*
19: diversae ab invicem *L.*
23: quod *ELT.*
23: filii/fol. 119/et.
p. 62
4: Aug. et Alip. episcopis missa *EL.*
8: (hypostases) epostases *BL.*
8: hoc est subsistentias *ELT.*
13: et *ELT.*
13: ei esse *EL.*
14: scilicet *om. L.*
14: ullas intelligit formas *ELT.*
15: scilicet *ELT.*
20: per hoc formas *ELT.*
21: (illud esse) istud esse *ELT.*
27: (nullis) nullum *L.*
27: (bona) dona *L.*
p. 63
1: alteram *om. ELT.*
3: videlicet/fol. 119^{v}/hoc.
4: (qui) quae *BEL.*
7: (dei) sanctus *L.*
10: Cap. IV *marg. L.*
11: quot . . . dicatur *marg. L.*
12: (quippe) quidem *EL.*
13: spectat *EL.*
13: (quod . . . sic) quod in VII de trinitate sic ait *L.*
14: deo *ELT.*
14: (aliud est patrem) aliud patrem *ELT.*
17: vel patrem *ELT.*
24: sit spiritus sanctus *EL.*
30: secundum *L.*
31: (ipsum) ipsam *L.*
31: tertiam *ELT.*
32: alterum *ELT.*
p. 64
3: proprium *om. L.*
12: plures personas *L.*
12: cogeremus/fol. 120/Rhetores.
18: (facti) facta *EL.*
21: nobis vel facta vel *L.*
23: persona *ELT.*
26: (filio) et filio *L.*
27: ad boni *ELT.*
34: sive *ELT.*
p. 65
2: vindicare *BEL.*
5: sancti *om. ELT.*
9: occurrit obiectio *ELT.*
10: et sapientia maxime *om. L.*
14: numquid *ELT.*
15: confiteri / fol. 120^{v}/quippe.
16: et *EL.*
17: vindicandum *BL.*
24: dictus *EL.*
24: (et) etiam *EL.*
24: (videretur) videtur *EL.*
25: discretio personarum *EL.*
34: sed *ELT.*
34: (eo) hoc *L.*
p. 66
2: fides tradita est *ELT.*
7: (ut) ut iam *ELT.*
8: philosophorum confirmantur *ELT.*
9: quae *L.*
9: ea *ELT.*
13: (quoque) quaeque *EL.*
19: accipi/fol. 121/enda.
p. 67
4: primum est *BLT.*
5: ipsa *om. ELT.*
6: (ipsa ita) ipsa potius ita *L.*
6: eam *ELT.*
7: (illa) ipsa *L.*
8: (sit) sint *BL.*
12: numeri *ELT.*
13: quod *BLT.*
13: res sit *L.*
13: diversis diffinitionibus *ELT.*
14: applicari diffinitiones *L.*
15: non *BLT.*
18: quod *ELT.*
21: in deo sit *L.*
22: deus *ELT.*
23: unus *ELT.*
23: est unus in personis *ELT.*
27: diffinitiones *ELT.*
p. 68
2: (et) etiam *ELT.*
8: autem idem *ELT.*
8: autem/fol. 121^{v}/idem.
9: idem *ELT.*
9: penitus sonaret *ELT.*
10: necesse esset *BLT* (esse *B*).
16: vel *EL.*

16: audiente et *ELT*.
20: est *ELT*.
22: tamen *ELT*.
23: est Socrates *ELT*.
25: omnino est *L*.
26: quia *ELT*.
32: II *om. BL*.
33: (hoc etiam) hoc *ELT*.
p. 69
1: tria per se *ELT*.
4: sit visum *EL*.
6: sint *BL*.
7: domus/fol. 122/sive.
9: citharoedus *om. L*.
10: sit factum *BLT*.
13: constitutum *BEL*.
17: autem *BLT*.
19 (de eadem) ex eadem *EL*.
23: (eo quod) eo scilicet quod *ELT*.
24: simpliciter *ELT* (simpliciter eam *L*).
27: penitus essentia *BLT*.
28: sit *BLT*.
28: (hoc nomen) haec nomina *L*.
31: et multa *ELT*.
p. 70
1: numero *BLT*.
2: aeternus est immensus *ELT*.
3: et alia *ELT*.
4: diversitatem diff. *ELT*.
5: non *ELT*.
5: quam diversitatem *ELT*.
8: in *om. ELT*.
9: conaretur *ELT*.
11: essentias *ELT*.
11: ulla/fol. 122^{v}/diversitas.
18: constitutivi divisio *ELT*.
19: quamlibet *ELT*.
20: constituunt priorem esse *ELT*.
21: posteriorem esse *ELT*.
21: (si non) sine *BEL*.
22: est *om. L*.
23: prior *om. EL*.
25: discretarum essentiarum *EL*.
26: tam *L*.
28: vel nisi etiam *EL*.
p. 71
2: ad *L*.
7: omnia illa *EL*.
9: quod *EL*.
13: a toto *EL*.
15: in trinitate potest assignari *EL*.
16: eadem *L*.
16: trinitatis/fol. 123/et.
20: aeterna *EL*.
25: aliquid *BL*.
29: aeternum est *BL*.
30: omnino *EL*.
31: (ideoque) ideo quoque *EL*.
32: (trahit) contrahit *EL*.
32: tribus personis *EL*.
33: quam ex tribus dico *EL*.
34: praepositio *EL*.
p. 72
4: (debet) potest *EL*.
5: illis *EL*.
9: et *EL*.
10: esse *om. EL*.
11: (necesse) necessario *EL*.
12: (existente) exigente *EL*.
13: est utrumque *L*.
14: praedicatione / 123^{v} / sive.
15: numquid *EL*.
16: rationabilius *EL*.
16: (et iste) iste *EL*.
18: (qui) quae *EL*.
20: (hoc est) id est *EL*.
20: sancti *L*.
21: eo *om. L*.
22: hic *EL*.
24: videlicet *EL*.
27: dicemus *EL*.
30: hic *EL*.
33: quam *EL*.
35: immo *EL*.
35: (aliqua) alia *EL*.
p. 73
3: non *EL*.
8: videlicet *EL*.
9: quorum/fol. 124/creator.
10: dominus esset *EL*.
14-15: hic *EL*.
20: a mundo *EL*.
29: autem ipso . . . incommutabilem *EL*.
33: et amittit *L*.
36: sit similis *BLT*.
36: ita *om. ELT*.
p. 74
1: negative magis *L*.
1: affirmative *BL*.
2: tale *ELT*.
3: eiusdem penitus *ELT*.
5: ad *ELT*.
7: quomodo/fol. 124^{v}/id.
9: fortassis *ELT*.
10: solum *ELT*.
13: (tantum) tamen *BLT*.
14: sic *EL*.
15: ad invicem *ELT*.
16: simile *ELT*.
17: quod *ELT*.
17: a contrario *ELT*.
18: (similis) consimilis *EL*.
21: determinavit *ELT*.
22: et *om. EL*.
23: (illud quod) illud *EL*.
27: omnino *om. L*.
27: sit *ELT*.
p. 75
8: (et cetera) vel cetera *ELT*.
8: quod si . . . procederet *ELT*.
10: V quaestio *marg. L*.
13 sincera/fol. 125/intell.
13: et sana intelligentia *ELT*.
17: ideo *ELT*.
19 homo *ELT*.
20: animal rationale mortale *BLT*.
24: affectiones *ELT*.
24 incidunt *BELT*.
25: affectio *ELT*.
28: praeterea et *EL*.
p. 76
1: (sive) seu *ELT*.
2: quarum etiam partium *ELT*.
2: unaquaeque ante abscissionem *ELT*.
6: nunc *BEL*.
6: homo permanet *BLT*.
8: (homo est) hoc est *EL*.
8: etiam *BEL*.
9: erat *ELT*.
9: hominis diffinitionem *ELT*.
11: rationale et mortale *ELT*.
13: uno *ELT*.
14: in uno homine erant *ELT*.
15: dicimus nisi *ELT*.
15: vegetatos *ELT*.
16: unaquaeque/fol. 125^{v}/est.
17: dicimus multos *L*.
18: deos *ELT*.
19: (quamvis) quarum *EL*.
22: cum *ELT*.
23: quem *ELT*.
23: vel *ELT*.
p. 77
5: tamen *om. EL*.
7: a nostris *ELT*.
7: graecis *BLT*.
8: essentia tres *ELT*.
10: fortassis *BLT*.
11: tantum *BLT*.
13: dominos *BEL*.
18: filius est *L*.
21: demonstramus/fol. 126/quarum.
23: plures personas dicimus *ELT*.
25: entia *EL*.
28: determinationem *BEL*.
29: unitates *ELT*.
31: vocum *ELT*.
31: figurate *EL*.
p. 78
2: (tantum) tamen *LT*.
4: rerum inquit *ELT*.
5: figurate *ELT*.
6: tantum res est *ELT*.
6: subiecta *EL*.
6: entia *ELT*.
7: quia cum saepe *BL*.
9: alia *ELT*.
12: personis dicatur *ELT*.
13: discretione *ELT*.
16: tamen non *LT*.
19: discretae *ELT*.
19: sunt *EL*.
19: haec scilicet *LT*.
20: grammaticis personis *ELT*.
24: dicenda *ELT*.
24: spir./126^{v}/creat.
25: eam *om. EL*.
25: unam *om. EL*.
p. 79
1: nulla sit in personis *ELT*.
2: vel *ELT*.
5: (sit et) sit *EL*.
10: esse *ELT*.
12: aliud esse gram-

maticum aliud esse oratorem *L.*
14: tamen est esse *L.*
14: in *om. ELT.*
16: et *BL.*
16: non tamen est *L.*
27: verba illa *EL.*
p. 80
6: et/fol. 127/signif.
6: ea . . . non sint *ELT.*
7: dicit mihi *EL.*
9: in libro . . . animabus *om. EL.*
10-14: idem . . . laborandum *om. EL.*
14: respondeo *ELT.*
14: (quod placet) et placet *L.*
15: sana *BEL.*
17: tum *ELT.*
18: tum *ELT.*
19: eis *ELT.*
19: offenderetur *BLT.*
20: sumeret *ELT.*
22: pater est *ELT.*
23: est pater *BLT.*
23: eadem est *BLT.*
24-27: nec . . . esse *om. EL.*
30: ad invocationem *BLT.*
p. 81
6: (vel de) vel *EL.*
8: videlicet *EL.*
11: (cum de) cum iam de *L.*
12: dicit *ELT.*
12: propositam *ELT.*
15: sit *ELT.*
16: (istorum) utriusque *L.*
17: translata/fol. 127^v/ut.
19: et *om. L.*
22: (facilitatem) facultatem *EL.*
23: cuiquam *ELT.*
24: (cuius) cui *L.*
25: commendet *ELT.*
29: diximus saepe *L.*
31: potens sit *L.*
p. 82
4: (verum est) verum etiam *EL.*
5: est . . . erit qui *ELT.*
10: (id quod) idem quod *EL.*
11: (vel) sive *ELT.*
12: ut dictum est proprietatis *ELT.*
13: (utriusque) utrique *L.*
16-17: quae . . . essentiae *om. EL.*
17: spectant / fol. 128 / pater.
20: (iustus seu) iustus sive *ELT.*
24: scilicet *ELT.*
29: (etiam) et *EL.*
32: est aeternus *ELT.*
33: est deus *BLT.*
p. 83
3: sicut *BLT.*
3: supra iam *ELT.*
6: ostendit *ELT.*
7: ad *om. L.*
7: spectant *BLT.*
7: immo *ELT.*
12: illa *BLT.*
14: praedicatur *BLT.*
14: (praedicato) praedicatur *L.*
15: (id est) hoc est *ELT.*
15: idem *ELT.*
16: facile *ELT.*
16: (comprehendi) deprehendi *ELT.*
17: ex regula *ELT.*
20: haec facit *ELT.*
20: proprietatis/128^v/sicut.
24: subiecti *ELT.*
26: consimiles *L.*
26: disputationis *EL.*
27: propter *om. EL.*
27: dispositione *L.*
27: competere *BLT*
29: semper est *ELT.*
30: hic *ELT.*
30: est semper *BLT.*
31 hominis *end of EL.*

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IV. Tristan and the Morholt: David and Goliath.

I.

EXCEPT for minor details, the story of the duel between Tristan and the Morholt and of the events that lead up to it is a straightforward narrative.[1] The Morholt has landed in Cornwall to claim from King Mark the tribute levied on his kingdom by the King of Ireland. He is a renowned warrior, gigantic in stature, first champion of the Irish hosts and brother-in-law to his king. According to a former pact, this year he demands as tribute boys and young girls to be drawn by lot from among the families of Cornwall. If a champion puts himself forward on Mark's behalf and conquers him, then Cornwall will be quit of the tribute.

Tristan learns of the demands made by the Morholt and plans to ask Mark to allow him to act as his champion. He takes counsel with Gorvenal, his mentor; the latter warns him that, whereas the Morholt is an experienced and famous warrior, he is but young and inexperienced. Gorvenal would dissuade Tristan, but at length yields. Both agree that first of all Mark must be prevailed upon to make Tristan a knight. At their request, the King replies that he would have preferred to wait upon happier times to do so, but he accedes and Tristan is dubbed knight.

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[1] For the purpose of setting forth the salient features of the Morholt episode, it is immaterial whether the Thomas version, as reconstructed by Joseph Bédier, be followed or the Béroul-Eilhart version which Miss Schoepperle views as preserving more accurately the earlier poetic version (*l'estoire*). Cf. *Tristan and Isolt* I (London, 1913), pp. 6-9. Both agree in essential details. Miss Schoepperle gives a resume of Eilhart, *op. cit.*, p. 13-5. For the reconstruction of the episode by Thomas, cf. Joseph Bédier, *Le Roman de Tristan par Thomas* I (Paris, 1902), pp. 71-91. A concordance of the primitive poem with variants from extant versions is given by Bédier, *op. cit.*, II (Paris, 1905), pp. 199-207. It is this concordance that I have generally followed. For variants that bear on the story and which affect this study, cf. *infra.*

The messengers of the Morholt bring his challenge before the whole assembled court at Tintagel. None of the barons there assembled dares doom himself in single combat against the Irish champion. Alone, Tristan offers to champion Mark. The King consents, not as yet aware that Tristan is his nephew. The Irish declare they will accept this unknown champion only on condition that he be of lineage equal to that of the Morholt. It is then that Tristan declares his identity: His name is Tristan, the nephew of King Mark, his father Rivalen, King of Loonois; he is the son of a king even as is the Morholt.

Mark is overjoyed at the avowal, but at the same time anguished at the perilous enterprise that Tristan has undertaken. Finally, he does keep the promise that he has made to his nephew. The combat is fixed to take place on an island nearby several days hence.

On the fixed day, Tristan is armed by King Mark himself who laces on his helmet, girds his sword about him and recommends him to God. All the people pray for their champion. Tristan then rides to the shore, has his warhorse brought aboard, mounts and directs the boat to the island. The Morholt has already crossed to the island and has moored his boat on the shore. On arrival Tristan debarks and shoves his boat off from the shore. When the Morholt asks him why he has not done as he did in making fast the boat, Tristan replies that one boat will be sufficient for him as conqueror. On the shore the crowd is assembled to witness the duel. In admiration of the youth and courage of his opponent, the Morholt offers an agreement: let Tristan renounce the battle and he will give him in exchange his friendship and will share his goods with him. Tristan refuses. Both mount for the combat.

They set spur to their horses and attack each other fiercely. Soon both are wounded, Tristan cut with the poisoned sword of his adversary. Finally, Tristan deals the Morholt such a terrible blow that the sword penetrates the helmet and drives into the Morholt's skull. As Tristan withdraws it, the sword breaks and a fragment of steel remains lodged in his enemy's head. Wounded unto death, the Morholt flees to his boat pursued by Tristan's taunts. The Morholt reaches his companions' boat and they bear him off still alive to Ireland. Mark receives the victor on the shore to the joy of all and brings him grievously wounded to the palace.

Meanwhile the Morholt has died of his wounds. His companions in Ireland tell of his defeat and the name of his conqueror. The Queen of Ireland, the Morholt's sister, and her daughter Isolt draw out of his brain the fragment of Tristan's sword and keep it as a precious relic.

The duel between the Tristan and the Morholt is an important link in the ingeniously forged chain of events that form the story of Tristan and Isolt. The poisoned wound of Tristan, inflicted by his adversary, can be cured only by the Queen of Ireland, the Morholt's sister. It is at that court later, after his rudderless voyage, as Tantris, that he regains health at her hands and meets the Queen's daughter, Isolt the Fair, for the first time. The remnant of his sword that had remained imbedded in the Morholt's skull and then preserved by his sister, reveals his true identity to Isolt when he has returned to the court of Ireland to woo her on behalf of Mark, his uncle.

II.

Every duel between a recognized and established champion and a comparatively untried opponent, whatever be the cause or occasion, brings to mind the Biblical account of the battle between David and Goliath. The duel between Tristan and the Morholt is no exception. In fact, as August Closs remarks, 'The

David-Goliath parallel is obvious'.[2] However, a close comparison of the two accounts seems to establish similarities between them that are suggestive of closer affinity.

There are, first of all, the principals engaged: David and Tristan, Goliath and the Morholt. David was the youngest of the eight sons of Isai, an obscure great-grandson of Ruth the Moabitess, a native of Bethlehem and of the tribe of Juda. He was chosen by the Lord to be anointed King of Israel by Samuel, to replace Saul, rejected because of his sin of disobedience.[3] After his anointing, he continues as a shepherd tending his father's flock. He is described as 'ruddy and beautiful to behold, and of a comely face',[4] 'a skillful player, one of great strength, and a man fit for war, and prudent in his words, and a comely person'.[5] Recommended to Saul, David is sent for and when he stood before him, 'Saul loved him and made him his armorbearer. And Saul sent to Isai, saying: 'Let David stand before me; for he has found favor in my sight'.[6] Tristan, on the other hand, was the only son of Rivalen, King of Loonois in Brittany, and Blancheflor, sister of King Mark. Orphaned at birth, he is reared by a faithful mentor and tutor, educated in letters, the arts and courtly manners: *Pour la noblesse du coeur, la largesse, la courtoisie, la subtilité de l'esprit, la hardiesse, le beau maintien, nul n'était plus richement doué. Ainsi, chaque jour, il crut en valeur.*[7] At the time of the challenge of the Morholt he is described as *hardi, beau de son corps, vaillant.*[8] After being kidnapped by the Norwegians,[9] he finds his way to Mark's court at Tintagel. His identity is revealed there and confirmed by his mother's ring, once given to her by Mark himself.[10] The King, his uncle, adopts him as his own son, and promises to make him his heir and successor.[11]

Except for the details of their parentage, there is a certain similarity between the two beyond their youth and physical appeal: David, a shepherd boy and the youngest of eight sons of Isai, an obscure native of Bethlehem, and Tristan, the sole child of royal parentage and an orphan; David, chosen by God Himself to be anointed King of Israel, and Tristan, adopted publicly by his uncle as his own son eventually to succeed him as king; David, who found favor in Saul's eyes, made a personal page and court attendant, and Tristan, the permanent companion of his uncle and member of his court.

The similarity is heightened by their common quality as harpers. As Saul brooded over his broken life and the loss of Samuel's friendship which had been the pledge of divine support, a sense of futility and helplessness plunged his mind into the depths of despair. A melancholy, akin to diabolic possession, reduced him to fits of depression bordering on madness. When one 'skillful in playing on the harp,'[12] was sought to soothe him, it was David 'a skillful player'[13] who was recommended: 'So, whenever the evil spirit of the Lord was upon Saul, David took his harp, and played with his hand, and Saul was refreshed, and was better, for the evil spirit departed from him'.[14] Tristan's ability to play on the harp is celebrated. Even before his identity is known to Mark, at Tintagel he plays the harp and sings *lais* to its accompaniment to entertain the King and his court.[15] Charmed by his art, Mark uses his talents in somewhat the same fashion as Saul had used David's: *Béni soit de Dieu le maître qui t'enseigna. Tu dormiras la nuit dans ma chambre, et quant je serai couché sans trouver le sommeil, tu harperas pour apaiser mon déconfort.*[16] And when he sets forth in the rudderless boat to seek healing, he takes only his harp and his sword.[17] When he has reached the shores of Ireland, the king of that land hears of his playing and is attracted thereby.[18] Isolt wishes to learn how to play and when Tristan is cured, he teaches her.[19]

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[2] *Tristan und Isolt, a Poem by Gottfried von Strassburg,* ed. August Closs (Oxford, 1944), p. xx.

[3] *I Kings* xvi, 13.

[4] *Ibid.,* 12.

[5] *Ibid.,* 19.

[6] *Ibid.,* 21-22.

[7] *Thomas,* I, p. 29. Cf. *Eilhart von Oberge,* hrsg. Franz Lichtenstein (Quellen und Forschungen zur Sprach- und Culturgeschichte, XIX, Strassburg, 1877), ll. 130-65.

[8] *Thomas,* p. 83.

[9] *Thomas,* p. 35. Eilhart has Tristan seek adventure and honor under Gorvernal's direction in foreign lands. He arrives at Mark's court, incognito, is well received, made a member of the King's court until such time as he should be knighted. *Eilhart,* ll. 191-350.

[10] It is only later on, when the Irish demand that the challenger of the Morholt be of the same lineage, that Tristan reveals his identity. *Eilhart,* ll. 631-6.

[11] *Thomas,* I, pp. 60, 63.

[12] *I Kings* xvi, 16.

[13] *Ibid.,* 18.

[14] *Ibid.,* 23.

[15] *Thomas,* I, p. 52. The incident is omitted

Goliath and the Morholt have in common their quality of invincible champions of their respective peoples, their prowess and their huge physical stature. Goliath of Geth was the official representative of the Philistines[20] with whom the Israelites had long waged war with varying fortunes. He was a man of lowly birth,[21] of immense height: six cubits.[22] His might and strength may be gauged by the weight of his coat of mail, the staff and head of his spear.[23] The Morholt like Goliath was the champion of the Irish host, so mighty, pitiless and fierce that once having seen him, no man dared to risk combat against him.[24] He is tall in stature, with thick and robust arms and legs, experienced in many battles.[25] Unlike Goliath, he was a Duke of Ireland, brother-in-law to its king, possessed of lands and riches. Once again, except for their birth and social background, there is a distinct similarity between Goliath and the Morholt in their physique, their repute as warriors and their status.

David and Tristan, Goliath and the Morholt have this in common: while the latter are the acknowledged champions of their peoples, the former, young, inexperienced and physically unequal to their adversaries, will elect to become champions of theirs, conscious that the duel in which they are to engage is not only one of skill against brute strength, but also one of justice against injustice. The duel which David and Goliath are to fight is simply to decide a war, whether the Israelites are to be slaves and servants of the Philistines or not. This is the challenge and defy of Goliath: 'Choose out a man of you, and let him come down and fight hand to hand. If he be able to fight with me, and kill me, we will be servants to you: but if I prevail against him, and kill him, you shall be servants, and shall serve us.'[26] The duel of Tristan and the Morholt, on the other hand, was occasioned by a demand of tribute made on a conquered people, but a people, who in acceding to the demand, are thereby enslaved.[27] The conditions and challenge are similar: *que l'un d'entre vous me combatte seul, pour prouver que vous ne devez pas le tribut. Si je faux à prouver mon droit, soyez désormais pleinement affranchi.*[28] As in the case of the Israelites,[29] the people of Cornwall are dismayed; none of Mark's barons dares oppose the challenge of the Morholt: *nul n'ose combattre le Morholt, parce que nul n'espère le vaincre.*[30] Like David, Tristan alone accepts to do battle. Brought before Saul, David says to him: 'I thy servant will go, and will fight against this Philistine'.[31] Tristan, addressing Mark in the assemblage of barons, says: *je veux . . . mettre ma jeunesse et ma vie à l'aventure, et combattre volentiers un contre un, avec ce que Dieux m'a donné de force.*[32] Just as Saul had tried to turn David aside: 'Thou are not able

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by Eilhart, but in telling of his education, Eilhart does say that Tristan learned to play the harp; harfin unde sêtin klingen / lerte Kurneval daz kint. ll. 132-3.

[16] *Thomas*, pp. 53-4.

[17] *Thomas*, I, p. 93; *Eilhart*, l. 1136. Cf. also Schoepperle, *op. cit.*, II, p. 287.

[18] *Thomas*, I, p. 94 and II, p. 209h. Eilhart omits the incident, but Schoepperle says the incident was probably contained in the *estoire; op. cit.*, p. 287.

[19] *Thomas*, I, p. 97.

[20] *I Kings* xvii, 8.

[21] *Ibid.*, 4. Cf. xvii, 23.

[22] *Ibid.*, 4. That is, ten feet roughly.

[23] *Ibid.*, 5 and 7. His coat of mail would weigh roughly 132 pounds, the head of his spear, 142.

[24] *Thomas*, I, p. 75.

[25] *Ibid.*, pp. 82, 86. Cf. *Eilhart*, ll. 353 ff.

[26] *I Kings* xvii, 9-10.

[27] *Thomas*, I, p. 79.

[28] *Thomas*, I, p. 83. Cf. II, p. 199b.

[29] *I Kings* xvii, 11 and 24.

[30] *Thomas*, I, p. 79 and II, p. 200a. Cf. *Eilhart*, ll. 554-5.

[31] *I Kings* xvii, 32.

[32] *Thomas*, I, p. 80.

to withstand this Philistine, nor to fight against him: for thou are but a boy, but he is a warrior from his youth',[33] so Gorvernal in almost the same words tried to dissuade Tristan from his intent to offer his sword to his uncle for the defence of his kingdom: *le Morhout est tel chevalier qu'i*[*l*] *n'a tel au monde; et tu* [*es*] *si jeune, et si n'appris oncques riens du mestier de chevalerie.*[34] However, like Saul, Gorvernal and Mark are won over.[35]

The places of battle differ: in the Bible the site of the duel was the valley of Elah, i.e. the Terebinth, that lay between the mountains on the slopes of which the armies were camped, the Israelites on the eastern slope of the valley and the Philistines on the western.[36] The site of the duel between Tristan and the Morholt was an island where their struggle might easily be seen by their partisans. Before the battle Saul himself clothed David with his garments, put a helmet of brass upon his head and armed him with a coat of mail.[37] David girded on his sword. In the Thomas version, Mark himself girds Tristan with his sword;[38] in Eilhart, Mark himself arms Tristan and laces on his helmet.[39]

When David approached Goliath with staff and sling and stone, Goliath despised and cursed him because he had come out to do battle as against an animal.[40] Not so the Morholt. As Tristan lands on the island, the Morholt in admiration of his youth and bravery, offers him friendship and a share of his wealth if he will renounce the battle and own himself vanquished.[41] The duel between Tristan and the Morholt is adapted to the age and fought according to twelfth-century tradition.[42] The duel between David and Goliath is a strange one: the skill of David with sling and stone versus the sword and armor and experience of the Philistine. The outcome is the same: in both, youth and inexperience triumph. The adversary is slain.[43]

There is one incident in the duels that is strikingly similar. As Goliath 'drew nigh, David made haste, and ran to the fight to meet the Philistine. And he put his hand into his scrip, and took a stone and cast it with the sling, and fetching it about struck the Philistine in the forehead: and the stone was fixed in his forehead, and he fell on his face upon the earth.'[44] In the duel of Tristan and the Morholt, after several passes and after Tristan is wounded with the poisoned sword, he fetches the Morholt so terrific a blow with his sword, that the blade pierces his helmet and penetrates into his skull. Tristan tries to free his sword, the blade breaks and a piece of it remains in his head: *il asséna son epée de tout son poids et frappa sur le heaume: le fer céda, l'acier se fendit, la coiffe de mailles ne sut pas résister, et l'épee, s'enfonçant à travers la chevelure, resta fichée dans le crane.*[45] The piece of sword that is recovered and treasured by the sister of the Morholt becomes later the token of Tristan's identification.[46]

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[33] *I Kings* xvii, 33.

[34] From the *Prose Roman de Tristan, Thomas,* II, p. 324. Cf. *Eilhart,* ll. 456-95.

[35] On coming from the pasturage to the Israelite encampment, to visit his brothers at the behest of his father, David had heard the challenge of Goliath, and heard the reward promised to him who would conquer the giant: 'And the man that shall slay him, the king will enrich with great riches, and will give him his daughter, and will make his father's house free from tribute in Israel' (*I Kings* xvii, 25-8). While in *Thomas,* it is true, in gratitude for his offer Mark promises Tristan, as he had done before (*Thomas,* I, p. 63), to make him his heir, almost identically the same promise is made by the King of Ireland to the man that shall slay the dragon that was devastating his land: il obtiendrait sa fille, . . . en outre il obtiendrait, pour lui et ses hoirs, la moitié de son royaume (*Thomas,* p. 115, II, p. 219). In Eilhart, the king limits his promise to his daughter (*Eilhart,* ll. 1605-7).

[36] *I Kings* xvii, 1-3.

[37] *Ibid.,* 38-9.

[38] *Thomas,* I, p. 84.

[30] *Eilhart,* ll. 755-6.

[40] *I Kings* xvii, 42-4.

[41] *Thomas,* I, p. 88. Eilhart has the Morholt make this offer when Tristan disembarks from the boat. *Eilhart,* ll, 810-30.

[42] Cf. G. Schoepperle, *op. cit.,* II, pp. 338-64. She terms the island duel 'a stereotyped incident of mediaeval French literature', p. 364.

[43] In the Thomas version, the Morholt is killed on the spot, *Thomas,* I, p. 88. Gottfried has Tristan cut off his head as David did Goliath, *ed cit.,* ll. 7088-90, and his companions come and bear his body away. Cf. *Thomas,* II, 203p-q.

[44] *I Kings* xvii, 48-9.

[45] *Thomas,* I, p. 88

[46] *Thomas,* I, pp. 133-4 and II, 221j.

In spite of the obvious differences in non-essentials: the parentage and background of the principals, the place of combat, the method of combat itself, there is a striking basic similarity between the two duels. Goliath and the Morholt are the champions of aggressive powers, noted for their prowess in battle, physically superior to their opponents. David and Tristan are the self-elected champions of the resisting powers, young and untried, but both destined to succeed in kingship. The issue of the duel, at first sight different, is fundamentally the same: servitude of the vanquished. The outcome is the same: the victory of the young champions over their brutal adversaries. In addition to these essential similarities, there is added the particular resemblances that both David and Tristan are famed for their harping, that the objects that contributed to the discomfiture of Goliath and the Morholt were such that adhered to their wounds: the stone to the forehead of Goliath, the fragment of the sword to the brain of the Morholt.

III.

The name Morholt, with vocalization of *l*: Morhout, Morhot, occurs in the extant Old French texts invariably with the definite article.[47] As such, the name is descriptive, evocative of some quality, physical or personal, and analogous to such proper names as Pierres l'Hermite, Aymeri le Chetif, Nahu le Grant, Clarion le Vieus of the epics,[48] to Charles the Great, Louis the Stammerer of Modern English. The value *ol, o, ou* of *-holt, -hot, -out* varies. In Béroul, le Morholt is found but once in rime: *javelot* 855, i.e. with the value of open *o*. In the *Folie Tristan*, le Morhout rimes with *volt* 332 and le Morholt with *Ysolt* 350. The rime seems to be in *u* from open *o* followed by vocalized *l*, the more so since Ysolt is made to rime with *-out*, third singular, imperfect indicative, first conjugation suffix: *surjurnout* 95, *amout* 117. Eilhart von Oberge rimes *-olt, -olde* with words having a short *o*, indicating that the *l* of the Old French has not as yet vocalized: stolt: Môrolt 561-2; solde: Morolde 579-80; holt: Morolt 807-8; Morolden: vorgolden 873-4; Moroldin: soldin 975-6. From the German forms in Eilhart and Gottfried von Strassburg, it is clear too that the interior *h* had no aspirate value but was mute.

There have been various attempts at explaining the derivation or origin of the name. *Morhold* is cited from Frankish documents of the eighth century.[49] Bruce is of the opinion that the similarity is probably accidental.[50] No trace of it can be found in Scandinavian documents; it is unknown in French outside of the Tristan texts.[51] According to W. Golther the name is neither Celtic nor Northgermanic, but Frankish-German and came into Old French as a substitution for another Celtic name whose initial element might be *mor*: the sea or *mor*: big, huge.[52] 'It is difficult', however, as Miss Schoepperle observes, 'to believe that French poets would have substituted for an unknown Celtic name an unknown German one'.[53]

The name *Morholt* itself is unknown in Celtic. The first element *mor*: means 'sea' in Irish and for that reason the Morholt has been linked to the *Fomori*:[54] the Fomorians, 'the beings from under the sea', an Irish prehistoric, mythical race of sea giants or monsters. As support for this connection there is cited an Irish tale of a princess offered as a tribute to the Fomorians and delivered by Cuchulainn. However, it is believed that the story is a variant of a folktale motif rather than an analogue to the Tristan episode.[55] Furthermore, as Kuno Meyer pointed out to Miss Schoepperle in a private communication, the connection is philologically unsound.[56] Joseph Lot proposed the etymology: *mori-solto* from an Old Celtic **mori-spolto-,* i.e. 'he who cleaves the sea'.[57]

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[47] The only exception occurs in the Douce manuscript of the *Folie Tristan*, ed. Joseph Bédier, (Paris, 1907), l. 434.

[48] Cf. Ernest Langlois, *Tables des noms propres de toute nature compris dans les Chansons de Geste* (Paris, 1904), *s.v.*

[49] *Altdeutsches Namenbuch* II, col. 1118.

[50] *The Evolution of Arthurian Romance* I (2nd ed. Baltimore, 1928), p. 189, note 66.

[51] Gertrude Schoepperle, *Tristan and Isolt*, II, p. 329, note 2.

[52] *Tristan und Isolde in den Dichtungen des Mittelalters und der neuen Zeit* (Leipzig, 1907), p. 17. Cf., by the same author, *Tristan und Isolde in der französischen und deutschen Dichtung des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit* (Stoff- und Motivgeschichte der deutschen Literatur, 2, Leipzig, 1929), p. 14.

[53] *Ibid.*

[54] Deutschbein, *Beiblatt zur Anglia*, XV (1904), 16 ff. Cf. also W. Golther, *Tristan und Isolde* (1907), p. 17; E. Muret, *Romania*, XVII (1888), 606.

These etymologies linking the Morholt with the sea presuppose his close connection with it. Actually, in the story, his only connection with the sea seems to be limited to his crossing it to reach Mark's kingdom—as his companions did along with him—and other kingdoms that he had subjected to the King of Ireland. His attachment to the sea is founded partly on Tristan's rudderless journey in which the hero abandons himself to chance or preternatural direction to reach the Morholt's land. It is there that he hopes to be cured of the poisonous wound inflicted in the duel by the Morholt's sister. This variant of the Imram type of Old Irish literature along with other Celtic themes leads Miss Schoepperle, for instance, to believe that the land of the Morholt was a 'land beyond the confines of the earth, a land that cannot be reached by means of chart or compass,'[58] and to see beyond the Morholt, the opponent of Tristan, 'a supernatural being rationalized by the redactors of the story into an Irish champion, the uncle of Isolt'.[59] As a matter of fact, the sea would fit Tristan much better for it is he who seeks healing, after the duel, in a rudderless boat; it is he who, even before the duel, had been kidnapped and after a sea voyage had been set ashore in Mark's kingdom.

The first element of the word *Morholt*: *mor* means also in Irish 'large', 'huge', 'mighty'—which does fit the person of the Morholt; he was a huge, mighty man. Taken together with the definite article with which the name always appears, the person indicated would be: 'the huge someone'.

The impressive parallelism between the Biblical David-Goliath incident and that of the Tristan-the Morholt provokes speculation on the origin of the Morholt, if not by the author or authors of the romances, then in the *estoire* that lies beyond the poetic versions. The piquant similarities between the physique, role and fate of Goliath with those of the Morholt summon up the possibility of linking their names and the tentative, perhaps fanciful, ascription of the etymology of the Morholt to that of his suggestive namesake. It is tempting to see in the Morholt the development of the Irish "the great Goliath".[59a]

Mor in the sense of 'great', 'huge', etc., is used in Celtic in composition with nouns: in Old Irish, *mórgein,* 'mighty birth', *mór-gnim* as a gloss for the Latin *magnopere, mór-rigu,* 'the great queen or Goddess', *mórgloir,* 'great glory';[60] in modern Irish, *mór-cumacht,* 'great power', *mór-flaith,* 'great lord' and so on.[61] When so compounded, the initial of the second element of the composition undergoes lenition.[62] In the case of the voiced stop *g,* this means that the initial of the second element is transformed into the voiced spirant, written *g* (modern *gh*), and subsequently lost.[63] As in Welsh and Cornish, the spirant value must have softened gradually and weakened until totally dropped.

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[55] G. Schoepperle, *op. cit.*, II, p. 331, note 1; Bruce, *op. cit.*, p. 189, note 66.

[56] *Op. cit.*, p. 331, note 1.

[57] *Contributions à l'étude des romans de la Table Ronde* (Paris, 1912), p. 29, note 1.

[58] *Op. cit.*, II, p. 390.

[59] *Ibid.*, p. 338.

[59a] I am very grateful to Professor Vernam Hull of Harvard University who, while viewing with dubious askance such an ascription, however tentative, of the Morholt to an Irish translation of 'The Great Goliath', was kind enough to offer wise and valued suggestions.

[60] Ernst Windisch, *Irische Texte mit Wörterbuch* I (Leipzig, 1880), p. 695. *s.v. mor.*

[61] Cf. Patrick S. Dineen, *An Irish-English Dictionary* (Dublin, 1927), *s.v. mor.*

[62] Lenition is the term used to describe a mutation of consonants which normally originated in a reduction of the energy employed in their articulation. It affected medial and those initial consonants as were closely associated with the preceding word. Rudolf Thurneysen, *A Grammar of Old Irish*, tr. Binchy and Bergin (Dublin, 1946), p. 74, #118.

Thus the initial *g* of Goliath, when lenited, would be continued to be written *g* and might conceivably be written *h* by continental scribes, but not by Irish scribes who, on rare occasions, however, might omit the *g*. In the hands of continental writers, the sound might be transcribed as *h* (so perhaps by the Old French authors of the romance) or elided altogether (as perhaps by the Middle German authors).

In the Biblical account of the David-Goliath encounter, the form *Goliath* is invariable. The only exception in the Bible is the form *Goliae,* the genitive singular, and that apart from the story of the duel.[64] The invariable form continues in Latin writings of the Middle Ages and in Latin Biblical accounts. Very early, however, the declension of Goliath was modelled on the first declension, masculine nouns of the Greek type *Archias, ae,* no doubt influenced too by such forms as Tobias, Elias, Zacharias etc.[65] Thus in Latin, alongside the Biblical invariable Goliath there is the remodelled nominative singular Golias with its case endings.

The earliest forms of Goliath recorded in Old Irish are derived from the inflected Latin form *Golias.* Apparently the form was comprised among the first and earlier group of Latin loanwords and was assimilated, because of its suffix, to the Irish masculine *io* stems, such as *cá(i)se*: *caseum, fíne*: *vineam* etc.[66] So are recorded in the nominative singular *Gola;*[67] genitive singular *Golai,*[68] *Góli* with variants *golae, gole, góillae, góile,*[69] *Gólai,*[70] *Gōlai;*[71] accusative singular *Gōlaii, Gōla;*[72] later *Golías* with variants *Golyas, Galías.*[73] *Mor*, then, in conjunction with what might be called the vernacular forms of Goliath, might be found as *mór-gól(a)e,* exceptionally by an Irish scribe and possibly by a non-Celtic transcriber as *mór-ól(a)e.*

If *mor* were to be compounded with the Latin and Biblical invariable form Goliath, then, in addition to the lenition of initial *g*, final *lth* would be delenited to *lt.*[74] In Irish, every word, simple or compound, moreover, that still had more than two syllables either after the loss of final vowels or when taken into the language, underwent syncope. According to that rule, normally the vowel of the second syllable was elided; *sam(a)il,* Latin *similem,* but *cosmil,* from **cossamil,* Latin *consimilem; apstal,* Latin *apostolum.*[75] Accordingly in the hypothetical *mór-Goliath,* the *o* should elide. There are, however, some exceptions due to levelling and other adjustments, so that exceptionally syncope might strike or affect the third syllable, that is the *-ia-* of Goliath.[76]

Granted all the foregoing reservations, the Morholt might conceivably be derived from the Irish *mor-Goliath*. Granted the transcription of the sound of lenited initial *g* as *h* by a non-Celtic scribe or author, granted exceptional syncope of the third syllable of the compound,[77] the delenition of final *lth*, granted above all that the original composer of the tale had the wit and genius to transfer to the Duke of Ireland, the adversary of Tristan, not only the physique, role and fate of Goliath, but also to attach to him the very name with the prefixed epithet of 'great', then it is possible that the Old French redactors of the Tristan story might have transcribed that name into the *hapax lagomenon* of *le Morholt*: the great Goliath.

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[63] *Ibid.*, p. 76, #122.

[64] *Eccles.* xlvii, 5.

[65] St. Philastrius of Brescia, (d. ca. 387) for instance, uses the invariable form for the accusative (*Liber de haeresibus;* PL 12, 1225). St. Augustine uses exclusively the flectional forms: nom. Golias, gen. Goliae, acc. Goliam, abl. Golia (*In Psalmum CXLIII;* PL 38, 196-7) as does St. Maximus of Turin (d. 466/70) (PL 57, 450, 481-2). Rhabanus Maurus (ca. 776-856) continues the practice but uses Goliath as well for the nom. sing. (PL 109, 52, 58, 111).

[66] Cf. Kenneth Jackson, *Language and History in Early Britain* (Edinburgh, 1953), chap. iv: 'The British Latin Loanwords in Irish', pp. 122-48, especially 128-29, and R. Thurneysen, *op. cit.*, p. 568, #916.

[67] Cf. Eleanor Knott, 'The Proper Names in *Saltair na Rann*', *Eriu,* XVI (1952), 112.

[68] *Ibid.*

[69] *The Martyrology of Oengus the Culdee,* Epilogue 484, ed. Whitley Stokes (Henry Bradshaw Society, XXIX, London, 1905), p. 285.

[70] *Colman's Hymn,* 30, ed. Stokes and Strachan, *Thesaurus Palaeohibernicus* II (Cambridge, 1903), p. 303, and Eleanor Knott, *loc. cit.*

[71] 'Mitteilungen aus irischen Handschriften', ed. Kuno Meyer, *Zeitschrift für celtische Philologie*, XIII (1911), 176, line 7.

[72] 'Mitteilungen aus . . .', 176, line 1; 175, line 35. Cf. also *Contributions to a Dictionary of the Irish Language*, fasc. G, arranged by Mary E. Byrnes (Dublin, 1955), *s.v.*

[73] *An Irish Version of Innocent III's De Contemptu mundi*, 2035, ed. James A. Geary (Washington, 1931), p. 99.

[74] R. Thurneysen, *A Grammar of Old Irish*, p. 88, #139.

[75] *Ibid.*, p. 67, #106.

[76] *Ibid.*, p. 69, #109.

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V. The Quotations of Aristotle's *Politics* in St. Thomas' *Lectura Super Matthaeum*

TWO recent discoveries have done much towards removing the obscurities which from olden times surrounded St. Thomas' *Lectura super Matthaeum*. Father R. Guindon O.M.I.,[1] succeeded in identifying two large interpolations in our traditional text, viz., the commentaries on *Mth*. v, 11-vi, 8 and on *Mth*. vi, 14-19 (ed. Taurin., 1951, nn. 444-582; 603-610). In these places the Vulgate text is not St. Thomas' but is rather by Peter of Scala O.P., a thirteenth-century scholastic writer. These interpolations were inserted into the text by Bartholomew of Spina O.P., who in 1527 established the first printed edition of this work of Aquinas. Spina's edition was re-printed in the ed. Romana, 1570/1, and so became the source of all subsequent editions up to our own day. The manuscript from which Spina drew his text presented lacunae at the places indicated above, and the editor, obsessed by that curious *horror vacui* which is a not uncommon preoccupation of early Thomistic editors, without any warning, filled these blank spaces with Scala's slightly re-arranged, but badly adapted texts. He was criticized for this procedure by one of his disciples, Hieronymus Vielmius, the author of *De D. Thomae Aquinatis doctrinis et scriptis*, a book which appeared in Padua, in 1564, and thereafter had several re-editions. Unfortunately Vielmius did not indicate the exact extent of the interpolations and when, in 1719, the famous Jacques Echard after a hasty examination of the documents (this is his own admission) failed to find in the *Lectura* any traces of Scala,[2] Vielmius' warnings were discredited in Thomistic bibliography, at least, if I may say so, its "orthodox" branch.[3] Echard himself, it is true, was too conscientious and competent a critic to deny to Vielmius any possibility of truth; he explicitly urged other scholars, with more time at their disposal, to investigate the matter more thoroughly. But the bolder Bernard de Rubeis whose *Dissertationes* were given the scarcely deserved honour of introducing St. Thomas' writings to the readers of the Leonine edition,[4] roundly and categorically pronounced Vielmius to have suffered from "hallucinations". It is a sad reflection on the critical quality of Thomistic studies that about four hundred years had to pass by before a scholar decided to subject the facts of Vielmius' story to a thorough examination. Fr. Guindon found them to be true. Spina's manuscript source is preserved to-day in three Italian manuscripts, viz., Vat. *Urb. lat.* 25, Florence, Laur. Fiesole 98, and Florence, Laur. Santa Croce *Plut.* 28, *dext.* 7. These manuscripts do indeed omit the commentary on the above indicated verses of St. Matthew's Gospel. On the other hand, Scala's commentary, preserved for instance in Paris, Bibl. Nat. *lat.* 15594, makes Spina's pious fraud evident beyond any doubt.

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[77] It might be observed that the suppression of *-ia-* of the suffix *-iath* might be due to the disappearance or suppression of case endings on the analogy of that of Latin endings and corresponding final syllables of native words, rather than to syncope, provided that the invariable suffix be regarded as a nominal suffix. *Goliath* may have belonged to a second and later group of Latin loanwords in which all Latin endings were lost, including those with *i*: *Pádraig*: *Patricium; purgadóir*: *purgatorium*. Cf. the Cothriche and Padraig group of loanwords discussed by Jackson, *op. cit.*, p. 129 ff. It is true there is no trace of such a phenomenon in the Biblical names cited by Jackson, pp. 307, 308, 323, 415, 418, 427, 618.

[1] "'*La Lectura super Matthaeum incompleta*' de saint Thomas," *Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa*, XXV (1955), 213-219.

[2] *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum* I (Paris, 1719), p. 325.

[3] An "unorthodox" branch, whose names are found in B. de Rubeis, p. xcvi (see following note), took Vielmius' statement to mean that the whole *Lect. sup. Mth.* was Scala's work.

[4] *De gestis et scriptis ac doctrina s. Thomas Aquinatis dissertationes criticae et apologeticae* (Venice, 1750). Edited in *Opera Omnia*, ed. Leonina I (Rome, 1882), pp. xlv-cccxlvi.

The second discovery was made by Father H.-V. Shooner O.P., member of the Leonine Commission, Canadian Section.[5] In the Universitätsbibliothek of Basel he found a fourth manuscript of the *Lectura* (B. V. 12). This manuscript was listed as an anonymous commentary on St. Matthew; its identity had remained unknown since the text begins only with the commentary on *Mth.* i, 22: *Hoc autem totum factum est* (ed. Taurin., n. 139).[6] Now this copy of Basel contains the two authentic passages lacking in the other manuscripts and in our printed edition. We now have therefore the full text of St. Thomas' *Lectura in Matthaeum.* This new manuscript terminates at the end of ch. xii, corresponding to n. 1076 (ed. Taurin). It reserved to its first modern student another surprise. Its text is identical with the printed text, from the commentary on *Mth.* i, 22, to v, 10. Then comes the part v, 11, to vi, 8, unknown to the Italian manuscripts. At vi, 9, however, there starts a text noticeably different from the Vulgate. To have determined the nature of this difference, though briefly and with but a few examples, is one of the most interesting points in Fr. Shooner's study. There can be no doubt about the authenticity of either text, the old and the new one, but it is the authenticity of two *Reportationes,* two sets of notes taken by two students from the same series of lectures of the same Master. They follow these lectures point by point in the same sequence, they present the same doctrine, the same authorities, in short, the same textual details, but they use different words and shape their phrases differently.

With this discovery one fact related in certain ancient documents is shown to be true by direct evidence. The Catalogue of Nicolas Trivet as well as the two lists of Prague[7] affirm that the *Lectura super Matthaeum* was written down partly by Petrus de Andria O.P., partly by a secular Master from Paris. The two Florentine manuscripts name *Magister Leodegarius Bissuntinus* (Leodegar of Besançon) as the reporter. It is therefore probable indeed that in the Basel *Ms* we have either a part or the whole of Peter de Andria's transcript. Many problems, of course, remain to be solved by the future editor of the *Lectura*: the problem of the identity of the first part in both versions, their true relation one to the other, the details of their history, etc. But the student of St. Thomas is now fully justified in using the text of Basel as well as the Vulgate (except the interpolations) as an authentic Thomistic *Reportatio.*

In the following note it is my purpose to point to the five quotations of the *Politics* of Aristotle, found in this *Lectura,* and to discuss, on this basis, the chronology of this work.

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In the left column, below, the reader will find the traditional, printed texts, in the right column those of the Basel *Ms.* I am indebted to the Leonine Commission, Section Ottawa, for kindly letting me use their microfilm of this manuscript. Four of the following quotations from the Aristotelian *Politics*, viz., those found *In Mth. viii, 9; x, 9; xi, 16; xii, 25,* were known to me in their traditional version; I pointed them out several years ago.[8] The first quotation (*In Mth. v, 21*) was brought to my attention by Fr. Shooner. When I saw it, it looked familiar to me. It is indeed identical with a text from the *Collationes de decem praeceptis*. The reading of the Basel *Ms* made it evident at once that not only the small passage containing the Aristotelian quotation but a much longer development in the same *Opusculum* corresponds most exactly to Peter de Andria's transcript of the *Lectura* of St. Thomas. The whole passage in the *Collatio de quinto praecepto*,[9] ed. Taurin., 1954, nn. 1259 (*Circa quod praeceptum . . .*) 1260, 1261 (. . . *sicut dicitur de Samsone.*) is in all relevant details the same as the passage *Ms* Basel B.V. 12, fol. 36^{rb} (*Notandum quod in isto praecepto . . .*) and fol. 36^{va} (. . . *et ita excusat Samsonem.*). I am not prepared at the moment to see in this parallelism anything but a confirmation of Fr. Shooner's hypothesis according to which the *Reportatio* of Basel is due to Peter de Andria; for it is this same Peter whom tradition credits with the *Reportatio* of those *Collationes* which are said to have been, originally, Aquinas' sermons, preached in the vernacular, in Lent 1273, to the students and the people in Naples. I am aware that (at least) the passage of these *Collationes* to which I referred above is not part of the Neapolitan Lenten-Cycle. But the history of St. Thomas' *Opuscula* collections, and the part which their posthumous first editors played in their constitution, are other problems.

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[5] "La *Lectura in Matthaeum* de s. Thomas," *Angelicum,* XXXIII (1956), 121-142.

[6] The identity of the text in *Ms* Basel B. V. 12 was also, and independently, recognized by F. Stegmüller, *Repertorium biblicum medii aevi* V (Madrid, 1955), n. 8084.

[7] See these documents in Grabmann, *Die Werke des hl. Thomas v. A.,* (3rd ed., Münster, 1949), p. 263 f.

(a) *In Mth. v, 21.*

(Circa quod praeceptum tripliciter est erratum. Quidam enim dixerunt quod non licet occidere etiam bruta animalia. Sed hoc falsum est, quia non est peccatum uti illis quae sunt subdita hominis potestati. Est etiam naturalis ordo quod plantae sint in nutrimentum animalium, et quaedam animalia in nutrimentum aliorum, et omnia in nutrimentum hominis: *Gen.* ix, 9: *Quasi olera virentia tradidi vobis omnia.* Philosophus etiam dicit in *Politica* quod venatio est sicut iustum bellum. *Collatio prima de quinto praecepto,* l.c.)

Notandum quod in isto praecepto fuit triplex error; quia quidam dixerunt quod non licebat occidere etiam minuta animalia. Sed hoc falsum est, quia non est peccatum uti illis quae subdita sunt hominis potestati. Est etiam naturalis ordo, quod plantae sint in nutrimento animalium, et quaedam animalia in nutrimento aliorum; et omnia sunt hominis nutrimentum: *Gen.* ix: *Quasi olera virentia.* Et Philosophus etiam in *Politicis* dicit quod venatio est sicut iustum bellum (fol. 36^{rb}-36^{va}).[10]

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[8] *St. Thomas Aquinas. On Kingship* (Toronto, 1949), p. xxix, n. 72. Cf. also "A Catalogue of St. Thomas' Works", in Etienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas* (New York, 1956, p. 398.

[9] On this chapter-heading see J. Destrez, *Bulletin thomiste*, I (1926), 66.

[10] The text continues as follows: Secundo est error quorundam qui dixerunt: *Nolite occidere*: hominem scilicet. Unde dicunt homicidas omnes iudices saeculares qui condemnant secundum leges aliquas. Contra quos Augustinus dicit quod Deus non abstulit sibi potestatem occidendi. Unde: *Ego occidam et ego vivere* etc. Ergo licitum est illis quod mandato Dei occidant, quia tunc Deus facit. Omnis autem lex mandatum Dei est: *Proverb.* viii: *Per me reges regnant. Rom.* xiii: *Non enim <sine causa gladium portat>. Sum agricola* (I do not understand the significance of these two words. The corrector of the manuscript who here interfered with the text originally written by the scribe—*non est sine* (*sive*) *agricola*—apparently wants us to remember *Zach.* xiii, 5: *Non sum propheta, homo agricola ego sum.* But I fail to see what this quotation would mean in the context.) Ergo intelligendum: *Non occides* auctoritate propria. Tertius error est quia aliqui crediderunt: *Non occides*: alium; sed licitum est occidere seipsum, quia invenitur hoc de Samsone, et etiam Catone, et de quibusdam virginibus quae iniecerunt se in flammam, secundum quod recitat Augustinus. Sed respondet Augustinus quod, qui se occidit, hominem occidit. Quia alium non debet occidere nisi auctoritate Dei, nec seipsum, nisi a voluntate Dei vel instinctu Spiritus Sancti. Et ita excusat Samsonem. Cf. the corresponding passage in *De praeceptis . . . l.c.*

(b) *In Mth. viii, 9.*

Et servo meo: Fac hoc, et facit. Unde vult arguere a minori: quia si ego qui sum in potestate constitutus hoc possum, quanto magis Dominus dominantium potest etc.	*Et homo sum etc.* Quasi dicat: si sermo meus tantum valet ut tantum subiecti mihi obediant ad nutum, multo magis obedient tibi qui es Dominus dominantium nullum habens superiorem.
Sed videndum quod rationales creaturae sunt liberae et sunt sicut milites: *Job* xxv, 3: *Numquid est numerus militum eius*? Et ideo dicitur Dominus exercituum.	Et sicut in isto invenitur duplex praelatio, scilicet militis et servi, ita in dominio Dei et Christi, quia rationalis creatura quasi subiecta comparatur militibus: *Job* xxv: *numquid est numerus*. Et ideo secundum hoc dicitur Dominus exercituum, quia isti sunt liberi arbitrii.
Sed creatura irrationalis habet subiectionem servilem, quia non habet liberi arbitrii facultatem. Vult ergo dicere: quia tibi natura obedit, dic naturae et obediet tibi, quia sermo tuus iudicio plenus est.	Sed creatura irrationalis habet subiectionem, secundum quod non habet liberum arbitrium. Vult ergo dicere: Dicas angelis et obedient, et natura similiter, quia sermo tuus potestate plenus est.
Videndum est quod istud duplex dominium invenitur in anima. Anima enim praesidet corpori, ratio vero irascibili et concupiscibili. Prima est dominativa potestas, quia ad imperium animae movetur corpus. Secunda praeest aliis quadam imperativa potestate et dominativa vel regali: unde habent aliquid de motu suo. Et haec sunt quasi milites: *Jacob.* iv, 1: *Unde bella et lites in vobis? Nonne ex concupiscentiis quae militant adversus animam?* (*Super Mth.* 8, 700-701).	Et secundum Philosophum in homine etiam invenitur duplex praelatio, quia anima praesidet corpori et ratio irascibili et concupiscibili, aliter tamen et aliter: quia anima est dominativa corporis quia habet se ad illud sicut dominus ad servum, cum non habeat liberum arbitrium. Sed ratio habet dominium regale ad concupiscibilem, quia habet aliquid de motu suo. Et ideo motus irascibilis et concupiscibilis sunt quasi milites: *Jacob.* iv: *Unde bella et lites.* (fol. 74^{vb}-75^{ra}).

(c) *In Mth. x, 9.*

Et quia quaedam sunt ad necessitatem, alia quibus emuntur necessaria: et hoc est quod dicitur quod quaedam sunt divitiae artificiales, ut vestes et calceamenta. Ideo utrumque prohibet. Dicit ergo: *Nolite* etc. (*Super Mth.* 10, 822).	Dominus duo prohibet in communi secundum quod duplex est genus divitiarum: quoddam quod pertinet ad necessaria vitae, quas Philosophus vocat divitias naturales; aliae quibus emuntur necessaria quas vocat artificiales. Dominus ergo primo prohibet divitias artificiales. Unde: *Nolite* (fol. 90^{ra}).

(d) *In Mth. xi, 16.*

Item notandum quod homo naturaliter sociale est, et hoc quia naturaliter unus alio indiget; unde delectatur in convictu. Unde Philosophus, primo *Poli-*	Item sciendum quod homo est animal sociale, et ideo delectatur vivere in convictu; et si aliquis non est socialis, hoc est quod delectatur vel in meliore

ticorum: Omnis homo qui solitarius est, aut est melior homine, et est deus; aut peior homine, et est bestia. Unde dicitur: *Sedentibus in foro* (*Super Mth.* 11, 931).

societate, scilicet cum Deo, vel quod homo est feralis. Et ideo dicit Philosophus quod homo solitarius aut est bestia aut deus. Et ideo dicit: *Sedentibus in foro* (fol. 90^{ra}).

(e) *In Mth. xii, 25.*

Triplex est communitas: domus sive familiae, civitatis et regni. Domus est communitas consistens ex his per quos fiunt communes actus: ideo consistit ex triplici coniugatione: ex patre et filio, ex marito et uxore, ex domino et servo. Communitas civitatis omnia continet quae ad vitam hominis sunt necessaria: unde est perfecta communitas quantum ad mere necessaria. Tertia communitas est regni, quae est communitas consummationis. Ubi enim esset timor hostium, non posset per se una civitas subsistere: ideo propter timorem hostium necessaria est communitas civitatum plurium, quae faciunt unum regnum. Unde sicut vita in quolibet homine, ita pax in regno. Et sicut sanitas nihil est nisi temperantia humorum, sic pax est cum unumquodque retinet ordinem suum. Et sicut recedente sanitate tendit homo ad interitum, sic de pace: si a regno descendit <*lege* recedit> tendit ad interitum. Unde ultimum quod attenditur est pax. Unde Philosophus:[11] sicut medicus ad sanitatem, sic defensor reipublicae ad pacem. Ideo dicit: *Omne regnum in se divisum desolabitur.* (*Super Mth.* 12, 1011).

Triplex secundum Philosophum est communitas, scilicet domus sive familiae, civitatis et regni. Prima consistit ex his quae sunt necessaria ad naturales actus: unde constat ex triplici coniugatione, scilicet ex uxore et viro, patre et filio, domino et servo. Communitas autem civitatis est per se perfecta, quia ibi requiruntur omnia quae sunt necessaria non solum ad naturales actus, sed etiam ad vitam. Tertia communitas habet sufficientiam et perfectionem non solum <quantum> ad ea quae sunt necessaria ad vitam, sed quantum <ad> ea quae sunt necessaria ad compugnationem hostium. Sicut enim vita est in corpore naturali, ita pax est in communitate, quia sicut sanitas animalis nihil aliud est nisi quaedam temperies humorum ordinata, ita pax nihil aliud est quam tranquillitas ordinis. Et sicut recedente sanitate corpus animalis ad interitum tendit, ita recedente pace civitas sive regnum sive domus tendit ad nihilum. Et ideo ultimus finis est pax; et propterea dicit Philosophus[11] quod sicut medicus non debet consiliari de sanitate vel sanando infirmo, ita nec rector civitatis sive regni vel <*lege de*> conservanda vel facienda pace. Recte ergo dicit Dominus: *Omne regnum.*

A comparison of the above texts will easily show that Peter's transcript, at least in these places, is superior to that of his classmate. In texts (b) and (c) Leodegar neglects to mention the fact that the Master was quoting Aristotle, and his *dicitur* in the latter text is clumsy indeed. Moreover the quotation itself is here incomplete; the *divitiae naturales* apparently escaped the student's attention (I am arguing on the basis of the printed text). In text (b) the point of the Aristotelian doctrine is not clearly set forth; the phrase: *Secunda praeest aliis quadam imperative potestate et dominativa*[12] *vel regali* is confusing. In regard to text (e) let the reader first of all note the very summary treatment

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[11] *Eth. Nicom.* III, 5: 1112b 12-14. St. Thomas says in his commentary: . . . medicus non consiliatur an debeat sanare infirmum, sed hoc supponit quasi finem. Nec rhetoricus consiliatur si debeat persuadere, sed hoc intendit quasi finem. Nec etiam politicus, idest rector civitatis, consiliatur an debeat facere pacem, quae se habet ad civitatem sicut sanitas ad corpus hominis, quae consistit in convenientia humorum, ut pax in convenientia voluntatum. (n. 474).

[12] This word should be *politica* instead of *dominativa.*

of the second quotation from Aristotle's *Ethics,* an abridgment which no doubt is Leodegar's own. Concerning the quotation from the *Politics,* I suspect the Parisian Master to have interpreted rather than reported Aquinas' teaching. With the division of three communities, viz., *domus, civitas, regnum,* St. Thomas was trying to express mediaeval realities in terms of the Aristotelian Politics,[13] a delicate task indeed, one in which Aquinas usually proceeds with caution.[14] It seems to me that Leodegar's *perfecta communitas quantum ad mere necessaria* goes considerably beyond Peter's *communitas . . . per se perfecta . . . ad vitam* which, after all, is a faithful expression of Aristotle's famous definition of the city-state. The quasi technical and, at any rate, very heavy term: *communitas consummationis,* designating a community to be placed over and above the *communitas perfecta,* will not fail to sound strange to the ears of a reader of St. Thomas. A certain tendency to interpret and embellish the Master's words may be at the bottom of all this, and it will perhaps be useful to keep this in mind for further readings of Leodegar's report.

The Aristotelian texts used by St. Thomas are the following: The references are to both the ed. Berolin. and William of Moerbeka's translation,[15] ed. Susemihl (Leipzig, 1872).

(a) Propter quod et bellica natura acquisitiva aliqualiter erit (praedativa enim pars ipsius), qua oportet uti et ad bestias et ad homines quicumque nati subici non volunt, tamquam natura iustum sit hoc praedativum bellum et primum (*Pol.* I, 8: 1256b 23-26; p. 32, 9-33, 2). This same text is used also in *Exp. in Ep. I ad Tit.* 4, lect. 1; *Summa* I, 96, 1; II-II, 64, 1; *De duobus praeceptis, l.c.*

(b) Est equidem . . . primum in animali contemplari et despoticum principatum et politicum; anima quidem enim corpori dominatur despotico principatu, intellectus autem appetitui politico et regali (*Pol.* I, 5: 1254b 2-6; p. 18, 10-13). Parallel texts: *Summa* I, 81, 3; I-II, 9, 2; *ibid.,* 17, 2; *ibid.,* 58, 2; *ibid.,* 74, 2; *Q. D. de malo* 3, 9; *Q. D. de virt.* 4, c; *ibid.,* ad 11; *Exp. in Eth.* 10, 10 (2082).

(c) Una . . . species possessivae secundum naturam oeconomicae pars est . . . quorum est thesaurizatio rerum ad vitam necessariarum et utilium in communitate civitatis aut domus . . . Est autem genus aliud possessivae, quam maxime vocant . . . pecuniativam . . . Est autem haec quidem natura, haec autem . . . per experientiam quandam et artem fit magis (*Pol.* I, 8: 1256b 26-30; *ibid.* 9:

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[13] Gierke characterized this attempt which was made by not a few mediaeval scholastics thus: When Aristotle's Politics had begun their new life (in Latin scholasticism), the current definition taught that the State is the highest and completest of Communities . . . It is evident that, so soon as men are taking this definition in earnest, only some one among the various subordinated Communities can be regarded as being the State. . . The *polis* or *civitas* that the ancients had defined was discovered by medieval Philosophy in a medieval town, and, by virtue of the ideal of the organic structure of the whole Human Race, the Community of this *polis* or *civitas* was subordinated to a *regnum* and to the *imperium:* that is, to higher and wider communities in which it found its completion and its limitations. Thus, no sooner has the medieval thinker given his definition, than he is withdrawing it without the slightest embarrassment: his superlative becomes a comparative, and the absolute attribute becomes relative. *Political Theories of the Middle Ages,* transl. Maitland (Cambridge, 1913), p. 96. See following note.

[14] St. Thomas tends to see in *civitas* and *regnum* not two specifically different communities, each having its own nature, to be defined by its proper end, but one and the same "perfect community". In other words, Aquinas transformed the univocal Aristotelian notion of *communitas perfecta* into an analogical one. Both *civitas* and *regnum* may therefore be subsumed under the one notion of perfect community; they are but historically different realizations of this idea. See Eschmann, *Thomas Aquinas. On Kingship* (Toronto, 1949), p. 9, n. 21. It is worthy of note that the text of *De Regno* I, 1 (*sed adhuc magis in provincia una. . .*) closely resembles Leodegar's version of the *Lectura.*

[15] The question may be asked whether St. Thomas' Aristotelian text in these lectures was not the *Politica transl. vetus* (*Aristoteles latinus,* pp. 74, 163). I have no means of investigating this question. The word *feralis* in text (d) may be worth a closer examination in the manuscripts of the older version. It never occurs in the parallel texts. St. Albert says in his commentary (ed. Borgnet VIII, p. 13): Et talis est transcorporatus in *ferinam* bestiam lupi vel leonis, ut dicit Plato.

1256a 5; p. 33, 2-34, 11). Parallel texts: *Exp. in I ad Tit.* 3, lect. 2; *Exp. in Job* 27, 1; *Summa* I-II, 2, 1; II-II, 117, 2; *ibid.*, 188, 7.

(d) Qui incivilis propter naturam et non propter fortunam, aut pravus est aut melior quam homo . . . Non potens autem communicare aut nullo indigens propter per se sufficientiam, nulla pars est civitatis, quare aut bestia aut deus (*Pol.* I, 2: 1253a 3-4, 27-29; p. 7, 7-8; p. 10, 3-5). Parallel texts: *Summa* II-II, 188, 8; III, 40, 1.

(e) In omnem quidem igitur diem constituta communitas secundum naturam domus est . . . Quae autem ex pluribus vicis communitas perfecta civitas iam, omnis habens terminum per se sufficientiae (*Pol.* I, 2: 1252b 12-14; 27-29; p. 5, 3-4; 6, 9-10). Parallel texts: *Exp. Ad Hebr.* 11, lect. 3; *Exp. in Joan.* 14, lect. 1; *De Regno* 1, 1 (ed. Perrier 7); *Summa* I-II, 90, 2; *ibid.*, 90, 3; *ibid.*, 105, 4.

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The chronological problem of the *Lectura super Matthaeum* was discussed, in 1928, by Pierre Mandonnet.[16] The cornerstone of Mandonnet's theory was the statement, regarding this work, made by Bartholomew of Capua in his Catalogue, the so-called "Official Catalogue". This statement which is transmitted to us in a corrupted form in the only manuscript source we possess (Paris, Bibl. Nat. *lat.* 3112), was reconstructed by Mandonnet as follows: *Lecturam super Matthaeum <reportavit> idem frater Petrus quondam scolaris parisiensis.* Hence his conclusion: *La reportation est dite par l'Officiel avoir été faite à Paris. Le témoignage est formel.*[17] The only remaining question was which of the two Parisian sojourns of St. Thomas should be selected for the *Lectura*. Mandonnet answered this question with his well known general theory of the chronology of Aquinas' Scripture writings, a theory based on the Master's lecturing routine. During his second stay in Paris St. Thomas lectured on St. John. Therefore, since these lectures "must have taken" all the time at the professor's disposition, St. Matthew "must have been" the object of St. Thomas' lectures in Paris during the years 1256 to 1259: *C'est alors qu'il a dû entreprendre l'exposition sur saint Matthieu.*[18]

P. Synave proved convincingly, in the same year 1928,[19] that Mandonnet's reading of Bartholomew's statement was inadmissible. The reading he proposed and which was obtained by a subtle critical method was this: *Lecturam super Matthaeum partim idem frater Petrus <reportavit>, partim quidam saecularis Parisiensis.* If so Mandonnet's *témoignage formel* was no longer valid, yet the opinion of the Parisian origin continued to prevail. P. Synave[20] founded it mainly on the fact that the *Lectura in Matthaeum*, in ch. 26, contains an allusion to the various French dialects as an example illustrating *Mth.* xxvi, 73; *Thy speech betrayeth thee.*

> . . . constat quod omnes Iudaei erant: quomodo ergo dicit: Nam et loquela tua manifestum te facit? Solvit Hieronymus, quod in eadem lingua saepe diversa locutio fit, sicut patet in Francia et Picardia et Burgundia, et tamen una loquela est (*Super Mth.* 26, 2296).

Concerning the precise time when St. Thomas held these lectures Synave agrees with Mandonnet's opinion and reason.[21]

This chronology is admitted to-day by the vast majority of critics, especially after it has been endorsed by P. Glorieux in a comprehensive and very competent study of the chronology of St. Thomas' Scripture writings.[22]

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[16] "Chronologie des écrits scripturaires de s. Thomas d'A. II. Premier enseignement Parisien", *Revue thomiste*, XXXIII (1928), 116-134.

[17] *L.c.*, 118.

[18] *L.c.*, 119.

[19] "Le catalogue officiel des oeuvres de s. Thomas d'A.", *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire au moyen-âge*, III (1928), 25-103.

[20] *Op. cit.*, p. 39.

[21] *Bulletin thomiste* III, 125.

The texts quoted above however seem to authorize the conclusion that the *Lectura in Matthaeum* was not held in Paris, 1256-1259. And I shall also draw attention to a text from the Basel *Ms* suggesting that the reason why we place this work in Paris at all, is not perhaps as conclusive as we presumed it to be.

The first point is evidenced by the fact of the quotations from Aristotle's *Politics.* Georg von Hertling, in a study which appeared as early as 1884,[23] pointed to the fact that the works of the first Parisian period are silent about the *Politics* and that therefore St. Thomas did not know this book until roughly around 1260. No trace of such a knowledge has so far come to light in any previous Latin scholastic author. Hertling was of the opinion that the three quotations in St. Thomas' *Contra Gentiles* III (chs. 22, 79, 81) were the first ones in Latin scholastic literature. This opinion may, or may not, be correct; the chronology of several works of Aquinas which may have to be taken into account (for instance the *Exp. in Job* with an allusion to the *Politics* in ch. 27, 1) is still very obscure. At any rate it suffices for our present purpose to insist on the negative aspect of the question: Aquinas' silence in regard to the *Politics* in all the writings which pertain to the years 1256-1259. This silence is significant. Hertling had no difficulty in proving this with the *IV Scriptum super Sententias* where St. Thomas doubtlessly would have found ample occasion to use the *Politics.* The *IV Scriptum* was composed, let us say, in 1256/7. But it is possible to give an interesting example of this silence in a text which brings us close to the end of the first Parisian sojourn. This example is the *Q. D. de veritate,* q. 25, a. 4. The object of this article is: *utrum sensualitas obediat rationi.* Once St. Thomas knew the *Politics*, it became one of the most constant characteristics of his teaching to avail himself in this matter of the very expressive and didactically helpful Aristotelian distinction, applied to the soul and reason by the Stagirite himself, between *a principatus despoticus* and a *principatus politicus vel regalis.* This is Aquinas' favorite, most often used quotation of the *Politics.* It occurs no less than ten times[24] in his writings, a considerable number, in view of the fact that the *Politics* is referred to but 172 times in all of St. Thomas' works. I know of no later text in which the soul's place in the human organism is discussed without a reference to the Aristotelian distinction. Yet *De Veritate l.c.* does not know it. Without indulging in the fancies of some scholars who would present to us the week, the month and the year of the composition of *De Veritate* 25, 4, it may securely be held, I think, that this passage was written at some time towards the end of Aquinas' first three years as a Master in Paris.

P. Synave, in order to show the French colouring of the *Lectura super Matthaeum,* pointed to a text found in ch. 26, *i.e.*, the part of which we have no report of Peter de Andria. In ch. 9, however, *In Mth.* ix, 1: *Et venit in civitatem suam,* there is, in the printed version, another example to the point:

> Sed est quaestio, quare Marcus et Lucas dicant istud esse factum in Capharnaum, hic vero habetur quod in Nazareth, quae erat civitas sua. Dicendum quod quaedam erat civitas Christi ratione nativitatis: et haec erat Bethlehem; quaedam ratione educationis: et haec erat Nazareth; quaedam ratione conversationis et operationis miraculorum: et sic Capharnaum. Ideo bene dicitur: *In civitatem suam.* Unde dicitur Luc. iv, 23: *Quanta audivimus facta in Capharnaum, fac et hic in patria tua.* Augustinus aliter solvit: quia Caphar-

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[22] "Essai sur les commentaires scripturaires de s. Thomas et leur chronologie," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*, XVII (1950), 237-266.

[23] "Zur Geschichte der Aristotelischen Politik im Mittelalter," *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie*, XXXIX (1884), 446-457; reprinted in G. v. Hertling, *Historische Beiträge zur Philosophie* (Kempten, 1914).

[24] See the parallel texts quoted above.

> naum inter alias civitates Galilaeae erat magis famosa; unde erat quasi metropolis. Et sicut si aliquis esset de aliqua villa iuxta Parisios, diceretur quod esset de Parisius propter notitiam loci, sic Dominus, quia erat de finibus Capharnaum, dicebatur inde esse. Vel aliter: quia praetermittunt aliquid evangelistae; unde aliquid potest addi, quod videlicet transivit per Nazareth et venit in Capharnaum (*Super Mth.* 9, 743).

Peter's corresponding text has a surprise in store for us: it does not mention Paris!

> (fol. 79^{vb}-80ra) Sed quaeritur quia Luc. v et Marco secundo < . . . > Et dicitur quod hoc miraculum factum fuit in Capharnaum, hic quod in Nazareth; ibi enim nutritus fuit, propter quod dicitur civitas sua. Et respondeo tripliciter. Chrysostomus[25] dicit quod potest intelligi de triplici civitate, cum dicitur civitas sua, quia sua vel ratione nativitatis: et sic Bethlehem; vel ratione educationis: et sic Nazareth: Luc. ii; vel ratione conversationis et perpetrationis miraculorum: et sic Capharnaum: Luc. iv, *Quanta*. Et sic dicit Chrysostomus <*lege* Augustinus[26]> quod Capharnaum dicitur civitas sua, quia erat quasi metropolis, a qua recurrebant omnes Galilaei. De villa Nazareth erat quasi villa ei subiecta. Tua est etc.[27] Etiam Augustinus:[28] quod evangelistae frequenter < . . . >

It seems that Peter here gives us, without elaborating them, the exact notes as he took them in class. His report leaves three phrases unfinished. Does this mean that he supposes his readers to be familiar with the fact that St. Thomas' lecture may easily be completed with the *Glossa continua*? Did the Master have this Gloss which we call *Catena aurea* before his eyes as he lectured? I have not enough experience with the Basel *Ms* to venture a comprehensive judgment about the quality of each student's report. But at any rate it seems to me that the omission, in Peter's transcript, of the example of Paris and its surroundings is worthy of note: it should make us cautious in drawing a chronological conclusion from texts which may be nothing but embellishing additions of Master Leodegar, *secularis Parisiensis,* who according to Nicolas Trivet was much delighted by St. Thomas' lectures on St. Matthew.

Fr. F. Pelster S.J., whose recent death is deplored by all lovers of St. Thomas, observed, in 1923,[29] that the documentation of the *Lectura super Matthaeum* closely resembled, and probably followed, the documentation of the *Glossa continua in Matthaeum.* Its date therefore should be set at "after 1264". When Mandonnet brought forth his theory about the Parisian origin, Pelster's observation appeared to be irrelevant.[30] It may, after closer examination of the facts, turn out to be the most pertinent dating, in modern literature, of the *Lectura super Matthaeum.*

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[25] *Hom.* (30) *in Matthaeum;* PG 57, 357. Cf. *Glossa continua,* in h. l.

[26] *De consensu evangelistarum* II, 25; PL 34, 1105 f, *Glossa continua* in h. l.

[27] Reference? Or should this text be read: *Tertia responsio est?* But what would then the *etc.* mean?

[28] *De consensu evangelistarum,* l.c.; *Glossa continua,* in h. l.

[29] "Echtheitsfragen bei den exegetischen Schriften des hl. Thomas v. A. II, 2: Die Lectura in Evangelium Matthaei"; *Biblica,* IV (1923), 300-307.

[30] Grabmann supported Pelster's opinion in *Enciclopedia Italianà* XXXIII (1937), p. 1014. In *Die Werke. . .* (1949), p. 264, he agrees with the common opinion.

Abelard's Rule for Religious Women

T. P. McLAUGHLIN C. S. B.

INTRODUCTION

THIS letter, numbered VII, completes the new edition of the *Historia Calamitatum* and of the correspondence between Heloise and Abelard by J. T. Muckle C.S.B., published in *Mediaeval Studies,* XII (1950), 163-213; XV (1953), 47-94 and XVII (1955), 240-281.* It contains Abelard's reply to the request of Heloise that he compose for her religious an adaptation of the Rule of St. Benedict. In it he discusses the virtues of monastic life, recrutement, the duties of the abbess and other officers, buildings, food and clothing, prayer and study.

As will be seen from the list following of the manuscripts used, the editing of this letter has presented special problems. For a description and an evaluation of these manuscripts, the reader is referred to the above mentioned edition, especially *Mediaeval Studies,* XII (1950), 163-167 and XVII (1955), 240-241.

T....Bibl. de Troyes, *Ms* 802, fols. 59^r-88^v.
This is the only manuscript containing the complete text of this letter. While not perfect, it can be classed as a very good manuscript.
C....Paris, Bibl. Nat. *Ms nouv. acq. lat.* 1873, fols. 176^v-182^v; 190^{rv}.
E....Paris, Bibl. Nat. *Ms lat.* 2545, fols. 40^r-53^v.
These two manuscripts contain numerous and long lacunae, amounting in all to about one third of the text. The lacunae in both are generally the same except for the length of the scriptural texts quoted. All lacunae have been noted in the edition lest confirmation of the readings adopted would seem to be indicated by these manuscripts. These manuscripts have not the value of *T* though sometimes their readings have been accepted.
A....Paris, Bibl. Nat. *Ms lat.* 2923, fol. 42^{rv}.
B....Paris, Bibl. Nat. *Ms lat.* 2544, fols. 40^v-41^r.
R....Bibl. de Reims, *Ms* 872 (J. 751), fol. 157^{rv}.
H....Paris, Bibl. Nat. *Ms nouv. acq. franç.* 20001, fol. 12.
These four manuscripts contain only the introduction to this letter, that is about one page of our text.
Paris, Bibl. Nat. *Ms lat.* 13826.
Always listed as a manuscript for the letters of Heloise and Abelard, this is found upon examination to be merely a handwritten copy—perhaps seventeenth century—of this letter from the edition of d'Ambroise. It contains his text, *argumentum,* references and variants. It has no place in the manuscript tradition of the text and consequently is not mentioned in the present edition.

Due to the fact that there exists only one known manuscript for about one third of the present letter, it has been possible to confirm and even underline the accuracy of the evaluation of earlier editions made by the editor of the preceding letters (*Mediaeval Studies,* XII (1950), 168-171). Cousin states that for his edition he used the manuscripts which we have designated *A, B, E* and *T*. Now *A* and *B* contain only the introduction to the letter. *E* contains only two thirds of the text. Therefore only *T* remains for the other third. An examination of this third reveals that Cousin did not make use of *T*, even when it supplied good or better readings, but reproduced the text of d'Ambroise. In one place especially he follows d'Ambroise in giving a text that is corrupt and with him recognizes that it is so, when *T* presents a clear and intelligible reading (*infra*, p. 280, n. 26). Again (p. 290, n. 99), he has omitted, following d'Ambroise, a word which is in the text of *T*. Numerous other examples in this same third of the text support this estimate of the edition.

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* While receiving invaluable aid from Father Muckle in the preparation of the following text, it is only fair to him to acknowledge that I accept sole responsibility for the readings adopted.

It is to be noted that even d'Ambroise did not use *T* to the extent which it deserved as may be seen from the same examples. However, because of the paucity of manuscripts for this letter, I have thought it advisable to list his readings when they differ from mine, as well as a considerable number of his variants. He may have had access to other manuscripts which are at present unknown to us.

SIGLA

A,B,C,E,H,R,T,==manuscripts as above.
Amb.==Edition of d'Ambroise (1616).
G==Variants given by d'Ambroise.
CSEL==Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum
PG==Migne, Patrologia Graeca
PL==Migne, Patrologia Latina
Regula==Sancti Benedicti Regula Monasteriorum (3rd edit.,
Freiburg im Breisgau, 1935).

TEXT

VII. [Institutio seu Regula Sanctimonialium]

Petitionis tuae[1] parte jam aliqua prout potuimus absoluta,[2] superest Domino annuente[3] de illa quae restat parte tam tuis quam spiritalium tuarum filiarum desideriis complendis operam dare.

Restat quippe juxta praedictae vestrae postulationis ordinem aliquam vobis[4] institutionem quasi quamdam propositi vestri[5] regulam a nobis scribi et vobis tradi ut certius ex scripto quam ex consuetudine habeatis quid[6] vos sequi conveniat. Nos itaque partim consuetudinibus bonis, partim scripturarum testimoniis vel rationum nitentes[7] fulcimentis, haec omnia in unum conferre decrevimus ut spiritale Dei templum[8] quod estis vos his[9] decorare[10] quasi quibusdam egregiis exornare picturis valeamus et[11] ex pluribus imperfectis quoad[12] possumus[13] unum[14] opusculum consummare. In quo quidem opere Zeuxim pictorem imitantes ita facere instituimus in templo spiritali sicut ille disposuit faciendum in corporali. Hunc enim ut in Rhetorica sua Tullius meminit[15] Crotoniatae asciverunt ad quoddam templum quod religiosissime colebant excellentissimis picturis decorandum. Quod ut diligentius faceret quinque sibi virgines pulcherrimas de populo illo elegit quas sibi pingenti assistentes[16] intuens earum pulchritudinem pingendo imitaretur. Quod duabus de causis factum esse credibile est: tum videlicet quia,[17] ut praedictus meminit doctor,[18] maximam peritiam[19] in[20] depingendis mulieribus pictor ille adeptus fuerat; tum etiam quia naturaliter puellaris forma elegantior et delicatior virili compositione[21] censetur. Plures autem vrgines ab eo eligi, supra memoratus philosophus ait, quia[22] quod[23] nequaquam credidit in una se reperire posse puella membra omnia aequaliter

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[1] Cf. *Epist.* V.
[2] Cf. *Epist.* VI.
[3] annuante *H Amb.*
[4] nobis *BR Amb.*
[5] nostri *BHR Amb.*
[6] quod *B.*
[7] intentes *R*] utentes *H.*
[8] Cf. *I Cor.* iii, 16; *II Cor.* vi, 16.
[9] habens *Amb.*
[10] *add et* H.
[11] ut *H.*
[12] quod *Amb.*
[13] poterimus *H*] possimus *Amb.*
[14] nostrum *H.*
[15] Cicero, *De Inventione rhetorica* II, 1.
[16] assistens *A.*
[17] *om. H.*
[18] *add* propter *H.*
[19] *om. C.*
[20] in . . . etiam] *om. BHR.*
[21] compactione *G.*
[22] *om. EHR*] corrupt *C.*
[23] *om. Amb.*

formosa nullique umquam a natura tantam pulchritudinis gratiam[24] esse collatam ut aequalem in omnibus membris pulchritudinem haberet ut nihil ex omni parte perfectum in compositione corporum ipsa expoliret tamquam uni sic omnia commoda conferret ut non haberet quid[25] ceteris largiretur.

Sic et nos ad depingendam animae pulchritudinem et sponsae Christi describendam perfectionem in qua[26] vos[27] tamquam speculo[28] quodam[29] unius[30] spiritalis virginis semper prae oculis habitae decorem vestrum vel turpitudinem deprehendatis, proposuimus[31] ex multis sanctorum patrum documentis vel consuetudinibus monasteriorum optimis vestram instruere conversationem, singula quaeque prout memoriae occurrerint delibando[32] et quasi in unum fasciculum congregando quae vestri propositi sanctitati congruere videbo, nec solum quae de monachabus, verum etiam quae de monachis instituta sunt.[33] Quippe sicut nomine et continentiae professione nobis estis conjunctae, ita etiam[34] fere omnia nostra vobis competunt instituta. Ex his ergo, ut diximus, plurima quasi quosdam flores decerpendo quibus vestrae lilia castitatis adornemus, multo majore studio describere debemus virginem Christi quam praedictus Zeuxis depingere simulacrum idoli. Et ille quidem quinque virgines quarum speciem imitaretur sufficere credidit. Nos vero[35] pluribus patrum documentis exuberantem copiam habentes, auxilio freti divino perfectius vobis[36] opusculum relinquere non desperamus quo ad sortem vel descriptionem illarum quinque prudentium virginum pertingere valeatis quas in depingenda virgine Christi Dominus nobis in Evangelio proponit.[37] Quod ut possimus sicut volumus vestris orationibus impetremus. Valete[38] in Christo sponsae[39] Christi.

Tripertitum instructionis nostrae[40] tractatum fieri decrevimus in describenda[41] atque munienda[42] religione vestra et divini obsequii[43] celebratione disponenda[44] in quibus religionis monasticae summam arbitror consistere, ut videlicet continenter et sine proprietate vivatur,[45] silentio maxime studeatur. Quod quidem juxta Dominicam evangelicae regulae disciplinam lumbos praecingere,[46] omnibus renuntiare,[47] otiosum verbum cavere.[48]

Continentia vero castitatis illa est quam suadens Apostolus ait:[49] *Quae innupta est et virgo, cogitat quae Domini sunt, ut sit sancta corpore et spiritu.* Corpore,[50] inquit, toto, non uno membro, ut ad nullam scilicet lasciviam in factis vel in dictis ejus aliquod membrum declinet. Spiritu vero tunc sancta est quando ejus mentem nec consensus inquinat, nec superbia inflat, sicut illarum quinque fatuarum virginum quae, dum ad vendentes oleum recurrerent, extra januam remanserunt. Quibus jam clausa janua, frustra pulsantibus et clamantibus:[51] *Domine, Domine, aperi nobis,* terribiliter sponsus ipse respondet: *Amen, dico vobis, nescio vos.*

Tunc autem relictis omnibus nudum Christum nudi sequimur, sicut sancti fecerunt Apostoli, cum propter eum non solum terrenas possessiones aut carnalis propinquitatis affectiones, verum etiam proprias postponimus voluntates, ut non nostro vivamus arbitrio, sed praelati nostri regamur imperio et ei qui nobis loco Christi praesidet tamquam Christo penitus pro Christo subjiciamur.[52] Talibus enim ipsemet dicit:[53] *Qui vos audit, me audit, et qui vos spernit, ipse me spernit.* Qui[54] si etiam, quod absit, male vivat cum bene praecipiat, non est tamen ex vitio hominis sententia contemnenda Dei de quolibet ipsemet praecipit dicens:[55] *Quae dixerint vobis, servate et facite; secundum vero opera eorum nolite facere.* Hanc autem ad Deum spiritalem a saeculo conversionem ipsemet diligenter describit dicens:[56] *Nisi quis renuntiaverit omnibus quae possidet, non potest meus esse discipulus.* Et iterum:[57] *Si quis venit ad me et non odit patrem suum aut matrem et uxorem et filios et fratres et sorores, adhuc autem et animam suam, non potest meus esse discipulus.* Hoc autem est odire patrem vel[58] matrem, etc., affectiones carnalium propinquitatum nolle sequi,[59] sicut et odire animam suam est voluntatem propriam sequi nolle. Quod alibi quoque praecipit dicens:[60] *Si quis vult post me venire, abneget semetipsum et tollat crucem suam et sequatur me.* Sic enim propinquantes post eum venimus, hoc est eum maxime imitando sequimur qui ait:[61] *Non veni facere voluntatem meam,*[62] *sed ejus qui misit me*; ac si diceret cuncta per obedientiam agere.

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[24] *add* novimus *H.*
[25] quod *CE Amb.*
[26] quam *B.*
[27] nos *CE.*
[28] speculum *H.*
[29] *om. BCEHR.*
[30] unus *B.*
[31] proposuimus . . . optimis] *om. CE.*
[32] deliberando *H.*
[33] *om. Amb.*
[34] et *Amb.*
[35] *add* de *CE.*
[36] nobis *R.*
[37] Cf. *Matt.* xxv, 1.
[38] valete . . . Christi] *om. CE.*
[39] sponsa *B.*
[40] vestrae *CE Amb.*
[41] *add* commendenda vel innuenda *E.*
[42] *add* in *CE.*
[43] *add* in *CE.*
[44] A blank of two cms. follows in *T.*
[45] *add* ac *Amb.*
[46] Cf. *Luke* xii, 35.
[47] Cf. *Luke* xiv, 33.
[48] Cf. *Matt.* xii, 36. A blank of almost two cms. follows in *T.*
[49] *I Cor.* vii, 34.
[50] corpore . . . nescio vos] *om. CE.*
[51] *Matt.* xxv, 11.
[52] subjiciatur *CE.*

Quid est[63] enim abnegare[64] semetipsum nisi carnales affectiones propriamque voluntatem postponere et alieno, non suo, regendum arbitrio se committere? Et sic profecto crucem suam, non ab alio[65] suscipit, sed ipsemet tollit, *per quem*[66] scilicet *ei mundus crucifixus sit*[67] *et ipse mundo,*[68] cum spontaneo propriae professionis voto mundana sibi et terrena desideria interdicit, quod est voluntatem propriam non sequi. Quid enim carnales aliud appetunt nisi implere quod volunt? Et quae est terrena delectatio[69] nisi propriae voluntatis impletio, etiam quando id quod volumus labore maximo sive periculo agimus? Aut quid est aliud crucem ferre, id est cruciatum aliquem sustinere, nisi contra voluntatem nostram aliquid fieri quantumcumque illud videatur facile nobis esse vel utile? Hinc alius Jesus longe inferior, in Ecclesiastico admonet dicens:[70] *Post concupiscentias tuas*[71] *non eas, et a voluntate tua avertere. Si praestes animae tuae concupiscentias ejus, faciet te in gaudium inimicis tuis.*

Cum vero ita tam rebus nostris quam nobis ipsis penitus renuntiamus, tunc vere omni proprietate abjecta vitam illam apostolicam inimus, quae omnia in commune reducit, sicut scriptum est:[72] *Multitudinis credentium erat cor unum et anima una. Nec quisquam eorum quae possidebat aliquid suum esse dicebat, sed erant illis omnia communia. Dividebatur autem singulis prout cuique opus erat.*[73] Non enim aequaliter omnes egebant et ideo non aequaliter omnibus distribuebatur, sed singulis prout opus erat. Cor unum[74] fide, quia corde creditur. Anima una quia eadem ex caritate voluntas ad invicem cum hoc unusquisque alii quod sibi vellet, nec sua magis quam aliorum commoda quaereret vel ad communem utilitatem ab omnibus omnia referrentur, nemine quae sua sunt, sed quae Jesu Christi, quaerente[75] seu affectante. Alioquin nequaquam sine proprietate viveretur, quae magis in ambitione quam in possessione consistit.

Otiosum verbum seu superfluum idem est quod multiloquium. Unde Augustinus Retractationum, libro I:

> Absit, inquit,[76] ut multiloquium deputem, quando necessaria dicuntur, quantalibet[77] sermonum multitudine ac prolixitate dicantur.

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[53] *Luke* x, 16.
[54] quid *C.*
[55] *Matt.* xxiii, 3.
[56] *Luke* xiv, 33.
[57] *Luke* xiv, 26.
[58] vel . . . etc.] *om. C* .
[59] sequi . . . nolle] *om. C.*
[60] *Luke* ix, 23.
[61] *John* vi, 38.
[62] *meam sed*] *om. T.*
[63] *om. Amb.*
[64] abneget *Amb.*
[65] illo C.] *om. E.*
[66] quam *Amb.*
[67] est *E.*
[68] *Galatians* vi, 14.
[69] dilectio *CE.*
[70] xviii, 30-31.
[71] tuas . . . concupiscentias] *om. C.*
[72] *Acts* iv, 32.
[73] *Acts* iv, 35. Cf. Augustine, *Epist.* CCXI, 5 (CSEL 57, 359; PL 33, 960).
[74] *add* in *CE.*
[75] Cf. *I Cor.* x, 24.
[76] I, preface (CSEL 36, 8; PL 32, 583).
[77] quantalibet . . . dicantur] *om. CE.*

Hinc autem per Salomonem dicitur:[78] *In multiloquio non deerit peccatum. Qui autem moderatur labia sua, prudentissimus est.* Multum ergo cavendum est in quo peccatum non deest et tanto studiosius huic morbo providendum est, quanto periculosius[79] et difficilius evitatur. Quod beatus providens[80] Benedictus:

> Omni tempore, inquit, silentium[81] debent studere[82] monachi.

Plus quippe esse[83] constat silentio studere quam silentium habere. Est enim studium vehemens applicatio animi ad aliquid gerendum. Multa vero negligenter agimus vel inviti, sed nulla studiose nisi volentes vel intenti.

Quantum vero difficile sit vel utile linguam refrenare, Apostolus Jacobus diligenter attendens ait:[84] *In multis enim offendimus omnes. Si quis in verbo non offendit, hic perfectus est vir.* Idem[85] ita:[86] *Omnis natura bestiarum et volucrum et serpentium et ceterorum domantur, et domita sunt a natura humana.* Qui simul considerans quanta sit in lingua malorum materia et omnium bonorum consumptio, supra sic et infra[87] loquitur:[88] *Lingua quidem modicum membrum quantus ignis quam magnam silvam incendit universitas iniquitatis, inquietum malum, plenum veneno mortifero.* Quid autem veneno periculosius vel cavendum amplius? Sicut ergo venenum vitam extinguit, sic loquacitas religionem penitus evertit. Unde idem superius:[89] *Si quis putat se,* inquit, *religiosum esse, non refrenans linguam suam, sed seducens cor suum, hujus vana est religio.* Hinc et in Proverbiis scriptum est:[90] *Sicut urbs patens et absque murorum ambitu, ita vir qui non potest in loquendo cohibere spiritum suum.* Hoc ille senex diligenter considerabat, qui de loquacibus fratribus ei in via sociatis, Antonio dicente:[91]

> Bonos fratres invenisti tecum, abba? Respondit: Boni sunt siquidem,[92] sed habitatio eorum non habet januam. Quicumque vult, intrat in stabulo[93] et solvit asinum.

Quasi enim ad[94] praesepe Domini anima nostra ligatur sacrae se meditationis in eo quadam ruminatione reficiens a quo quidem praesepi solvitur atque huc et illuc toto mundo per cogitationes discurrit nisi eam clausura taciturnitatis retineat. Verba[95] quippe intellectum animae immittunt ut ei quod intelligit intendat et per cogitationem haereat. Cogitatione vero Deo loquimur sicut verbis hominibus. Dumque huc verbis hominum intendimus, necesse est ut inde ducamur, nec Deo simul et hominibus intendere valemus.

Nec solum otiosa, verum etiam quae utilitatis aliquid habere videntur, vitanda sunt verba, eo quod facile a necessariis ad otiosa, ab otiosis ad noxia veniatur. *Lingua*[96] *quippe*, ut Jacobus ait,[97] *inquietum malum,* quo ceteris minor est aut subtilior membris, tanto mobilior et ceteris motu lacescentibus ipsa cum non movetur fatigatur et quies ipsa ei fit onerosa. Quae quanto in vobis[98] subtilior et ex mollitie corporis vestri[99] flexibilior, tanto mobilior et etiam[1] in verba pronior existit et omnis malitiae seminarium patet. Quod in vobis praecipue vitium Apostolus notans, omnino feminis in ecclesia loqui interdicit nec de iis etiam quae ad Deum pertinent nisi domi viros interrogare permittit. Et in iis etiam discendis vel quibuscumque[2] faciendis silentio eas praecipue subjicit Timotheo super his ita scribens:[3] *Mulier in silentio discat cum omni subjectione. Docere autem mulieri non permitto, neque dominari in virum, sed esse in silentio.*

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[78] *Prov.* x, 19.
[79] *add* est *CE.*
[80] *Regula,* 42 (Edit. Butler, p. 80).
[81] silentio *Amb.*
[82] custodire *CE.*
[83] ipse *CE.*
[84] iii, 2.
[85] iii, 7.
[86] infra *CE.*
[87] *James* iii, 5-8.
[88] loquatur *T.*
[89] *James* i, 26.
[90] xxv, 28.
[91] *Vitae patrum* V, 4, 1 (PL 73, 864).
[92] quidem *CE.*
[93] stabulum *Amb.*
[94] a *CE.*
[95] verba . . . valemus] *om. CE.*
[96] lingua . . . arguit] *om. CE.*
[97] iii, 8.
[98] nobis *Amb.*
[99] nostri *Amb.*
[1] *om. Amb.*
[2] quaecumque *T.*

Quod si laicis et conjugatis[4] feminis ita de silentio providerit, quid vobis est faciendum? Qui rursus eidem cur hoc praeceperit innuens verbosas eas et loquentes cum non oportet arguit. Huic igitur tantae pesti remedium aliquod providentes his saltem penitus locis vel temporibus linguam continua taciturnitate domemus, in oratorio scilicet, in claustro, dormitorio, refectorio, et in omni comestione et coquina, et post Completorium deinceps, hoc maxime ab omnibus observetur. Signis vero his locis vel temporibus, si necessarium est,[5] pro verbis utamur. De quibus etiam signis docendis seu addiscendis diligens habeatur cura per[6] quae, etiamsi verbis quoque opus est, ad colloquium invitetur loco congruo et ad hoc instituto. Et expletis breviter verbis illis necessariis, redeatur ad priora, vel quod opportunum est fiat.

Nec tepide corrigatur verborum aut signorum excessus, sed verborum praecipue in quibus majus imminet periculum. Cui profecto multo magnoque periculo et beatus Gregorius succurrere vehementer cupiens, VII[7] Moralium libro sic nos instruit:[8]

> Dum otiosa, inquit, verba cavere negligimus, ad noxia pervenimus. Hinc seminantur stimuli, oriuntur rixae, accenduntur faces odiorum, pax tota extinguitur cordium. Unde bene per Salomonem dicitur:[9] *Qui dimittit aquam, caput est jurgiorum.* Aquam quippe dimittere est linguam in fluxum eloquii relaxare. Quo[10] contra et in bonam partem asserit, dicens:[11] *Aqua profunda ex ore viri.* Qui ergo dimittit aquam, caput est jurgiorum quia, qui linguam non refrenat, concordiam dissipat. Unde[12] scrptum est:[13] *Qui imponit stulto silentium, iras mitigat.*

Ex quo nos manifeste admonet in hoc praecipue vitio corrigendo districtissimam adhibere censuram ne ejus vindicta ullatenus[14] differatur et per hoc maxime religio[15] periclitetur. Hinc quippe detractiones, lites, convicia et nonnumquam conspirationes et conjurationes germinantes totum religionis aedificium non[16] tam labefactant quam evertunt. Quod quidem vitium cum amputatum fuerit, non omnino fortasse pravae cogitationes extinguuntur, sed ab alienis cessabunt corruptelis. Hoc unum vitium fugere quasi religioni sufficere arbitraretur[17] abbas Macharius admonebat, sicut scriptum est his verbs:[18]

> Abbas Macharius, major in Scyti, dicebat fratribus: Post Missas ecclesias fugite, fratres. Et dixit ei unus fratrum: Pater, ubi habemus fugere amplius a solitudine ista? Et ponebat digitum suum in ore suo dicens: Istud est quod fugiendum dico. Et sic intrabat in cellam suam et claudens ostium sedebat solus.

Haec vero silentii virtus quae, ut ait Jacobus, perfectum hominem reddit[19] et de quo[20] Isaias praedixit:[21] *Cultus justitiae silentium*, tanto a sanctis patribus fervore est arrepta quod, sicut scriptum est,[22] abbas Agatho per triennium lapidem in ore suo mittebat donec taciturnitatem disceret.

Quamvis locus non salvet, multas tamen praebet opportunitates ad religionem facilius observandam et tutius muniendam et multa religionis auxilia vel impedimenta ex eo consistunt. Unde et filii prophetarum quos, ut ait Hieronymus,[23] monachos legimus in Veteri Testamento ad solitudinis secretum se transtulerunt praeter fluenta Jordanis casulas suas constituentes. Joannes quoque et discipuli ejus quos etiam propositi nostri principes habemus, et deinceps Paulus, Antonius, Marcharius et qui praecipue in nostro floruerunt proposito tumultum saeculi et plenum tentationibus mundum fugientes ad quietem solitudinis lectulum suae contemplationis contulerunt ut videlicet Deo possent sincerius vacare. Ipse quoque Dominus ad quem nullus[24] tentationis motus accessum habebat, suo nos erudiens exemplo cum aliqua vellet agere praecipua[25] secreta petebat et populares declinabat tumultus. Hinc ipse Dominus nobis quadraginta dierum abstinentia eremum consecravit, turbas in eremo refecit et ad orationis puritatem, non solum a turbis, verum etiam ab Apostolis secedebat.[26] Ipsos quoque Apostolos etiam[27] in monte seorsum instruxit atque constituit[28] et transfigurationis suae gloria solitudinem insignivit[29] et exhibitione resurrectionis suae discipulos communiter in monte laetificavit[30] et de monte in caelum ascendit[31] et cetera quaecumque magnalia in solitudinibus vel secretis operatus est locis. Qui etiam Moysi vel antiquis patribus in solitudinibus apparens et per solitudinem ad terram promissionis populum transducens ibique populo diu detento legem tradens, manna pluens, aquam de petra educens, crebris apparitionibus ipsum consolans et mirabilia operans, patenter docuit quantum ejus singularitas solitudinem pro nobis amet cui purius in ea vacare possumus.

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[3] *I Tim.* ii, 11.
[4] *add* et *T.*
[5] vel *CE.*
[6] per . . . fiat] *om. CE.*
[7] VIII *T.*
[8] VII, 37 (PL 75, 800).
[9] *Prov.* xvii, 14.
[10] Quo . . . mitigat] *om. CE.*
[11] xviii, 4.
[12] A blank of two cms. follows in *T.*
[13] *Prov.* xxvi, 10.
[14] nullatenus *CE.*
[15] religio . . . convicia et] *om. C.*
[16] ut *CE.*
[17] arbitrabatur *CE*] arbitratus *G.*
[18] *Vitae patrum* V, 4, 27 (PL 73, 868).
[19] Cf. *James* iii, 2.
[20] qua *Amb.*
[21] xxxii, 17.
[22] Cf. *Vitae patrum* V, 4, 7 (PL 73, 865).

Qui etiam libertatem mystice onagri solitudinem amantis diligenter describens et vehementer approbans ad beatum Job loquitur dicens:[32] *Quis dimisit onagrum liberum, et vincula ejus quis solvit? Cui dedi*[33] *in solitudine domum et tabernacula ejus in terra salsuginis. Contemnit multitudinem civitatis,*[34] *clamorem exactoris non audit, circumspicit*[35] *montes pascuae suae et virentia quaeque perquirit.* Ac si aperte dicat: Quis hoc fecit nisi ego? Onager quippe quem silvestrem asinum vocamus monachus est qui saecularium rerum[36] vinculis absolutus ad tranquillam vitae solitariae libertatem se contulit et saeculum fugiens in saeculo non remansit. Hinc in terra salsuginis habitat cum membra ejus per abstinentiam sicca sunt et arida. Clamorem exactoris non audit sed vocem quia ventri, non superflua, sed necessaria impendit. Quis enim tam importunus exactor et quotidianus exactor[37] quam venter? Hic clamorem, id est[38] immoderatam postulationem, habet in superfluis et delicatis cibis in quo minime est audiendus. Montes pascuae sunt illi vitae vel doctrinae sublimium patrum quas[39] legendo et meditando reficimur. Virentia quaeque dicit universa vitae caelestis et immarcessibilis scripta.

Ad quod nos praecipue beatus Hieronymus exhortans sic Heliodoro scribit monacho:[40]

> Interpretare vocabulum monachi, hoc est nomen tuum. Quid facis in turba qui solus es?

Idem et nostram a clericorum vita distinguens ad Paulum, presbyterum, scribit his verbis:[41]

> Si officium vis exercere presbyteri, si episcopatus te vel opus, vel onus forte delectat, vive in urbibus et castellis et aliorum salutem fac lucrum

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[23] *Epist.* 58 *ad Paulinum,* 5 (CSEL 54, 533; PL 22, 583).

[24] nullus . . . et cetera quaecumque] *om.* CE.

[25] praecipue *Amb.*

[26] Cf. *Matt.* iv, 2.

[27] et *Amb.*

[28] Cf. *Matt.* v, 1; *Luke* vi, 12.

[29] Cf. *Matt.* xvii, 1.

[30] Cf. *Matt.* xxviii, 16.

[31] Cf. *Acts* i, 9.

[32] xxxix, 5-8.

[33] dedit *Amb.*

[34] civis *Amb.*

[35] circumspicit . . . perquirit] *om. CE.*

[36] virorum *CE*] vitiorum *G.*

[37] *om. CE.*

[38] id est] et *C.*

[39] quibus *CE.*

[40] *Epist.* 14, 5 (CSEL 54, 52; PL 22, 350).

[41] *Epist.* 58, 5 (CSEL 54, 533; PL 22, 582).

> animae tuae. Si cupis esse quod diceris, monachus, id est solus, quid facis in urbibus quae utique non sunt solorum habitacula, sed multorum? Habet unumquodque propositum principes suos. Et ut ad nostram [vitam] veniamus, episcopi et presbyteri habeant ad exemplum Apostolos et apostolicos viros, quorum honorem possidentes, habere nitantur et meritum. Nos autem habeamus propositi nostri principes Paulos, Antonios, Hilariones, Macharium[42] et, ut ad scripturarum materiam redeam, noster princeps Elias,[43] Eliseus,[44] duces[45] prophetarum, qui habitabant in agris et solitudine[46] et faciebant sibi tabernacula praeter[47] fluenta Jordanis. De his sunt et illi filii Rechab qui vinum et siceram non bibebant, qui morabantur in tentoriis, qui Dei voce[48] per Jeremiam laudantur,[49] quod non deficiat de stirpe eorum vir stans coram Domino.

Et nos ergo, ut coram Domino stare et ejus obsequio parati magis valeamus assistere, tabernacula nobis erigamus in solitudine ne[50] lectulum nostrae quietis frequentia hominum concutiat, quietem turbet, ingerat tentationes, mentem a sancto evellat proposito. Ad quam quidem liberam vitae tranquillitatem[51] beatum Arsenium Domino dirigente omnibus in uno[52] manifestum datum est exemplum. Unde et scriptum est:[53]

> Abbas Arsenius cum adhuc esset in palatio, oravit ad Dominum dicens: Domine, dirige me ad salutem. Et venit ei vox dicens: Arseni, fuge homines et sanaberis.[54] Idem ipse: Ac discedens ad monachalem vitam, rursum oravit eumdem sermonem dicens: Domine, dirige me ad salutem. Audivitque vocem dicentem sibi: Arseni, fuge, tace, quiesce; haec enim sunt radices non peccandi.

Ille igitur hac una divini praecepti regula instructus, non solum homines fugit, sed eos etiam a se fugavit. Ad quem archiepiscopo suo cum quodam judice quadam die venientibus et aedificationis sermonem ab[55] eo requirentibus ait:[56]

> Et si dixero vobis, custodietis? Illi autem promiserunt se custodire. Et dixit eis: Ubicumque audieritis Arsenium, approximare nolite. Alia iterum vice archiepiscopus eum visitans misit primo videre si aperiret. Et mandavit ei dicens: Si venis, aperio tibi, sed si tibi aperuero, omnibus aperio, et tunc jam ultra hic non sedeo. Haec audiens archiepiscopus dixit: Si eum persecuturus vado, numquam vadam ad hominem sanctum.

Cujus etiam sanctitatem cuidam Romanae matronae visitanti dixit:[57]

> Quomodo praesumpsisti tantam navigationem assumere? Nescis quia mulier es et non debes exire quoquam? Aut ut vadas Romam et dicas aliis mulieribus: quia vidi Arsenium, et faciant mare viam mulierum venientium ad me? Illa autem dixit: Si voluerit me Deus[58] reverti Romam, non permitto aliquem venire huc; sed ora pro me et memor esto mei semper. Ille autem respondens dixit ei: Oro Deum ut deleat memoriam tui de corde meo. Quae audiens haec egressa est turbata.

Hic quoque, sicut scriptum est, a Marco abbate requisitus cur fugeret homines, respondit:[59]

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[42] Macharios *Amb.*
[43] *add* noster *Amb.*
[44] *add* nostri *Amb.*
[45] *add* et filii *CE Amb.*
[46] Cf. *IV Kings* vi, I.
[47] prope *CE.*
[48] Placed after Jeremiam *T.*
[49] Cf. *Jer.* xxxv, 19.
[50] *add* in *CE.*
[51] *add* ad *CE.*
[52] immo *T.*
[53] *Vitae patrum* V, 2, 3 (PL 73, 858).
[54] salvaberis *CE.*
[55] ab eo . . . illi autem] *om. CE.*
[56] *Vitae patrum* V, 2, 4 (PL 73, 858).
[57] *Id.* V, 2, 7 (PL 73, 859).
[58] Dominus *Amb.*
[59] *Vitae patrum* V, 17, 5 (PL 73, 973).

> Scit Deus quia diligo homines, sed cum Deo pariter et hominibus esse non possum.

In tantum vero sancti patres conversationem hominum atque notitiam abhorrebant ut nonnulli eorum, ut illos a se penitus removerent, insanos se fingerent et, quod dictu mirabile est, haereticos etiam se profiterentur. Quod,[60] si quis voluerit, legat in Vitis Patrum[61] de abbate Simone qualiter se praeparavit judici provinciae ad se venienti qui se videlicet sacco cooperiens, et tollens in manu sua panem et caseum, sedit in ingressu cellae suae et coepit manducare. Legat et de illo anachoreta qui, cum quosdam sensisset obviam sibi cum lampadibus occurrere, expolians se vestimenta sua, misit in flumen et stans nudus coepit ea lavare. Ille autem qui ministrabat ei haec[62] videns erubuit et rogavit homines dicens:[63]

> Revertimini, quia senex noster sensum perdidit. Et veniens ad eum, dixit ei: Quid hoc[64] fecisti, abba? Omnes enim qui te viderunt dixerunt quia daemonium habet senex. Ille autem respondit: Et ego hoc volebam audire.

Legat insuper[65] de abbate Moyse qui, ut a se penitus judicem provinciae removeret, surrexit ut fugeret in palude. Et occurrit ei ille judex cum suis et interrogavit eum dicens:[66]

> Dic nobis, senex, ubi est cella abbatis Moysi? Et dicit eis: Quid vultis eum inquirere? Homo fatuus est et haereticus, etc.

Quid etiam de abbate Pastore qui nec se a judice provinciae videri permisit ut sorori[67] suae supplicanti filium de carcere liberaret?[68]

Ecce potentes saeculi cum magna veneratione et devotione sanctorum praesentiam postulant et illi etiam cum summo sui dedecore eos a se penitus repellere student!

Ut autem sexus etiam vestri in hac re virtutem cognoscatis, quis digne praedicare sufficiat virginem illam quae beatissimi quoque Martini visitationem respuit ut vacaret contemplationi? Unde ad Oceanum monachum Hieronymus scribens:[69]

> In beati, inquit, Martini Vita legimus commemorasse Sulpitium quod transiens sanctus Martinus virginem quamdam moribus et castitate praecelsam, cupiens salutare, illa noluit, sed exenium[70] misit et per fenestram respiciens ait sancto viro: Ibi, pater, ora quia numquam sum a viro visitata. Quo audito gratias egit Deo sanctus Martinus quod talibus imbuta moribus castam custodierit voluntatem. Benedixit eam et abiit laetitia plenus.

Haec revera de[71] contemplationis suae lectulo surgere dedignata vel verita, pulsanti ad ostium amico parata erat dicere:[72] *Lavi pedes meos, quomodo inquinabo illos?*

O quantae sibi imputarent injuriae episcopi vel praelati hujus temporis, si hanc ab Arsenio vel ab hac virgine repulsam pertulissent! Erubescant ad ista si qui nunc in solitudine morantur monachi cum episcoporum frequentia gaudent cum eis proprias in quibus suscipiantur fabricant domos cum saeculi potentes quos turba comitatur vel ad quos confluit, non solum non fugiunt, sed adsciscunt et occasione hospitum domos multiplicantes quam quaesierunt solitudinem redigunt in civitatem.

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[60] quod quis si non noverit *CE*] quod si qui si voluerit, with first *si* deleted *T*.

[61] V, 8, 18 (PL 73, 908).

[62] *om. CE.*

[63] *Vitae patrum* VII, 12, 7 (PL 73, 1035).

[64] hic *Amb.*

[65] *add* et *Amb.*] deleted *T*.

[66] *Vitae patrum* V, 8, 10 (PL 73, 907)

[67] sorori suae supplicantes *T*] sororis suae supplicantis *Amb.*

[68] *Vitae patrum* V, 8, 13 (PL 73, 907).

[69] I am unable to locate this passage.

[70] xenium *G.*

[71] *om. CE.*

[72] *Cant.* v, 3.

Hac profecto antiqui et callidi tentatoris[73] machinatione omnia fere hujus temporis monasteria, cum prius in solitudine constituta fuissent ut homines fugerentur,[74] postea fervore religionis refrigescente, homines asciverunt et servos atque ancillas congregantes villas maximas in locis monasticis construxerunt et sic ad saeculum redierunt, immo ad se traxerunt saeculum. Qui se miseriis maximis implicantes et maximae servituti tam ecclesiasticarum quam terrenarum potestatum[75] alligantes dum otiose appeterent vivere et de alieno victitare labore, ipsum quoque monachi, hoc est solitarii, nomen pariter amiserunt et vitam. Qui etiam saepe tantis urgentur incommodis ut, dum suos et res eorum tutari laborant, proprias[76] amittant et frequenti incendio vicinarum domorum ipsa quoque monasteria cremantur. Nec sic tamen ambitio refrenatur.

Hi[77] quoque districtionem monasterii qualemcumque non ferentes ac per villas castella civitates sese dispergentes binique vel terni aut etiam singuli sine aliqua observatione regulae victitantes tanto saecularibus deteriores sunt hominibus quanto a[78] professione sua amplius apostatantur. Qui habitationum quoque suarum sicut[79] sua abutentes obedientias loca sua nominant ubi nulla regula tenetur, ubi nulli rei nisi ventri et carni obeditur, ubi cum propinquis vel familiaribus suis manentes tanto liberius agunt[80] quod volunt, quanto minus a conscientiis suis verentur. In quibus profecto impudentissimis[81] apostatis excessus illos criminales esse dubium non est qui in ceteris veniales sunt hominibus. Qualium omnino vitam non solum non[82] attingere, sed nec audire sustineatis.

Vestrae vero infirmitati tanto magis est solitudo necessaria, quanto carnalium tentationum bellis minus hic infestamur et minus ad corporalia per sensus evagamur.[83] Unde et beatus Antonius:[84]

> Qui sedet, inquit, in solitudine et quiescit, a tribus bellis eripitur, id est auditus, locutionis et visus, et contra unum habebit tantummodo pugnam, id est cordis.

Has quidem vel ceteras eremi commoditates insignis ecclesiae doctor Hieronymus diligenter attendens et ad eas Heliodorum monachum vehementer adhortans, exclamat dicens:[85]

> O eremus familiarius[86] Deo gaudens! Quid agis, frater, in saeculo, qui major es mundo?

Nunc vero quia ubi construi monasteria convenit disseruimus qualis et ipsa loci positio esse debeat ostendamus. Ipsi autem monasterii loco constituendo, sicut quoque beatus consuluit[87] Benedictus,[88] ita, si fieri potest, providendum est ut intra monasterii septa contineantur illa maxime quae monasteriis sunt necessaria, id est hortus, aqua, molendinum, pistrinum cum furno et loca quibus quotidiana sorores exerceant opera, ne foras vagandi detur occasio.

Sicut in castris saeculi, ita et in castris Domini, id est congregationibus monasticis, constituendi sunt qui praesint ceteris. Ibi quippe imponitur[89] unus, ad cujus nutum omnia gerantur, praeest omnibus. Qui etiam pro multitudine exercitus vel diversitate officiorum sua nonnullis impertiens onera quosdam sub se adhibet magistratus qui diversis hominum catervis aut officiis provideant.

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[73] hostis *CE*.
[74] fugerent *E*.
[75] potestatem *CET*.
[76] suas *CE*.
[77] hic *T*.
[78] *om.* *CE*.
[79] *add* in *C*] *add* et *E Amb*.
[80] agere *T*.
[81] impudentissimus *CET*.
[82] *om.* *CE Amb*.
[83] evadamus *CE*.
[84] *Vitae patrum* V, 2, 3 (PL 73, 858).
[85] *Epist.* 14, 10 (CSEL 54, 59; PL 22, 354).
[86] familiari *Amb*.
[87] consulit *CE*.
[88] *Regula*, 66 (Edit. Butler, p. 124).
[89] ponitur *CE*] imperator *Amb*.

Sic et in monasteriis fieri necesse est ut ibi una omnibus praesit matrona ad cujus considerationem atque arbitrium omnes reliquae omnia operentur nec[90] ulla ei in aliquo praesumat obsistere vel etiam ad aliquod ejus praeceptum murmurare. Nulla quippe hominum congregatio vel quantulacumque domus unius familia consistere potest incolumis nisi unitas in ea conservetur ut videlicet totum ejus regnum in unius personae magisterio[91] consistat. Unde et[92] archatypum ecclesiae gerens cum multos tam in longo quam in lato cubitos haberet in uno consummata est. Et in Proverbiis scriptum est:[93] *Propter peccata terrae multi principes ejus.* Unde etiam Alexandro mortuo, multiplicatis regibus, mala quoque multiplicata sunt. Et Roma pluribus communicata rectoribus concordiam tenere non potuit. Unde Lucanus in primo sic meminit:[94]

Tu causa malorum
Facta tribus dominis[95] communis,[96] Roma, nec umquam
In turbam missi feralia foedera regni.

Et post pauca:

Dum terra fretum terramque levabit
Aer et longi[97] volvent Titana labores
Noxque diem caelo totidem per signa sequetur,[98]
Nulla fides regni sociis, omnisque potestas
Impatiens consortis erit.

Tales profecto[99] illi erant discipuli sancti Frontonii abbatis quos ipse in civitate in qua natus est cum usque ad septuaginta congregasset, et magnam ibidem gratiam tam apud Deum quam apud homines adeptus esset, relicto tamen[1] monasterio civitatis cum mobilibus rebus nudos secum ad eremum traxit. Qui postmodum more Israelitici populi adversus Moysem conquerentis quod eos etiam de Aegypto, relictis ollis carnium et abundantia terrae, in solitudinem eduxisset murmurantes incassum dicebant:[2]

> Numquid sola in eremo castitas quae in urbibus non est? Cur itaque non in civitatem revertimur de qua ad tempus exivimus. An in eremum solum Deus exaudiet orantes? Quis cibo angelorum vivat? Quem pecorum et ferarum delectat fieri socium? Quanta nos habet necessitas hic morari? Cur itaque non regressi in locum in quo nati sumus benedicimus Dominum?

Hinc et Jacobus admonet Apostolus:[3] *Nolite,* inquit, *plures magistri fieri, fratres mei, scientes quoniam majus judicium sumitis.* Hinc quoque Hieronymus ad Rusticum monachum de institutione vitae scribens:[4]

> Nulla, inquit, ars absque magistro discitur. Etiam multa[5] animalia et ferarum greges ductores sequuntur suos. In apibus unam praecedentem reliquae subsequuntur. Grues unum sequuntur ordine litterato. Imperator unus, judex unus[6] provinciae. Roma, ut condita est, duos fratres simul habere reges non potuit et[7] parricidio dedicatur. In Rebeccae utero Esau et Jacob bella gesserunt. Singuli ecclesiarum episcopi, singuli archipresbyteri, singuli archidiaconi et omnis ordo ecclesiasticus suis rectoribus nititur. In nave unus gubernator. In domo unus dominus. In quamvis grandi exercitu unius

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[90] nec . . . murmurare] *om. CE.*
[91] ministerio *G.*
[92] et archa . . . scriptum est] *om. CE.*
[93] xxviii, 2.
[94] *De Bello civili* I, 84.
[95] dominus *Amb.*
[96] *om. Amb.*
[97] longe *T.*
[98] sequatur *T.*
[99] *add* et *Amb.*] deleted et *T.*
[1] *om. Amb.*
[2] *Vita Frontonii,* 2, 3, in *Vitae patrum* I (PL 73, 439).
[3] iii, 1.
[4] *Epist.* 125, 15 (CSEL 54, 133; PL 22, 1080).
[5] muta *Amb.*
[6] unius *CET.*
[7] et parricidio . . . spectatur] *om. CE.*

> signum spectatur. Per haec omnia ad illud tendit oratio ut doceam te, non tuo arbitrio dimittendum, sed vivere debere in monasterio sub unius disciplina patris consortioque multorum.[8]

Ut igitur in omnibus concordia servari possit unam omnibus praeesse convenit cui per omnia omnes obediant. Sub hac etiam quasi magistratus quosdam nonnullas alias personas prout ipsa decreverit constitui oportet. Quae quibus officiis ipsa praeceperit et quantum voluerit praesint, ut sint[9] videlicet istae quasi duces vel consules in exercitu dominico. Reliquae autem omnes tamquam milites vel pedites, istarum cura eis praevidente, adversus malignum ejusque satellites libere pugnent.

Septem vero personas ex vobis ad omnem monasterii administrationem necessarias esse credimus atque sufficere: portariam scilicet, cellerariam, vestiariam, infirmariam, cantricem,[10] sacristam et ad extremum diaconissam, quam nunc abbatissam nominant. In his itaque castris et divina quadam militia, sicut scriptum est:[11] *Militia est vita hominis super terram.* Et[12] alibi:[13] *Terribilis ut castrorum acies ordinata,* vicem imperatoris cui per omnia obeditur ab omnibus obtinet diaconissa. Sex vero aliae sub ea quas dicimus officiales ducum sive consulum loca possident. Omnes vero reliquae moniales[14] quas vocamus claustrales militum more divinum peragunt expedite servitium. Conversae autem quae etiam saeculo renuntiantes obsequio monialium se dicarunt habitu quodam religioso non tamen monastico quasi pedites inferiorem obtinent gradum.

Nunc vero superest Domino inspirante hujus militiae gradus singulos ordinare ut adversus impugnationes daemonum vere sit quod dicitur: castrorum acies ordinata. Ab ipso itaque[15] ut dictum est capite quod diaconissam dicimus hujus institutionis ducentes exordium de ipsa primitus disponamus per quam sunt omnia disponenda. Hujus vero sanctitatem, sicut in praecedenti meminimus epistola beatus Paulus Apostolus Timotheo scribens quam eminentem et probatam oporteat esse diligenter describit dicens:[16] *Vidua eligatur non minus sexaginta annorum quae*[17] *fuerit unius viri uxor, in operibus bonis testimonium habens, si filios educavit, si hospitio recepit, si sanctorum pedes lavit, si tribulationem patientibus subministravit, si omne opus bonum subsecuta est. Adolescentiores*[18] *autem viduas devita*, etc. Idem supra de diaconissis cum etiam diaconorum institueret vitam: *Mulieres,* inquit,[19] *similiter pudicas, non detrahentes, sobrias, fideles in omnibus.* Quae quidem omnia quid intelligentiae vel rationis habeant, quantum aestimamus, epistola praecedente nostra satis disseruimus. Maxime cur eam Apostolus unius viri et provectae velit esse aetatis.

Unde non mediocriter miramur quomodo perniciosa haec in ecclesia consuetudo inolevit ut quae virgines sunt potius quam quae viros cognoverunt ad hoc eligantur et frequenter juniores senioribus praeficiantur. Cum tamen Ecclesiastes dicat:[20] *Vae tibi terra cujus rex puer est.* Et cum illud[21] beati Job omnes pariter approbemus: *In antiquis est sapientia et in multo tempore prudentia.* Hinc et in Proverbiis scriptum est:[22] *Corona dignitatis senectus quae in viis justitiae reperietur.* Et in Ecclesiastico:[23] *Quam speciosum canitiei judicium et a presbyteris cognoscere consilium! Quam speciosa veterani sapientia et gloriosus intellectus et consilium! Corona senum multa peritia et gloria illorum timor Dei.* Item:[24] *Loquere major natu; decet enim te. Adolescens*[25] *loquere in tua causa*

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[8] *add* ut ab alio *T*, which follows in the text of St. Jerome.

[9] *om. CE.*

[10] cartatricem *G.*

[11] *Job* vii, 1.

[12] et alibi . . . ordinata] *om. CE.*

[13] *Cant.* vi, 9.

[14] *om. CE.*

[15] inquam *T Amb.*

[16] *I Tim.* v, 9-11.

[17] quae . . . aetatis] *om. CE.*

[18] adolescentes *Amb.*

[19] *I Tim.* iii, 11.

[20] x, 16.

[21] xii, 12.

[22] xvi, 31.

[23] xxv, 6-8.

[24] *Id.* xxxii, 4.

[25] *Id.* xxxii, 10-13.

vix.[26] *Si bis*[27] *interrogatus fueris, habeat caput responsum tuum. In multis esto quasi inscius, et audi tacens simul et quaerens et loqui in medio magnatorum*[28] *non praesumas, et ubi sunt senes, non multum loquaris.* Unde et presbyteri qui in ecclesia populo praesunt seniores interpretantur ut ipso quoque nomine quales esse debeant doceatur. Et qui sanctorum Vitas scripserunt, quos nunc abbates dicimus, senes appellabant.[29]

Modis itaque omnibus providendum est ut in electione vel consecratione diaconissae consilium praecedat Apostoli,[30] ut videlicet talis eligatur quae ceteris vita et doctrina praeesse debeat et aetate quoque morum maturitatem polliceatur et quae obediendo meruerit imperare et operando magis quam audiendo regulam didicerit et firmius noverit. Quae si litterata non fuerit, sciat se non ad philosophicas scholas vel disputationes dialecticas sed ad doctrinam vitae et operum[31] exhibitione[32] accommodari, sicut de Domino scriptum est:[33] *Qui coepit facere et docere*; prius videlicet facere, postmodum[34] docere, quia melior atque perfectior est doctrina operis quam sermonis, facti quam verbi. Quod diligenter attendamus ut scriptum est:[35]

> Dixit abbas Ipitius: Ille est vere sapiens qui facto suo alios docet, non qui verbis.

Nec parum consolationis et confidentiae super hoc affert.

Attendatur et illa quoque beati Antonii ratio qua verbosos confutavit philosophos, ejus videlicet tamquam idiotae et illitterati hominis magisterium irridentes:

> Respondete, inquit,[36] mihi quid prius est, sensus an litterae et quid cujus exordium est sensus ex litteris an litterae oriuntur ex sensu? Illis asserentibus quia sensus esset auctor atque inventor litterarum, ait: Igitur cui sensus incolumis est, hic litteras non requirit. Audiat quoque illud[37] Apostoli et confortetur in Domino: *Nonne stultam fecit Deus sapientiam hujus mundi?* Et iterum:[38] *Quae stulta sunt mundi elegit Deus ut*[39] *confundat sapientes; et infirma elegit Deus ut confundat fortia; et ignobilia mundi et contemptibilia elegit Deus ut ea quae non sunt tamquam ea quae sunt destrueret;*[40] *ut non glorietur omnis caro in conspectu ejus.* Non enim sicut ipse postmodum dicit[41] in sermone est regnum Dei, sed in virtute.

Quod si de aliquibus melius cognoscendis ad scripturam recurrendum[42] esse censuerit a litteratis hoc requirere et addiscere non erubescat[43] nec in his litteraturarum[44] documenta contemnat, sed[45] diligenter suscipiat cum ipse quoque Apostolorum princeps coapostoli sui Pauli publicam correctionem[46] diligenter exceperit.[47] Ut[48] enim beatus quoque meminit Benedictus:[49]

> Saepe minori revelat Dominus quod melius est.

Ut autem amplius Dominicam sequamur providentiam quam Apostolus quoque supra memoravit numquam de nobilibus aut potentibus saeculi nisi maxima incumbente necessitate et certissima ratione fiat haec electio. Tales namque de genere suo facile confidentes aut gloriantes aut praesumptuosae aut superbae fiunt et tunc maxime quando indigenae[50] sunt earum praelatio perniciosa fit monasterio. Verendum[51] quippe est ne vicinia suorum eam praesumptiorem reddat et frequentia ipsorum gravet aut inquietet monasterium atque ipsa per suos religionis perferat detrimentum aut aliis veniat in contemptum juxta illud Veritatis:[52] *Non est propheta sine honore nisi in patria sua.*

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[26] *add* enim necesse fuit *CET*] cum necesse fuerit *Amb.* The phrase is not in the Vulgate.

[27] hiis *CE.*

[28] magnatum *G.*

[29] Books III, V, VI and VII of the *Vitae patrum* are called *Verba seniorum.*

[30] Cf. *I Tim.* v.

[31] operis *E.*

[32] exhibitione *T.*

[33] *Acts* i, 1.

[34] postea *CE.*

[35] *Vitae patrum* V, 10, 75 (PL 73, 925).

[36] Athanasius, *Vita Antonii,* in *Vitae patrum* I, 45 (PL 73, 158).

[37] *I Cor.* i, 20.

[38] *Id.* i, 27-29.

[39] et . . . elegit Deus] *om. CE.*

[40] destruat *Amb.*

[41] *add* non and *om.* est *CE.*

[42] revertendum *Amb.*

[43] erubescant *CE.*

[44] literarum *Amb.*

[45] *add* devote et *Amb.* which is deleted in *T.*

[46] correptionem *G.*

[47] Cf. *Galatians* ii, 11.

[48] ut . . . melius est] *om. CE.*

[49] *Regula,* 3 (Edit. Butler, p. 19).

Quod beatus quoque providens Hieronymus ad Heliodorum scribens[53] cum pleraque annumerasset quae monachis officiunt in sua morantibus patria:

> Ex hac, inquit, supputatione illa summa nascitur monachum in patria sua perfectum esse non posse. Perfectum esse autem nolle, delinquere est.

Quantum vero est animarum damnum si minor in religione fuerit quae religionis praeest magisterio? Singulis quippe subjectis singulas virtutes exhibere sufficit. In hac autem omnia exempla debent eminere virtutum ut omnia quae aliis praeceperit propriis praeveniat exemplis ne[54] ipsa quae praecipit moribus oppugnet[55] et quod verbis aedificat factis ipsa destruat et de ore suo verbum correctionis auferatur cum ipsa in aliis erubescat corrigere quae constat eam committere.

Quod[56] quidem Psalmista ne ei eveniat Dominum precatur dicens:[57] *Et ne auferas de ore meo verbum*[58] *veritatis usquequaque.* Attendebat quippe illam gravissimam Domini increpationem de qua et ipse alibi meminit dicens:[59] *Peccatori autem dixit Deus: Quare tu enarras justitias meas et assumis testamentum meum per os tuum? Tu vero odisti disciplinam et projecisti sermones meos retrorsum.* Quod studiose praecavens Apostolus: *Castigo,* inquit,[60] *corpus meum et in servitutem redigo, ne forte cum aliis praedicaverim, ipse reprobus efficiar.* Cujus quippe vita despicitur restat ut et praedicatio vel doctrina contemnatur. Et cum curare quis alium debeat, si in eadem laboraverit infirmitate recte ipsi ab aegroto improperatur:[61] *Medice cura*[62] *teipsum.*

Attendat sollicite quisquis ecclesiae praeesse videtur quantam ruinam casus ejus praebeat cum ipse ad praecipitium secum pariter subjectos trahat. *Qui solverit,* inquit[63] Veritas, *unum de mandatis istis minimis et docuerit sic homines, minimus vocabitur in regno caelorum.* Solvit quippe mandatum qui contra agendo infringit ipsum et exemplo suo corrumpens alios in cathedra pestilentiae doctor residet.[64] Quod si quislibet hoc agens minimus habendus est in regno caelorum, hoc est in ecclesia praesenti, quanti habendus est pessimus praelatus a cujus negligentia non suae tantum sed omnium subjectarum animarum sanguinem Dominus requirit? Unde bene Sapientia talibus comminatur:[65] *Data est a Domino potestas vobis et virtus ab Altissimo qui interrogabit opera vestra et cogitationes scrutabitur. Quoniam cum essetis ministri regni illius, non recte judicastis, neque custodistis legem justitiae. Horrende etiam cito apparebit vobis, quoniam judicium durissimum in*[66] *his qui praesunt, fiet. Exiguo enim conceditur misericordia. Potentes autem potenter tormenta patientur et*[67] *fortioribus fortior instat cruciatio.*

Sufficit quippe unicuique subjectarum animarum a proprio sibi providere delicto. Praelatis autem etiam[68] in peccatis alienis mors imminet. Cum enim augentur dona, rationes etiam[69] crescunt donorum et cui plus committitur plus ab eo exigitur. Cui quidem periculo tanto maxime providere in Proverbiis admonemur cum dicitur:[70] *Fili, si spoponderis pro amico tuo, defixisti*[71] *apud extraneum manum tuam. Illaqueatus es verbis oris tui et captus propriis sermonibus. Fac ergo quod dico, fili mi, et temetipsum libera, quia incidisti in*[72] *manum proximi tui. Discurre, festina, suscita amicum tuum, ne dederis somnum oculis tuis, nec dormitent palpebrae tuae.* Tunc enim pro amico sponsionem facimus cum aliquem caritas nostra in nostrae congregationis conversationem[73] suscipit. Cui nostrae providentiae curam promittimus sicut et ille nobis obedientiam suam. Et sic quoque manum nostram apud eum defigimus cum sollicitudinem nostrae operationis erga eum spondendo constituimus. Tum et in manum ejus incidimus quia nisi nobis ab ipso providerimus ipsum animae nostrae interfectorem sentiemus. Contra quod periculum adhibetur consilium cum subditur: *discurre, festina,* etc. Nunc igitur huc nunc illuc deambulans more providi et impigri ducis castra sua sollicite giret vel scrutetur ne per alicujus negligentiam ei *qui tamquam leo circuit quaerens quem devoret*[74] aditus pateat. Omnia mala domus suae prior agnoscat ut ab ipsa prius possint corrigi quam a ceteris agnosci et in exemplum trahi. Caveat[75] illud[76] quod stultis vel negligentibus beatus improperat Hieronymus:

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[50] indigne *E.*
[51] verendum . . . delinquere est] *om. CE.*
[52] *Matt.* xiii, 57.
[53] *Epist.* 14, 7 (CSEL 54, 54; PL 22, 352).
[54] nec *CE.*
[55] oppugnatur *CE.*
[56] quod . . . praecavens] *om. CE.*
[57] *Psalm* cxviii, 43.
[58] verbum veritatis] veritatem *Amb.*
[59] *Psalm* xlix, 16-17.
[60] *I Cor.* ix, 27.
[61] *Luke* iv, 23.
[62] curat *C.*
[63] *Matt.* v, 19.
[64] praesidet *CE.*
[65] vi, 4-9.
[66] *om. CE.*
[67] et . . . cruciato] *om. CE.*
[68] et *Amb.*
[69] *om. CE.*

> Solemus mala domus nostrae scire novissimi ac liberorum ac conjugum vitia vicinis canentibus ignorare.

Attendat quae hic[77] praesidet quia tam corporum quam animarum custodiam suscepit.

De[78] custodia vero corporum admonetur cum dicitur in Ecclesiastico:[79] *Filiae tibi sunt? serva corpus illarum et non ostendas faciem tuam hilarem ad illas.* Et iterum:[80] *Filia patris abscondita est vigilia et sollicitudo ejus aufert somnum, ne quando polluatur.* Polluimus vero corpora nostra non solum fornicando, sed quodlibet indecens in ipsis operando tam lingua quam alio membro seu quolibet membro sensibus corporis ad vanitatem aliquam abutendo. Sicut scriptum est:[81] *Mors intrat per fenestras nostras.* Hoc est peccatum ad animam per quinque sensuum instrumenta. Quae vero mors gravior aut custodia periculosior quam animarum? *Nolite,* inquit[82] Veritas, *timere eos qui occidunt corpus, animae vero non habent quid faciant.* Si quis hoc audit consilium, quis non magis mortem corporis quam animae timet? Quis non magis gladium quam mendacium cavet? Et[83] tamen scriptum est:[84] *Os, quod mentitur, occidit animam.*

Quid tam facile interfici quam anima potest? Quae sagitta citius fabricari quam peccatum valet?[85] Quis sibi a cogitatione saltem providere potest? Quis propriis peccatis providere sufficit nedum alienis? Quis carnalis pastor spiritales oves a lupis spiritalibus invisibiles ab invisibilibus custodire sufficiat? Quis raptorem non timeat qui infestare non cessat quem nullo possumus excludere vallo, nullo interficere vel laedere gladio? Quem incessanter insidiantem et maxime religiosos persequentem juxta illud[86] Habacuc: *Escae illius electae.* Petrus Apostolus cavendum adhortatur dicens:[87] *Adversarius vester diabolus tamquam leo rugiens*[88] *circuit quaerens quem devoret.* Cujus quanta sit praesumptio in devoratione nostra ipse Dominus beato Job dicit:[89] *Absorbebit fluvium et non mirabitur; et habet fiduciam quod influat Jordanis in os ejus.* Quid enim aggredi non praesumat qui ipsum quoque Dominum aggressus est tentare? Qui de paradiso primos statim parentes captivavit et de apostolico coetu ipsum etiam quem Dominus elegerat Apostolum rapuit? Quis ab eo locus tutus, quae claustra illi non sunt pervia? Quis ab ejus insidiis providere? Quis ejus fortitudini valet resistere? Ipse est qui uno impulsu concutiens quatuor angulos domus sancti viri Job filios et filias innocentes oppressit et extinxit.[90] Quid sexus infirmior adversus eum poterit? Cui seductio ejus tantum timenda est quantum feminae? Hanc quippe ipse primum seduxit et per ipsam virum ejus pariter et totam posteritatem captivavit. Cupiditas[91] majoris boni possessione minoris mulierem privavit. Hac[92] quoque arte[93] nunc facile mulierem seducet cum praeesse magis quam prodesse cupierit rerum ambitione vel honoris ad hoc[94] impulsa. Quod autem horum praecesserit sequentia probabunt. Si enim[95] delicatius vixerit praelata quam subjecta vel si supra necessitatem aliquid sibi peculiare vindicaverit, non dubium est hoc eam concupisse. Si pretiosiora postmodum quam antea quaesierit ornamenta, profecto vana tumet[96] gloria. Qualis prius extiterit postmodum apparebit. Quod prius exhibebat utrum virtus fuerit an simulatio, indicabit praelatio.

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[70] vi, 1-4.

[71] indefixisti *CE.*

[72] in manum . . . oculis tuis] *om. CE.*

[73] conversionem *C.*

[74] *I Peter* v, 8.

[75] caveat . . . ignorare] *om. CE.*

[76] *Epist.* 147 *ad Sabinianum,* 10 (CSEL 56, 327; PL 22, 1203).

[77] sic *Amb.*

[78] de custodia . . . instrumenta] *om. CE.*

[79] vii, 26.

[80] *Id.* xlii, 9-10.

[81] *Jer.* ix, 21.

[82] *Matt.* x, 28; *Luke* xii, 4.

[83] *add* hoc *CE.*

[84] *Wisdom* i, 11.

[85] valebit *C.*

[86] i, 16.

[87] *I Peter* v, 8.

[88] rugiens . . . devoret] *om. CE.*

[89] xl, 18.

Trahatur ad praelationem magis quam veniat dicente Domino:[97] *Omnes quotquot venerunt,*[98] *fures sunt et latrones.*

> Venerunt, inquit[99] Hieronymus, non qui missi sunt.

Sumatur potius ad honorem quam sibi sumat honorem. *Nemo enim,* inquit[1] Apostolus, *sibi sumit honorem, sed qui vocatur a Deo tamquam Aaron.* Vocata lugeat tamquam ad mortem deducta, repulsa gaudeat tamquam a[2] morte liberata. Erubescimus ad verba quae dicimus ceteris meliores. Cum autem in electione nostra rebus ipsis hoc exhibetur impudenter sine pudore sumus. Quis enim nesciat meliores ceteris[3] praeferendos. Unde libro Moralium XXIV:[4]

> Non debet autem hominum ducatum suscipere qui nescit homines bene admonendo increpare. Qui[5] ad hoc eligitur[6] ut aliorum culpas corrigat, quod[7] resecari debuit, ipse committat.

In qua tamen electione, si forte hanc impudentiam aliquando levi verborum repulsa tamen per aures oblatam recusamus dignitatem; hanc profecto in nos[8] accusationem proferimus quo justiores et digniores videamur. O quot in electione sua flere vidimus corpore et ridere corde! Accusare se tamquam indignos et per hoc gratiam sibi et favorem humanum magis venari! attendentes quod scriptum est:[9] *Justus prior accusator est sui.* Quos[10] postea cum accusari contingeret et se eis occasio cedendi offerret, importunissime et impudentissime suam sibi praelationem defendere nituntur quam se invitos suscepisse fictis lacrymis et veris accusationibus sui monstraverant. Quot[11] in ecclesiis vidimus canonicos episcopis suis reluctantes cum ab eis ad sacros ordines cogerentur et se indignos tantis ministeriis profitentes nec omnino velle acquiescere, quos cum forte clerus ad episcopatum postmodum eligeret nullam aut levem perpessus est repulsam? Et qui heri sicut aiebant animae suae periculum vitantes diaconatum refugiebant jam quasi una nocte justificati de altiore gradu praecipitium non verentur. De qualibus quidem in ipsis scriptum est Proverbiis:[12] *Homo stultus plaudet manibus*

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[90] Cf. *Job* i, 19.

[91] cupiditas . . . privavit] *om. CE.*

[92] hanc *CE.*

[93] ante *E*] autem *C.*

[94] huc *CE.*

[95] vero *Amb.*

[96] timet *C.* In the margin of *T* is found: Contra eos qui ambiunt praelationes.

[97] *John* x, 8.

[98] veniunt *Amb.*

[99] *Dialogus contra Pelagianos* II, 17 (PL 23, 580).

[1] *Hebrews* v, 4.

[2] *om. CE.*

[3] ceteros *T.*

[4] XXIV, 25 (PL 76, 318).

[5] quae *C.*

[6] eligatur *CE.*

[7] et *E.*

[8] vos *C.*

[9] *Prov.* xviii, 17.

[10] quid *C*] quod *E.*

[11] quot . . . verentur] *om. CE.*

[12] xvii, 18.

cum sposponderit pro amico. Tunc enim miser gaudet unde potius lugendum ei esset cum ad regimen aliorum veniens in cura subjectorum propria professione ligatur a quibus magis amari quam timeri debet.

Cui profecto pestilentiae quantum possumus providentes omnino interdicimus ne delicatius aut mollius vivat praelata quam subjecta, ne privatos habeat secessus ad comedendum vel dormiendum, sed cum sibi commisso grege cuncta peragat et tanto eis amplius provideat, quanto eis amplius praesens assistit.[13] Scimus quidem beatum Benedictum de peregrinis et hospitibus maxime sollicitum mensam abbatis[14] cum illis seorsum constituisse.[15] Quod licet tunc pie sit constitutum, postea tamen utilissima monasteriorum dispensatione ita est immutatum ut abbas a conventu non recedat et fidelem dispensatorem peregrinis provideat. Facilis quippe est inter epulas lapsus et tunc disciplinae magis est invigilandum. Multi etiam occasione hospitum sibi magis quam hospitibus propitii fiunt[16] et hinc maxima suspicione laeduntur absentes et murmurant. Et[17] tanto praelati minor est auctoritas quanto ejus vita suis est magis incognita. Tunc quoque tolerabilior omnibus quaelibet habetur inopia cum ab omnibus aeque participatur maxime vero a praelatis. Sicut in Catone quoque didicimus. Hic quippe, ut scriptum est, 'populo secum sitiente' oblatum sibi aquae paululum respuit et effudit 'suffecitque omnibus unda'.[18]

Cum igitur praelatis maxime sobrietas sit necessaria tanto eis parcius est vivendum quanto per eos ceteris providendum. Qui etiam ne donum Dei, hoc est praelationem sibi concessam in superbiam convertant et maxime subjectis per hoc insultent, audiant quod scriptum est:[19] *Noli esse sicut leo in domo tua, evertens domesticos tuos et opprimens subjectos tibi.*[20] *Odibilis*[21] *coram Deo est et hominibus superbia.* Initium[22] superbiae hominis apostatare a Deo quoniam ab eo qui fecit illum recessit cor ejus quam initium peccati est omnis superbia. *Sedes*[23] *ducum superborum destruxit Dominus et sedere fecit mites pro eis. Rectorem*[24] *te posuerunt? Noli extolli. Esto in illis quasi unus ex ipsis.* Et Apostolus Timotheum erga subjectos instruens: *Seniorem,* inquit,[25] *ne increpaveris, sed obsecra ut patrem; juniores ut fratres, anus ut matres, juvenculas ut sorores. Non vos me,* inquit[26] Dominus, *elegistis, sed ego elegi vos,* etc. Universi alii praelati a subjectis eliguntur et ab eis creantur et constituuntur quia non ad dominium,[27] sed ad ministerium, assumuntur. Hic autem solus vere est Dominus et subjectos sibi ad serviendum habet eligere. Nec tamen se dominum sed ministrum exhibuit et suos jam ad dignitatis arcem aspirantes proprio confutat exemplo dicens:[28] *Reges gentium dominantur eorum et qui potestatem habent super eos, benefici vocantur. Vos autem non sic,* etc. Reges igitur gentium imitatur quisquis in subjectis dominium appetit magis quam ministerium et timeri magis quam amari satagit et de praelationis suae magisterio intumescens amat primos recubitus in caenis et primas cathedras in synagogis et salutationes in foro et vocari ab hominibus Rabbi. Cujus quidem vocationis honorem ut nec nominibus gloriemur et in omnibus humilitati provideatur. *Vos autem,* inquit[29] Dominus, *nolite vocari Rabbi. Et patrem nolite vocare*[30] *vobis*[31] *super terram.* Et postremo universam prohibens gloriationem: *Qui se,* inquit,[32] *exaltaverit, humiliabitur.*

Providendum quoque est ne per absentiam pastorum grex periclitetur et ne praelatis extravagantibus intus disciplina torpeat. Statuimus itaque ut diaconissa magis spiritalibus quam corporalibus intendens nulla exteriore cura monasterium deserat, sed[33] circa subjectas tanto sit magis sollicita quanto magis assidua et tanto sit hominibus quoque praesentia ejus venerabilior, quanto rarior, sicut scriptum est:[34] *Advocatus a potentiore, discede. Ex hoc enim magis te advocabit.* Si[35] qua vero legatione monasterium egeat, monachi vel eorum conversi ea fungantur. Semper enim viros mulierum necessitudinibus oportet providere. Et quo earum major religio amplius vacant Deo et majori virorum egent patrocinio. Unde et Matris Domini curam agere Joseph ab angelo admonetur quam tamen cognoscere non permittitur.[36] Et ipse Dominus moriens quasi alterum filium matri suae providit qui ejus temporalem ageret curam.[37] Apostoli quoque quantam devotis curam impenderent feminis dubium non est, ut jam satis alibi meminimus; quorum[38] etiam obsequiis diaconos septem instituerunt.[39] Quam quidem nos auctoritatem sequentes ipsa etiam rei necessitate hoc exigente decrevimus monachos et eorum conversos more Apostolorum et diaconorum in iis quae ad exteriorem pertinent curam monasteriis feminarum providere. Quibus maxime propter Missas necessarii sunt monachi, propter opera vero conversi.

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[13] assistat *CE*] assistet *Amb.*

[14] *add* seorsum *CET.*

[15] Cf. *Regula,* 53, 56 (Edit. Butler, pp. 96, 104).

[16] sunt *Amb.*

[17] et tanto . . . unda] *om. CE.*

[18] unde Lucanus ait *T.* Cf. *Pharsalia* IX, 498 ff.

[19] *Eccli.* iv, 35.

[20] tibi . . . humiliabitur] *om. CE.*

[21] *Eccli.* x, 7.

[22] initium . . . superbia] *om. Amb.*

[23] *Eccli.* x, 17.

[24] *Id.,* xxxii, 1.

[25] *I Tim.* v, 1.

[26] *John* xv, 16.

[27] Dominum *Amb.*

[28] *Luke* xxii, 25.

[29] *Matt.* xxiii, 8-9.

[30] vocari *T.*

[31] *om. Amb.*

[32] *Matt.* xxiii, 12.

Oportet itaque sicut Alexandriae sub Marco Evangelista legimus esse factum in ipso ecclesiae nascentis exordio ut monasteriis feminarum monasteria non desint virorum et per ejusdem religionis viros omnia extrinsecus feminis administrentur. Et tunc profecto monasteria feminarum firmius propositi sui religionem observare credimus, si spiritalium virorum providentia gubernentur et idem tam ovium quam arietum pastor constituatur ut qui videlicet viris ipse quoque praesit feminis et semper juxta institutionem Apostolicam:[40] *caput mulieris sit vir sicut viri Christus et Christi Deus.* Unde et monasterium beatae Scholasticae in possessione fratrum monasterii situm fratris quoque providentia regebatur et crebra ipsius vel fratrum visitatione instruebatur et consolabatur.[41]

De cujus quoque regiminis providentia beati Basilii regula quodam loco nos instruens ita continet:[42]

> Interrogatio: Si oportet eum qui praeest, extra eam quae sororibus praeest, loqui aliquid quod ad aedificationem pertineat virginibus? Responsio: Et quomodo servabitur illud praeceptum Apostoli dicentis:[43] *Omnia vestra honeste et secundum ordinem fiant?*

Item sequenti capitulo:

> Interrogatio: Si convenit eum qui praeest cum ea quae sororibus praeest frequenter loqui et maxime si aliqui de fratribus per hoc laeduntur? Responsio: Apostolo dicente:[44] *Ut quid enim libertas judicatur ab aliena conscientia?* Bonum est imitari eum dicentem:[45] *Quia non sum usus*[46] *potestate mea,*[47] *ne offendiculum aliquod ponerem*[48] *Evangelio Christi.* Et quantum fieri potest, et rarius videndae sunt et brevius est sermocinatio finienda.

Hinc et illud est Hispalensis concilii:[49]

> Consensu communi decrevimus ut monasteria virginum in provincia Baetica

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[33] sed . . . sicut] *om. CE.*

[34] *Eccli.* xiii, 12.

[35] si qua . . . certum sit (eight paragraphs lower)] *om. CE.*

[36] Cf. *Matt.* i, 20.

[37] Cf. *John* xix, 26.

[38] quarum *Amb.*

[39] Cf. *Acts* vi, 5.

[40] *I Cor.* xi, 3.

[41] Cf. Gregory, *Dialogi* II, 33 (Edit. Moricca in *Fonti per la storia d'Italia* LVII [Rome, 1924], p. 125; PL 66, 178).

[42] *Regula fusius tractata,* 197, 199 (PL 103, 551).

[43] *I Cor.* xiv, 40.

[44] *Id.* x, 29.

[45] *Id.* ix, 12.

[46] visus *Amb.*

[47] *add* uti *T Amb.*

[48] *om. T.*

[49] An. 619, can. 11 (Mansi, *Concilia,* 10, 560).

> monachorum ministratione ac praesidio gubernentur. Tunc enim salubria Christo dicatis virginibus providemus quando eis spiritales patres eligimus quorum non solum gubernaculis tueri, sed etiam doctrinis aedificari possint. Hac tamen circa monachos cautela servata ut remoti ab earum peculiaritate, nec usque ad vestibulum habeant accedendi permissum familiare, sed[50] neque abbatem vel eum qui praeficitur extra eam quae praeest loqui virginibus Christi aliquid quod ad institutionem morum pertinet licebit. Nec cum sola quae praeest frequenter eum colloqui oportet, sed sub testimonio duarum aut trium sororum. Ita ut rara sit accessio brevis locutio. Absit enim ut[51] monachos, quod etiam dictu nefas est, Christi virginibus familiares esse velimus. Sed juxta quod jussa regularia vel canonum admonent longe discretos atque sejunctos eorum tantum gubernaculis[52] easdem deputamus constituentes ut unus monachorum probatissimus eligatur cujus curae sit praedia earum rusticana vel urbana intendere, fabricas struere, vel si quid aliud ad necessitatem monasterii providere, ut Christi famulae pro animae suae tantum utilitate sollicitae solis divinis cultibus vivant, operibus suis inserviant. Sane is qui ab abbate suo proponitur judicio sui episcopi comprobetur. Vestes autem illae iisdem[53] coenobiis faciant a quibus tuitionem exspectant. Ab iisdem denuo, ut praedictum est, laborum fructus et procurationis suffragium recepturae.

Hanc nos itaque providentiam sequentes monasteria feminarum monasteriis virorum ita semper esse subjecta volumus ut sororum curam fratres agant et unus utriusque[54] tamquam pater praesideat ad cujus providentiam utraque spectent monasteria et utrorumque in Domino quasi *unum sit ovile et unus pastor.*[55] Quae quidem spiritalis fraternitatis societas tanto gratior tam Deo quam hominibus fuerit, quanto ipsa perfectior omni sexui ad conversionem venienti sufficere possit ut videlicet monachi viros, moniales feminas suscipiant, et omni animae de salute sua cogitanti possit ipsa consulere. Et quicumque cum uxore[56] vel matre aut sorore vel filia seu aliqua cujus curam gerit converti voluerit, plenum ibi solatium reperire possit. Et tanto majoris caritatis affectu[57] sibi utraque monasteria sint connexa et pro se invicem sollicita, quanto quae ibi sunt personae propinquitate aliqua vel affinitate amplius sunt conjunctae.

Praepositum autem monachorum quem abbatem nominant sic etiam monialibus praeesse volumus ut eas quae Domini sponsae sunt cujus ipse servus est proprias recognoscat dominas nec eis praeesse sed prodesse gaudeat. Et sit tamquam dispensator in domo regia qui non imperio dominam premit, sed providentiam erga eam gerit ut ei de necessariis statim obediat et in noxiis eam non audiat et sic exterius cuncta ministret ut thalami secreta numquam nisi jussus introeat. Ad hunc igitur modum servum Christi sponsis Christi providere volumus et[58] earum pro Christo fideliter curam gerere et de omnibus quae oportet cum diaconissa tractare. Nec ea inconsulta quidquam de ancillis Christi vel de iis quae ad eas pertinent eum statuere nec ipsum cuiquam earum nisi per eam quidquam praecipere vel loqui praesumere. Quoties vero eum diaconissa vocaverit ne tardet venire et quae ipsa ei consuluerit de iis quibus ipsa vel ei subjectae opus habent, non moretur exsequi quantum valet. Vocatus autem a diaconissa numquam nisi in manifesto et sub testimonio probatarum personarum ei loquatur, nec ei proximus adjungatur, nec prolixo sermone eam detineat.

Omnia vero quae ad victum aut vestitum pertinent[59] et si quae etiam pecuniae fuerint apud ancillas Christi congregabuntur vel reservabuntur, et inde fratribus necessaria tradentur de iis quae sororibus supererunt. Omnia itaque fratres

[50] et *Amb.*
[51] *add* ne *Amb.*
[52] gabernaculis *T.*
[53] isdem *T.*
[54] utrisque *Amb.*
[55] *John* x, 16.
[56] *om. Amb.*
[57] affectui *Amb.*
[58] ut *T.*
[59] pertinet *Amb.*

exteriora procurabunt et sorores ea tantum quae intus a mulieribus agi convenit, componendo scilicet vestes etiam fratrum vel abluendo, panem etiam conficiendo et ad coquendum tradendo et coctum suscipiendo. Ad ipsas etiam cura lactis et eorum quae inde fiunt pertinebit et gallinarum vel anserum nutritura et quaecumque convenientius mulieres agere quam viri possunt.

Ipse vero praepositus quando constitutus fuerit in praesentia episcopi et sororum jurabit quod eis fidelis in Domino dispensator erit et earum corpora a carnali contagio sollicite observabit. In quo si forte, quod absit, episcopus eum negligentem deprehenderit, statim eum tamquam perjurii reum deponat. Omnes quoque fratres in professionibus suis hoc se sororibus sacramento astringent quod nullatenus eas gravari consentient et earum carnali munditiae pro posse suo providebunt. Nullus igitur virorum nisi licentia praepositi ad sorores accessum habebit, nec aliquid eis missum nisi a praeposito transmissum suscipietur. Nulla umquam sororum septa monasterii egredietur sed omnia exterius, sicut dictum est, fratres procurabunt et in fortibus fortes sudabunt operibus. Nullus umquam fratrem septa haec ingredietur nisi obtenta[60] praepositi et diaconissae licentia cum aliqua hoc necessaria vel honesta exegerit causa. Si quis forte contra hoc praesumpserit, absque dilatione de monasterio projiciatur.

Ne tamen viri fortiores feminis in aliquo eas gravare praesumant, statuimus eos quoque nihil praesumere contra voluntatem diaconissae, sed omnia ipsos etiam ad nutum ejus peragere et omnes pariter tam viros quam feminas ei professionem facere et obedientiam promittere ut tanto pax firmior habeatur et melius servetur concordia quanto fortioribus minus licebit et tanto minus fortes debilibus obedire graventur, quanto earum violentiam minus vereantur. Et quanto amplius hic humiliaverit se apud Deum amplius exaltari certum sit. Haec in praesenti de diaconissa dicta sufficiant. Nunc ad officiales stylum inclinemus.

Sacrista[61] quae et thesauraria toti oratorio providebit et omnes quae ad ipsum pertinent claves et quae ipsi necessaria sunt ipsa servabit et si quae fuerint oblationes ipsa suscipiet et de iis quae in oratorio sunt necessaria faciendis vel reficiendis et de toto ejus ornatu curam aget. Ipsius quoque providere est de hostiis, de vasis et[62] libris altaris et toto ejus ornatu, de reliquiis, de incenso, de luminaribus, de horologio, de signis pulsandis.

Hostias vero, si fieri potest, virgines conficiant et frumentum purgent unde fiant et altaris pallam abluant. Reliquias autem vel vasa altaris numquam ei vel alicui monialium contingere licebit nec etiam pallas nisi cum eis traditae ad lavandum fuerint. Sed ad hoc vel monachi vel eorum conversi vocabuntur et exspectabuntur. Et si necesse fuerit, aliqui sub ea ad hoc officium instituantur qui haec contingere cum opus fuerit digni sint et arcis ab ea reseratis haec inde ipsi sumant vel ibi reponant. Haec quidem quae sanctuario praesidet vitae munditia praeeminere debet et quae si fieri potest, mente cum corpore sit integra et[63] ejus tam abstinentia quam continentia sit probata. Hanc praecipue de compoto lunae instructam esse oportet ut secundum temporum rationem oratorio provideat.

Cantrix toti choro providebit et divina disponet officia et de doctrina cantandi vel legendi magisterium habebit et de eis quae ad scribendum pertinent vel dictandum. Armarium quoque librorum custodiet et ipsos inde tradet atque suscipiet et de ipsis scribendis vel aptandis curam suscipiet vel sollicita erit. Ipsa ordinabit quomodo sedeatur in choro et sedes dabit et a quibus legendum sit vel cantandum providebit et inscriptionem componet sabbatis recitandam in capitulo ubi omnes hebdomadariae describantur.[64] Propter quae maxime litteratam eam esse convenit et praecipue musicam non ignorare. Ipsa etiam post diaconissam toti disciplinae providebit. Et si forte illa rebus alienis fuerit occupata, vices illius in hoc exsequetur infirmaria.[65]

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[60] licentia *T.*

[61] sacrifica *Amb.* Sacrista . . . exponatur (fourteen paragraphs lower)] *om. CE.*

[62] *add* de *Amb.*

[63] *om. Amb.*

[64] describentur *Amb.*] *T* has first deleted *scribentur.*

Infirmaria ministrabit infirmis et eas observabit tam a culpa quam ab indigentia. Quidquid infirmitas postulaverit tam de cibis quam de balneis vel quibuscumque aliis est eis indulgendum. Notum quippe est proverbium in talibus: Infirmis non est lex posita. Carnes eis nullatenus denegentur nisi sexta feria vel praecipuis vigiliis aut jejuniis quatuor temporum seu quadragesimae. A peccato autem tanto amplius coerceantur, quanto amplius de exitu suo cogitandum incumbit. Maxime vero tunc silentio studendum est in quo exceditur plurimum et orationi instandum sicut scriptum est:[66] *Fili, in tua infirmitate ne despicias teipsum, sed ora Deum, et ipse curabit te. Avertere a delicto et dirige manus et ab omni delicto munda cor tuum.* Oportet quoque infirmis providam semper assistere custodiam quae cum opus fuerit statim subveniat et domum omnibus instructam esse quae infirmitati illi sunt necessaria. De medicamentis quoque, si necesse est, pro facultate loci providendum erit. Quod facilius fieri poterit si quae infirmis praeest non fuerit expers medicinae. Ad quam etiam de iis quae sanguinem minuunt cura pertinebit. Oportet autem aliquam flebotomiae peritam esse ne virum propter hoc ad mulieres ingredi necesse sit. Providendum etiam est de officiis horarum et communione ne desint infirmis ut saltem Dominico die communicetur, confessione semper et satisfactione quam potuerint praeeuntibus. De unctione quoque infirmorum beati Jacobi Apostoli sententia[67] sollicite custodiatur ad quam quidem faciendam tunc maxime cum de vita aegrotantis desperatur, inducantur ex monachis duo seniores sacerdotes cum diacono qui sanctificatum oleum secum afferant et conventu sororum assistente, interposito tamen pariete, ipsi hoc celebrent sacramentum. Similiter cum opus fuerit, de communione agatur. Oportet itaque domum infirmarum sic aptari ut ad haec facienda monachi facilem habeant accessum et recessum, nec conventum videntes, nec ab eo visi.

Singulis autem diebus semel ad minus diaconissa cum celleraria infirmam tamquam Christum visitent ut de necessitatibus ejus sollicite provideant tam in corporalibus quam spiritualibus et illud[68] a Domino audire mereantur: *Infirmus eram et visitastis*[69] *me.* Quod si aegrotans ad exitum propinquaverit et in extasi agoniae venerit, statim aliqua ei assistens ad conventum properet cum tabula et eam pulsans exitum sororis nuntiet totusque conventus quaecumque[70] hora sit diei vel noctis ad morientem festinet nisi ecclesiasticis praepediatur[71] officiis. Quod si acciderit, quod nihil est operi Dei praeponendum,[72] satis est diaconissam cum aliquibus quas elegerit accelerare et conventum postmodum sequi. Quaecumque vero ad hunc tabulae pulsum[73] occurrerint statim litaniam inchoent quousque sanctorum et sanctarum invocatio compleatur et tunc vel psalmi vel cetera quae ad exsequias pertinent subsequantur. Quam salubre vero sit ad infirmos ire sive mortuos, Ecclesiastes diligenter attendens ait:[74] *Melius est ire ad domum luctus quam ad domum convivii. In illa enim finis cunctorum admonetur hominum, et vivens cogitat quid futurus sit.* Item:[75] *Cor sapientium ubi tristitia est et*[76] *cor stultorum ubi laetitia.*

Defunctae vero corpusculum a sororibus statim abluatur et aliqua vili sed munda interula et caligis indutum feretro imponatur velo capite obvoluto. Quae quidem indumenta firmiter corpori consuantur sive ligentur nec ulterius moveantur. Ipsum corpus a sororibus in ecclesia delatum monachi cum oportuerit sepulturae tradant et sorores interim in oratorio psalmodiae vel orationibus intente vacabunt. Diaconissae vero sepultura id tantum prae ceteris habeat honoris ut cilicio solo totum ejus corpus involvatur et in eo quasi in sacco tota consuatur.

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[65] *add infirmaria T.*
[66] *Eccli.* xxxviii, 9-10.
[67] v, 14.
[68] *Matt.* xxv, 36.
[69] visitasti *Amb.*
[70] quacumque *T.*
[71] impediatur *G.*
[72] Cf. Benedict, *Regula*, 43 (Edit, Butler, p. 82).
[73] cursum *T.*
[74] vii, 3.
[75] vii, 5.
[76] et . . . laetitia] *om. Amb.*

Vestiaria[77] totum quod ad curam indumentorum spectat providebit tam in calciamentis scilicet quam in ceteris omnibus. Ipsa tonderi oves faciet, coria calciamentorum suscipiet. Linum seu lanam excolet et colliget et totam curam telarum habebit. Filum et acum et forfices omnibus ministrabit. Totam dormitorii curam habebit et stratis omnibus providebit. De mantilibus quoque mensarum et manutergiis et universis pannis curam aget incidendis, suendis, abluendis. Ad hanc maxime illud[78] pertinet: *Quaesivit lanam et linum et operata est consilio manuum suarum. Manum suam misit ad colum et digiti sui apprehenderunt fusum. Non timebit domui suae a frigoribus nivis. Omnes enim domestici ejus vestiti duplicibus et ridebit in die novissimo. Consideravit semitas domus suae et panem otiosa non comedit. Surrexerunt filii ejus et beatissimam praedicaverunt eam.* Haec suorum operum habebit instrumenta et providebit de suis operibus quae quibus debeat injungere sororibus. Ipsa enim novitiarum curam aget donec in congregationem suscipiantur.

Celleraria curam habebit de iis omnibus quae pertinent ad victum, de cellario, refectorio, coquina, molendino, pistrino cum furno, de hortis etiam et viridariis et agrorum tota cultura, de apibus quoque, armentis et pecoribus cunctis, seu avibus necessariis. Ab ipsa requiretur quidquid de cibis necessarium erit. Hanc maxime non esse avaram convenit sed promptam et voluntariam ad omnia necessaria tribuenda. *Hilarem enim datorem diligit Deus.*[79] Quam omnino prohibemus ne de administrationis suae dispensatione sibi magis quam aliis sit propitia nec privata sibi paret fercula nec sibi reservet quod[80] aliis defraudet.

> Optimus, inquit Hieronymus,[81] est dispensator qui sibi nihil reservat.

Judas suae dispensationis abutens officio, cum loculos haberet, de coetu periit apostolico.[82] Ananias quoque et Saphira uxor ejus sua[83] retinendo sententiam mortis exceperunt.[84]

Ad portariam sive ostiariam, quod idem est, pertinet de suscipiendis hospitibus vel quibuslibet advenientibus et de his nuntiandis vel adducendis ubi oporteat et de cura hospitalitatis. Hanc aetate et mente discretam esse convenit ut sciat accipere responsum et reddere et qui vel qualiter suscipiendi sint an non sint dijudicare. Ex qua maxime tamquam ex vestibulo Domini[85] religionem monasterii decorari oportet cum ab ipsa ejus notitia incipiat. Sit igitur blandis verbis, mitis alloquio, ut in his quoque quos excluserit convenienti reddita ratione caritatem studeat aedificare. Hinc enim scriptum est:[86] *Responsio mollis frangit iram; sermo durus suscitat furorem.* Et alibi:[87] *Verbum dulce multiplicat amicos et mitigat inimicos.* Ipsa quoque saepius pauperes videns meliusque cognoscens, si qua eis de cibis aut vestimentis distribuenda sunt, distribuet; tam ipsa vero quam ceterae officiales, si suffragio vel solatio aliquarum eguerint, dentur eis a diaconissa vicariae. Quas praecipue de conversis assumi convenit ne aliqua umquam monialium divinis desit officiis sive capitulo vel refectorio.

Domunculam juxta portam habeat in qua ipsa vel ejus vicaria praesto sit semper advenientibus, ubi etiam otiosae non maneant et tanto amplius silentio studeant, quanto earum loquacitas his quoque qui extra sunt facilius potest innotescere. Ipsius profecto est non solum homines quos oportet arcere, verum etiam rumores penitus excludere, ne ad conventum temere deferantur et ab ipsa est exigendum quidquid in hoc quoque fuerit excessum. Si quid vero audierit quod scitu opus sit, ad diaconissam secreto referet ut ipsa super hoc si placet deliberet. Mox autem ut ad portam pulsatum vel inclamatum fuerit, quae[88] praesto est quaerat a supervenientibus qui sint aut quid velint portamque si opportuerit statim aperiat ut advenientes suscipiat. Solas quippe feminas intus hospitari licebit. Viri autem ad monachos dirigentur. Nullus itaque aliqua de causa intus admittetur nisi consulta prius et jubente diaconissa. Feminis autem statim patebit introitus. Susceptas vero feminas seu viros quacumque occasione introeuntes portaria in cellula sua pausare faciet donec a diaconissa vel sororibus, si necessarium est vel opportunum, eis occurratur. Pauperibus vero quae ablutione pedum indigent hanc quoque hospitalitatis gratiam ipsa diaconissa seu sorores diligenter exhibeant. Nam et Apostolis[89] ex hoc Dominus[90] praecipue humanitatis obsequio dictus est diaconus, sicut in Vitis quoque Patrum quidam ipsorum meminit dicens:[91]

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[77] vestiararia *T.*

[78] *Prov.* xxxi, 13, 19 ff.

[79] *II Cor.* ix, 7.

[80] quae *Amb.*

[81] *Epist.* 52 ad *Nepotianum,* 16 (CSEL 54, 440; PL 22, 539).

[82] Cf. *John* xiii, 29.

[83] *om. Amb.*

[84] Cf. *Acts* v.

[85] domum *T.*

[86] *Prov.* xv, 1.

[87] *Eccli.* vi, 5.

> Propter te homo Salvator factus diaconus praecingens se linteo, lavit pedes discipulorum praecipiens eis fratrum pedes lavare.

Hinc Apostolus de diaconissa meminit dicens:[92] *Si hospitio recepit, si sanctorum pedes lavit.* Et ipse Dominus:[93] *Hospes,* inquit, *eram et collegistis me.* Officiales omnes praeter cantricem de his instituantur quae litteris non intendunt si ad hoc tales reperiri possint idoneae ut litteris vacare liberius queant.

Oratorii ornamenta necessaria sint non superflua, munda magis quam pretiosa. Nihil igitur in eo de auro vel de argento compositum sit praeter unum calicem argenteum vel plures etiam si necesse sit. Nulla de serico sint ornamenta praeter stolas aut phanones. Nulla in eo sint imaginum sculptilia. Crux ibi lignea tantum erigatur ad altare in qua si forte imaginem Salvatoris placeat depingi non est prohibendum. Nullas vero alias imagines altaria cognoscant. Campanis duabus monasterium sit contentum. Vas aquae benedictae ad introitum oratorii extra collocetur ut ea sanctificentur mane ingressurae vel post Completorium egressae.

Nullae monialium horis desint canonicis sed statim ut pulsatum fuerit signum omnibus aliis postpositis ad divinum properetur officium modesto tamen incessu. Introeuntes autem secreto oratorium dicant quae poterunt: *Introibo in domum tuam, adorabo ad templum sanctum tuum,*[94] etc. Nullus in choro liber teneatur nisi officio praesenti necessarius. Psalmi aperte et distincte ad intelligendum dicantur et tam moderata sit psalmodia vel cantus ut quae vocem habent infirmam sustinere valeant. Nihil in ecclesia legatur aut cantetur nisi de authentica sumptum scriptura, maxime autem de novo vel veteri testamento. Quae utraque sic per lectiones distribuantur ut ex integro per annum in ecclesia legantur. Expositiones vero ipsorum vel sermones doctorum seu quaelibet scripturae aliquid aedificationis habentes ad mensam vel in capitulo recitentur et ubicumque opus sit omnium lectio concedatur. Nulla autem legere vel cantare praesumat nisi quod prius praeviderit. Si qua forte de iis aliquid in oratorio vitiose protulerit, ibidem supplicando coram omnibus satisfaciat secreto dicens: Ignosce, Domine, etiam hac vice negligentiae meae.

Media autem nocte secundum institutionem propheticam ad vigilias nocturnas surgendum est propter quod adeo tempestive cubandum est ut has vigilias ferre natura valeat infirma, et omnia quae ad diem pertinent cum luce fieri possint sicut et beatus Benedictus instituit.[95] Post vigilias autem ad dormitorium redeatur antequam hora matutinarum Laudum pulsetur. Et si quid noctis adhuc superest, infirmae somnus non negetur naturae. Maxime namque somnus lassatam recreat naturam et patientem operis reddit et sobriam conservat et alacrem. Si quae

[88] qui *T.*
[89] apostolus *T Amb.*
[90] *om. Amb.*
[91] VI, 4, 8 (PL 73, 1016).
[92] *I Tim.* v, 10.
[93] *Matt.* xxv, 35.
[94] *Psalm* v, 8.
[95] *Regula,* 8 ff. (Edit. Butler, p. 41 ff.).

tamen psalterii vel aliquarum lectionum meditatione indigent ut beatus quoque meminit Benedictus[96] vacare ita debent ut quiescentes non inquietent. Ideo namque meditationi hoc loco potius quam lectioni dixit ne lectio aliquorum quietem impediret aliorum. Qui etiam cum ait:[97] A fratribus qui indigent, profecto nec ad hanc meditationem compulit. Nonnumquam tamen si doctrina etiam cantus opus est, de hoc similiter providendum est iis quibus necesse est.

Hora vero matutina die statim illucescente peragatur et exorto lucifero si provideri potest ipsa pulsetur. Qua completa revertatur ad dormitorium. Quod si aestas fuerit, quia tunc breve est tempus nocturnum et longum matutinum, aliquantulum ante Primam dormire non prohibemus donec sonitu facto excitantur.[98] De qua etiam quiete post matutinales videlicet Laudes beatus Gregorius secundo Dialogorum capitulo cum de venerabili viro Libertino loqueretur meminit[99] dicens:[1]

> Die vero erat altera pro utilitate monasterii causa constituta. Expletis igitur hymnis matutinalibus, Libertinus ad lectum abbatis venit, orationem sibi humiliter petiit, etc.

Haec igitur quies matutinalis a pascha usque ad aequinoctium autumnale ex quo videlicet[2] nox incipit diem excedere non denegetur.

Egressae autem de dormitorio abluant et acceptis libris in claustro sedeant legentes vel cantantes donec Prima pulsetur. Post Primam vero in capitulum eatur et omnibus ibi residentibus lectio martyrologii legatur, luna ante pronuntiata. Ubi postmodum vel aliquo sermonis aedificio fiat vel aliquid de regula legatur et exponatur. Deinde si quae corrigenda sunt vel disponenda, prosequi haec[3] oportet.

Sciendum vero est nec monasterium nec domum aliquam inordinatam dici debere si qua ibi inordinate fiant, sed si[4] cum facta fuerunt non sollicite corrigantur. Quis enim locus a peccato penitus expers? Quod diligenter beatus attendens Augustinus cum clerum suum instrueret ita[5] quodam loco meminit:[6]

> Quantumlibet enim vigilet[7] disciplina domus meae; homo sum et inter homines vivo. Nec mihi arrogare audeo ut domus mea melior sit quam arca Noe, ubi tamen inter octo homines unus inventus est reprobus;[8] aut quam domus Abrahae, ubi dictum est:[9] *Ejice ancillam et filium ejus*; aut[10] domus Isaac, *Jacob dilexi, Esau odio habui;*[11] aut domus Jacob ubi lectum patris filius incestavit;[12] aut domus David, cujus filius [unus] cum sorore concubuit,[13] alter contra patris tam sanctam mansuetudinem rebellavit;[14] aut cohabitatio Apostoli Pauli qui, si inter omnes bonos habitaret, non diceret:[15] *Foris pugnae, intus timores,* nec[16] loqueretur:[17] *Nemo est homo qui germane de vobis sollicitus sit. Omnes quae sua sunt quaerunt,* etc.; aut cohabitatio ipsius Christi in qua undecim boni perfidum et furem Judam toleraverunt;[18] aut postremo quam caelum unde angeli ciciderunt.[19]

Qui etiam nos ad disciplinam monasterii plurimum exhortans adnexuit dicens:[20]

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[96] *Id.* 8 (*Ibid.* p. 41).

[97] *Ibid.*

[98] excitentur *Amb.*

[99] nemini *T.*

[1] I, 2 (Edit. Moricca, p. 24; PL 77, 161).

[2] videlicet nox] *om. Amb.*

[3] *om. Amb.*

[4] non *CE.*

[5] in *CE.*

[6] *Epist.* 78, 8 (CSEL 34, 343; PL 33, 272). *add* dicens *Amb.*

[7] invigilet *CE.*

[8] Cf. *Gen.* vii, 1.

[9] *Id.* xxi, 10.

[10] aut . . . habui] *om. CE.*

[11] *Malac.* i, 2.

[12] Cf. *Gen.* xxxv, 22.

[13] Cf. *II Kings* xiii, 14.

[14] Cf. *id.* xv.

[15] *II Cor.* vii, 5.

[16] nec . . . quaerunt] *om. CE.*

[17] *Philip.* ii, 20.

[18] Cf. *John* xiii, 29.

[19] Cf. *Apoc.* xii, 9.

[20] *Epist.* 78, 9 (CSEL 34, 344; PL 33, 272).

> Fateor coram Deo ex quo Deo[21] servire coepi quomodo difficile sum expertus meliores quam qui in monasteriis profecerunt.[22] Ita non sum expertus pejores quam qui in monasteriis ceciderunt.

Ita ut hinc arbitror in Apocalypsi scriptum:[23] *Justus justior fiat et sordidus sordescat adhuc.*

Tanta igitur correctionis districtio sit ut quaecumque in altera viderit quod corrigendum sit et celaverit graviori subjaceat disciplinae quam illa quae hoc commisit. Nulla igitur vel suum vel alterius delictum accusare differat. Quaecumque vero se accusans alias praevenerit sicut scriptum est:[24] *Justus prior est accusator sui,* mitiorem meretur disciplinam, si ejus cessaverit negligentia.[25] Nulla vero aliam excusare praesumat nisi forte diaconissa ab aliis ignotam rei veritatem interroget. Nulla umquam aliam caedere[26] pro quacumque culpa praesumat nisi cui injunctum fuerit a diaconissa. Scriptum[27] est autem de disciplina correctionis: *Disciplinam Domini, fili mi, ne abjicias; ne deficias cum ab eo corriperis; quem enim diligit Dominus, corripit, et quasi pater in filio complacet sibi.* Item:[28] *Qui parcit virgae, odit filium; qui autem diligit illum, instanter erudit. Pestilente*[29] *flagellato stultus sapientior erit. Mulctato*[30] *pestilente sapientior erit parvulus. Flagellum*[31] *equo et chamus asino et virga dorso imprudentium. Qui*[32] *corripit hominem gratiam*[33] *postea inveniet apud eum magis quam ille qui per linguae blandimenta decipit. Omnis*[34] *autem disciplina in praesenti quidem*[35] *videtur non esse gaudii, sed moeroris. Postea autem fructum pacatissimum exercitatis per eam reddet justitiae. Confusio*[36] *patris est in filio indisciplinato; filia*[37] *autem fatua in deminoratione erit. Qui*[38] *diligit filium, assiduat illi flagella ut laetetur in novissimo. Qui docet filium, laudabitur in illo et in medio domesticorum in illo gloriabitur.*[39] *Equus*[40] *indomitus evadet durus et filius remissus evadet praeceps. Lacta filium tuum et paventem te faciet. Lude cum eo et contristabit te.*

In discussione vero consilii cuilibet suam proferre sententiam licebit sed quidquid omnibus videatur diaconissae[41] decretum immobile teneatur in cujus arbitrio cuncta consistunt etiamsi, quod absit, ipsa fallatur et quod deterius est ipsa constituat. Unde et illud est beati Augustini libro Confessionum:[42]

> Multum peccat qui inobediens est suis praelatis in aliquo, si vel meliora eligat quam ea quae sibi jubentur.

Multo quippe melius est nobis bene facere quam bonum facere. Nec tam quod fiat, quam quod[43] quomodo vel quo[44] animo fiat, pensandum est. Bene vero fit quidquid per obedientiam fit etiamsi quod fit bonum esse minime videatur. Per omnia itaque praelatis est obediendum quantacumque sint damna rerum, si nullum apparet animae periculum. Provideat praelatus ut bene praecipiat quia subjectis bene obedire sufficit nec suam, sicut professi sunt, sed praelatorum sequi voluntatem. Omnino[45] enim prohibemus ut numquam consuetudo rationi praeponatur, nec umquam aliquid defendatur quia sit consuetudo, sed quia ratio, nec quia sit usitatum, sed quia bonum, et tanto libentius excipiatur quanto melius apparebit. Alioquin judaizantes legis antiquitatem Evangelio praeferamus.

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[21] ipso *CE.*

[22] profecerunt . . . adhuc] *om. CE.*

[23] xxii, 11.

[24] *Prov* xviii, 17.

[25] negligentia . . . diaconissa] *om. CE.*

[26] caedere praesumat post quamcumque culpam *CE.*

[27] *Prov.* iii, 11-12.

[28] *Id.*, xiii, 24.

[29] *Id.*, xix, 25.

[30] *Id.*, xxi, 11.

[31] *Id.*, xxvi, 3. Flagellum . . . decipit] *om. CE.*

[32] *Id.*, xxviii, 23.

[33] *om. Amb.*

[34] *Hebrews* xii, 11.

[35] quid *Amb.*

[36] *Eccli* xxii, 3.

[37] filia . . . contristabit te] *om. CE.*

[38] *Eccli.* xxx, 1-2.

[39] gloriatur *Amb.*

[40] *Eccli.* xxx, 8-9.

[41] diaconissa *T*] *add* tamquam *CE.*

[42] This passage is not in the Confessions.

[43] *om. CE.*

[44] *om. Amb.*

[45] omnibus *G.*

Ad quod beatus Augustinus de Concilio[46] Cypriani pleraque asserans testimonia quodam loco ait:[47]

> Qui contempta veritate praesumit consuetudinem sequi, aut circa fratres invidus est et malignus, quibus veritas revelatur, aut circa Deum ingratus est cujus inspiratione ecclesia ejus instruitur.

Item:[48]

> In Evangelio Dominus:[49] *Ego sum*, inquit, *Veritas*. Non dixit: Ego sum consuetudo. Itaque veritate manifestata,[50] cedat consuetudo veritati.

Item.[51]

> Revelatione[52] facta veritatis, cedat error veritati quia et Petrus qui prius circumcidebat, cessit Paulo praedicanti veritatem.

Item libro IV de Baptismo:[53]

> Frustra quidem qui ratione vincuntur, consuetudinem nobis objiciunt, quasi consuetudo major sit veritate, aut non sit in spiritualibus sequendum, quod in melius fuit a Spiritu sancto revelatum. Hoc plane verum est quia ratio et veritas consuetudini praeponenda est.

Gregorius VII Wimundo[54] episcopo:[55]

> Et certe, ut beati Cypriani utamur sententia, quaelibet consuetudo quantumvis vetusta quantumvis vulgata, veritati est omnino postponenda[56] et usus qui veritati est contrarius abolendus.

Quanto etiam[57] amore veritas quoque verborum amplectenda sit[58] admonemur in Ecclesiastico cum dicitur:[59] *Pro anima tua non confundaris dicere verum.* Item:[60] *Non contradicas verbo veritatis ullo*[61] *modo.* Et iterum:[62] *Ante omnia opera verbum verax praecedat te et ante omnem actum consilium stabile.* Nihil etiam in auctoritatem ducatur quia geritur a multis, sed quia probatur a sapientibus et bonis. *Stultorum,* inquit[63] Salomon, *infinitus est numerus.* Et[64] juxta Veritatis assertionem:[65] *Multi vocati, pauci vero electi.* Rara sunt quaeque pretiosa et quae abundant numero minuuntur pretio. Nemo enim in consilio majorem hominum partem, sed meliorem sequatur. Nec aetas hominis, sed sapientia consideretur, nec amicitia, sed veritas attendatur. Unde et poetica est illa sententia:[66]

Fas est et ab hoste doceri.

Quoties autem opus est consilio non differatur et si de rebus praecipuis est deliberandum, convocetur conventus. In minoribus autem rebus discutiendis sufficiet diaconissa paucis ad se de majoribus personis convocatis. Scriptum quoque est de consilio:[67] *Ubi non est gubernator populus corruit. Salus*[68] *autem*

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[46] consilio *CE Amb.*

[47] *De baptismo* III, 5 (CSEL 51, 203; PL 43, 143).

[48] *Id.*, III, 6 (*Ibid.*).

[49] *John* xiv, 6.

[50] manifesta *CE.*

[51] III, 7 (*Ibid.*).

[52] revelatione . . . veritatem] *om. CE.*

[53] IV, 5 (CSEL 53, 228; PL 43, 157).

[54] *add* adversario *CE.*

[55] The origin of this text is uncertain. It is to be found in the *Decretum* of Yvo (IV, 213) and later in the *Decretum* of Gratian (D.8, c.5.).

[56] praeponenda *T.*

[57] autem *CE.*

[58] *om. Amb.*

[59] iv, 24.

[60] *Id.*, iv, 30.

[61] nullo *CE.*

[62] *Eccli.* xxxvii, 20.

[63] *Eccl.* i, 15.

[64] et juxta . . . pretio] *om. CE.*

[65] *Matt.* xxii, 14.

[66] Ovid, *Metamorphoseon* IV, 428.

[67] *Prov.* xi, 14.

[68] salus . . . audit consilia] *om. CE.*

ubi multa consilia. Via[69] *stulti recta in oculis ejus. Qui autem sapiens est, audit consilia. Fili,*[70] *sine consilio nihil*[71] *facias et post factum non paenitebis.* Si forte sine consilio aliquid prosperum habet eventum, non excusat hominis[72] praesumptionem fortunae beneficium. Sin autem post consilium nonnumquam errant, potestas quae consilium quaesivit rea non tenetur[73] praesumptionis. Nec tam culpandus est qui credidit quam quibus ipse errando acquievit.

Egressae vero capitulum iis quibus oportet operibus intendant, legendo scilicet vel cantando sive manibus operando usque ad Tertiam. Post[74] Tertiam autem missa dicatur ad quam quidem celebrandam unus ex monachis sacerdos hebdomadarius instituatur. Quem profecto si copia tanta sit cum diacono et subdiacono venire oportet qui ei quod necessarium est administrent vel quod suum est et ipsi operentur. Quorum accessus vel recessus ita fiant ut sororum conventui nullatenus pateant. Si vero plures necessarii fuerint,[75] de his providentdum erit et ita semper si fieri potest ut monachi propter missas monialium numquam conventui suo in officiis desint divinis.

Si vero communicandum a sororibus fuerit, senior eligatur sacerdos qui post missam eas communicet; egressis inde prius diacono et subdiacono propter tollendam tentationis occasionem. Ter vero ad minus in anno totus communicet conventus, id est Pascha, Pentecoste et Natale Domini, sicut a patribus est institutum de saecularibus etiam hominibus.[76] His autem communionibus ita se praeparent ut tertio die ante ad confessionem et congruam satisfactionem omnes accedant et terno se panis et aquae jejunio et oratione frequenti purificent cum omni humilitate et tremore illam Apostoli terribilem apud se retractantes sententiam: *Itaque, inquit,*[77] *quicumque manducaverit panem vel biberit calicem Domini indigne, reus erit corporis et sanguinis Domini. Probet autem seipsum homo, et sic de pane illo edat et*[78] *calice bibat. Qui enim manducat et bibit indigne, judicium sibi manducat et bibit, non dijudicans corpus Domini. Ideo inter vos multi infirmi et imbecilles, et dormunt multi. Quod si nosmetipsos dijudicaremus, non utique judicaremur.*[79] Post missam quoque ad opera redeant usque ad Sextam et nullo tempore otiose vivant sed unaquaeque id quod potest et quod oportet operetur. Post Sextam autem prandendum est nisi jejunium fuerit. Tunc enim Nona est exspectanda et in quadragesima etiam Vespera. Nullo vero tempore conventus careat lectione quam cum diaconissa terminare voluerit, dicat: sufficit, et statim ad grates Domino referendas ab omnibus surgatur. Aestivo tempore post prandium usque ad Nonam quiescendum est in dormitorio et post Nonam ad opera redeundum usque ad Vesperas. Post Vesperas autem vel statim caenandum est vel potandum. Et inde[80] secundum temporis considerationem[81] ad collationem eundum. Sabbato autem ante collationem munditiae fiant in ablutione videlicet pedum et manuum, in quo quidem obsequio diaconissa famuletur cum hebdomadariis quae coquinae deservierunt. Post collationem vero ad Completorium statim est veniendum, inde dormitum est eundum.

De victu autem et vestitu apostolica teneatur sententia[82] qua dicitur: *Habentes autem alimenta et quibus tegamur, his contenti simus.* Ut videlicet necessaria sufficiant, non superflua quaerantur. Et quod vilius poterit comparari vel facilius haberi et sine scandalo sumi, id[83] concedatur. Solum quippe scandalum propriae conscientiae vel alterius in cibis Apostolus vitat sciens quia non est cibus in vitio sed appetitus. *Qui manducat,* inquit,[84] *non manducantem non spernat; qui non manducat, manducantem non judicet. Tu quis es qui judicas alienum servum? Qui manducat, Domino manducat. Gratias enim agit Deo. Et qui non manducat, Domino non manducat, et gratias agit Deo. Non ergo amplius invicem judicemus, sed hoc judicate magis, ne ponatis offendiculum fratri, vel scandalum. Scio et confido in Domino Jesu, quia nihil commune per ipsum, nisi qui existimat quid commune esse. Non est regnum Dei esca et potus, sed justitia et pax et gaudium in Spiritu sancto. Omnia quidem munda sunt, sed malum est homini qui per offendiculum manducat. Bonum est non manducare carnem et non bibere vinum, neque in quo frater tuus offendatur aut scandalizetur.* Qui etiam post scandalum fratris de proprio scandalo ipsius qui contra conscientiam suam comedit adjungit dicens:[85] *Beatus qui non judicat semetipsum in eo quod probat. Qui autem discernit, si manducaverit, damnatus est, quia non ex fide. Omne autem quod non est ex fide, peccatum est.*

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[69] *Prov.* xii, 15.

[70] *Eccli.* xxxii, 24.

[71] nihil . . . paenitebis] *om. CE.*

[72] hominis . . . acquievit] *om. CE.*

[73] teneatur *Amb.*

[74] post . . . est eundum (end of next paragraph)] *om. CE.*

[75] *add* et *Amb.*

[76] This rule, laid down by the Council of Agde in 506 (can. 18), was renewed by many later councils and is found in all the canonical collections, e.g. Yvo, *Decretum* (II, 27) and Gratian, *Decretum* (D.2,c.16,*de cons.*). The rule of the annual Easter Communion was substituted for it by the IV Lateran Council in 1215 (can.21). See A. Villien, *Histoire des commandements de l'Eglise* (3rd edit., Paris, 1936), pp. 186-187.

[77] *I Cor.* xi, 27-31.

[78] *add* de *Amb.*

[79] dijudicaremur *Amb.*

[80] *add* etiam *Amb.*

[81] consuetudinem *Amb.*

[82] *I Tim.* vi, 8.

In omni quippe quod agimus contra conscientiam nostram et contra hoc quod credimus, peccamus. Et in eo quod probamus, hoc est per legem quam approbamus atque recipimus, judicamus nosmetipsos atque damnamus, si illos videlicet comedimus cibos quos discernimus, hoc est secuundum[86] legem excludimus et separamus tamquam immundos. Tantum enim est testimonium conscientiae nostrae ut haec nos apud Deum maxime accuset vel excuset. Unde et Joannes in prima sua meminit Epistola:[87] *Carissimi, si cor nostrum non reprehenderit nos, fiduciam habemus ad Deum. Et*[88] *quidquid petierimus, accipiemus ab eo, quoniam mandata ejus custodimus et ea quae sunt placita coram eo,*[89] *facimus.* Bene itaque et Paulus superius ait:[90] *Nihil esse commune per Christum, nisi ei qui commune quid esse putat,* hoc est immundum et interdictum si[91] sibi credit. Communes quippe cibos dicimus qui secundum legem mundi[92] vocantur, quod eos scilicet lex a suis excludens quasi his qui extra legem sunt exponat[93] et publicet. Unde et communes feminae immundae sunt et communia quaeque vel publicata vilia sunt vel minus cara. Nullum itaque cibum per Christum asserit esse communem, id est immundum, quia lex Christi nullum interdicit nisi, ut dictum est, propter scandalum removendum vel propriae scilicet conscientiae vel alienae. De qua et alibi dicit:[94] *Quapropter, si esca scandalizat fratrem meum, non manducabo carnem*[95] *in aeternum, ne fratrem meum scandalizem. Non*[96] *sum liber? non sum Apostolus?* etc. Ac si diceret: Numquid non habeo illam libertatem quam Dominus Apostolis dedit de quibuslibet scilicet edendis vel de stipendiis aliorum sumendis? Sic quippe cum Apostolos mitteret quodam loco ait:[97] *Edentes et bibentes quae apud illos sunt,* nullum videlicet cibum a ceteris distinguens. Quod diligenter Apostolus attendens et omnia ciborum genera etiamsi sint infidelium cibi et idolathyta Christianis esse licita studiose prosequitur solum, ut diximus, in cibis scandalum vitans. *Omnia,* inquit,[98] *licent, sed non omnia expediunt.*[99] *Omnia mihi licent, sed non omnia aedificant. Nemo quod suum est quaerat, sed quod alterius. Omne quod in macello venit, manducate, nihil interrogantes propter conscientiam. Domini est terra et plenitudo ejus. Si quis vocat vos infidelium ad coenam et vultis ire, omne quod vobis apponitur, manducate, nihil interrogantes propter conscientiam. Si quis autem dixerit: hoc immolatum*

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[83] re *Amb.*

[84] *Rom.* xiv, 3 ff.

[85] *Id.*, xiv, 22-23.

[86] per *Amb.*

[87] iii, 21.

[88] ut *CE.*

[89] Deo *CE.*

[90] Cf. *Rom.* xiv, 14.

[91] *om. CE.*

[92] immundi *CE.*

[93] apponat *C.*

[94] *I Cor.* viii, 13.

[95] *om. Amb.*

[96] *I Cor.* ix, 1.

[97] *Luke* x, 7.

[98] *I Cor.* x, 22 ff.

[99] expediunt . . . non omnia] *om. CE.*

est idolis, nolite manducare propter illum qui judicavit[1] *et*[2] *propter conscientiam. Conscientiam autem dico, non tuam, sed alterius. Sine offensione estote Judaeis et Gentibus et ecclesiae Dei.*

Ex quibus videlicet Apostoli verbis manifeste colligitur nullum nobis[3] interdici quo sine offensa propriae conscientiae vel alienae vesci possimus. Sine offensa vero propriae conscientiae tunc agimus si propositum vitae quo salvari possumus nos servare[4] confidimus. Sine offensa autem alienae si eo modo vivere credimur quo salvemur. Eo quidem modo vivemus si omnibus necessariis naturae indultis peccata vitemus, nec de nostra virtute praesumentes illi vitae jugo per professionem nos obligemus quo praegravati succumbamus et tanto sit gravior casus quanto fuerat professionis altior gradus.

Quem quidem casum et stultae professionis votum Ecclesiastes praeveniens ait.[5] *Si quid vovisti Deo ne moreris reddere. Displicet enim ei infidelis et stulta promissio. Sed quodcumque voveris, redde. Melius est non vovere, quam post votum promissa non reddere.* Cui quoque periculo apostolicum occurrens consilium. *Volo*, inquit,[6] *juniores nubere, filios procreare, matresfamilias*[7] *esse, nullam occasionem dare adversario maledicti gratia. Jam enim quaedam conversae sunt retro Satanam.* Aetatis infirmae naturam considerans remedium vitae laxioris opponit periculo melioris. Consulit residere in imo ne praecipitium detur ex alto.

Quem[8] et beatus secutus Hieronymus Eustochium virginem instruens[9] ait:[10]

> Si autem et illae quae virgines sunt ob alias tamen culpas non salvantur, quid fiet illis quae prostituerunt membra Christi et mutaverunt templum Spiritus sancti in lupanar? Rectius fuerat homini subiisse conjugium, ambulasse per plana, quam ad altiora tendentem in profundum inferni cadere.

Quod si etiam universa revolvamus Apostoli dicta, numquam eum reperiemus secunda matrimonia nisi feminis indulsisse sed viros maxime ad continentiam exhortans ait:[11] *Circumcisus aliquis vocatus est? Non adducat praeputium.* Et iterum:[12] *Solutus es ab uxore? Noli quaerere uxorem.* Cum Moyses tamen viris magis quam feminis indulgens uni viro plures simul feminas, non uni feminae plures viros concedat, et districtius adulteria[13] feminarum quam virorum puniat.[14] *Mulier*, inquit[15] Apostolus, *si mortuus fuerit vir ejus, liberata est a lege viri ut non sit adultera si fuerit cum alio viro.* Et alibi:[16] *Dico autem non nuptis et viduis: Bonum est illis si sic permaneant, sicut et ego. Quod si non se continent, nubant. Melius est enim nubere quam uri.* Et iterum:[17] *Mulier si dormierit vir ejus, liberata est; cui vult nubat, tantum in Domino. Beatior autem erit si sic permanserit secundum consilium meum.* Nam secunda tantum matrimonia infirmo sexui concedit, verum[18] etiam ea nullo concludere audet numero sed cum dormierint earum viri nubere aliis permittit. Nullum matrimoniis earum praefigit numerum,[19] dummodo fornicationis evadant reatum. Saepius magis nubant quam semel fornicentur ne[20] se[21] uni prostituant,[22] multis carnalis commercii debitum solvant. Quae tamen debiti solutio non est penitus immunis a peccato sed indulgentur minora ut majora vitentur peccata. Quid igitur mirum si id in quo nullum est omnino conceditur ne[23] peccatum incurrant, hoc est alimenta quaelibet necessaria, non superflua? Non est enim, ut dictum est, cibus in vitio sed appetitus, cum videlicet libet[24] quod non licet et concupiscitur quod interdictum est et nonnumquam impudenter sumitur unde maximum scandalum generatur.

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[1] judicat *CE.*
[2] *om. CE.*
[3] *add* cibum *CE.*
[4] salvare *CE.*
[5] v, 3-4.
[6] *I Tim.* v, 14-15.
[7] matresfamilias . . . Satanam] *om. CE.*
[8] quod *CE.*
[9] instituens *Amb.*
[10] *Epist.* 22, 6 (CSEL 54, 150; PL 22, 397).
[11] *I Cor.* vii, 18.
Id., vii, 27.
[13] adultera *Amb.*
[14] Cf. *Levit.* xx, 10; *Deut.* xxii, 22.
[15] *Romans*, vii, 3.
[16] *I Cor.* vii, 8-9.
[17] *Id.*, vii, 39-40.
[18] verum . . . permittit] *om. CE.*
[19] matrimonium *C.*
[20] ne se . . . peccata] *om. CE.*
[21] si *Amb.*
[22] prostituantur *Amb.*
[23] nec *CE.*

Quid vero inter universa hominum alimenta tam periculosum est vel damnosum et religioni nostrae vel sanctae quieti contrarium quantum vinum? Quod maximus ille sapientum diligenter attendens ab[25] hoc maxime nos dehortatur dicens:[26] *Luxuriosa res, vinum, et tumultuosa ebrietas. Quicumque his delectatur, non erit sapiens. Cui*[27] *vae? Cujus patri vae? Cui rixae? Cui foveae? Cui sine causa vulnera? Cui suffusio oculorum? Nonne his qui morantur in vino et student calicibus epotandis? Ne*[28] *intuearis vinum quando flavescit, cum splenduerit in vitro color ejus. Ingreditur blande, sed in novissimo mordebit ut coluber et sicut regulus, venena diffundet. Oculi tui videbunt extraneas et cor tuum loquetur perversa. Et eris sicut dormiens in medio mari*[29] *et*[30] *quasi sopitus gubernator, amisso clavo. Et dices: Verberaverunt me et non dolui, traxerunt me et ego non sensi. Quando evigilabo et rursus vina reperiam?* Item:[31] *Noli regibus, o Lamuel, noli regibus dare vinum, quia nullum secretum est ubi regnat ebrietas. Ne*[32] *forte bibant et obliviscantur judiciorum et mutent*[33] *causam filiorum pauperis.* Et in Ecclesiastico scriptum est:[34] *Operarius ebriosus non locupletabitur, et*[35] *qui spernit modica, paulatim decidet. Vinum et mulieres apostatare faciunt sapientes et arguunt sensatos.*

Isaias quoque universos praeteriens cibos solum in causam captivitatis populi commemorat vinum. *Vae,* inquit,[36] *qui consurgitis mane ad ebrietatem sectandam et potandum usque ad vesperam, ut vino aestuetis. Cithara et lyra et tympanum et tibia et vinum in conviviis vestris, et opus Domini non respicitis. Propterea captivus ductus est populus meus, quia non habuit scientiam. Vae*[37] *qui potentes estis ad bibendum vinum et viri fortes ad miscendam ebrietatem.* Qui etiam de populo usque ad sacerdotes et prophetas querimoniam extendens, ait:[38] *Verum*[39] *hii quoque prae vino nescierunt et prae ebrietate erraverunt. Sacerdos et propheta nescierunt prae ebrietate; absorpti sunt a vino, erraverunt*[40] *in ebrietate, nescierunt videntem, ignoraverunt judicium. Omnes enim mensae repletae sunt vomitu sordiumque, ita ut non esset ultra locus. Quem docebit scientiam et quem intelligere faciet auditum?* Dominus per Joel dicit:[41] *Expergiscimini ebrii et flete qui bibitis vinum in dulcedine.* Non enim uti prohibet vino[42] in necessitate, sicut Apostolus inde Timotheo consulit[43] *propter stomachi frequentes infirmitates,* non[44] tantum infirmitates sed frequentes.

Noe primus vineam plantavit nesciens adhuc fortassis ebrietatis malum et inebriatus femora denudavit, quia vino conjuncta est luxuriae turpitudo. Qui etiam superirrisus a filio maledictionem in eum intorsit et servitutis illum sententia obligavit quae antea nequaquam facta esse cognovimus.[45] Lot virum sanctum ad incestum nullatenus trahi nisi per ebrietatem filiae ipsius providerunt.[46] Et beata vidua superbum Holofernem nonnisi hac arte illudi posse et prosterni credidit.[47] Angelos antiquis patribus apparentes et ab eis hospitio susceptos, carnibus non vino usos esse legimus.[48] Et maximo illi et primo principi nostro Eliae in solitudinem latenti corvi mane et vespere panis et carnium alimoniam, non vini ministrabant.[49]

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[24] cibus *C.*

[25] ad *T.*

[26] *Prov.* xx, 1.

[27] *Id.*, xxiii, 29-35.

[28] non *CE.*

[29] maris *CE.*

[30] et quasi . . . reperiam] *om. CE.*

[31] *Prov.* xxxi, 4.

[32] ne forte . . . pauperis] *om. CE.*

[33] mittant *T.*

[34] xix, 1.

[35] et qui . . . decidet] *om. CE.*

[36] v, 11.

[37] *Id.*, v, 22.

[38] *Isaias* xxviii, 7-9.

[39] verum . . . erraverunt] *om. CE.*

[40] erraverunt . . . auditum] *om. CE.*

[41] i, 5.

[42] vinum *T.*

[43] *I Tim.* v, 23.

[44] non tantum . . . frequentes] *om. CE.*

[45] Cf. *Gen.* ix, 20.

[46] Cf. *id.*, xix, 33.

[47] Cf. *Judith* xiii, 4.

[48] Cf. *Gen.* xviii, 1 ff.

[49] Cf. *III Kings* xvii, 6.

Populus etiam Israeliticus delicatissimis in eremo cibis maxime coturnicum educatus,[50] nec vino usus fuisse, nec ipsum appetiisse legitur.[51] Et[52] refectiones illae panum et piscium quibus in solitudine populus sustentabatur vinum nequaquam habuisse referuntur. Solummodo nuptiae quae indulgentiam habent incontinentiae vini in quo est luxuria miraculum habuerunt.[53] Solitudo vero quae propria est monachorum habitatio, carnium magis quam vini beneficium novit.

Summa etiam illa in lege Nazaraeorum religio qua[54] se Domino consecrant, vinum et quod inebriare potest solummodo vitabant.[55] Quae namque virtus, quod bonum in ebriis manet? Unde non solum vinum, verum etiam omne quod inebriare potest antiquis quoque sacerdotibus legimus interdici. De quo et Hieronymus ad Nepotianum de vita clericorum scribens et graviter indignans quod sacerdotes legis ab omni quod inebriare potest abstinentes nostros in hac abstinentia superent.

> Nequaquam, inquit,[56] vinum redoleas ne audias illud[57] philosophi: Hoc non est osculum porrigere sed proprinare. Vinolentos[58] sacerdotes et Apostolus damnat[59] et lex vetus prohibet.[60] Qui altario deserviunt vinum et siceram non bibent. Sicera Hebraeo sermone omnis potio nuncupatur quae inebriare potest sive illa quae fermento conficitur, sive pomorum succo, aut favi decoquuntur in dulcem et barbaram[61] potionem, aut palmarum fructus exprimuntur in liquorem coctisque frugibus aqua pinguior colatur. Quidquid inebriat et statum mentis evertit, fuge similiter ut vinum.

Ex regula sancti Pacomii:[62]

> Vinum et liquamen absque loco aegrotantium nullus attingat.

Quis etiam vestrum[63] non audierit vinum monachorum penitus non esse et in tantum olim a monachis abhorreri ut ab[64] ipso vehementer dehortantes ipsum Satanam appellarent? Unde[65] in Vitis Patrum scriptum legimus:[66]

> Narraverunt quidam abbati Pastori de quodam monacho quia non bibebat vinum et dixit eis quia vinum monachorum omnino non est.

Item post aliqua:[67]

> Facta est aliquando celebratio missarum in monte abbatis Antonii et inventum est ibi cenidium[68] vini. Et tollens unus de senibus parvum vas, calicem portavit ad abbatem Sisoi et dedit ei et bibit semel, et secundo et accepit et bibit. Obtulit ei etiam tertio sed non accepit dicens: Quiesce, frater, an nescis quia est Satanas?

Et iterum de abbate Sisoi:[69]

> Dicit ergo Abraham disciplus ejus, si occurritur in Sabbato et Dominica ad ecclesiam et biberit tres calices, ne multo est? Et dixit senex: Si non esset Satanas, non esset multum.

Hinc et beatus non immemor Benedictus cum dispensatione quadam monachis vinum indulgeret ait:[70]

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[50] advocatus *C*.
[51] Cf. *Exodus* xvi, 12.
[52] et refectiones . . . referuntur] *om. CE*.
[53] Cf. *John* ii, 1 ff.
[54] quo *CET*.
[55] Cf. *Numbers* vi, 3.
[56] *Epist.* 52, 11 (CSEL 54, 434; PL 22, 536).
[57] I am unable to locate this saying.
[58] vinolentes . . . ut vinum] *om. CE*.
[59] Cf. *I Tim.* iii, 3; *Titus* i, 7.
[60] Cf. *Levit.* x, 9.
[61] dulce et herbarum *T Amb.*
[62] Chap. 45 (PL 23, 72).
[63] nostrum *G*.
[64] ab ipso . . . dehortantes] *om. CE*.
[65] unde . . . esset multum] *om. CE*.
[66] V, 4, 31 (PL 73, 868).
[67] *Id.*, 36 (*Id.*, 869).
[68] In a later hand *T*.
[69] *Id.*, 37 (*Ibid.*).
[70] *Regula*, 40 (Edit. Butler, p. 78).

> Licet legamus vinum monachorum omnino non esse, sed quia nostris temporibus id monachis persuaderi non potest.

Quid enim mirum si monachis penitus non sit indulgendum quod feminis quoque quarum in se natura debilior et tamen contra vinum fortior, ipsum omnino beatus interdicit Hieronymus? Hic[71] enim Eustochium virginem Christi de conservanda instruens virginitate vehementer adhortatur dicens:[72]

> Si quid itaque in me potest esse consilii, si experto creditur, hoc primum moneo et obtestor ut sponsa Christi vinum fugiat pro veneno. Haec[73] adversus adolescentiam prima sunt arma daemonum. Non sic avaritia quatit, inflat superbia, delectat ambitio. Facile aliis caremus vitiis. Hic hostis intus inclusus est. Quocumque pergamus nobiscum portamus inimicum. Vinum et adolescentia duplex incendium voluptatis. Quid oleum flammae adjicimus? Quid ardenti corpusculo fomenta ignium ministramus?

Constat tamen ex eorum documentis qui de physica scripserunt multo minus feminis quam viris virtutem vini praevalere posse. Cujus quidem rei rationem inducens Macrobius Theodosius VII[74] Saturnaliorum libro sic ait:[75]

> Aristoteles mulieres, inquit, raro inebriantur crebro senes. Mulier humectissimo est corpore. Docet hoc et lenitas[76] cutis et splendor. Docent praecipue assiduae purgationes superfluo exonerantes corpus humore. Cum ergo epotum vinum in tam largum ceciderit humorem, vim suam perdit, nec facile cerebri sedem ferit fortitudine ejus exstincta.

Item:[77]

> Muliebre corpus crebris purgationibus deputatum[78] pluribus consertum foraminibus ut pateat in meatus et vias praebeat humori in[79] egestionis exitum confluenti. Per haec foramina vapor vini celeriter evanescit.

Qua igitur ratione id monachis indulgetur quod infirmiori sexui denegatur. Quanta est insania id eis concedere quibus amplius potest nocere et aliis negare? Quid denique stultius id quod religioni magis est contrarium et a Deo plurimum facit apostatare religionem non abhorrere? Quid impudentius quam id quod regibus quoque et sacerdotibus legis interdicitur?[80] Christianae perfectionis abstinentiam non vitare? immo in hoc maxime delectari? Quis namque ignoret quantum in hoc tempore clericorum praecipue vel monachorum studium circa cellaria versetur ut ea scilicet diversis generibus vini repleant? Herbis illud[81] melle et speciebus condiant ut tanto facilius se inebrient[82] quanto delectabilius potent.[83] Et tanto se magis ad libidinem incitent quanto amplius vino aestuent?[84] Quis hic non tam error quam furor ut qui se maxime per professionem continentiae obligant, minus se ad conservandum votum praeparent? Imo ut minime custodiri possit efficiant? Quorum profecto si claustris retinentur corpora, corda libidine plena sunt et in fornicationem inardescit animus. Scribens ad Timotheum Apostolus: *Noli,* inquit,[85] *adhuc aquam bibere, sed vino modico utere propter stomachum tuum et frequentes infirmitates tuas.* Cui propter infirmitatem vinum conceditur modicum. Constat utique[86] quia sanus sumeret nullum. Si vitam profitemur apostolicam et praecipue formam vovemus paenitentiae et fugere saeculum proponimus, cur eo maxime delectamur quod proposito nostro maxime adversari videmus et universis est alimentis delectabilius? Diligens paenitentiae descriptor beatus Ambrosius nihil in victu paenitentium praeter vinum accusat dicens:[87]

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[71] hinc *CE.*

[72] *Epist.* 22, 8 (CSEL 54, 154; PL 22, 399).

[73] haec . . . ministramus] *om. CE.*

[74] IV *CET Amb.*

[75] VII, 6, 16-17.

[76] levitas *Amb.*

[77] *Id.*, 18.

[78] depuratum *T.*

[79] in . . . confluenti] *om. CE.*

[80] Cf. *Levit.* x, 9; *Prov.* xxxi, 4.

[81] *add* et *CE.*

[82] inebriant *CE.*

[83] potant *CE.*

[84] aestuant *CE.*

[85] *I Tim.* v, 23.

[86] quippe *CE.*

> An quis putat illam paenitentiam ubi acquirendae ambitio dignitatis, ubi vini effusio, ubi ipsius copulae conjugalis usus? Renuntiandum[88] saeculo est facilius inveni qui innocentiam servaverint, quam qui congrue egerint paenitentiam.

Idem in libro De fuga saeculi:[89]

> Bene, inquit, fugis si oculus tuus fugiat calices et phialas ne fiat libidus[90] dum moratur in vino.

Solum de omnibus alimentis in fuga saeculi vinum commemorat et hoc vinum si fugiamus bene nos saeculum fugere asserit quasi omnes saeculi voluptates ex hoc uno[91] pendeant nec[92] etiam dicit, si gula fugiat ejus gustum, verum etiam oculus visum ne libidine et voluptate ipsius capiatur quod frequenter intuetur. Unde et illud[93] est Salomonis quod supra meminimus: *Ne intueamur vinum quando flavescit, cum splenduerit in vitro color ejus,* etc. Quid[94] et hic quaeso, dicemus qui ut tam gustu ejus quam visu oblectemur cum illud melle herbis vel speciebus diversis condierimus phialis etiam ipsum propinari volumus?

Beatus Benedictus vini coactus indulgentiam faciens:

> Saltem vel hoc, inquit,[95] consentiamus non usque ad satietatem bibamus, sed parcius, quia *vinum*[96] *apostatare facit etiam sapientes.*

O utinam usque ad satietatem bibere sufficeret ne majoris rei transgressionis ad superfluitatem efferremur. Beatus etiam Augustinus monasteria ordinans clericorum et eis regulam scribens sabbato tantum et Dominica vinum[97] eis indulget dicens:[98]

> Sabbato et Dominica, sicut consuetudo est, qui volunt vinum accipiant;

tum videlicet pro reverentia Dominicae diei et ipsius vigiliae quae est Sabbatum, tum etiam quia tunc dispersi per cellulas fratres congregabuntur. Sicut etiam[99] in Vitis Patrum beatus commemorat Hieronymus scribens de loco quem Cellia nominavit his verbis:[1]

> Singuli per cellulas manent. Die tamen Sabbati et Dominica in unum ad ecclesiam coeunt et ibi semetipsos invicem tamquam e[2] caelo redditos vident.

Unde[3] profecto conveniens erat haec indulgentia ut insimul[4] convenientes aliqua recreatione congauderent, non tam dicentes quam sentientes: *Ecce*[5] *quam bonum et*[6] *quam jucundum habitare fratres in unum.*

Ecce si a carnibus[7] abstineamus magnum quid nobis imputatur quantacumque superfluitate ceteris vescamur. Si multis expensis diversa piscium fercula comparemus, si piperis et specierum sapores misceamus, si cum inebriati mero fuerimus, calices herbatorum et phialas pigmentorum superaddamus. Totum id excusat vilium abstinentia carnium dummodo eas publice non voremus quasi ciborum qualitas magis quam superfluitas in culpa sit, cum solam Dominus crapulam et ebrietatem nobis interdicat,[8] hoc est cibi pariter et vini superfluitatem potius[9] quam qualitatem.

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[87] *De Paenitentia* II, 10 (PL 16, 542).

[88] renuntiandum . . . paenitentiam] *om. CE.*

[89] 9 (CSEL 32, pars 2, 206; PL 14, 624).

[90] libidinosus *Amb.*

[91] vino *CEG.*

[92] nec . . . color ejus] *om. CE.*

[93] *Prov.* xxiii, 31.

[94] quid et hic] quid ad *T*] sed quid et hic *CE Amb.*

[95] *Regula,* 40 (Edit. Butler, p. 79).

[96] *Eccli.* xix, 2.

[97] vinum . . . Dominica] *om. C Amb.*

[98] From the so-called *Ordo monasterii,* a fifth-century work designated as the *Regula secunda Augustini* and often attached to the *Regula tertia* (PL 32, 1459). It is called *Regula incerti auctoris* in PL 66, 995. Recent editions by D. de Bruyne in *Rev. Bénédictine,* XLII (1930), 319, and A. C. Vega, *Le regla de san Agustin* (El Escorial, 1933).

[99] et *Amb.*

[1] This is from the *Historia monachorum,* 22, of Rufinus, (PL 21, 444). It forms the second book of the *Vitae patrum.*

[2] *om. C Amb.*

[3] ubi *CE.*

[4] simul *CE.*

[5] *Psalm* cxxxii, 1.

[6] et quam . . . unum] *om. CE.*

[7] carnalibus *CE.* In margin of T is found: Contra illos qui a carnibus abstinent et ceteris superflue vescuntur et potant.

Quod et diligenter beatus attendens Augustinus nihilque[10] in alimentis praeter vinum veritus, nec ullam[11] ciborum qualitatem distinguens, hoc in abstinentia satis esse credidit quod breviter expressit:[12]

> Carnem, inquit, vestram domate jejuniis et abstinentia escae[13] vel potus quantum valitudo permittit.

Legerat, nisi fallor, illud[14] beati Athanasii in Exhortatione ad monachos:

> Jejuniorum quoque non sit volentibus[15] certa mensura, sed in quantum possibilitas valet nisi[16] laborantis extensa, quae praeter Dominicam diem semper sint solemnia, si[17] votiva sint.

Ac si diceret: si ex voto suscipiuntur, devote compleantur omni tempore nisi in Dominicis diebus. Nulla hic jejunia[18] praefiguntur sed quantum permittit valitudo. Dicitur[19] enim:

> Solam naturae facultatem inspicit et ipsam sibi modum praefigere permittit sciens quoniam in nullis delinquitur si modus in omnibus teneatur.

Ut videlicet nec remissius quam oportet voluptatibus resolvamur, sicut de populo medulla tritici et meracissimo vino educato[20] scriptum est:[21] *Incrassatus est dilatatus*[22] *et recalcitravit.* Nec supra modum abstinentia macerati vel omnino victi succumbamus vel murmurantes mercedem amittamus vel de singularitate gloriemur. Quod Ecclesiastes praeveniens ait:[23] *Justus perit in sua justitia. Noli esse justus multum, neque plus sapias quam necesse est, ne obstupescas,* de tua quasi admirans singularitate intumescas.

Huic vero diligentiae sic omnium virtutum mater discretio praesit ut quae quibus imponat onera sollicite videat, unicuique scilicet secundum propriam virtutem et naturam sequens potius quam trahens nequaquam usum saturitatis[24] sed abusum auferat superfluitatis et sic extirpentur[25] vitia ne laedatur natura. Satis est infirmis si peccata vitent etsi non ad[26] perfectionis cumulum conscendant. Sufficit quoque paradisi angulo residere si martyribus non possis considere. Tutum est vovere modica ut majora debitis superaddat gratia. Hinc enim scriptum est:[27] *Cum feceritis omnia quae praecepta sunt, dicite servi inutiles sumus; quae debuimus facere, fecimus. Lex,* inquit[28] Apostolus, *iram operatur. Ubi enim non est lex nec praevaricatio.* Et iterum:[29] *Sine lege enim peccatum mortuum erat. Ego autem vivebam sine lege aliquando. Sed cum venisset mandatum, peccatum revixit. Ego autem mortuus sum et inventum est mihi mandatum quod erat ad vitam, hoc est ad mortem. Nam peccatum occasione accepta per mandatum*

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[8] Cf. *Luke* xxi, 34.

[9] potius quam qualitatem *om. CE.*

[10] nihil *CE.*

[11] illam *CE.*

[12] *Epist.* 211, 8 (CSEL 57, 361; PL 33, 960).

[13] escae . . . permittit] *om. CE.*

[14] PL 103, 667. This work appears as an appendix to the *Codex Regularum* of Benedict of Aniane. PG 26, 1558, lists it among the spurious works of Athanasius.

[15] nolentibus *CE.*

[16] visu C] nisi *Amb.*

[17] non *Amb.*

[18] jejuniorum tempora *CE.*

[19] I have not located this passage.

[20] inducato *CE.*

[21] *Deut.* xxxii, 15.

[22] dilectus *CE.*

[23] vii, 16-17.

[24] satietatis *C Amb. E* (?).

[25] extirpantur *CE.*

[26] *om. CE.*

[27] *Luke* xvii, 10.

[28] *Romans* iv, 15.

[29] *Id.*, vii, 8 ff.

seduxit me et per illud me occidit ut fiat supra modum peccans peccatum per mandatum. Augustinus ad Simplicianum:[30]

> Ex prohibitione aucto desiderio, dulcius factum est, et ideo fefellit.

Idem in libro Quaestionum LXXXIII:[31]

> Suasio delectationis ad peccatum vehementior est cum adest prohibitio.

Hinc[32] et illud est poeticum:[33]

> Nitimur in vetitum semper cupimusque negata.

Attendat hoc[34] cum tremore quisquis se jugo alicujus regulae quasi novae legis professioni vult alligare. Eligat quod possit, timeat quod non possit. Nemo legis efficitur reus nisi qui eam fuerit ante professus. Antequam profitearis delibera. Cum professus fueris, observa. Ante est voluntarium quod postea fit necessarium. *In domo Patris mei,* dicit[35] Veritas, *mansiones multae sunt.* Sic et[36] plurimae sunt quibus illuc perveniatur viae. Non damnantur conjuges, sed facilius salvantur continentes. Non ad hoc ut salvemur[37] sanctorum patrum superadditae[38] sunt regulae, sed ut facilius salvemur et purius Deo vacare possimus. *Et si,* inquit[39] Apostolus, *nupserit virgo, non peccabit; tribulationem tamen carnis habebunt hujusmodi. Ego autem vobis parco.* Item[40] et: *Mulier quae innupta est et virgo, cogitat quae Domini sunt, ut*[41] *sit sancta corpore et spiritu. Quae autem nupta est, cogitat quae sunt mundi, quomodo placeat viro. Porro hoc ad utilitatem vestram dico, non ut laqueum vobis injiciam, sed ad*[42] *id quod honestum est et quod facultatem praebeat sine impedimento Deum observandi.* Tunc vero facillime id agitur cum a saeculo corpore quoque recedentes claustris nos monasteriorum recludimus, ne nos saeculares inquietent tumultus. Nec solum qui legem suscipit, sed qui legem imponit, provideat ne multiplicatis praeceptis transgressiones multiplicet. Verbum Dei veniens, verbum abbreviatum fecit super terram. Multa Moyses locutus est et tamen, ut ait[43] Apostolus: *Nihil ad perfectum adduxit lex.* Multa profecto et in tantum gravia ut Apostolus Petrus ejus praecepta neminem potuisse portare profiteatur dicens:[44] *Viri fratres, quid tentatis Deum, imponere jugum super cervicem discipulorum, quod neque patres nostri neque nos portare potuimus? Sed per gratiam Domini Jesu credimus salvari, quemadmodum et illi.*

Paucis Christus de aedificatione morum et sanctitate vitae Apostolos instruxit et perfectionem docuit. Austere removens et gravia, suavia praecepit et levia quibus omnem consummavit religionem. *Venite,* inquit,[45] *ad me omnes qui laboratis*[46] *et onerati estis, et ego reficiam vos. Tollite jugum meum super vos et*[47] *discite a me, quia mitis sum et humilis corde, et invenietis requiem animabus vestris. Jugum enim meum suave est et onus meum leve.*

Sic enim saepe in operibus bonis, sicut in negotiis agitur[48] saeculi. Multi quippe in negotio plus laborant et minus lucrantur. Et multi exterius amplius affliguntur et minus interius apud Deum proficiunt qui cordis potius quam operis inspector est. Qui etiam quo in exterioribus amplius occupantur minus ad interiora vacare possunt et quanto apud homines qui de exterioribus judicant amplius innotescunt, majorem gloriam apud eos assequuntur et facilius per elationem seducuntur. Cui Apostolus occurrens errori opera vehementer extenuat et fidei justificationem amplificans ait:[49] *Si enim Abraham ex operibus justificatus est, habet gloriam, sed non apud Deum. Quid enim dicit scriptura? Credidit Abraham Deo et reputatum est ei ad justitiam.* Et[50] iterum:[51] *Quid ergo dicemus?*[52] *Quod gentes quae non sectabantur justitiam, apprehenderunt justitiam; justitiam autem quae ex fide est. Israel vero sectando legem justitiae, in legem justitiae non pervenit. Quare? Quia non ex fide, sed quasi ex operibus.* Illi quod catini est vel parapsidis de foris mundantes, de interiori munditia minus provident et carni magis quam animae vigilantes carnales potius sunt quam spirituales.

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[30] I, 1, 5 (PL 40, 104).
[31] Q. 66, 5 (PL 40, 63).
[32] hinc . . . poeticum] *om. Amb.*
[33] Ovid, *Amores* III, 4, 17.
[34] *om. Amb.* and *adds* haec *after* tremore.
[35] *John* xiv, 2.
[36] etiam *Amb.*
[37] salvaremur *Amb.*
[38] additae *Amb.*
[39] *I Cor.* vii, 28.
[40] *Id.*, vii, 34-35.
[41] ut sit . . . viro] *om. CE.*
[42] *om. CE.*
[43] *Hebrews* vii, 19.
[44] *Acts* xv, 10-11.
[45] *Matt.* xi, 28-29.
[46] laboratis . . . vos] *om. CE.*
[47] et discite . . . vestris] *om. CE.*
[48] agat *CE.*

Nos vero Christum in interiori[53] homine per fidem habitare cupientes pro modico ducimus exteriora quae tam reprobis quam electis sunt communia, attendentes quod scriptum est:[54] *In me sunt, Deus, vota tua quae reddam laudationes tibi.* Unde et exteriorem illam legis abstinentiam non sequimur quam nihil justitiae certum est conferre. Nec quidquam nobis in cibis Dominus interdicit nisi crapulam et ebrietatem,[55] id est superfluitatem. Qui etiam quod nobis indulsit in seipso exhibere non erubuit, licet hinc multi scandalizati non mediocriter improperarent. Unde et per semetipsum loquens: *Venit Joannes,* inquit,[56] *non manducans et non bibens et dixerunt: daemonium habet. Venit Filius hominis manducans et bibens et dixerunt: Ecce homo vorax et potator vini,* etc. Qui etiam suos excusans quod non sicut discipuli Joannis jejunarent, nec etiam manducantes corporalem illam munditiam abluendarum manuum magnopere curarent. *Non possunt,* inquit,[57] *lugere filii sponsi quamdiu cum illis est sponsus, etc.* Et alibi:[58] *Non quod intrat in os, coinquinat hominem, sed*[59] *quod procedit ex ore. Quae autem procedunt de ore, de corde exeunt, et ea coinquinant hominem. Non lotis autem manibus manducare, non coinquinat hominem.*

Nullus itaque cibus inquinat[60] animam sed appetitus cibi vetiti. Sicut enim corpus nonnisi corporalibus inquinatur sordibus, sic nec anima nisi spiritalibus. Nec timendum est quidquid agatur in corpore si animus ad consensum non trahitur. Nec confidendum de munditia carnis si mens voluntate[61] corrumpitur. In corde igitur tota mors animae consistit et vita. Unde et Salomon in Proverbiis:[62] *Omni custodia serva cor tuum, quoniam ex ipso vita procedit.* Et[63] juxta praedictam Veritatis assertionem ex corde procedunt quae coinquinant hominem quoniam bonis vel malis desideriis anima damnatur vel salvatur. Sed quoniam animae et carnis in unam conjunctarum personam maxima est unio, summopere providendum est ne carnis delectatio ad consensum animam trahat et dum nimis indulgetur carni, ipsa lasciviens reluctetur spiritui et quam oportet subjici incipiat dominari. Hoc autem cavere poterimus si necessariis omnibus concessis superfluitatem, ut saepius dictum est, penitus amputemus et infirmo sexui nullum ciborum usum sed omnium denegemus abusum. Omnia concedantur sumi sed nulla immoderate consumi. *Omnis,* inquit[64] Apostolus, *creatura Dei bona*[65] *et nihil rejiciendum quod cum gratiarum actione percipitur. Sanctificantur*[66] *enim per verbum Dei et orationem. Hoc proponens fratribus bonus eris minister Christi Jesu, enutritus verbis fidei et bonae doctrinae quam assecutus es.*

Et nos igitur cum Timotheo hanc Apostoli insecuti doctrinam et juxta Dominicam sententiam nihil in cibis nisi crapulam et ebrietatem vitantes,[67] sic omnia temperemus ut ex omnibus infirmam naturam sustentemus, non vitia nutriamus.

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[49] *Romans* iv, 2.

[50] et iterum . . . laudationes tibi] *om. CE.*

[51] *Romans* ix, 30-32.

[52] dicimus *Amb.*

[53] exteriori *Amb.*

[54] *Psalm* lv, 12.

[55] Cf. *Luke* xxi, 34.

[56] *Matt.* xi, 18.

[57] *Id.*, ix, 15.

[58] *Id.*, xv, 11, 18, 20.

[59] sed quod . . . coinquinat hominem] *om. CE.*

[60] coinquinat *C.*

[61] voluptate non *CE.*

[62] iv, 23.

[63] et juxta . . . salvatur] *om. CE.*

[64] *I Tim.* iv, 4-5.

[65] *add* est *CE.*

[66] sanctificatur . . . assecutus es] *om. CE.*

[67] Cf. *Luke* xxi, 34.

Et quo quaeque[68] amplius sua superfluitate possunt nocere temperamenti magis accipiant. Majus quippe est ac laudabilius temperate comedere quam omnino abstinere. Unde[69] et beatus Augustinus in libro De bono conjugali, cum de corporalibus ageret sustentamentis:

> Nequaquam, inquit,[70] eis bene utitur, nisi qui et uti non potest. Multi quidem facilius se abstinent ut non utantur, quam temperant ut bene utantur. Nemo tamen potest eis sapienter uti, nisi potest et continenter non uti.

Ex hoc habitu et Paulus dicebat:[71] *Scio et abundare et penuriam pati.* Penuriam quippe pati quorumcumque hominum est, sed scire penuriam pati magnorum est. Sic et abundare quisquam hominum[72] incipere potest, scire autem abundare nonnisi eorum est quos abundantia non corrumpit.

De vino itaque quia, sicut[73] dictum est, luxuriosa res est et tumultuosa, ideoque tam continentiae quam silentio maxime contrarium, aut omnino feminae abstineant propter Deum sicut uxores gentilium ab hoc inhibentur metu adulteriorum, aut ita ipsum aqua temperent ut et siti pariter et sanitati consulat et vires nocendi non habeat. Hoc[74] autem fieri credimus si hujus mixturae quarta pars ad minus aquae fuerit. Difficilimum vero est ut appositum nobis potum sic observemus ut non usque ad satietatem inde bibamus, sicut de vino beatus praecipit Benedictus.[75] Ideoque tutius arbitramur ut nec satietatem interdicamus, nec[76] inde periculum incurramus. Non enim satietas, ut saepe jam diximus, sed superfluitas in crimine est. Ut vero pro medicamento herbata vina conficiantur aut etiam purum vinum sumatur non prohibendum est. Quibus tamen conventus numquam utatur sed separatim ab infirmis haec degustentur.

Triticeae[77] quoque medullae similaginem omnino prohibemus, sed semper cum habuerint triticum, tertia pars ad minus grossioris annonae misceatur. Nec calidis umquam oblectentur panibus, sed qui ad minus uno die ante cocti fuerint. Ceterorum vero alimentorum providentiam sic habeat diaconissa ut, sicut[78] jam praefati sumus, quod vilius poterit comparari vel facilius haberi, infirmi sexus naturae subveniat. Quid[79] enim stultius quam, cum sufficiant nostra, emamus aliena? Et cum sint domi necessaria, quaeramus extra superflua? Et cum sint ad manum quae sufficiunt,[80] laboremus ad illa quae superfluunt? De qua quidem necessaria discretionis moderatione non tam humano quam angelico seu etiam Dominico instructi documento noverimus ad hujus vitae necessitudinem transigendam non tam qualitatem ciborum exquirere quam his quae praesto sunt contentos esse. Unde et Abraham carnibus apparatis angeli vescuntur[81] et inventis in solitudine piscibus jejunam multitudinem Dominus Jesus refecit.[82] Ex quo videlicet manifeste docemur indifferenter tam carnium quam piscium esum non esse respuendum, et eum praecipue sumendum qui et offensa peccati careat et sponte se offerens faciliorem habeat apparatum et minorem exigat expensam.

Unde et Seneca maximus ille paupertatis et continentiae sectator et summus inter universos philosophos morum aedificator:

> Propositum, inquit,[83] nostrum est secundum naturam vivere. Hoc contra naturam est torquere corpus suum et faciles odisse[84] munditias et squalorem appetere et cibis non tantum vilibus uti, sed taetris[85] et horridis. Quemad-

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[68] quae *CE.*
[69] unde . . . corrumpit] *om. CE.*
[70] 21 (CSEL 41, 219; PL 40, 390).
[71] *Philip.* iv. 12.
[72] hominum incipere] in margin in later hand *T.*
[73] sicut . . . ideoque] *om. CE.*
[74] hoc . . . fuerit] *om. CE.*
[75] *Regula,* 40 (Edit. Butler, p. 79).
[76] ne *Amb.*
[77] triticeae . . . fuerint] *om. CE.*
[78] sicut . . . sumus] *om. CE.*
[79] quid . . . superfluunt] *om. CE.*
[80] sufficiant *Amb.*
[81] Cf. *Gen.* xviii, 8.
[82] Cf. *Mark* viii, 8; *John* vi, 9.
[83] *Ad Lucillum* I, 5, 4.
[84] odisse . . . frugalitas] *om. CE.*
[85] certis *T Amb.*

> modum desiderare delicatas res luxuriae est ita[86] usitatas et non magno parabiles fugere dementiae. Frugalitatem exigit philosophia, non poenam. Potest tamen esse non incomposita frugalitas, hic mihi modus placet.

Unde et Gregorius Moralium libro XXX cum in[87] ipsis hominum moribus non tam ciborum quam animorum qualitatem attendendam esse doceret[88] ac gulae tentationes distingueret:

> Aliquando, inquit,[89] cibos lautiores quaerit; aliquando quaelibet sumenda praeparari accuratius appetit.[90]

Nonnumquam[91] vero et abjectius est quod desiderat et tamen ipso aestu immensi desiderii deterius[92] peccat.

Ex Aegypto populus eductus in eremo occubuit quia despecto manna cibos carnium petiit quos lautiores putavit. Et primogenitorum gloriam Esau amisit quia magno aestu desiderii vilem cibum, id est lenticulam concupivit, quam dum vendendis etiam primogenitis praetulit quo in illam appetitu anhelaret indicavit. Neque enim cibus sed appetitus in vitio est. Unde et lautiores cibos plerumque sine culpa sumimus et abjectiores non sine reatu conscientiae degustamus. Hic quippe quem diximus Esau primatum per lenticulam perdidit[93] et Elias in eremo virtutem corporis carnes edendo servavit.[94] Unde[95] et antiquus hostis, quia non cibum sed cibi concupiscentiam esse causam damnationis intelligit, et primum sibi hominem non carne sed pomo subdidit, et secundum non carne sed pane tentavit. Hinc est quod plerumque Adam culpa committitur etiam cum abjecta et vilia sumuntur. Ea itaque sumenda sunt quae naturae necessitas quaerit et non quae edendi libido suggerit. Minori vero desiderio concupiscimus quae minus pretiosa esse videmus et quae magis abundant et vilius emuntur sicut est communium cibus carnium qui et infirmam [naturam] multo validius quam pisces confortat et minores expensas et faciliorem habet apparatum.

Usus autem carnium ac vini, sicut et nuptiae, intermedia boni et mali, hoc est indifferentia computantur, licet copulae nuptialis usus omnino peccato non careat, et vinum omnibus alimentis periculosius existat. Quod profecto si temperate sumptum religioni non[96] interdicitur, quid aliorum timemus alimentorum dummodo in eis modus non excedatur? Si beatus ipsum Benedictus quod monachorum non esse profitetur, quadam tamen dispensatione monachis hujus temporis jam refrigescente pristinae caritatis fervore concedere cogitur,[97] quid cetera indulgere feminis non[98] debeamus quae adhuc eis nulla professio interdicit? Si pontificibus ipsis et ecclesiae sanctae rectoribus; si denique monasteriis clericorum sine offensa carnibus etiam vesci licet quia nulla scilicet professione ab eis religantur, quis has culpet feminis indulgeri, maxime si in ceteris majorem tolerent districtionem? Sufficit quippe discipulo ut sit sicut magister ejus[99] et magna videtur crudelitas[1] si quod monasteriis clericorum indulgetur monasteriis feminarum prohibeatur. Nec parvum etiam aestimandum est si feminae cum cetera monasterii districtione in hac una carnium indulgentia religione fidelium laicorum inferiores non sint, praesertim cum teste Chrysostomo:[2]

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[86] *add* et *Amb.*

[87] *om. Amb.*

[88] daret *CE.*

[89] XXX, 18 (PL 76, 556).

[90] In margin of *T* is found: Contra vehementes appetitores etiam vilium ciborum.

[91] nonnumquam . . . vitio est] *om. CE.*

[92] *om. Amb.*

[93] Cf. *Gen.* xxv, 29.

[94] servabit *Amb.* Cf. *III Kings* xvii, 6.

[95] unde . . . apparatum] *om. CE.*

[96] non . . . modus non] *om. CE.*

[97] *Regula,* 40 (Edit. Butler, p. 79).

[98] *om. T.* Placed before *indulgere Amb.*

[99] Cf. *Matt.* x, 24.

[1] credulitas *C Amb.*

[2] *Homilia VII in Epistolam ad Hebraeos* (PG 63, 67).

> Nihil licet[3] saecularibus quod non liceat[3] monachis, excepto concumbere tantum cum uxore.

Beatus quoque Hieronymus clericorum religionem non inferiorem quam monachorum judicans ait:[4]

> Quasi quidquid in monachos dicitur non redundet in clericos qui patres sunt monachorum.

Quis etiam ignoret omnino discretioni contrarium esse si tanta debilius quanta fortibus imponantur onera? Si tanta feminis quanta viris injungatur abstinentia? De quo etiam si quis supra ipsum naturae documentum auctoritatem efflagitet beatum quoque super hoc Gregorium consulat. Hic quippe magnus ecclesiae tam rector quam doctor de hoc quoque ceteros ecclesiae doctores diligenter instruens, libri Pastoralis capitulo[5] XXIV ita meminit:[6]

> Aliter igitur admonendi sunt viri atque aliter feminae quia illis gravia, istis vero sunt injungenda leviora, et[7] illos magna exerceant, istas vero levia demulcendo convertant.

Quae enim parva sunt in fortibus magna reputantur in debilibus. Quamvis[8] haec quoque vilium licentia carnium minus habeat oblectamenti quam ipsae piscium vel avium carnes quas minime tamen nobis beatus interdicit Benedictus.[9] De quibus etiam Apostolus cum diversas species carnis distingueret: *Non omnis,* inquit,[10] *caro eadem caro, sed alia hominum, alia pecorum, alia*[11] *volucrum, alia autem piscium.* Et pecorum quidem et avium carnes in sacrificio Domini lex ponit, pisces vero nequaquam, ut nemo piscium esum[12] mundiorem Deo quam carnium credat. Qui etiam tanto est onerosior paupertati vel carior, quanto piscium minor est copia quam carnium et minus infirmam corroborat naturam, ut in altero magis gravet, in altero magis subveniat.

Nos itaque fortunae pariter et naturae hominum consulentes nihil in alimentis, ut diximus, nisi superfluitatem interdicimus. Ipsumque[13] ita carnium sive ceterorum esum temperamus ut omnibus concessis major sit abstinentia monialium quam quibusdam interdictis modo sit monachorum. Igitur ipsum quoque carnium esum ita temperari volumus ut non amplius quam semel in[14] die sumant, nec diversa inde[15] fercula eidem personae parentur, nec[16] seorsum aliqua superaddantur pulmenta, nec ullatenus ei vesci liceat plusquam ter in hebdomada, prima videlicet feria, tertia et quinta feria, quantaecumque etiam festivitates intercurrant. Quo namque solemnitas major est, majoris abstinentiae devotione est celebranda. Ad quod nos egregius doctor Gregorius Nazianzenus[17] vehementer exhortans libro III De Luminibus vel Secundis Epiphaniis ait:[18]

> Diem festum celebremus, non ventri indulgentes, sed spiritu exsultantes.

Idem libro IV De Pentecoste et Spiritu sancto:[19]

> Et hic est noster festus dies, ait, in animae thesauros perenne aliquid et perpetuum recondamus non ea quae pertranseunt et dissolvuntur. Sufficit[20] corpori malitia sua non indiget copiosiore materia nec insolens bestia abundantioribus cibis ut insolentior fiat et violentius urgeat.

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[3] liceat, licet *CET.*

[4] *Epist. 54 ad Furiam,* 5 (CSEL 54, 471; PL 22, 552).

[5] capitulum *T.*

[6] III, 1 (PL 77, 51).

[7] et illos . . . debilibus] *om. CE.*

[8] In margin of *T* is found: Contra illos qui abstinent vel abstinendum praedicant a carnibus et non aliis cibis.

[9] *Regula,* 39 (Edit. Butler, p. 77).

[10] *I Cor.* (xv, 39).

[11] alia . . . nequaquam ut] *om. CE.*

[12] *om. T.*

[13] ipsum itaque *Amb.*

[14] inde *CE.*

[15] in die *CE.*

[16] nec . . . pulmental] *om. CE.*

[17] Nazanzenus *T.*

[18] *In Sancta lumina,* 20 (PG 36, 358).

[19] 1 (PG 36, 430). In margin of *T* is found: Contra illos qui diebus festivis se ingurgitant.

[20] sufficit . . . solemnitas] *om. CE.*

Idcirco autem spiritaliter magis est agenda solemnitas quam et beatus Hieronymus ejus discipulus secutus in epistola sua de acceptis muneribus ita quodam loco meminit:[21]

> Unde nobis sollicitius providendum ut solemnem diem, non tam ciborum abundantia quam spiritus exsultatione celebremus. Quia valde absurdum est nimia saturitate honorare velle martyrem quem sciamus Deo placuisse jejuniis.

Augustinus De paenitentiae medicina:[22]

> Attende tot martyrum milia. Cur enim natalitia eorum conviviis turpibus celebrare delectat et[23] eorum vitam sequi honestis moribus non delectat?

Quoties vero carnes deerunt duo eis fercula qualiumcumque pulmentorum concedimus, nec superaddi pisces prohibemus. Nulli vero pretiosi sapores cibis apponantur in conventu, sed iis contentae sint quae in terra quam inhabitant nascuntur; fructibus vero nonnisi in coena vescantur. Pro medicamento autem quibus opus fuerit vel herbas vel radices seu fructus aliquos[24] vel alia hujusmodi numquam prohibemus mensis apponi. Si qua forte peregrina monialis hospitio recepta mensis intererit, ferculo ei aliquo superaddito caritatis sentiat humanitatem. De quo quidem si quid distribuere voluerit, licebit. Haec autem vel si plures fuerint, in majore mensa residebunt et eis diaconissa ministrabit. Postea cum aliis quae mensis ministrant comestura. Si qua vero sororum parciori cibo carnem domare voluerit, nullatenus hoc ipsa nisi per obedientiam praesumat et nullatenus hoc ei denegetur, si hoc non levitate sed virtute videatur appetere quod ejus firmitudo valeat tolerare. Nulli[25] tamen umquam permittatur ut per hoc desit[26] conventui, nec ut aliquam diem sine cibo transigat. Sagiminis condimento sexta feria numquam utantur sed quadragesimali cibo contentae sponso suo ea die passo quadam compatiantur abstinentia. Illud vero non solum prohibendum sed vehementer est abhorrendum quod in plerisque monasteriis agi solet quod videlicet parte aliqua panis quae superest esui et pauperibus est reservanda manus et cultellos mundare et extergere solent et ut mappis parcant mensarum panem polluunt pauperum. Immo ejus qui se attendens in pauperibus ait:[27] *Quod uni ex minimis meis fecistis, mihi fecistis.*

De abstinentia jejuniorum generalis institutio ecclesiae illis[28] sufficiat, nec supra fidelium laicorum religionem in hoc eas[29] gravare praesumimus nec virtuti virorum earum[30] infirmitatem in hoc praeferre audemus. Ab[31] aequinoctio vero[32] autumnali usque ad Pascha propter dierum brevitatem unam in die comestionem sufficere credimus.[33] Quod quia non pro abstinentia religionis, sed pro brevitate dicimus temporis, nulla hic ciborum genera distinguimus.[34]

Pretiosae vestes quas omnino scriptura damnat summopere fugiantur. De quibus nos praecipue Dominus dehortans et damnati divitis superbiam de iis accusat et Joannis humilitatem econtrario commendat. Quod beatus diligenter attendens Gregorius Homilia Evangeliorum VI:

> Quid est, inquit,[35] dicere: *Qui mollibus vestiuntur in domibus regum sunt,*[36] nisi aperta sententia demonstrare quod non caelesti, sed terreno regno

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[21] *Epist.* 31 *ad Eustochium*, 3 (CSEL 54, 251; PL 22, 446).

[22] *Sermon 351 De utilitate paenitentiae*, 4 (PL 39, 1548).

[23] et eorum . . . comestura] *om. CE.*

[24] aliquot *Amb.*

[25] nulli . . . mihi fecistis] *om. CE.*

[26] desit conventui] All editions following *Amb.* read. per hoc conventu followed by a suspension and note that the passage is corrupt.

[27] *Matt.* xxv, 40.

[28] vobis *CE.*

[29] vos *CE.*

[30] vestram *CE.*

[31] ab . . . distinguimus] *om. CE.*

[32] *add* aut *T.*

[33] credamus *Amb.*

[34] distinguemus *Amb.*

[35] PL 76, 1097.

[36] *Matt.* xi, 8.

> militant qui pro Deo perpeti aspera fugiunt, sed solis exterioribus dediti, praesentis vitae mollitiem delectationemque quaerunt?

Idem Homilia XL:[37]

> Sunt nunnulli qui cultum subtilium pretiosarumque vestium non putant esse peccatum. Quod videlicet si culpa non esset, nequaquam sermo Dei tam vigilanter exprimeret quod dives qui torquebatur apud[38] inferos, bysso et purpura indutus fuisset.[39] Nemo quippe vestimenta praecipua nisi ad[40] inanem gloriam quaerit, videlicet ut honorabilior ceteris esse videatur. Nam quia[41] pro sola inani gloria vestimentum pretiosius quaeritur, res ipsa testatur, quod nemo vult ibi pretiosis vestibus indui, ubi ab aliis non possit videri.

A quo et prima Petri Epistola saeculares et conjugatas feminas dehortans ait:[42] *Similiter*[43] *et mulieres subditae sint viris suis, ut et si qui non credunt verbo, per mulierum conversationem sine verbo lucrifiant, considerantes in timore castam conversationem vestram. Quarum sit non extrinsecus capillatura aut circumdatio auri aut indumenti vestimentorum*[44] *cultus, sed qui absconditus corde est homo incorruptibilitate quieti et modesti spiritus quod est in conspectu Domini locuples.*[45] Bene autem feminas potius quam viros ab hac vanitate censuit dehortandas quarum infirmus animus id amplius appetit quo per eas et in eis amplius incitari[46] luxuria possit. Si autem saeculares hinc inhibendae sunt feminae, quid Christo devotas convenit providere? quarum hoc ipsum illis est cultus quod sunt incultae. Quaecumque igitur hunc appetit cultum vel non renuit oblatum castitatis perdit testimonium.[47] Et quaecumque talis est non se religioni praeparare, sed fornicationi credatur, nec tam monialis quam meretrix censeatur. Cui et ipse cultus est tamquam[48] lenonis praeconium qui incestum prodit animum, sicut scriptum est:[49] *Amictus corporis et risus dentium et ingressus hominis enuntiant de*[50] *illo.*

Legimus Dominum in Joanne, ut jam supra meminimus, vilitatem seu asperitatem vestium potius quam escae commendasse atque laudasse. *Quid existis,* inquit,[51] *in desertum videre? Hominem mollibus vestitum?* etc. Habet enim nonnumquam usus pretiosorum ciborum utilem aliquam dispensationem, sed vestium nullam. Quae videlicet vestes quanto sunt pretiosiores tanto carius custodiuntur et minus usitatae minus proficiunt et ementem amplius gravant et prae subtilitate sui facilius possunt corrumpi et minus corpori praebent fomenti. Nulli vero panni magis quam nigri lugubrem paenitentiae habitum decent, nec[52] adeo sponsis Christi pelles aliquae conveniunt sicut agninae, ut ipso quoque habitu Agnum sponsum virginum indutae videantur vel induere moneantur.

Vela vero earum non de serico, sed de tincto aliquo lineo panno fiant. Duo autem velorum genera esse volumus ut alia sint scilicet virginum jam ab episcopo consecratarum, alia vero minime. Quae vero praedictarum[53] sunt virginum crucis sibi signum habeant impressum quo scilicet ipsae integritate quoque corporis ad Christum maxime pertinere monstrentur et sicut in consecratione distant[54] a ceteris, ita et hoc habitus signo distinguantur quo et quique fidelium territi magis abhorreant in concupiscentiam earum exardescere. Hoc autem signum virginalis munditiae in summitate capitis candidis expressum filis virgo gestabit, et hoc nullatenus antequam ab episcopo consecretur gestare praesumat. Nulla autem alia vela hoc signo insignita sint.

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[37] PL 76, 1305.

[38] ad *Amb.*

[39] Cf. *Luke* xvi, 19.

[40] *om. C.*

[41] *om. Amb.*

[42] iii, 1.

[43] similiter . . . vestram] *om. CE.*

[44] vestimentoriis *Amb.*

[45] locuplex *T.*

[46] imitari *Amb.*

[47] testimonium . . . credatur] *om. CE.*

[48] tam *CE.*

[49] *Eccli. xix,* 27.

[50] de illo . . . nullam] *om. CE.*

[51] *Matt.* xi, 8.

[52] nec adeo . . . sacrilegio caret] *om. CE.*

[53] pudictarum *Amb.*

[54] distare *Amb.*

Interulas mundas ad carnem habeant in quibus etiam cinctae semper dormiant. Culcitrarum quoque mollitiem vel linteaminum usum infirmae ipsarum non negamus naturae. Singulae vero dormiant et comedant. Nulla penitus indignari praesumat si vestes vel quaecumque alia sibi ab aliquibus transmissa alii quae amplius indiget concedantur sorori. Sed tunc maxime gaudeat cum in sororis necessitate fructum habuerit eleemosynae vel se respexerit non solum sibi, sed aliis vivere. Alioquin ad sanctae societatis fraternitatem non pertinet, nec proprietatis sacrilegio caret.

Sufficere autem ad corpus contegendum credimus interulam,[55] pelliceam, togam et, cum multum exasperaverit frigus, insuper mantellum. Quo[56] videlicet mantello pro opertorio quoque uti jacentes poterunt. Oportebit autem pro infestatione vermium vel gravamine sordium abluendarum, haec omnia esse duplicia indumenta[57] sicut ad litteram in laude fortis et providae mulieris Salomon ait:[58] *Non timebit domui suae a frigoribus nivis; omnes enim domestici ejus vestiti duplicibus.* Quorum ita sit moderata longitudo ut ultra oram sotularium non procedant, ne pulverem moveant. Manicae[59] vero extensionem brachiorum et manuum non excedant. Crura vero et pedes caligae pedules et sotulares muniant. Nec[60] umquam occasione religionis nudae pedes incedant. In lectis culcitra una, pulvinar, auriculare, lodix[61] et linteolum sufficiant. Caput vero muniant vitta candida et velum desuper nigrum et pro tonsura capillorum pileum agninum cum opus fuerit supponatur.

Nec in victu tantum aut vestitu superfluitas evitetur, verum etiam in aedificiis aut quibuslibet possessionibus. In aedificiis quidem hoc manifeste dignoscitur si ea majora vel pulchriora quam necesse sit componantur, vel si nos ipsa sculpturis vel picturis ornantes, non habitacula pauperum aedificemus sed palatia regum erigamus.

Filius hominis, inquit[62] Hieronymus, *non habet ubi caput reclinet*,[63] et tu amplas porticus et ingentia tectorum[64] spatia metiris. Cum pretiosis vel pulchris delectamur equitaturis, non solum superfluitas, sed elationis vanitas innotescit. Cum autem animalium greges vel terrenas multiplicamus possessiones, tunc se ad exteriora dilatat ambitio et quanto plura possidemus in terra, tanto amplius de ipsis cogitare cogimur et a contemplatione caelestium devocamur. Et licet corpore claustris recludamur haec tamen quae foris sunt et diligit animus sequi cogitur et se pariter huc et illuc cum illis diffundit, et quo plura possidentur quae amitti possunt, majori nos metu cruciant, et quo pretiosiora[65] sunt amplius diliguntur et ambitione sui miserum magis illaqueant animum.

Unde omnino providendum est ut domui nostrae sumptibusque nostris certum praefigamus modum, nec supra necessaria vel appetamus aliqua, vel recipiamus oblata, vel retineamus suscepta. Quidquid enim necessitati superest, in rapina possidemus et tot pauperum mortis rei sumus quot inde sustentare potuimus. Singulis igitur annis cum collecta fuerint victualia, providendum est quantum sufficiat per annum et, si qua superfuerint, pauperibus non[66] tam danda sunt quam reddenda.

Sunt qui providentiae modum ignorantes, cum redditus paucos habeant multum habere familiam gaudent. De cujus quidem procuratione dum gravantur, impudenter hanc quaerentes mendicant, vel quae non habent violenter ab aliis extorquent. Tales[67] etiam jam nonnullos monasteriorum patres conspicimus qui de multitudine conventus gloriantes, non tam bonos filios quam multos habere student et magni videntur in oculis suis si inter multos majores habeantur. Quos quidem ut ad suum trahant dominium, cum aspera eis deberent praedicare, levia[68] promittunt et nulla examinatione antea probatos quos indiscrete suscipiunt, facile apostatantes perdunt. Talibus, ut video, improperabat Veritas dicens:[69] *Vae vobis qui circuitis mare et aridam ut faciatis unum proselytum; quem cum feceritis, facitis illum filium gehennae duplo quam vos.* Qui profecto minus de multitudine gloriarentur si salutem animarum magis quam numerum quaererent et de suis viribus in ratione sui regiminis reddenda minus praesumerent.

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[55] interualla *C*] blank *E*.
[56] quo . . . autem pro] *om. CE*.
[57] indumenta . . . duplicibus] *om. CE*.
[58] *Prov.* xxxi, 21.
[59] manicae . . . excedant] *om. CE*.
[60] nec . . . supponatur] *om. CE*.
[61] lodex *T*.
[62] *Epist. 14 ad Heliodorum*, 6 (CSEL 54, 52; PL 22, 350).
[63] *Matt.* viii, 20.
[64] rectorum *T*.
[65] pretiosiosiora *T*.
[66] *om. CE*.
[67] In margin of *T* is found: Contra illos qui circumveniunt alios ut intrent religionem qui in multitudine gloriantur et per mundum discurrunt.

Paucos Dominus elegit apostolos et de ipsa electione sua unus in tantum apostatavit ut pro ipso Dominus diceret:[70] *Numquid ego duodecim vos elegi? Et unus ex vobis diabolus est.* Sicut autem de Apostolis Judas, sic et de septem diaconibus Nicolaus periit.[71] Et cum paucos adhuc Apostoli congregassent, Ananias et Saphira uxor ejus mortis excipere sententiam meruerunt.[72] Quippe et ab ipso antea Domino cum multi abiissent discipulorum retrorsum pauci cum ipso remanserunt.[73] Arcta quippe via est quae ducit ad vitam et pauci ingrediuntur per eam. Sicut econtrario lata est et spatiosa quae ducit ad mortem et multi sunt qui se ultro ingerant.[74] Quia, sicut ipse Dominus testatur alibi:[75] *Multi vocati, pauci vero electi.* Et[76] juxta Salomonem:[77] *Stultorum infinitus est numerus.* Timeat itaque quisquis de[78] multitudine gaudet subjectorum, ne in eis juxta Dominicam assertionem pauci reperiantur electi et ipse immoderate gregem suum multiplicans minus ad custodiam ejus sufficiat ut ei recte a spiritualibus illud propheticum dici possit:[79] *Multiplicasti gentem, non magnificasti laetitiam.* Tales utique scilicet de multitudine gloriantes dum tam pro suis quam suorum necessitatibus saepius exire atque ad saeculum redire et mendicando discurrere coguntur curis se corporalibus magis quam spiritalibus implicant et infamiam sibi magis quam gloriam acquirunt.

Quod[80] quidem in feminis tanto magis est erubescendum quanto eas per mundum discurrere videtur minus tutum. Quisquis igitur quiete vel honeste cupit vivere et officiis vacare divinis et tam Deo quam saeculo carus[81] haberi, timeat aggregare quos non possit procurare, nec in expensis suis de alienis confidat marsupiis, nec eleemosynis petendis, sed dandis invigilet. Apostolus ille magnus Evangelii praedicator et habens potestatem de Evangelio sumptus accipere, laborat manibus ne quos gravare videatur et gloriam suam evacuet.[82] Nos ergo quorum non est praedicare, sed peccata plangere, qua temeritate vel impudentia mendicantes quaerimus? Unde hos quos inconsiderate congregamus, sustentare possimus?[83] Qui etiam saepe in tantam prorumpimus insaniam ut, cum praedicare nescimus praedicatores conducamus et pseudoapostolos nobiscum circumducendo, cruces et phylacteria reliquiarum gestemus, ut tam haec quam verbum Dei seu etiam figmenta diaboli simplicibus et idiotis vendamus Christianis, et eis promittamus quaecumque ad extorquendos nummos proficere credimus. Ex qua quidem impudenti cupiditate, quae sua sunt non quae Jesu Christi quaerente, quantum jam ordo noster et ipsa divini praedicatio verbi viluerit, neminem jam latere arbitror.

Hinc et ipsi abbates vel qui majores in monasteriis videntur potentibus saeculi et mundanis curiis sese importune ingerentes jam magis curiales[84] esse quam coenobitae didicerunt, et favorem hominum quacumque arte venantes, crebrius cum hominibus fabulari quam cum Deo loqui consueverunt. Illud saepe frustra legentes atque negligentes vel audientes, sed non exaudientes quod beatus Antonius admonet dicens:[85]

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[68] lenia *Amb.*
[69] *Matt.* xxiii, 15.
[70] *John* vi, 71.
[71] Cf. *Acts* vi, 5.
[72] Cf. *Acts* v.
[73] Cf. *John* xviii, 6.
[74] Cf. *Matt.* vii, 13.
[75] *Matt.* xx, 16.
[76] et juxta . . . numerus] *om. CE.*
[77] *Eccli.* i, 15.
[78] *om. CE.*
[79] *Isaias* ix, 13.
[80] quod . . . tutum] *om. CE.*
[81] corpus *C.*
[82] Cf. *Thess.* ii, 9; *I Cor.* ix, 15.
[83] possumus *CE Amb.*
[84] carnales *Amb.*] corrected from in *T.*

> Sicut pisces, si tardaverint in sicco, moriuntur, ita et monachi tardantes extra cellulam aut cum viris saecularibus immorantes, a[86] quietis proposito resolvuntur. Oportet ergo sicut piscem in mari, ita et nos ad cellam recurrere, ne forte foris tardantes obliviscamur interioris custodiae.

Quod ipse quoque monasticae scriptor regulae, scilicet beatus Benedictus diligenter attendens quasi in monasteriis assiduos velit esse abbates et super custodiam sui gregis sollicite stare tam exemplo quam scripto patenter edocuit. Hic enim cum[87] a fratribus ad sacratissimam sororem suam visitandam profectus, cum ipsa eum pro aedificatione saltem nocte una vellet retinere, aperte professus est manere extra cellam nullatenus se posse.[88] Nec ait quidem non possumus, sed non possum, quia hoc per eum fratres, non ipse posset, nisi hoc ei[89] Domino, sicut postmodum actum est, revelante. Unde et cum regulam scriberet, nusquam de abbatis, sed solummodo fratrum egressu meminerit. De cujus etiam assiduitate ita caute providit ut in vigiliis dominicorum et festorum dierum evangelicam lectionem et quae illi adjuncta sunt, nonnisi ab abbate praecipiat dici. Qui etiam instituens ut mensa abbatis cum peregrinis et hospitibus sit semper et quoties minus sunt hospites cum [eo], quos voluerit de fratribus vocare, seniore uno tantum aut duobus dimissis cum fratribus,[90] patenter insinuat numquam in tempore mensae abbatem monasterio debere deesse et ut delicatis principum ferculis jam assuetus cibarium panem monasterii subjectis derelinquat, de qualibus[91] quidem Veritas: *Alligant*, inquit,[92] *onera gravia et importabilia et imponunt in humeros hominum; digito autem suo nolunt ea movere.* Et alibi[93] de falsis praedicatoribus: *Attendite a falsis prophetis qui veniunt ad vos*, etc. Veniunt,[94] inquit, per se, non a Deo missi, vel exspectantes ut pro eis mandetur. Joannes Baptista princeps noster cui pontificatus hereditate cedebat semel ab urbe recessit ad eremum, pontificatum scilicet pro monachatu, civitates pro solitudine deserens, et ad eum populus exibat, non[95] ipse ad populum introibat.[96] Qui cum tantus esset ut Christus crederetur et multa[97] in civitatibus corrigere posset, in illo jam erat lectulo unde pulsanti dilecto respondere paratus erat:[98] *Exspoliavi me tunica mea, quomodo induar illa? Lavi pedes meos, quomodo*[99] *inquinabo illos?*

Quisquis itaque quietis monasticae secretum desiderat, lectulum magis quam lectum se habere gaudeat. *De lecto* quippe, ut Veritas ait,[1] *unus assumetur et alter relinquetur.* Lectulum vero sponsae esse legimus, id est animae contemplativae Christo arctius copulatae et summo ei desiderio adhaerentis. Quem quicumque intraverit neminem esse relictum legimus. De quo et ipsamet loquitur:[2] *In lectulo meo pernoctans quaesivi quem diligit anima mea.* A quo etiam lectulo ipsa surgere dedignans vel formidans pulsanti dilecto quod supra meminimus respondet. Non enim sordes nisi extra lectum suum esse credit quibus inquinari pedes metuit.

Egressa est Dina ut alienigenas videret et corrupta est.[3] Et sicut Malcho illi captivo monacho ab abbate suo praedictum est et ipse postmodum est expertus, ovis quae de ovili egreditur cito lupi morsibus patet.[4] Ne igitur multitudinem congregemus pro qua egrediendi occasionem quaeramus[5] immo et egredi compellamur et cum detrimento nostri lucra[6] faciamus aliorum, ad modum videlicet plumbi quod ut argentum servetur in fornace consumitur. Verendum potius est ne et plumbum pariter et argentum fornax vehemens consumat tentationum. Veritas,[7] inquiunt, ait:[8] *Et eum qui venit ad me, non ejiciam foras.* Nec nos ejici susceptos volumus, sed de suscipiendis provideri[9] ne cum eos intus susceperimus, nos ipsos extra pro eis ejiciamus. Nam et ipsum Dominum non susceptum ejecisse legimus, sed offerentem se respuisse. Cui quidem dicenti:[10] *Magister sequar te quocumque ieris.* Ipse[11] enim repellens eum respondit: *Vulpes foveas habent, etc.*

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[85] *Vitae patrum* V, 2, 1 (PL 73, 858).

[86] a quietis . . . resolvuntur] *om. CE.*

[87] *om. CE.*

[88] Cf. Gregory, *Dialogi* II, 33 (Edit. Moricca, p. 126; PL 66, 194).

[89] et a *Amb.*

[90] *Regula*, 56 (Edit. Butler, p. 104).

[91] quibus *CE.*

[92] *Matt.* xxiii, 4.

[93] *Id.*, vii, 15.

[94] veniunt . . . mandetur] *om. CE.*

[95] nec *Amb.*

[96] intrabat *CE.*

[97] nulla *Amb.*

[98] *Cant.* v, 3.

[99] quomodo . . . morsibus patet] *om. CE.*

[1] *Luke* xvii, 34.

[2] *Cant.* iii, 1.

[3] Cf. *Gen.* xxxiv, 1.

Qui etiam de sumptibus nos ante providere cum aliquid facere meditamur cui sint ipsi necessarii, diligenter admonet dicens:[12] *Quis nostrum*[13] *volens turrim aedificare, nonne prius sedens computat sumptus qui necessarii sunt, si habet ad perficiendum, ne posteaquam posuerit fundamentum, et non potuerit perficere, omnes qui viderint incipiant illudere ei dicentes: Quia hic homo coepit aedificare et non potuit consummare*? Magnum est si vel se unum quis salvare sufficiat et periculosum est multis eum providere qui vix ad custodiam sui sufficit vigilare. Nemo vero studiosus est in custodiendo nisi qui pavidus fuerit in suscipiendo. Et nemo sic perseverat in incoepto[14] sicut qui tardus est et providus ad incipiendum. In quo quidem tanto major feminarum sit providentia, quanto earum infirmitas magna minus tolerat onera et quiete plurimum est fovenda.

Speculum animae scripturam sacram constat esse in quam quilibet legendo vivens, intelligendo proficiens, morum suorum pulchritudinem cognoscit vel deformitatem deprehendit, ut illam videlicet augere, hanc studeat removere. Hoc nobis speculum beatus commemorans Gregorius in secundo Moralium ait:[15]

> Scriptura sacra mentis oculis quasi quoddam speculum opponitur ut interna nostra facies in[16] ipsa videatur. Ubi etenim foeda,[17] ibi pulchra nostra cognoscimus.[18] Ibi sentimus quantum proficimus ibi a profectu quam longe distamus.

Qui autem scripturam conspicit quam non intelligit quasi caecus ante oculos [speculum][19] tenet in quo qualis sit cognoscere non valet, nec doctrinam quaerit in scriptura ad quam ipsa est tantummodo facta et tamquam asinus applicetur ad lyram, sic otiosus sedet ad scripturam, et quasi panem appositum habet quo jejunus non reficitur, dum verbum Dei nec se per intelligentiam penetrante, nec alio ei docendo frangente, inutiliter cibum habet qui ei nullatenus prodest.

Unde et Apostolus generaliter ad scripturarum studium nos adhortans: *Quaecumque,* inquit,[20] *scripta sunt, ad nostram doctrinam*[21] *scripta sunt, ut per patientiam et consolationem scripturarum spem habeamus.* Et alibi:[22] *Implemini Spiritu sancto loquentes vobismetipsis in psalmis et hymnis et canticis spiritualibus.* Sibi quippe vel secum loquitur qui quod profert intelligit vel de intelligentia verborum suorum fructum facit. Idem ad Timotheum: *Dum venio,* inquit,[23] *attende lectioni exhortationi doctrinae.* Et iterum:[24] *Tu vero permane in his quae didicisti et credita*[25] *sunt tibi, sciens a quo didiceris et quia ab*

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[4] Cf. Jerome, *Vita Malchi* (PL 23, 55)).
[5] sumamus *CE.*
[6] lucrum *C Amb.*
[7] Veritas . . . consummare] *om. CE*
[8] *John* vi, 37.
[9] providere *Amb.*
[10] *Matt.* viii, 19.
[11] ipse . . . eum] *om. Amb.*
[12] *Luke* xiv, 28-30.
[13] vestrum *Amb.*
[14] coepto *Amb.*
[15] II, 1 (PL 75, 553).
[16] in ipsa . . . prodest] *om. CE.*
[17] *add* cognoscimus *Amb.*
[18] conspicimus *Amb.*, which is deleted in *T.*
[19] *om. T Amb.* Reading suggested by Cousin.
[20] *Romans* xv, 4.
[21] doctrinam . . . habeamus] *om. CE.*
[22] *Ephesians* v, 18-19.
[23] *I Tim.* iv, 13.
[24] *II Tim.* iii, 14-17.
[25] tradita *CE.*

infantia sacras litteras nosti, quae te possunt instruere ad salutem, per fidem quae est in Christo Jesu. Omnis scriptura divinitus inspirata utilis est[26] *ad docendum, ad arguendum, ad corripiendum, ad erudiendum in justitia, ut perfectus sit*[27] *homo Dei ad omne opus bonum instructus.* Qui etiam ad intelligentiam scripturae Corinthios admonens ut quae videlicet alii de scriptura loquuntur exponere valeant: *Sectamini,* inquit,[28] *caritatem, aemulamini spiritualia, magis autem spiritus ut prophetetis. Qui enim loquitur, lingua non hominibus loquitur, sed Deo. Qui autem prophetat,*[29] *ecclesiam aedificat. Et*[30] *ideo qui loquitur lingua, oret ut interpretetur. Orabo spiritu, orabo et mente; psallam spiritu, psallam et mente. Ceterum si benedixeris spiritu, quis supplet*[31] *locum idiotae, quomodo dicet Amen super tuam benedictionem, quoniam quid dicas, nescit? Nam tu quidem bene gratias agis, sed alter non aedificatur. Gratias ago Deo quoniam omnium vestrum lingua loquor. Sed in ecclesia volo quinque verba sensu meo loqui ut*[32] *et alios instruam quam decem millia verborum. Fratres, nolite effici pueri*[33] *sensibus, sed malitia parvuli estote, sensibus autem perfecti.*

Loqui lingua dicitur qui ore tantum verba format non intelligentia exponendo ministrat. Prophetat vero sive interpretatur qui more[34] prophetarum qui videntes dicuntur id est intelligentes ea quae dicit intelligit, ut ipsa exponere possit. Orat[35] ille spiritu sive psallit qui solo prolationis flatu verba format, non mentis intelligentiam accommodat. Cum vero spiritus noster orat, id est nostrae prolationis flatus solummodo verba format, nec quod ore profertur corde concipitur, mens nostra sine fructu est quem in oratione videlicet habere debet, ut ipsa scilicet ex intelligentia verborum in Deum compungatur atque accendatur. Unde[36] hanc in verbis perfectionem nos admonet habere, ut non more puerorum[37] verba tantum sciamus proferre, verum etiam intelligentiae sensum in iis habere, atque aliter nos orare vel psallere infructuose protestatur. Quem et beatus sequens Benedictus:

> Sic stemus, inquit,[38] ad psallendum ut mens nostra concordet voci nostrae.

Hoc et[39] Psalmista praecipiens ait:[40] *Psallite sapienter* ut videlicet verborum prolationi sapor et condimentum intelligentiae non desit et cum ipso veraciter dicere Domino valeamus:[41] *Quam dulcia faucibus meis eloquia tua,* etc. Et alibi:[42] *Non in tibiis,* inquit,[43] *viri*[44] *beneplacitum erit ei.* Tibia quippe sonitum emittit ad delectatonem voluptatis, non ad intelligentiam mentis. Unde bene in tibiis cantare, nec in hoc Deo placere dicuntur qui melodia sui cantus sic oblectantur ut nulla hinc aedificentur intelligentia. Qua etiam ratione, inquit Apostolus, cum benedictiones in ecclesia fiunt respondebitur amen, si quod oratur in illa benedictione non intelligitur? Utrum videlicet bonum sit quod oratio postulat aut non? Sic enim saepe multos idiotas et litterarum sensum ignorantes videmus in ecclesia per errorem nonnulla[45] sibi nociva quam utilia precari, veluti cum dicitur: Ut sic transeamus per bona temporalia ut non amittamus aeterna. Facile ipsa consimilis vocis affinitas nonullos sic decipit, ut vel sic dicant: ut nos amittamus aeterna; vel ita proferant: ut non admittamus aeterna. Cui etiam periculo Apostolus providens ait:[46] *Ceterum si benedixeris spiritu,* id est prolationis tantum flatu verba benedictionis formaveris non sensu mentem audientis instruxeris, *quis supplet locum idiotae?* id est quis de assistentibus, quorum est respondere, id aget respondendo quod idiota non valet, immo nec debet? *Quomodo dicet amen*? etc., cum videlicet nesciat utrum in maledictionem potius[47] quam benedictionem inducas. Denique quae scripturae non habent intelligentiam, quomodo sermonis aedificationem sibi ministrabunt, aut etiam regulam exponere vel intelligere, aut vitiose prolata corrigere valebunt?

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[26] est ad . . . instructus] *om. CE.*

[27] est *Amb.*

[28] *I Cor.* xiv, 1 ff.

[29] prophetizat *C.*

[30] *I Cor.* xiv, 13-20. et ideo . . . estote] *om. CE.*

[31] implebit *Amb.*

[32] *om. Amb.*

[33] parvi *Amb.*

[34] *om. CE.*

[35] orat . . . accendatur] *om. CE.*

[36] unde hanc] quam *CE.*

[37] plurimorum *Amb.*

[38] *Regula,* 19 (Edit. Butler, p. 54).

[39] *om. CE.*

[40] xlvi, 8.

[41] *Psalm* cxviii, 103.

[42] *Psalm* cxlvi, 10.

[43] *om. Amb.*

[44] *om. CE.*

[45] plura *CE.*

[46] *I Cor.* xiv, 16.

Unde non mediocriter miramur quae inimici suggestio in monasteriis hoc egit ut nulla ibi de intelligendis scripturis sint studia, sed de cantu tantum vel de verbis solummodo[48] formandis, non intelligendis, habeatur disciplina, quasi ovium balatus plus utilitatis habeat quam pastus. Cibus quippe est animae et spiritalis refectio ipsi divina intelligentia Scripturae. Unde et Ezechielem prophetam ad praedicandum Dominus destinans eum prius volumine cibat quod statim *in ejus ore factum est mel dulce.*[49] De quo etiam cibo scriptum est in Jeremia:[50] *Parvuli petierunt panem et non erat qui frangeret eis.* Panem quippe parvulis frangit qui litterae sensum simplicioribus aperit. Hi vero parvuli panem frangi postulant, cum de intelligentia scripturae animam saginari desiderant, sicut alibi Dominus testatur:[51] *Emittam famem in terram, non famem panis, neque sitim aquae sed audiendi verbum Domini.*

Hinc autem econtrario antiquus hostis famem et sitim audiendi verba hominum et rumores saeculi claustris monasteriorum immisit, ut vaniloquio vacantes divina tanto amplius fastidiamus eloquia, quanto magis sine dulcedine vel condimento intelligentiae nobis fiunt insipida. Unde et Psalmista, ut supra meminimus:[52] *Quam dulcia faucibus*[53] *meis eloquia tua super mel ori meo.* Quae quidem dulcedo in quo consisteret statim adnexuit dicens:[54] *A mandatis tuis intellexi,* id est a mandatis tuis potius quam humanis intelligentiam accepi, illis videlicet eruditus atque instructus. Cujus quidem intelligentiae quae sit utilitas non praetermisit, subjungens:[55] *Propterea odivi omnem viam iniquitatis.* Multae quippe iniquitatis viae ita per se sunt apertae ut facile omnibus in odium vel contemptum veniant, sed omnem iniquitatis viam nonnisi per eloquia divina cognoscimus,[56] ut omnes evitare possimus. Hinc et illud est[57] *In corde meo abscondi eloquia tua, ut non peccem tibi.* In[58] corde potius recondita sunt quam in ore sonantia, cum eorum intelligentiam meditatio nostra retinet. Quorum quidem intelligentiae quanto minus studemus, minus has iniquitatis vias cognoscimus atque vitamus, et minus a peccato nobis providere valemus.

Quae quidem negligentia tanto amplius in monachis qui ad perfectionem aspirant est arguenda, quanto haec eis facilior esset doctrina qui et sacris abundant libris et quietis otio perfruuntur. Quos quidem de multitudine scriptorum gloriantes, sed ab eorum lectione vacantes, senex ille in Vitis Patrum egregie arguit dicens:[59]

> Prophetae conscripserunt libros; patres autem vestri[60] venerunt post eos et operati sunt in eis plurima. Et[61] iterum successores illorum commendaverunt illos memoriae. Venit autem generatio haec quae nunc est et scripsit et in chartis atque membranis et reposuit in fenestris otiosa.

Hinc et abbas Palladius ad discendum pariter et docendum nos vehementer adhortans ait:[62]

> Oportet animam secundum Christi voluntatem conversantem aut discere fideliter quae nescit, aut docere manifeste quae novit.

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[47] potius quam benedictionem] *om. CE.*
[48] tantummodo *CE.*
[49] iii, 3.
[50] *Lament.* iv, 4.
[51] *Amos* viii, 11.
[52] cxviii, 103.
[53] faucibus . . . ori meo] *om. CE.*
[54] *Psalm* cxviii, 104.
[55] *Ibid.*
[56] cognoscamus *Amb.*
[57] *Psalm* cxviii, 11.
[58] in corde . . . retinet] *om. CE.*
[59] V, 10, 114 (PL 73, 933).
[60] nostri *CE Amb.*
[61] et iterum] etenim *Amb.*
[62] *Vitae patrum* V, 10, 67 (PL 73, 924).

Si autem utrumque cum possit non vult, insaniae morbo laborat. Initium enim recedendi a Deo fastidium doctrinae est et cum non appetit illud quod semper anima esurit, quomodo diligit Deum? Hinc et beatus Athanasius[63] in Exhortatione monachorum in tantum discendi vel legendi studium commendat, ut per hoc etiam orationes intermitti suadeat:

> Pergam, inquit,[64] per tramitem vitae[65] nostrae. Primum abstinentiae cura, jejunii patientia, orandi assiduitas, et legendi vel, si quis adhuc litterarum expers sit, audiendi sit desiderium cupiditate discendi. Haec enim prima sunt quasi lactantium cunabulorum in Dei agnitione crepundia.

Et post aliqua cum praemisisset:[66]

> Orationibus vero ita instandum est, quod[67] vix eas aliquod tempus interpolet.

Postea subjecit:[68]

> Has, si fieri potest, sola legendi intercapedo disrumpat.

Neque enim alias Petrus Apostolus admoneret:[69] *Parati semper estote ad rationem reddendam ad omnes poscentes vos de verbo fidei et spei.* Et Apostolus:[70] *Non cessamus pro vobis orantes ut impleamini agnitione ejus in omni sapientia et intellectu spiritali.* Et rursum:[71] *Verbum Christi habitet in vobis abundanter in omni sapientia.* Nam in veteri Testamento similem hominibus curam sacrae praeceptionis inculcavit eloquium. Sic enim David ait:[72] *Beatus vir qui non abiit in consilio impiorum,* etc., *sed in lege Domini voluntas ejus,* etc. Et ad Jesum Nave Deus loquitur:[73] *Non recedet liber iste de manibus tuis et meditaberis in eo die ac nocte.*

His[74] quoque[75] negotiis malarum cogitationum lubrica frequenter se ingerunt et, quamvis ipsa sedulitas animum ad Deum praestet intentum, efficit tamen in se mordax saeculi cura sollicitum. Quod si hoc frequenter importune patitur religioso labori deditus, numquam profecto illis carebit otiosus. Et beatus papa Gregorius libro Moralium XIX:[76]

> Quae tempora, inquit, jam nunc inchoasse ingemiscimus, cum multos intra ecclesiam positos cernimus, quia nolunt operari quod intelligunt, aut hoc ipsum quoque sacrum eloquium intelligere ac nosse contemnunt. A veritate enim avertentes auditum ad fabulas convertuntur, dum *omnes quae sua sunt quaerunt, non*[77] *quae Jesu Christi.*[78] Scripta Dei ubique reperta[79] opponuntur oculis, sed[80] haec cognoscere homines dedignantur. Pene nullus scire quaerit[81] quod credidit.

Ad quod etiam plurimum ipsos et professionis suae regula et sanctorum patrum adhortantur exempla. Nihil quippe de doctrina vel studio cantus admonet Benedictus cum ipse plurimum de lectione praecipiat et ipsa legendi tempora sicut et laborandi diligenter assignet,[82] et in tantum de ipsa quoque dictandi seu scribendi doctrina provideat, ut inter necessaria quae ab abbate monachi sperare debeant tabulas etiam et graphium non praetermittat.[83] Qui cum inter cetera jubeat[84] quod:

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[63] Anastasius *T Amb.*] Anathasius *C*] Anathanasius *E.*

[64] PL 103, 665.

[65] viae *CE Amb.*] vitae G.

[66] PL 103, 667.

[67] ut *CE.*

[68] PL 103, 667.

[69] *I Peter* iii, 15.

[70] *Colossians* i, 9.

[71] *Id.*, iii, 16.

[72] *Psalm* i, 1-2.

[73] *Josue* i, 8.

[74] his . . . otiosus] *om. CE.*

[75] *add* se *T.*

[76] XIX, 30 (PL 76, 136).

[77] non quae . . . exempla] *om. CE.*

[78] *Philip.* ii, 21.

[79] *add* cognoscuntur *Amb.*] deleted in *T.*

[80] si *T Amb.*

[81] quaerat *Amb.*

[82] Cf. *Regula*, 48 (Edit. Butler, p. 88.).

[83] *Id.*, 55 (*Id.*, p. 103).

[84] *Id.*, 48 (*Id.*, p. 91).

> In capite quadragesimae omnes monachi singulos accipiant codices de biblioteca quos per ordinem ex integro legant.

Quid hoc magis ridiculosum quam lectioni vacare et intelligentiae operam non dare? Notum[85] quippe est illud Sapientis proverbium:[86]

> Legere et non intelligere, negligere est.

Tali quippe lectori merito illud philosophi:[87]

> Anonos[88] lyras improperandum est.

Quasi enim asinus est ad lyram lector librum tenens, id ad quod liber est factus agere non valens. Multo etiam salubrius tales lectores alias[89] intenderent ubi aliquid utilitatis inesset quam otiose vel scripturae litteras inspicerent vel folia versarent. In quibus profecto lectoribus illud Isaiae compleri manifeste videmus. *Et erit,* inquit,[90] *vobis visio omnium sicut verba libri signati, quem cum dederint scienti litteras dicent: Lege istum, et respondebit: Non possum, signatus est enim. Et dabitur liber nescienti litteras diceturque ei: Lege, et respondebit; Nescio litteras. Et dixit Dominus: eo quod appropinquat populus iste ore suo et labiis suis glorificat me, cor autem ejus longe est a me et*[91] *timuerunt me mandato hominum et doctrinis. Ideo ecce ego addam ut admirationem faciam populo huic miraculo grandi et stupendo. Peribit enim sapientia a sapientibus ejus et intellectus prudentium ejus abscondetur.* Scire quippe litteras in claustris dicuntur quicumque illas proferre didicerunt. Qui profecto quantum ad intelligentiam spectat se nescire legere[92] profitentes, librum qui traditur habent signatum aeque ut illi quos illitteratos ibidem dicunt. Quos quidem Dominus arguens dicit eos ore et labiis potius quam corde sibi appropinquare, quia quae proferre utcumque valent intelligere minime possunt. Qui dum divinorum eloquiorum scientia careant, magis consuetudinem hominum quam utilitatem scripturae obediendo sequuntur. Propter hoc Dominus eos quoque, qui sapientiores inter eos videntur et doctores resident, excaecandos esse comminatur.

Maximus ecclesiae doctor et monasticae professionis honor Hieronymus qui[93] nos ad amorem litterarum adhortans ait:[94]

> Ama scientiam litterarum et carnis vitia non amabis.

Quantum laborem et expensas in doctrina earum consumpserit ejus quoque testimonio didicimus. Qui inter cetera quae ipsemet de proprio scribit studio, ut nos etiam videlicet suo instruat exemplo, ad Pammachium et Oceanum quodam loco sic meminit:[95]

> Dum essem juvenis miro discendi fervebam amore, nec juxta quorumdam praesumptionem ipse me docui, Apollinarem audivi Antiochiae frequenter et colui, cum me in scripturis sanctis erudiret. Jam canis spargebatur caput et magistrum potius quam discipulum decebat. Perrexi tamen Alexandriam, audivi Didymum; in multis ei gratias ago quod nescivi didici. Putabant me homines finem fecisse discendi. Rursus Hierosolymae et Bethlehem, quo[96] labore, quo pretio, Baraninam Hebraeum nocturnum habui praeceptorem! Timebat enim Judaeos et mihi alterum sese exhibebat Nicodemum.

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[85] notum . . . improperandum est] *om. CE.*

[86] M. Boas, *Disticha Catonis* (Amsterdam, 1952), p. 10. Cato, *Disticha,* prol. W. J. Chase, *The Distichs of Cato* (Univ. of Wisconsin Studies in the Social Sciences and History, VII, Madison, 1922), p. 12.

[87] Jerome refers to this old Greek proverb in *Epist.* 61 *ad Vigilantium,* 4 (CSEL 54, 581; PL 22, 605).

[88] The initial letters *an* may be from the Greek *ean.*

[89] aliis *CE.*

[90] xxix, 11-14.

[91] et timuerunt . . . comminatur] *om. Ce.*

[92] legem *Amb.*

[93] *om. CE.*

[94] *Epist. 125 ad Rusticum,* 11 (CSEL 56, 130; PL 22, 1078).

[95] *Epist.* 84, 3 (CSEL 55, 122; PL 22, 745).

[96] qua *T.* quo . . . Nicodemum] *om. CE.*

Memori profecto mente hic recondiderat quod in Ecclesiastico legerat:[97] *Fili, a juventute tua excipe doctrinam et usque ad canos invenies sapientiam.* In[98] quo ipse non solum scripturae verbis, verum etiam sanctorum patrum instructus exemplis inter ceteras excellentis illius monasterii divitissimas[99] laudes hoc de singulari exercitio ejus in scripturis divinis adjecit:[1]

> Scripturarum vero divinarum meditationem et intellectum atque scientiae divinae, numquam tanta vidimus exercitia, ut singulos paene eorum oratores credas in divinam esse sapientiam.

Sanctus etiam Beda, sicut in Historia refert Anglorum, a puero in monasterium susceptus:

> Cunctum, inquit,[2] ex eo tempus vitae in ejusdem monasterii habitatione peragens omnem meditans scripturis operam dedi atque inter observantiam disciplinae regularis et quotidianam cantandi in ecclesia, curam semper aut discere aut scribere dulce habui.

Nunc vero qui[3] in monasteriis erudiuntur adeo stulti perseverant ut litterarum sono contenti, nullam de intelligentia curam assumant, nec cor instruere, sed linguam student. Quos[4] patenter illud Salomonis arguit proverbium:[5] *Cor sapientis quaerit doctrinam et os stultorum pascetur imperitia,* cum videlicet verbis quae non intelligit oblectatur. Qui profecto tanto minus Deum amare et in eum accendi possunt, quanto amplius ab intelligentia ejus et a sensu scripturae de ipso nos erudientis absistunt.

Hoc autem duabus maxime de causis in monasteriis accidisse credimus, vel per laicorum scilicet conversorum seu etiam ipsorum praepositorum invidiam, vel propter vaniloquium otiositatis cui hodie plurimum claustra monastica vacare videmus. Isti profecto nos terrenis magis quam spiritualibus secum intendere cupientes illi sunt qui tamquam Allophili fodientem puteos Isaac persequuntur[6] et eos replendo congerie terrae aquam ei satagunt prohibere. Quod beatus exponens Gregorius libro Moralium XVI ait:[7]

> Saepe cum eloquiis sacris intendimus malignorum spirituum insidias gravius toleramus, quia menti nostrae terrenarum cogitationum pulverem aspergunt[8] ut[9] intentionis nostrae oculos a luce intimae visionis obscurent.

Quod nimium Psalmista pertulerat cum dicebat:[10] *Declinate a me maligni, et scrutabor mandata Dei mei.* Videlicet patenter insinuans quia mandata Dei perscrutari non poterat cum malignorum spirituum insidias in mente tolerabat.

Quod etiam in Isaac opere Alliphilorum pravitate cognoscimus designari qui puteos quos Isaac foderat terrae congerie replebant. Nos enim nimirum puteos fodimus cum in scripturae sacrae abditis sensibus alta penetramus. Quos tamen occulte replent Allophili quando nobis ad alta tendentibus immundi spiritus terrenas cogitationes ingerunt et quasi inventam divinae scientiae aquam tollunt. Sed quia nemo hos hostes sua virtute superat per Eliphaz dicitur:[11] *Eritque omnipotens contra hostes tuos et argentum coacervabitur tibi.* Ac si diceretur: dum malignos spiritus Dominus sua a te virtute repulerit, divini in te eloquii talentum lucidius crescit. Legerat iste, nisi fallor, magni Christianorum philosophi

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[97] vi, 18.

[98] in quo . . . sapientiam] *om. CE.*

[99] This is a suggested reading of *T* which has *devita* with a stroke over *ta* and a superscript *s* over the *a*. The passage is missing in the other manuscripts. All editions omit the word without calling attention to it.

[1] Rufinus, *Historia monachorum,* 21 (PL 21, 444).

[2] *Hist. Eccl.* V, 24 (Edit. Plummer, I, 357; PL 95, 288).

[3] *om. CE.*

[4] quos . . . oblectatur] *om. CE.*

[5] xv, 14.

[6] Cf. *Gen.* xxvi, 15.

[7] XVI, 18 (PL 75, 1131).

[8] spargunt G.

[9] ut . . . crescit] *om. CE.*

[10] cxviii, 115.

[11] *Job* xxii, 25.

Origenis homelias in Genesi et de ejus hauserat puteis quod nunc de his loquitur puteis. Ille quippe spiritualium puteorum fossor studiosus non solum ad eorum potum, sed etiam effossionem nos vehementer adhortans expositionis praedictae homelia XII[12] ita loquitur:[13]

> Tentemus facere etiam illud quod Sapientia commonet dicens:[14] *Bibe aquam de tuis fontibus et de tuis puteis et sit tibi fons tuus proprius.* Tenta ergo et tu, o auditor, habere proprium puteum et proprium fontem ut et tu cum apprehenderis librum scripturarum, incipias etiam ex proprio sensu proferre aliquem intellectum, et secundum ea quae in ecclesia didicisti, tenta et tu bibere de fonte ingenii tui. Est[15] intra te natura aquae vivae, sunt venae perennes et irrigua fluenta rationabilis sensus, si modo non sint terra et rudibus completa. Sed satage fodere terram tuam et purgare sordes, id est ingenium, amovere desidiam et torporem cordis excutere. Audi enim quod dicit scriptura:[16] *Punge oculum et profer lacrymam; punge cor et profer sensum.* Purga etiam et tu ingenium tuum, ut aliquando etiam de tuis fontibus bibas et de tuis puteis haurias aquam vivam. Si enim suscepisti in te verbum Dei, si accepisti ab Jesu aquam vivam et fideliter accepisti, fiet in te fons aquae salientis in vitam aeternam.

Idem Homelia sequente de puteis Isaac supra memoratis:

> Quos, inquit,[17] Philistini terra repleverant, illi sine dubio qui intelligentiam spiritalem claudunt ut neque ipsi bibant, neque alios bibere permittant. Audi[18] Dominum dicentem:[19] *Vae vobis, Scribae et Pharisaei, quoniam tulistis clavem scientiae, neque*[20] *ipsi introistis, neque volentes permisistis,* etc. Nos vero numquam cessemus puteos aquae vivae fodiendo et nunc quidem vetera, nunc etiam nova discutiendo, efficiamur similes illi evangelico scribae de quo Dominus dixit:[21] *Qui profert de thesauro suo nova et vetera.* Item redeamus ad Isaac et fodiamus cum ipso puteos aquae vivae; etiamsi obsistunt Philistini, etiamsi rixantur, nos tamen perseveremus cum ipso puteos fodiendo ut et nobis dicatur:[22] *Bibe aquam de tuis vasis et de tuis puteis,* et in tantum fodiamus ut superabundent aquae putei in plateis nostris, ut non solum nobis sufficiat scientia scripturarum, sed et alios doceamus et instruamus ut bibant homines. Bibant et pecora quia et Propheta dicit:[23] *Homines et jumenta salvos facies, Domine.*

Et post aliqua:

> Qui Philistinus est, inquit,[24] et terrena sapit, nescit in omni terra invenire aquam, invenire rationabilem sensum. Quid tibi prodest habere eruditionem et nescire ea uti? habere sermonem et nescire loqui? Istud opus[25] proprie puerorum est Isaac qui in omni terra fodiunt puteos aquae vivae.

Vos autem non sic sed vaniloquio penitus supersedentes quaecumque discendi gratiam assecutae sunt, de iis quae ad Deum pertinent erudiri studeant, sicut de beato scriptum est viro:[26] *Sed in lege Domini voluntas ejus et in lege ejus meditabitur die ac nocte.* Cujus[27] quidem assidui studii in lege Domini quae sequatur utilitas statim adjungitur:[28] *Et erit tamquam lignum quod plantatum est secus decursus aquarum,* etc. Quasi enim lignum aridum est et infructuosum quod fluentis divinorum eloquiorum non irrigatur. De quibus scriptum est:[29] *Flumina de ventre ejus fluent aquae vivae.* Haec illa sunt fluenta de quibus in laude sponsi canit sponsa in Canticis eum describens:[30] *Oculi ejus sicut columbae super rivulos aquarum quae lacte sunt lotae et resident juxta fluenta plenissima.* Et vos igitur lacte lotae, id est candore castimoniae nitentes juxta haec fluenta quasi columbae residete et[31] hinc sapientiae haustus sumentes, non solum discere, sed et docere et aliis tamquam oculi viam possitis ostendere et sponsum ipsum non solum conspicere, sed et aliis valeatis describere. De cujus quidem singulari sponsa quae ipsum aure cordis concipere meruit scriptum esse novimus:[32] *Maria autem conservabat omnia verba haec, conferens in corde suo.* Haec igitur summi Verbi Genetrix verba ejus in corde potius habens quam in ore, ipsa etiam diligenter conferebat, quia studiose singula discutiebat et invicem sibi ea conferebat, quam congrue scilicet inter se convenirent omnia. Noverat juxta mysterium legis omne animal immundum dici, nisi quod ruminat et ungulam findit. Nulla quippe est anima munda, nisi quae meditando quantum capere potest divina ruminat praecepta et in his exsequendis discretionem habeat, ut non solum bona, sed et bene, hoc est recta faciat intentione. Divisio quippe ungulae pedis discretio est animi de qua scriptum est:[33] *Si recte offeras, recte autem non dividas, peccasti.*

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[12] XI *T.*

[13] *Homilia XII in Genesim*, 5 (Edit. W. A. Bathrens, *Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderts* (Leipzig, 1920), p. 112; PG 12, 229.

[14] *Prov.* v, 15.

[15] est intra . . . aeternam] *om. CE.*

[16] *Eccli.* xxii, 24.

[17] *Homilia* XIII, 2-4 (Edit. Baehrens, p. 114, 116, 121; PG 12, 231, 232, 235).

[18] audi . . . fodiunt puteos aquae vivae] *om. CE.*

[19] *Luke* xi, 52.

[20] non *Amb.*

[21] *Matt.* xiii, 52.

[22] *Prov.* v, 15.

[23] *Psalm* xxxv, 7.

[24] *Homilia* XIII, 3 (Edit. Baehrens, p. 117; PG 12, 232).

[25] *om. Amb.*

[26] *Psalm* i, 2.

[27] cujus . . . peccasti] *om. CE.*

Si quis diligit me, inquit[34] Veritas, *sermonem meum servabit.* Quis autem verba vel praecepta Domini sui servare obediendo poterit, nisi haec prius intellexerit? Nemo studiosus erit in exsequendo, nisi qui attentus fuerit in audiendo. Sicut[35] et de beata illa legitur muliere quae ceteris omnibus postpositis sedens secus pedes Domini audiebat verbum illius, illis videlicet auribus intelligentiae quas ipsemet requirit dicens:[36] *Qu habet aures audiendi, audiat.*

Quod si in tantae fervorem devotionis accendi non valetis, imitamini saltem et amore et studio sanctarum litterarum beatas illas sancti Hieronymi discipulas Paulam et Eustochium quarum praecipue rogatu tot voluminibus ecclesiam praedictus doctor illustravit.

[28] *Id.*, 1, 3.
[29] *John* vii, 38.
[30] v, 12.
[31] ut *Amb.*
[32] *Luke* ii, 19.
[33] *Gen.* iv, 7, Septuagint.
[34] *John* xiv, 23.
[35] sicut . . . audiat] *om. CE.*
[36] *Matt.* xi, 15.

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